Lexicon Philosophicum: International Journal for the History of Texts and Ideas
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Activity and Final Causes. On Principles of Nature and Grace §3
Full text linkThis paper analyses how the notion of final causation is related to the complex of Leibniz’s account of activity of substances. In doing so I will focus on the 3rd paragraph of the Principles of Nature and Grace and on other texts where a similar thesis is proposed. I aim at showing that final causes are better intended as model of explanation rather than a distinct type of causes. I will first analyse two points raised by the PNG thesis: that it applies to all simple substances and its opposition with causation as it occurs in bodies, with the aim of highlighting some of the features of final causation in substances, to then focus on two questions. Is final causation, being situated at the level of simple substances, the most fundamental causal process in Leibniz’s metaphysics? How should the causal role of goals be understood?L’articolo analizza il rapporto tra la nozione di causalità finale e la concezione leibniziana dell’attività delle sostanze nel suo complesso. Mi concentrerò su una tesi formulata nel terzo paragrafo dei Principi della natura e della grazia, insieme con altri testi in cui si propongono tesi analoghe. Intendo mostrare che le cause finali possono essere intese più appropriatamente come un modello esplicativo che come un particolare tipo di cause. Analizzerò innanzitutto due punti sollevati nella tesi dei PNG (che la causalità finale concerne tutte le sostanze semplici, e che è contrapposta alla causalità che ha luogo nei corpi) allo scopo di evidenziare alcuni caratteri della causalità finale nelle sostanze. Affronterò poi due questioni: la causalità finale, in quanto si colloca al livello delle sostanze semplici, può essere considerata il processo causale fondamentale nella metafisica di Leibniz? Come va inteso il ruolo causale dei fini
La question du “pourquoi” dans la formulation du principe de raison
Full text linkIn the Principles of Nature and Grace (PNG) Leibniz asks two questions, “Why is there rather something than nothing?”, and why the things “must exist thus, and not otherwise”, as an immediate extension of the principle of reason. Differently from Heidegger’s, our hypothesis is that Leibniz thinks the principle of reason in a truly questioning way going deeper into the question why in a metaphysical sense. To verify this hypothesis, we will first study the genesis of the formulation of the principle of reason, starting from the “why” and, in particular, from the substativation of the interrogative adverb, Leibniz’s lexicon identifying in this case “the reason” with “the why”. Secondly, we will study the genesis of the “first question” of §7 of the PNG as far as it defines the primary questioning of metaphysics.Dans les Principes de la nature et de la grâce (PNG) Leibniz pose deux questions, “Pourquoy il y a plustôt quelque chose que rien ?”, et pourquoi les choses “doivent exister ainsi, et non autrement”, comme prolongement immédiat du principe de raison. Différemment de celle de Heidegger, notre hypothèse est que Leibniz pense le principe de raison de façon véritablement questionnante grâce à l’approfondissement de la question pourquoi dans un sens métaphysique. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, nous étudierons d’abord la genèse de la formulation du principe de raison à partir du “pourquoi”, et en particulier lorsque l’adverbe interrogatif est substantivé, le lexique leibnizien identifiant alors “la raison” avec “le pourquoi”. Dans un second temps, nous étudierons la genèse de la “première question” du §7 des PNG en tant qu’elle définit le questionnement premier de la métaphysique
La transformation leibnizienne des principes. Le principe de raison comme principe pratique
Full text linkTwo main questions will be addressed here: the transformation of Leibniz’s conception of principles will be projected on the model of reconstruction of his philosophy called metaphysics of systemic individuality; the principle of reason will then be analyzed, and especially its practical aspect, i.e. as a principle of action. On the one hand, certain versions of the principle of reason find application in the realm of what can or ought to be done. For example, the principle of reason as the principle of convenience. On the other hand, Leibniz distinguishes between the human subject and the divine subject as two different epistemological points of view, performing what is more convenient in very different ways – from the human point of view, there is a process of ‘perpetual progress’. These practical versions of the principle of reason are linked to the dominant principle of ethics and politics (the principe d’autrui, principle of the other) and with the meta-principle of Leibnizian logic