Canadian Review of Social Policy (CRSP) / Revue canadienne de politique sociale (RCSP)

NAFTA Won't Help Mexico's Poor 
Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice 
Toronto 
Proponents of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) often 
repeat a hackneyed slogan from the 1960s, "trade not aid," to defend a deal 
they claim will be good for Mexico. They seldom differentiate between the 
likely impact on Mexico's small economic klite and the majority who live in 
poverty. 
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari says Mexico wants "to 
export goods, not people," warning that without free trade "instead of 
seeing hundreds of thousands of Mexicans crossing the border looking for 
jobs in the north, you will see millions." Salinas invites Canadian and 
American firms to invest in Mexico to take advantage of low wage labour to 
compete with Europe and Japan. Canada's former Trade Minister, Michael 
Wilson, said that a major reason for joining NAFTA was so that Canadian 
firms would have the same access to cheap Mexican labour as their American 
competitiors. 
Wilson was nonchalant about the resulting job losses in Canada. He 
claimed that Canada should not even bother with labour intensive produc- 
tion but instead leave them to low-wage countries like Mexico. However, 
Mexican economists looking at the prospects for NAFTA in light of Mex- 
ico's recent experience with trade liberalization warn that "what U.S. and 
Canadian workers lose, Mexican workers won't gain." Instead NAFTA is 
more likely to drag everyone down. 
Salinas claims that NAFTA will allow Mexican incomes "to recover on 
a permanent basis." But will it? Is the real aim to improve conditions for 
Mexican workers? Or will they be doomed to remain a low-wage labour 
force at  the service of a continental corporate elite? 
There are three major reasons why NAFTA will not lead to rising living 
standards for the majority of Mexicans: debt, demographic growth and 
rural depopulation. 
Debt and Structural Adjustment 
Since 1982 more than half of Mexico's trade earnings have been handed 
over to foreign banks to cover interest payments on its foreign debt. Mexico 
has turned itself inside out in an effort to increase exports. The structural 
adjustment program (SAP) imposed by its foreign creditors has involved the 
90 No. 33, 1994 
Canadian Review of Social Policy 
unilateral lowering of import barriers, severe wage controls, high interest 
rates, deep cuts to government spending, privatization of state enterprises 
and changes to foreign investment regulations. 
The effects of this program have been devastating for Mexico's poor. 
Real minimum wages fell by 57% between 1983 and 1992. Thousands of 
peasant farmers lost their land. The share of national wealth accruing to 
wage earners fell from 36% of Gross Domestic Product in 1980 to only 26% 
in 1988. 
Wealthy Mexicans invested so much in U.S. banks and real estate that 
their holdings are now estimated to be worth as much as Mexico's entire 
external debt. Government spending on health, education and urban de- 
velopment fell by 14% in real terms between 1980 and 1990. Some 77,000 
Mexican businesses, employing hundreds of thousands of workers closed af- 
ter the Mexican government began tearing down trade barriers in 1986. 
NAFTA is part of a strategy to make permanent the structural adjust- 
ments forced on Mexico by its foreign creditors. The U.S. Ambassador to 
Mexico, John Negroponte, sent a confidential memo to the State Depart- 
ment in April of 1991 saying: 
[NAFTA] can be seen as an instrument to promote, consolidate and guar- 
antee continued policies of economic reform in Mexico beyond the Salinas 
administration. I think it's reasonable to suppose that the [NAFTA] ne- 
gotiations themselves will be a useful lever in prying open the Mexican 
economy even further. For exemple, I think we can reasonably expect the 
foreign investment law to change as a result of [NAFTA] talks. I would 
also foresee liberalization of the financial services rkgime.l 
Mr. Negroponte's reference to "economic reforms" in fact refers to all the 
structural adjustments already imposed by the Mexican government. Since 
1983 Mexico has privatized 765 public enterprises leaving only 285 under 
public control in 1990. The changes already made to  its foreign investment 
law did prompt a ca,pital inflow of US$30.5 billion over the period 1989 
through the middle of 1992. But 55% of this amount went into speculative 
purchase of shares on the Mexican stock exchange rather than investment 
in new productive facilities. Many Mexicans fear this speculative capital 
could flow out just as quickly and under NAFTA's terms there would be no 
way to stop it. 
