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The Israel-Hamas Conflict: International Law, Accountability, and Challenges in Modern Warfare
No full textHow to Destroy the Liberal International Order
Get PDFThis Article argues that a policy of containment directed at China could have disastrous consequences on the stability of the global system. The liberal international order, created to promote international coordination and structure global trade, comprises key institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. It is possible that much of the strength of these institutions stems from the fact that nations are locked into them simply because they are the only game in town. Put another way, the liberal order is, for lack of a better word, a monopoly.
The problem with monopolies is that it is difficult to assess their true strength because it may simply be due to the absence of competition. This Article introduces the term brittle order to describe an institutional system where the lack of competition gives the impression of stability, but it is, in fact, fragile and primed to collapse. This Article argues that the current global system may be a brittle order. The risk in trying to isolate China is that it can destabilize the liberal order it seeks to protect because it will force China and its partners to establish parallel institutions, which will weaken the lock-in effect of the existing international order. If the liberal order is indeed brittle, disaffected countries will then begin to abandon its institutions, and it might quickly unravel. The Article thus concludes that the most effective way to ensure the liberal order survives is to maintain the strength of its lock-in effect, and the best way to do this is to discourage institutional competition by not isolating China from the global system
The Letter and Its Spirit: Interpretive Dynamism and Mediating Change in Biblical and Constitutional Law
Get PDFCommunication with Public Officials in the Modern Age of Social Media: Does It Violate the First Amendment When Public Officials Block Private Individuals From Their Social Media Pages?
Get PDFIn the modern world, social media dominates. It is considered an almost essential function of public officials, ranging from the President of the United States to local politicians, to maintain at least one social media page to keep the public updated on their policies and current events. As public officials shift toward social media to communicate with the public, these social media sites become the new spaces for public discourse, with members of the public often commenting on or responding to public officials\u27 posts. As more public discourse occurs on these sites, and individuals begin to criticize their public officials on them, this criticism of the officials, protected by the First Amendment, must be given the same safeguards as more traditional forms of speech.
This Note argues that it violates the First Amendment when public officials block individuals from their public social media pages for criticizing the official. Various courts have analyzed this issue, with some courts finding First Amendment violations due to the public official\u27s blocking of an individual and other courts finding no such violation. The Supreme Court has yet to issue an opinion on this issue but will soon, after recently granting cert. for two cases discussed in this Note: Garnier v. O\u27Connor-Ratcliff and Lindke v. Freed. Therefore, this Note argues that the cases where the courts did not find First Amendment violations were decided incorrectly. In a time when social media is the center of public discourse, the law must adopt to fit modern times, leading to a finding of First Amendment violations when public officials prohibit free speech online, in the same way as it does when they prohibit free speech in any other public forum
Missing Pieces: Gaps in the Record of Early American Decisional Law
Get PDFIn its most recent major Second Amendment decision, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, the Supreme Court suggested that historical laws “rarely subject to judicial scrutiny” are not especially illuminating because “we do not know the basis of their perceived legality.” Legal scholars have defended Bruen’s approach to historical evidence in part by arguing that the decision requires merely an artificially-limited historical inquiry into internal legal sources to discern overarching principles accepted across the country in the Founding Era. But modern-day lawyers and judges actually know far less than they might believe about whether certain laws were subject to judicial scrutiny during crucial eras of American history because many court decisions—especially from the Founding Era—were simply never recorded for posterity. Those omissions were not random, and they do not represent merely what we today would consider insignificant holdings. Rather, omissions from the surviving record of decisional law are the product of curation by early court reporters, newspaper editors, and other actors often motivated by profit or partisan bias. Therefore, it is often perilous to extrapolate “the general law” from the extant, unrepresentative caselaw that happens to be preserved today.
This Essay examines how the non-legal choices and preferences of those who recorded early American case law prior to the gradual emergence of more consistent reporting of judicial decisions in the late nineteenth century shaped the historical record of early decisional law that exists today. Part I chronicles the largely inconsistent and at times chaotic practice of court reporting at and after the Founding and explores how judicial decisions were preserved and published during that time. Part II addresses how modern originalist theories should approach and appreciate the “curated” nature of legal history from that time. I argue that the record of early American decisional law has been profoundly influenced by various actors (legal and non-legal) according to considerations other than preserving an accurate, comprehensive snapshot of “general law” at the time—namely, based on motives including profit and partisanship. This reality, I suggest, means that it is crucial to expand the universe of historical sources when possible to capture what may be missing from the universe of preserved decisional law
Among the Rarest: Saving the Eastern North Pacific Right Whale
Get PDFThe North Pacific Right Whale (NPRW) is perhaps the rarest, most endangered large whale species in the world. Only about thirty surviving individuals make up the eastern population, which lives in waters around Alaska. This note aims to highlight the crisis facing eastern NPRWs and the steps that can be taken to support the recovery of this rare whale. The paper first presents information on the history of the species and its importance. It next examines existing international and domestic U.S. legal regimes as well as a pending petition to revise NPRW critical habitat off of Alaska. Finally, it advances six recommendations to support the eastern NPRW\u27s recovery: (1) more data collection should be facilitated; (2) the precarious situation of the NPRW should be shared to raise public awareness and support for protection measures; (3) the critical habitat designation should be expanded, but to a lesser extent than the petition has requested; (4) a whale-ship interaction risk reduction regime should be adopted; (5) whale-friendly fishing gear should be widely adopted; and (6) commercial whaling must remain illegal. It argues that with the right protections, eastern NPRWs can avoid extinction
Alaska\u27s Recognition of Tribes: Alaska House Bill 123 and Tribal Trust Lands
Get PDFFor decades, the United States Department of the Interior\u27s land acquisition regulations included an Alaska Exception that barred acquisition of land into trust in Alaska apart from those acquisitions made for the Metlakatla Indian Community. Although the Alaska Exception was initially removed from the regulations in 2014, the fight continues over land-into-trust acquisitions within Alaska. Throughout these debates, the state of Alaska has consistently opposed land-into-trust acquisitions. This Practitioner Guide provides an overview of the recent history of land-into-trust acquisitions in Alaska and analyzes the juxtaposition of the intent behind Alaska\u27s State Recognition of Tribes in House Bill 123 and the continuing state opposition to land-into-trust applications. Specifically, this Practitioner Guide argues that, without state collaboration and cooperation with Tribal Nations on land-into-trust issues, House Bill 123, which was meant to signify the State\u27s desire to foster engagement with Alaska Natives and tribal organizations, ultimately rings hollow
Kohlhaas v. State: Encouraging Democratic Reform Through Constitutional Flexibility
Get PDFIn the spirit of democracy reform, Alaska recently adopted a jungle primary and ranked choice voting electoral system for all state-wide elections. In Kohlhaas v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld this reform against numerous state and federal constitutional challenges. While doing so, the court avoided rigid constitutional interpretations that would have frozen the electoral system in its current first-past-the-post state. Moreover, the court refused to credit the plaintiff\u27s speculation about the hypothetical malign effects of ranked-choice voting, placing the burden to produce hard evidence of their critiques on RCV\u27s opponents. Alaska can serve as a model for other states, as those states increasingly consider adopting electoral reforms of their own and must interpret similar state constitutional language