Journal of Analytic Theology
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    335 research outputs found

    Perry Hendricks. Skeptical Theism.

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    God, Gaps, and Evil

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    Jc Beall has recently advanced a glut-theoretic solution to the problem of evil. In this paper, I explore a dual, gap-theoretic approach to the problem, which also finds its roots in Beall’s work. Specifically, working with the same background commitments as Beall, I argue that a natural (and novel) gap-theoretic solution to the problem of evil emerges. Not only does this proposal show promise, it also highlights some interesting virtues which accompany gap-theoretic approaches to theological issues.  

    Daniel H. Spencer. Forsaking the Fall: Original Sin and the Possibility of a Nonlapsarian Christianity.

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    Taking the Transitivity of Identity Seriously: Simplicity and Trinitarian Doctrine

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    Although the apparent incompatibility of trinitarian doctrine and absolute divine simplicity is well-known, an extended treatment of the transitivity of identity – which is the basis for that apparent incompatibility – is rarely applied to the issue. This paper explains why the transitivity of identity, as entailed by the law of non-contradiction, must be upheld in trinitarian theology as in all other forms of meaningful discourse. It then examines the efforts of ADS adherents to avoid the application of the transitivity of identity in the realm of trinitarian theology, and why those efforts fail. It concludes by attempting to address the key motivators that prompt theologians to embrace ADS, despite its clear tensions with trinitarian doctrine. 

    Hans Van Eyghen. The Epistemology of Spirit Beliefs

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    Kevin Hector. Christianity as a Way of Life: A Systematic Theology

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    Olli-Pekka Vainio. Faith in Certain Terms. Routledge Studies in Analytic and Systematic Theology.

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    Maimonides’ Austere Quietism

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    Maimonides claims that knowledge of God is negative knowledge, expressible through negations. He further claims that this negative knowledge varies in degree. Maimonides introduces this latter claim through the use of a parable in his Guide of the Perplexed, Book 1, Chapter 60. We show that this parable is unable to serve the function which Maimonides introduces it to serve. We argue that the parable, and the position it supposedly illustrates, is a rhetorical device which points us towards Maimonides’ proper position. This is the quietist view that there is knowledge of God which cannot be expressed in language. This quietism is austere because Maimonides refuses to attempt to express such knowledge through rhetorical devices. We account for the failure of Maimonides’ parable and its tension with other parts of the Guide through appeal to the fifth source of contradiction outlined in the Guide’s Introduction. Our position is complicated by the fact that Maimonides does not explicitly endorse quietism. We argue that due to the inexpressibility proper to quietism and his theory of reference, Maimonides is as explicit in his endorsement as he can be. This discussion offers a novel reading of the parable in I.60 and also serves as a further argument in favour of the non-skeptical reading of Maimonides. We engage with the work of Lorberbaum, Lobel, Blumenthal, Kars, and Benor, among others

    Degrees of Divine Revelation

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    Analytic Jewish theologians have recently taken up the topic of divine revelation. In this paper, I examine two theories of divine revelation recently advanced by two analytic Jewish theologians—Jerome Gellman and Samuel Lebens. I investigate whether they can explain a claim about divine revelation implied by some Jewish sources: the claim that different texts are divinely revealed to different degrees. I argue that Gellman’s theory can explain this gradation of degrees of divine revelation while Lebens’s cannot. I do not claim that Gellman’s theory is a better theory overall, only that it has this one advantage over Lebens’s theory

    Swinburne\u27s A Priori Argument for Social Trinitarianism

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    In this paper, I critically assess Richard Swinburne’s argument for the conceptual necessity of the claim that if there is one divine person, there are exactly three divine persons. I argue that his argument fails

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