Increased exports - whether of petroleum or tomatoes or the value 
added by Mexican labour to North American products assembled in the 
maquiladoras -are crucial to keeping a net flow of wealth into the coffers 
of Northern banks. Little of the income that Mexico might earn through 
increased North American trade is likely to be available for domestic invest- 
ment as long as Mexico has to  make its onerous debt servicing obligations. 
The reorganization of external debt Mexico achieved under the Brady Plan, 
No. 33, 1994 9 1 
Revue canadienne de ~o l i t i aue  sociale 
named after U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, only reduced Mexico's 
debt payments by 4% a year. 
The effect of Mexico's SAP has been to transform the country into a 
haven for foreign investors seeking low wage labour. The cost of employing 
a young woman to assemble products in a maquiladora fell from US$1.53 
an hour in 1982 to just sixty cents in 1990. Three quarters of the manu- 
facturing jobs created in Mexico between 1984 and 1990 were in low-wage 
maquiladoras while only one quarter of the jobs were in Mexican industries 
producing for the domestic market. Workers in those industries earn higher 
wages and are more likely to  belong to  trade unions than their sisters toiling 
in the maquiladoras. Since maquiladoras buy only 1.7% of their inputs from 
within Mexico few spin-off jobs are created when they expand. 
It  is these domestic industries that are most vulnerable to  free trade. 
900,000 Mexicans work in 135,000 small and medium enterprises with less 
than 100 workers each. The Banco de Mexico and National Institute of 
Statistics and Geography estimate that 31,000 Mexican factories employing 
340,000 workers will go bankrupt under NAFTA. David Barkin, an economist 
a t  the Metropolitan University say Mexican job losses could be as high as 
1.9 million under NAFTA. These laid-off workers will be added to  a pool of 
unemployed and underemployed who together make up almost half of the 
labour force. 
Mexico has a very young population. Forty per cent of its 85 million 
people are under 15 years of age. Over one million young people enter the 
labour force every year. As many as ten million children work illegally. Em- 
ployers skirt around the law by accepting easily falsified photocopies of birth 
certificates when they hire fourteen and fifteen year-olds. A reporter for the 
W a l l  St. Journal  oberved 12-year old shoemakers dipping their fingers into 
cans of glue marked "toxic substances . . . prolonged or repeated inhalation 
causes grave health damage; do not leave in the reach of minors." Other 
children sell gum, wash car windows or shine shoes to  survive. 
Productivity and Wages 
Defenders of NAFTA argue that new investment will raise the productivity 
of Mexican labour resulting in higher wages and living standards over time. 
But there is no automatic mechanism that translates productivity gains into 
higher wages. Consider how productivity growth in electronics and auto- 
motive firms located in Mexico in recent years has coincided with actual 
declines in wage costs. Over the years 1975 to  1984 output per worker in 
electronics firms located in Mexico grew from 63% to 83% of U.S. produciv- 
ity levels. Over the same period wages paid to  Mexican electronics workers 
fell from 24% to 15% of U.S. levels for that industry. In transportation 
equipment Mexican workers' productivity rose from 53% to 57% over the 
92 No. 33, 1994 
Canadian Review of Social Policy 
same years while their wages fell from 31% of U.S. levels in 1975 to  13% in 
1984.2 
In Mexico a corrupt trade union movement, officially attached to the 
governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), has repressed workers 
legitimate demands for wage gains. As Mexican economist Gabriel Mendoza 
Pichardo observes, for the corporations waiting to take advantage of NAFTA 
"high productivity with cheap manpower is the perfect combination."3 
For the economic growth model promoted by Salinas to  continue wages 
must remain low. If salaries were to  rise investors would simply look else- 
where for cheaper labour. 
Rural Depopulation 
Over the last 30 years some nine million campesinos [peasant farmers] have 
been forced off their land. This rural exodus occurred, in part, because large 
landowners turned to  cattle grazing or agribusiness production of fruits and 
vegetables for export. In recent years the migration from rural areas has 
grown as crop prices have fallen by 50% in real terms. Government programs 
of technical and financial assistance to farmers have been dismantled as 
part of the structural adjustment program. Government spending on rural 
development fell by 66% between 1980 and 1990. High interest rates and 
the withdrawal of government credits have been devastating for Mexican 
farmers. The exodus from the countryside will accelerate as a result of 
recent changes t o  the Mexican Constitution allowing the sale of communal 
lands, known as ejidos. 
