LARC Cardoso Law (Yeshida Univ)
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Ethics Accountability: The Next Era for Lawyers and Judges
No full textFive decades ago, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered remarks that sound like they were written in the early 2020s: [O]ur profession has recently suffered greatly because a score of lawyers has been convicted or indicted for felonious conduct in the performance of their official duties in the highest reaches of our national government. . . . Their alleged criminal offenses pertain to serious violations of our system of justice and to the performance of basic functions of government. The inner sanctum of the White House has been tarnished, and the end of the debacle is not yet in sight.[1] Warren, of course, was describing the aftermath of the Watergate scandal where government lawyers were suspended, disbarred, and even sentenced with prison time for their misconduct.[2] But similar sentiments have been expressed about the lawyers who attempted to overturn the valid election results in the 2020 presidential election, several of whom have been indicted and sanctioned—including loss of their license to practice law—though none have been imprisoned, at least not yet.[3] Lawyers filed more than sixty lawsuits, and all but one was tossed out by the courts over lack of any fact-based evidence.[4] Other aspects of Chief Justice Warren’s speech echo modern concerns about legal ethics. The purpose of his talk ostensibly was to commemorate what he called “a happy occasion”—the dedication of the Branch Knox Miller Memorial Law Building at Loyola Law School in New Orleans on April 27, 1974. He certainly picked a somber topic for the celebratory moment, choosing to push back against proposals from Congress and the American Bar Association (“ABA”) to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[5] At the time, Warren had been retired from the bench for several years,[6] which is perhaps why he felt free to speak so bluntly about the state of the legal profession. The title of his speech, “A Response to Recent Proposals to Dilute the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,”[7] also sounds straight from the 2020 news cycle. Indeed, in 2024 alone, members of Congress filed articles of impeachment against two Supreme Court Justices[8] and proposed legislation to heighten financial disclosures[9] as well as reduce the Court’s jurisdiction.[10] Former President Joe Biden called for term limits among other reforms after announcing he would not seek a second term himself.[11] This latest criticism of the Court stemmed from investigative reporting that revealed undisclosed gifts to Justices from billionaires, among other concerns about bias and improper influences.[12
Fairer Public Benefit in Copyright Law
No full textIn 1966, a court considered expressly whether a secondary use of copyrighted works served a public benefit. While public benefit has become a subfactor of the fair use doctrine, it remains undefined, uncodified, and undertheorized. Courts often invoked public benefit in pivotal cases involving novel technologies, from home video recorders to digital libraries to algorithms—but they did not need to. After the recent Supreme Court decision in Google v. Oracle, however, public benefit is unavoidable: The Court stated that “we must take into account the public benefits the copying will likely produce.” A qualitative analysis of key public benefit cases assessing novel technologies reveals five emergent values: expression, knowledge, entertainment, competition, and efficiency. Forthcoming judicial decisions about the latest novel technology, artificial intelligence (AI), will be shaped by these cases. However, mid-aughts decisions about “public benefit” algorithms expose an “FU” long lurking in fair use: Name aside, there is nothing particularly fair about it. Those cases excused privacy-invasive, coercive, and biased AI systems as efficient when finding them to be fair use. Many scholars have written about the unfairness of fair use, and this Article contributes to those conversations by using a feminist cyberlaw lens to critique the practice of dubbing technologies “public benefits” without acknowledging, let alone assessing, countervailing public harms. A public benefit that ignores public harms is incomplete. Purported fair uses, particularly those underpinning AI systems, can amplify bias, dis/misinformation, and environmental destruction—harms that are predictable, preventable, and passed over by public benefit presently. This Article responds by recalibrating public benefit to better account for these and other public harms. It defines a fairer public benefit and develops a framework for realizing it. Defining a fairer public benefit poses challenges. In courts, public harms have already happened when matters are litigated, placing a premium on compensation rather than prevention. Congress could codify public benefit, but it is unlikely that Congress could agree upon a satisfactory definition. To further complicate matters, neither judges nor legislators have duties of sociotechnical competency. But lawyers do. Client-centered counseling could facilitate a fairer public benefit if there was a framework for doing so. This Article proposes one: FAIRR (pronounced “fairer”), a mnemonic for formalize purpose, assess benefits, identify harms, reconsider those benefits in light of those harms, and report to the client. Inspired by computer science’s threat modeling methodology, FAIRR represents a rigorous, repeatable method for analyzing how infringement liability, public perception, and social progress are affected by public benefits and public harms. By deconstructing the inequities embedded in public benefit as it exists now and developing a fairer alternative for the future, this Article helps lawyers shape better technologies
From Matrimony to Autonomy: Divorce as a Fundamental Right