and rationality: the principe de l’ordre, principle of order.Deux questions principales seront ici abordées : la transformation de la conception leibnizienne des principes sera projetée sur le modèle de reconstruction de sa philosophie appelé métaphysique de l’individualité systémique ; le principe de raison sera ensuite analysé et tout spécialement, son aspect pratique en tant que principe de l’action. D’une part, il existe certaines versions du principe de raison qui trouvent leur application dans le domaine de ce qui peut ou doit être fait (par exemple, le principe de raison comme principe de la convenance). D’autre part, Leibniz distingue le sujet humain et le sujet divin comme deux points de vue épistémologiques différents, qui font ce qui est plus convenable de différentes façons : du point de vue humain, il se produit un processus de ‘progrès perpétuel’. Les versions pratiques du principe de raison sont liées au principe dominant de l’éthique et de la politique (le principe d’autrui) et avec le méta-principe de la logique et de la rationalité leibnizienne : le principe de l’ordre
Au-delà de la nature. Les principes de la grâce chez Leibniz
Full text linkLeibniz chose the title Principles of Nature and Grace (PNG) by himself, so this occurrence deserves in our opinion a special research. Indeed, the question remains open as to whether Leibniz is alluding to two different types of principles, each governing their own set of objects, or rather to a single type of principle governing two different types of entities. In §15 of the PNG, Leibniz offers an analogy regarding the relationship between the realm of nature and the realm of grace: in one, God acts as an architect; in the other, like a monarch. This analogy suggests a dualist reading: the principles of creation are not the same as those of governance – at least that is the interpretation I will suggest. I will also try to answer the question, which touches on the nature of the relationship between divine intelligence and will: How can we understand the idea that there are principles of grace?Leibniz a choisi le titre des Principes de la nature et de la grâce (PNG) par lui-même, si bien que cette occurrence du terme mérite à notre avis une recherche à part entière. Or la question reste ouverte de savoir si Leibniz fait allusion à deux types de principes différents, gouvernant chacun leur propre ensemble d’objets, ou plutôt à un seul type de principe gouvernant deux types différents d’entités. Au §15 des PNG, Leibniz propose une analogie concernant la relation entre le royaume de la nature et le royaume de la grâce : dans l’un, Dieu agit comme un architecte ; dans l’autre, comme un monarque. Cette analogie suggère une lecture dualiste : les principes de la création ne sont pas les mêmes que ceux de la gouvernance. C’est du moins l’interprétation que je proposerai. J’essayerais de repondre aussi à la question, qui touche à la nature de la relation entre l’intelligence et la volonté divines : comment pourrions-nous comprendre l’idée qu’il y a des principes de la grâce
Ritrovati due esemplari della prima edizione della Nova dilucidatio di Kant (1755) che si riteneva perduta
Full text linkWhile preparing the new critical edition of Kant’s Latin dissertations, two copies were found of the first edition of the Nova dilucidatio (1755), which had been considered as entirely lost since 1944. One copy is preserved at the Latvijas Universitātes Akadēmiskā Bibliotēka Riga in Riga, the other one at the Kongelige Bibliotek in Copenhagen. The Copenhagen copy is interleaved with handwritten notes by Johann Reinhold Grube, one of the opponents in the public discussion of Kant’s dissertation which took place on 27 September 1755
Connexion universelle et enveloppement du futur dans le présent
Full text linkThis text aims to contribute to the study of the physical, psychological and metaphysical dimensions that articulate the theme of universal connection and of the envelopment of the future in the present. I will begin by examining how the theme of the monad as a mirror of the world appears in §3 and in §12 of the Principles of Nature and Grace (PNG) – I will not consider the 3rd occurrence, §14, where it is question of the spirit as image of God. Then I will investigate the relation which exists between the thesis maintaining that, because of the universal connection, the monad perceives (confusedly) all that happens at every moment in the world, and the thesis according to which the monad perceives (confusedly) its whole history past and future. Finally, I will briefly consider the question of the asymmetry between past and future as a temporal property which has no equivalent for space.Ce texte a pour but de contribuer à l’étude de la manière dont s’articulent les dimensions physique, psychologique et métaphysique du thème de la connexion universelle et de l’enveloppement du futur dans le