Mexican campesinos are already suffering from their government's uni- 
lateral trade liberalization measures. After Salinas became Planning Minis- 
ter in 1985 he lowered tariffs and removed most items from import licensing 
requirements. As a result Mexico nonr imports ten million tons of agricul- 
tural products annually, equivalent to one third of its food consumption. 
The import bill would be higher were it not for the fact that per capita 
consumption of basic foods has fallen by 30% over the last eight years due 
to  the 57% decline in real wages and high urban unemployment. 
Under NAFTA as many as 15 million campesinos including women and 
children will come under pressure to abandon subsistence agriculture as they 
will be unable to  compete with cheap imports from mechanized farms in 
the U.S. and Canada. Large landholders will gobble up more small farms. 
More of the best lands will be handed over to agribusiness maquiladoras 
using foreign capital and inputs to  grow fruits and vegetables for export. 
No. 33, 1994 
Revue canadienne de politique sociale 
Conclusion 
NAFTA will tend to make permanent the export-oriented model imposed on 
Mexico by its structural adjustment program. Mexico's creditors, including 
Canada's chartered banks, would continue to collect interest on loans that 
probably will never be repaid. 
The kind of investment that would take place in Mexico would chiefly 
come from transnational corporations seeking to use cheap labour to  pro- 
duce for export since the depressed wages of Mexican workers would make 
the domestic market unattractive. 
Some new job creation would no doubt occur. But even the most op- 
timistic economic growth projections based on an inflow of new foreign 
investment that might be attracted by NAFTA would not begin to create 
enough jobs to  absorb those currently unemployed, let alone the new en- 
trants t o  the labour force and the huge numbers of peasant farmers and 
their families displaced from their ancestral lands by free trade in agri- 
culture. Even if NAFTA does attract all the new foreign investment the 
Mexican government expects, only about 12% of the workforce will find 
employment in export industries. Mexican economists call this "an unequal 
exchange of today's jobs for tomorrow's exports." 
As Professor Adolfo Aguilar Zinser of Mexico's national university told 
a Canadian parliamentary committee "a very clear, conscious technocratic 
decision" has been made by Salinas and his advisors to include only half 
of Mexico's population in a dynamic process of economic growth. The 
economic model they have chosen means that by the year 2000, fifty million 
Mexicans would be left to 1a.nguish as a reserve of cheap labour assuring 
that wages remain low for years to come. 
Fortunately there are alternatives. Opposition groups in Mexico pro- 
pose development alternatives that begin by addressing A/Iexico's real prob- 
lems. 
A real alternative must include the cancellation of most of Niexico's 
external debt and an end to the onerous structural adjustment conditions 
imposed by external creditors. Revitalizing small and medium Mexican 
industries producing for the domestic market is the key to job creation. 
Authentic development for Mexico would reject free trade in agriculture 
and instead provide peasant farmers with adequate credits, crop insurance, 
marketing facilities a,nd prices to  make Mexico once again capable of feeding 
themselves. 
Canadians wishing to stand in solidarity with poor Mexicans will join 
them in rejecting NAFTA. Our best solidarity with Mexico would be to  
cancel the foreign debt and remove the structural adjustment conditions. 
No. 33, 1994 
Canadian Review of Social Policy 
l. A partial text of the Negroponte memo was reproduced in the Mexican news- 
magazine Proceso 758 (May 13, 1991), p. 7. 
2. Robert A. Blecker and William E. Briggs, "On Beyond NAFTA: Emplotment, 
Growth and Income Distribution Effects of a Western Hemisphere Free Trade 
Ares." Economic Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1992, p. 37. 
3. Gabriel Mendoza Pichardo "La politica salarial en I\/ICxico." Alternativas 2 
(June 1991), p. 10. 