No full textLiberal divorce is under assault. Yet this development—one that arguably may shape the everyday life of Americans more profoundly than nearly any other domain of state law—has elicited surprisingly little scholarly inquiry. Because divorce has long fallen within the province of states and hewed to the whim of state legislatures, restrictions on divorce have rarely inspired constitutional analysis. As a result, the constitutional architecture necessary to conceptualize—let alone resolve—the question of how divorce law intersects with fundamental rights remains strikingly wanting. Indeed, one of the enduring puzzles of constitutional scholarship is the diametrically opposed treatment of marriage and divorce. While the constitutional dimensions of marriage have attracted sustained attention from constitutional philosophers, feminist thinkers, and queer theorists alike, the relationship between constitutional law and divorce law has remained almost entirely overlooked. Correspondingly, the much noted “constitutionalization of family law” has bypassed marital dissolution, leaving the right to divorce underdeveloped and undertheorized. This Article seeks to fill the academic void by analyzing the constitutional dimensions of divorce law. Recent developments have rendered this inquiry especially urgent: Numerous states have responded to surging divorce rates by introducing—or considering—novel barriers to marital exit, a trend often termed “the divorce counter-revolution.” These efforts encompass restrictive proposals such as fault-based thresholds, predivorce counseling, extended waiting periods, spousal consent requirements, restrictions on divorce for parents of minor children, and peculiar forms of “opt-in” covenant marriage regimes. Some commentators situate these combative stances toward progressive divorce laws within the broader post-Dobbs political landscape, construing the decision as a rallying cry for men’s rights activists.8 In their view, the backlash embodied in Dobbs has furnished “the perfect maxim” for those galvanized by the demise of Roe, who are newly emboldened to target yet another achievement of women’s equality: the regime of fault-free marital exit
Can Commercials Be Art? An Analysis of Intellectual Property PreAwareness In The \u3ci\u3eBarbie\u3c/i\u3e Era
No full textThe note examines the evolution of advertising, particularly native advertising, and critiques the inadequacy of current regulatory frameworks in addressing its deceptive potential. It highlights how modern advertising practices, such as product placement in films like Barbie, blur the line between commercial speech and artistic expression, challenging the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) ability to protect consumers. The analysis argues that strengthening existing regulations is insufficient and advocates for empowering consumers to make informed decisions, as the legal system struggles to keep pace with innovative advertising strategies
CJCR Publishes Volume 26, Issue 1 (Fall 2024)
No full textThe Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution—the country’s preeminent legal journal of arbitration, negotiation, mediation, settlement, and restorative justice—today published the web edition of Volume 26, Issue 1 (Fall 2024). The print edition of the issue has also been released.
Accessible at Volume 26.1: Fall 2024, this issue contains a transcript from the Twenty-Third Annual International Advocate for Peace Award, Honoring Dr. Richard N. Haass; a transcript from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Articles by Ariana R. Levinson and Hal Abramson; and Notes by Armando D. Gonzalez, Nowshin Nawal, Jane Perov, and Nicholas Wynne.
The print edition of the issue has also been released. This post was originally published on the Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution website on January 28, 2025
CJCR Publishes Volume 26, Issue 2 (Symposium 2024)
No full textThe Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution—the country’s preeminent legal journal of arbitration, negotiation, mediation, settlement, and restorative justice—today published the web edition of Volume 26, Issue 2 (Symposium 2024). The print edition of the issue has also been released.
Accessible at Volume 26.2: Symposium 2024, this issue contains Remarks by Lady Justice Joyce Alouch; Articles by Zachary R. Calo, Diego Faleck, Nokukhanya Ntuli, and Nancy A. Welsh; and Notes by Peri Ayzidor, Jared Man, Yakov Schwalb, and Bayla Zohn.
The print edition of the issue has also been released. This post was originally published on the Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution website on April 30, 2025
Cardozo Journal of Equal Rights & Social Justice 2025 Symposium
No full textThis symposium will focus on the contrasting judicial opinions of Justices Barrett and Justice Jackson. We have planned three panel discussions covering key topics before the Court, including gun rights and presidential immunity. For the gun rights panel, we will focus on New York Pistol Association v. Bruen and Rahimi v. United States. The presidential immunity panel will discuss Trump v. United States. Lastly, we plan to have an additional panel dedicated to exploring the judicial ideologies of Justice Jackson and Justice Barrett, specifically examining how their theories of constitutional interpretation diverge from other justices.https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/event-invitations-2025/1011/thumbnail.jp
A Conversation with George Bouvier
No full textJoin the FAME Center as we host the Founder and Executive Director of Academia Cerebra, George Bouvier. He will be in conversation with the Fashion Law Society to discuss FAME’s collaboration with Academia Cerebra, Europe’s premier academy specializing in luxury fashion.https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/event-invitations-2025/1025/thumbnail.jp
The Containment
No full textJoin us for a special evening with Michelle Adams, the Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, and former Cardozo Professor, as she discusses her acclaimed new book The Containment: Detroit, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for School Desegregation.https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/flyers-2025-2026/1016/thumbnail.jp