présent. Je commencerai par examiner selon quelles modalités le thème de la monade miroir du monde apparaît dans les Principes de la nature et de la grâce (PNG), dans le §3 et dans le §12 – je ne prendrai pas en considération la 3ème occurrence, §14, où il est question de l’esprit comme image de Dieu –, puis je m’interrogerai sur la relation qui existe entre la thèse qui affirme que, du fait de la connexion universelle, la monade perçoit (confusément) tout ce qui arrive à chaque instant dans le monde et celle qui affirme que la monade perçoit (confusément) toute son histoire, le passé comme le futur. Cela m’amènera à envisager rapidement la question de l’asymétrie entre passé et futur comme propriété temporelle qui n’a pas d’équivalent pour l’espace
La variation dans le style d’écriture leibnizien et la tradition philosophique arabe
Full text linkIn most histories Western philosophy, entire areas are often obscured, especially that relating to Arab and Islamic philosophy. Chinese and Indian philosophies are no better off. There is a real philosophical problem of understanding and communication between East and West, caused by an endlessly reiterated vision of a self-centered West, fully Christian and not indebted to any other culture, especially not to Arab culture. Important texts have been written to denounce this “falsification of history in the name of ideology”. However, it is not at this controversial and ideological level that we place ourselves. The modest work that we present here attempts a calm analysis of the positions of two philosophers (Ibn Rushd and Leibniz) who, although belonging to two different worlds, meet on many points. We will be particularly interested in the relationship they establish between philosophy and theology.Résumé : Dans la plupart des livres d’histoire relatifs à la philosophie occidentale, se trouvent souvent occultés des pans entiers, notamment celui qui concerne la philosophie arabe et islamique. Les philosophies chinoise et indienne ne sont pas mieux loties. Il y a un réel problème philosophique de compréhension et de communication entre l’Orient et l’Occident suscité par une vision sans cesse réitérée d’un Occident centré sur lui-même, bien chrétien et non redevable à aucune autre culture, surtout pas à la culture arabe. Des textes importants ont été écrits pour dénoncer cette “falsification de l’histoire au nom de l’idéologie”. Cependant, ce n’est pas à ce niveau polémique et idéologique que nous nous plaçons. Le modeste travail que nous présentons ici tente une analyse sereine de la position de deux philosophes (Ibn Rushd et Leibniz) qui, bien qu’appartenant à deux mondes différents, se rencontrent sur de nombreux de points. Nous nous intéresserons en particulier au rapport qu’ils établissent entre la philosophie et la théologie
Naturalizing Grace. Leibniz’s Reshaping of the Two Kingdoms of Nature and Grace Between Malebranche and Kant
Full text linkWhile in Malebranche the specific laws of grace were structurally homogeneous to those of nature, in Leibniz’s view the system of nature, unfolding according to its own rules, at the same time satisfies the moral requirements. Human beings are subjected both to the natural laws, as embodied souls, and to the jurisdiction of the moral law, as citizens of the ‘city of God’. The realm of grace is a “moral world within the natural world”: harmony seems to be required. And what he wants to get from such harmony is that final conciliation of subjective consciousness and divine justice also called for by Locke. But this eschatological outcome is thought of by him in a more intra-mundane way, that is, the reconciliation of nature with the moral ends of the ‘kingdom of grace’ is projected into the future development of this world. Notably, the conceptual framework expressed by the Leibnizian ‘kingdom of grace’ will be taken again by Kant from a transcendental point of view.Mentre in Malebranche le leggi specifiche della grazia erano strutturalmente omogenee a quelle della natura, secondo Leibniz il sistema della natura, sviluppandosi secondo le proprie regole, soddisfa allo stesso tempo le esigenze morali. Gli esseri umani sono soggetti sia alle leggi naturali, in quanto anime dotate di un corpo, sia alla giurisdizione della legge morale, in quanto cittadini della ‘città di Dio’. Il regno della grazia è un “mondo morale nel mondo naturale”: un’armonia sembra essere richiesta. E ciò che Leibniz vuole ottenere con tale armonia è quella conciliazione finale di coscienza soggettiva e giustizia divina richiesta anche da Locke. Ma l’esito escatologico è da lui pensato in un modo più intramondano: la riconciliazione della natura con i fini morali del ‘regno della grazia’ è proiettata nello sviluppo futuro di questo mondo. Significativamente, il quadro concettuale espresso dal ‘regno della grazia’ leibniziano sarà ripreso da Kant da un punto di vista trascendentale