No. 33, 1994 


English

NAFTA Won't Help Mexico's Poor (Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice)

Editorial/Éditorial

Neal, Rusty

Community Organizing in a Diverse Society, edited by Felix G. Rivera and John L. Erlich

Mullaly, Robert

Weinman, Joan

A Response to the New Brunswick Government 'S 
Social Reform Paper "Creating New Options" 
Robert  Mullaly 
Department  of Social Work 
St .  Thomas University 
and  
Joan  Weinman 
Executive Assistant 
Leader of the New Brunswick NDP 
Direction of discussion paper: Back to the Poor Laws 
We view this discussion paper as another step by the I\/IcKenna government 
in dismantling the social welfare system which took New Brunswickers over 
two hundred years to build. Generally, the evolution of the Canadian welfare 
state corresponds with the responsibility for social provision shifting from 
the family and local charitable organizations to municipal authorities, then 
to provincial levels, and finally to the federal level. This evolution, which 
has been the pattern of development for most of this century, came to a 
halt under the Mulroney government in the 1980s and has actually been 
reversed here in new Brunswick under the McKenna government. 
In this Province we are actually witnessing a reversal of the histori- 
cal progress of dealing with financial distress. Over the past six years the 
McKenna government has been consistently abdicating its constitutional 
responsibilities for the provision of social welfare. Through its policies 
of retrenchment and cut-backs, along with the lowest rates of welfa,re in 
the country, this government has pushed its responsibility down onto local 
communities to look after its poor by using such degrading charitable de- 
vices as soup kitchens, food banks, emergency shelters and clothing depots. 
Who would have thought twenty years ago that we would have more food 
banks today than i\/IacDonalds restaurants? This discussion paper repre- 
sents another step in this devolution of the welfare state as it suggests that 
responsibility for social welfare will now be pushed down to the family level. 
Thus, we a.re returning to the very sa.me conditions that we originally put a 
welfare state in place to deal with. The family, local cha.rities and churches 
could not adequately deal with the social needs of a modern industrial soci- 
ety at a.ny time during the first half of this century. Why does the McKenna 
government think that these measures will work now as we head into the 
twenty-first century? 
No. 34, 1994 
The sad irony of this whole situation is that New Brunswick was the 
last province in Canada to  repeal its Elizabethan Poor Laws (in 1960), and 
now appears to be the first province to bring them back. There are, in 
fact, many similarities between the dreaded Poor Laws and your Discussion 
Paper. 
First, by emphasizing the difference between unemployable and employ- 
able income assistance recipients you are reviving the notion that there are 
two groups of poor people - the deserving and the non-deserving. Such 
labelling often engenders harsh and punitive attitudes by an uninformed 
public in that the employable (non-deserving) group is often blamed for 
the poverty it is experiencing in spite of the reality of a sick economy that 
cannot accommodate them. The Poor Laws taught us that this catego- 
rization leads to  one's "employability status" being the main criterion for 
assistance rather then "need". We think your discussion paper undermines 
the Canada Assistance Plan's principle that "need" be the sole criterion 
for financial assistance. And, we think it will take us down the same road 
as the American welfare proposal that employable persons be eligible for 
assistance for a maximum of two years after which they are on their own- 
no matter what their circumstances may be. 
Second, requiring that people in need approach their families and/or 
that families be obligated to  contribute to  the assistance of a family member 
was also a principle of the unworkable Elizabethan Poor Laws. Experience 
with the Poor Laws showed us that when family ties are positive, members 
will support each other financially and emotionally as well. And we know 
this to  be the case even today. The Poor Laws also showed us the weaknesses 
of family responsibility. Not all families are able to  contribute t o  help their 
members. Poor people tend t o  come from poor families. Not all families 
have positive relationships among their members. Not all families have 
members who live in close proximity to  each other. And, contributing to  
the financial situation of a relative often undermines the financial security 
of those contributing. Family responsibility as a condition of eligibility did 
not work in the nineteenth century even with the extended family living 
in an agrarian society being the typical family unit. Why do you think it 
will work in the high tech, post-industrial and highly mobile society of the 
twenty-first century, where almost half our families are single parent units? 
