6163 research outputs found
Sort by
Task Force Issues Roadmap of Recommendations to Combat Racism in Justice System
Get PDFhttps://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/news_center/1147/thumbnail.jp
Seattle University School of Law Partners with O.P. Jindal Global University in India to Provide Global Opportunities for Law Students
Get PDFhttps://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/news_center/1146/thumbnail.jp
Workshop Promotes Diverse Leaders in Legal Education
Get PDFhttps://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/news_center/1145/thumbnail.jp
Seattle U Law to Provide Graduate Study Scholarship to Law Students from India
Get PDFhttps://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/news_center/1151/thumbnail.jp
Class Acts with the Facts
Get PDFhttps://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/news_center/1149/thumbnail.jp
Less Restrictive Alternatives and the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
Get PDFIn Ohio v. American Express, both the majority and dissent introduced into Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence a new test for evaluating restraints under the rule of reason: a less restrictive alternatives test. Occasionally appearing in circuit court cases, less restrictive alternatives tests have not been part of Supreme Court’s approach to the rule of reason, which generally evaluates restraints of trade by balancing their anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.
American Express was the first Supreme Court case to mention a less restrictive alternatives test, potentially representing a major shift in antitrust law, but it was not the last. In 2021’s Alston v. NCAA, the Supreme Court applied the test to strike several NCAA compensation restrictions, but it did so without explaining how the test might fit into the rule of reason or providing any single statement of the rule of reason. Rather than explicitly adopting the less restrictive alternatives test as a necessary part of the rule of reason, the Court merely noted that it has “sometimes spoken of” a three-step framework that includes the less restrictive alternatives test, suggesting that the test might or might not apply in any particular rule of reason case.
The Supreme Court has discussed alternatives in antitrust cases, though, and many find in those cases a distinct less restrictive alternatives test. Careful analysis of the cases shows that prior to Alston, the Court has not used anything like a less restrictive alternatives test. Nor should it. A less restrictive alternatives test injects tremendous uncertainty into the rule of reason while doing little to reduce the problems inherent in the kind of balancing the rule of reason requires. The Court’s willingness to accept the less restrictive alternatives test in Alston without accounting for the ramifications of the test is likely to increase confusion in antitrust cases as litigants struggle not only with the inherent indeterminacy of the less restrictive alternatives test itself but also with the question of whether the less restrictive alternatives test is even relevant to their particular case.
This Article traces the development of the less restrictive alternatives test in antitrust scholarship and commentary and evaluates how consideration of alternatives actually does, and should, inform antitrust analysis. The scholarly impulse to include a less restrictive alternatives test in the rule of reason actually highlights the need for a reinvigorated approach to another aspect of antitrust law: the ancillary restraints doctrine. Properly applied, the ancillary restraints doctrine responds to the concerns that motivate the less restrictive alternatives test, but less restrictive alternatives are of limited use even in that inquiry
Post-Pandemic Estate Planning: Analyzing the Recent Changes in Remote Notarization Laws
Get PDFThis Note explores estate planning in the post-pandemic landscape. Part I of this Note discusses how the resistance to remote technology in estate planning is rooted in traditional notions of formalism. Part II introduces a discussion regarding the use of remote technology, including its benefits and drawbacks. Part III articulates the current legal requirements to validly notarize signatures on various estate planning documents in Washington state. This part also discusses the extent of electronic or remote notarization allowed in the wake of emergency orders issued by Washington State Governor Jay Inslee in response to the spread of COVID-19. Additionally, Part III analyzes approaches taken by other states and discusses a possible response currently under consideration by the federal government. Part IV of this Comment includes a discussion of the general trend towards digitization in estate planning law as shown by both the adoption of remote notarization laws in at least twenty-three states and the promulgation of the Uniform Electronic Wills Act by many states. Finally, Part IV highlights how the emergency orders resulting from COVID-19 may provide greater impetus for lawmakers to make permanent changes to remote notarization
Dean James E. Bond
No full textJames E. Bond served as dean from 1986-1993 and again from 1995-2000.https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/archives_photos/1013/thumbnail.jp
Dean Donald Carmichael
No full textDonald Carmichael served as Acting Dean from 1993-1995.https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/archives_photos/1015/thumbnail.jp
Dean Annette Clark
No full textAnnette Clark served as Interim Dean from 2009-2010 and as dean from 2013-2022.https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/archives_photos/1016/thumbnail.jp