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Introduction: Framing Regulatory Managerialism as an Object of Study and Strategic Displacement
Get PDFReturn to Sender?: Analyzing the Senior Leader “Open Letter” on Civilian Control of the Military
Get PDFIn response to the September 2022 open letter, “To Support and Defend: Principles of Civilian Control and Best Practices of Civil-Military Relations,” by eight former secretaries of defense and five former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this Article adds a piece to the unsettled puzzle of civil-military relations. The Letter attempts to detail “core principles or best practices” (CP/BP) regarding civil-military relations, and in response, this Article comments on and clarifies these well-intended efforts. This Article sequentially dissects each CP/BP in today’s context of hyper-politicization, partisanship, technology, and more. Where necessary, the Article explains how the law may impact the CP/BPs and identifies areas of potential misunderstandings. In sum, this Article aims to put together the puzzle pieces of legal nuances, practical applications, and societal norms found throughout civil-military relations
New Perspectives on Iran: The Path to Progressive Family Law Before the Islamic Revolution
Get PDFA progressive Iranian women\u27s rights movement has slipped through the cracks of mainstream scholarship. In the 1960s, Iranian women rallied for progressive family law reforms; their efforts culminated in the Family Protection Law of 1967. This note provides an alternative view of the women\u27s rights movement in the Middle East and highlights how a social movement gave rise to comprehensive and progressive family law reform. Over the last century, Iran has been under authoritarian rule, first in the form of a monarchy and now in a theocracy. In spite of this, Iranian women have been steadfast in the fight for freedom. In 2022, Iranian women of all ages, faiths, and socioeconomic backgrounds have led an unprecedented uprising against their government. For the first time since 1979, there is hope for democracy in Iran. This note shines a light on the road to restoring women\u27s rights in Iran
Effecting Free Exercise and Equal Protection
Get PDFThere is an emerging discrepancy in free exercise and equal protection law. For decades, the Supreme Court has maintained that a law’s effects on a protected group are usually insufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny under either the Free Exercise or Equal Protection Clause. This longstanding rule has rendered it virtually impossible to challenge facially neutral laws on constitutional race, sex, and religious discrimination grounds, even where such laws inflict substantial harms on protected groups. Recent free exercise decisions, however, have abandoned this traditional barrier to enforcing constitutional equality rights. In doing so, they have subverted the usual rule that a law’s effects do not much matter, not just under the Free Exercise Clause, but also under the Equal Protection Clause.
This Article argues that recent free exercise law makes a powerful case that a law’s effects both can and should play a meaningful role in triggering equal protection scrutiny. Free exercise and equal protection cases historically relied on the same theoretical and doctrinal principles to dismiss a meaningful role for effects in triggering heightened scrutiny. Recent free exercise law—by providing such a role for effects—has overcome each objection. In the process, it has created a doctrinal roadmap for overcoming the same objections in the equal protection context. It has also provided good reason to do so. Recent free exercise decisions have justified attention to effects by insisting that laws that devalue protected interests merit heightened scrutiny. In doing so, they have endorsed a broad new theory of equality that applies to, and requires attention to effects in, the equal protection context
Domestic Terrorism: Where Are We Now, and Where Do We Go from Here?
No full textThe panel discusses the relationship between cybersecurity policy and national security.
Discussant:
Prof. Shane Stansbury, Robinson Everett Distinguished Fellow, Duke Law School
Panelists:
Mr. Thomas E. Brzozowski, Counsel for Domestic Terrorism in the Counterterrorism Section of the U.S. Department of Justice
Mr. Michael F. Easley Jr., U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolin
Indian Child Welfare Act: A Roadblock in a Native Child\u27s Pathway to Permanency
Get PDFThe Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requires the testimony of a qualified expert witness to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, the termination of parental rights in cases involving Native children. Initially, Congress expressed a preference for qualified expert witnesses to possess intimate knowledge of Native tribes\u27 childrearing norms and practices. However, the permissive language of the 2016 Regulations has deemphasized this preference. Instead, the Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted the 2016 Regulations as requiring an expert to be qualified to testify about the mental, emotional, and physical wellbeing of children, therefore requiring formalized education in these areas of study. This has disqualified many Native witnesses who previously testified as experts based on their firsthand experience and knowledge of tribal norms. This resulted in many parental termination decisions being appealed, and eventually overturned, therefore increasing the time a Native child must wait to achieve permanency through adoption. As the nation awaits the U.S. Supreme Court\u27s ruling on the constitutionality of ICWA\u27s placement preferences, Alaska\u27s interpretation of the 2016 Regulations continues to prevent Native children from achieving permanency. The 2016 Regulations have permitted the Alaska Supreme Court to return to the standard it created under the 1979 Guidelines—a categorical determination that numerous ICWA termination hearings do not require expert cultural witness testimony.
State v. Cissy A., a recent Alaska Supreme Court decision, marks yet another change to the expert witness requirement. Cissy A. provides a return to ICWA protections that adequately encourage and respect tribal cultural norms and increase positive outcomes for Native children. However, this case is only a starting point. As such, this Note suggests that Alaska\u27s legislature should adopt its own state ICWA protections to better integrate Native voices in the parental termination process. In addition, this Note identifies and discusses concerns that lingered in Cissy A. and proposes ways these concerns could be addressed in the state ICWA provision
Upholding the Domestic Violence Firearm Prohibitors Under Bruen’s Second Amendment
Get PDFFederal law prohibits individuals subject to a domestic violence protective order (§ 922(g)(8)) or convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors (§ 922(g)(9)) from possessing firearms. Before New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen, these commonsense gun laws had generally been considered uncontroversial, both in terms of their broad popular support and their constitutionality under the Second Amendment. In Bruen, however, the Supreme Court held that when a regulation burdens a Second Amendment right, the regulation must be consistent with American historical tradition, meaning that the regulation must be analogous to a pattern of historical firearm regulation.
After Bruen, the domestic violence firearm prohibitors have faced Second Amendment constitutional challenges in courts around the country. The most noteworthy of these cases is a Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Rahimi, which held that the domestic violence misdemeanor firearm ban was unconstitutional because it was not sufficiently analogous to American historical firearm regulation. The Fifth Circuit is the first federal appeals court to examine one of the domestic violence firearm prohibitors after Bruen, and the government swiftly announced its intent to appeal the decision.
Because Congress only began regulating domestic violence in the twentieth century, a time period explicitly carved out of the Bruen historical analysis, courts must perform an analysis based in analogy to uphold the constitutionality of the domestic violence firearms prohibitors. Although these complications under the Bruen standard may spark discussion of the decision\u27s logic, this Note meets the law where it is and aims to argue for the constitutionality of these prohibitors within the Bruen framework. Indeed, for Bruen to remain internally consistent and instruct a workable doctrine, domestic violence restrictions on firearm ownership must survive Second Amendment constitutional scrutiny, as they have since their inception