Third, emphasizing partnerships with local community organizations- 
that is, dumping your responsibilities onto churches and volunteer groups, 
is also a Poor Law practice. Although heroic in their efforts to  minister 
to  the needs of the poor, churches and local charities have been trying to  
tell you for years that they cannot do any more. Can you tell us how it 
contributes to  the dignity of people or how it builds citizenship when you 
make people line up at soup kitchens and food banks just so they can eat? 
No. 34, 1994 95 
Revue canadienne de politique sociale 
Don't you think you are violating the Canada Assistance Plan's principal 
objective- "To provide adequate assistance to those in need," by promoting 
soup kitchens, food banks, etc.? 
Finally, we believe you have elevated the Poor Law practice of making 
moral judgements on the poor to a fine art form. This document supports 
the socially pernicious myth that people on welfare are lazy, inactive, per- 
sonally deficient and prefer welfare over work. This government has shown 
its disdain over and over again toward New Brunswickers who are forced to 
resort to  income assistance. As evidence: 
It is this government which has the lowest rates of social welfare benefits 
in Canada. 
It  is this government which forced 8,000 recipients to line up in public 
view in the cold of winter to receive their meagre welfare cheques. 
It is this government which took the day care subsidy away from single 
parents on income assistance who were attending university. 
And, it was the leader of this government-the biggest moral en- 
trepreneur of them all-who referred to income assistance and other 
social programs as ". . . programs which foster dependency, which make 
it comfortable for people to do nothing and learn nothing" (Frank 
McKenna, quoted in The Daily Gleaner, June 15, 1993). 
Such cynical, moralistic and punitive views would probably be consid- 
ered as inciting hatred toward an identifiable group of people if it were any 
other group in society but poor people. And, as with most acts of discrimi- 
nation, they are based entirely on myth and stereotype, and fly in the face of 
all evidence. People do not choose poverty and income assistance as a career 
goal. There a.re many thousands of New Brunswickers working at poverty 
wages who do not leave their jobs. There are thousands of unemployed New 
Brunswickers who beat the pavement every day in search of a job. People 
are unemployed by circumstances not by choice, and this Discussion Paper 
does nothing about the absence of jobs. 
The fallacy of self-sufficiency 
The goal promoted by this Discussion Paper of "self-sufficiency" also under- 
pins the government's other social reform activities. In fact, self-sufficiency 
is almost like a religion to this government and its leader, Frank McKenna, 
who has been called the "Billy Graham of self-sufficiency." 
Self-sufficiency or self-reliance is a concept which has been used by op- 
ponents of the welfare state such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. 
It is based on an ideal that the state should do less and that people should 
do more to  assist themselves. We believe that this concept is unworkable 
and morally objectionable. 
96 No. 34, 1994 
Canadia,n Review of Social Policy 
The arguments in favour of self-sufficiency or self-reliance refer to two 
central concepts - the notions of "reliance" and "the self." Looking at the 
concept of "reliance" first it should be noted that there are many people in 
dependency situations besides the poor - children, students, mothers caring 
for children, the aged who have earned retirement, etc. However, society 
does not find these dependencies offensive. Instead it fixates on those who 
are employable but are not working and whose character, therefore, would 
seem to  be flawed. That is, the poor are viewed as if it were their choice to 
be poor and to  rely on the state. This view flies in the fact of all serious 
studies of poverty and poor people. Poor people are just like everybody else. 
They have hopes and dreams; they wish for a decent life for themselves and 
their children; they will accept work if it is available; and they not arrange 
their affairs wilfully with a view to relying on state support (Goodin, 1985). 
The notion of "self" in self-sufficiency does not refer to the self as an 
individual as it is simply impossible for any individual to go through life 
completely self-sufficient. This Discussion Paper is dedicated to a policy of 
self-sufficiency or self-reliance which would, in effect, force people to rely 
on the family for support rather than the state (i.e., the boundaries of the 
'self' are extended to include one's family). 
Shifting the welfare burden off onto families is an old familiar trick 
which originated in the Elizabethan Poor Laws. Although cherished by 
many politicians (e.g., Thatcher, Reagan), the goal of enforcing family re- 
sponsibility has been a dismal failure for three pragmatic reasons. 
First, family ties cannot be maintained or strengthened by legislation. 
Experience has shown that legislated family responsibility is ". . . often very 
painful to  those in need of help . . . does not yield any returns in family 
solidarity, and . . . yields monetary returns which are far below the cost of 
litigation1' (Judge and I\/lathews, 1980). 
Second, to enforce family responsibility is to ignore the fact that most 
poor people are found in poor families. These families are in no better 
position to provide assistance than is the person requiring it (Goodin, 1985). 
Finally, and paradoxically, by encouraging "self-reliance" on the part 
of recipients by making them seek help from their fa,milies you may be 
discouraging self-reliance on the part of family benefactors. That is, by 
giving one's savings, etc. to a family member, the benefactor may be putting 
him- or herself at risk. 
Apa.rt from these pragmatic points there is a principled objection to  
family responsibility provisions. Such provisions reduce public dependency 
only by increasing private dependency. In other words, people are made 
less dependent on the state by being more dependent on family assistance. 
This is a complete reversal of attempts to reduce the dependency of wives on 
husbands and children on parents. How do you reconcile this contradiction? 
No. 34, 1994 97 
Revue canadienne de politique socia.le 
In sum, self-sufficiency is a pernicious doctrine. It  does nothing to pre- 
vent vulnerability a.nd dependency. On the contrary, it exacerbates the 
worst kind of dependency and violates some of our strongest moral respon- 
sibilities as a society. 
Workfare and learnfare 
This government has been receiving much attention for its so-called social 
experiments such as N.B. Works. The fact of the matter is that these 
experiments are not new as they too are based on Poor Law practices. The 
Americans have tried a number of workfare and learnfare programs over 
the past two decades. All serious studies of these projects have shown that 
they are dismal failures in getting people back into the labour market. The 
following are the major findings of these studies: 
m not one new job is created by these programs 
m the poverty and unemployment rates are not reduced 
m graduates often go back on welfare because there a.re no jobs 
m if graduates get a job, it is usually a part-time, low wage, dead-end job 
that keeps them in poverty and displaces someone else from the labour 
market 
m participants a.re stigmatized by perpetuating the myth that unemployed 
people are lazy and only work when forced to  do so 
m punishes women most by not recognizing or valuing the crucial work 
of childrearing and homemaking unless someone comes into another's 
home to perform these tasks 
m is a low-cost strategy compared to  education, real job training and job 
creation 
These programs are based on two assumptions: (1) that the poor have 
lost the work ethic (as the Premier believes); and/or (2) that people on 
welfare need an incentive to go to work. These assumptions, of course, fly 
in the face of all reason and evidence, but it begs a certain question which 
is not addressed in this Discussion Paper. 
What conclusion will be drawn at  the end of these experiments if the 
participants are not working? Politicians, such as Frank McKenna, may 
conclude that the participants, most of whom are women, do not have the 
work ethic and/or they do not respond to  the "carrot", i.e., incentives. And, 
therefore, they need the "stick", that is, compulsory work programs, which 
the Premier has already stated he is not against. Compulsory programs do 
not create jobs or reduce poverty. They only blame and punish victims of 
our weak economy and ineffective government economic and labour market 
policies. The problem is a lack of jobs not a lack of the work ethic. 
98 No. 34, 1994 
Canadian Review of Social Policy 
Alternatives 
In closing we would point out that the problems of poverty, unemployment 
and scarce resources require bolder and larger changes tha.n that of picking 
on poor people. The idea that Canada in general, and New Brunswick in 
particular, cannot afford an adequate and compassionate welfare state is 
incorrect. Canada spends much less on its social programs than most other 
OECD countries. It is not a problem of economics, it is a problem of political 
will. For starters, the federal a.nd provincial governments could: 
1. Reform the corporate welfare system (tax breaks, deferrals and loop- 
holes for business) which is costing billions of dolla,rs every yea.r and 
which increase corporate profits rather than decrease unemployment. 
2. Reform our Income Tax Act where 20 Canadia,n millionaires pa.id less 
than $100 each in income ta.x three years in a row (1989-91) a.nd where 
190 Canadians who earned more than $250,000 in 1991 paid no income 
tax. 
3. Implement a full-employment policy similar to  those of Sweden, Norway, 
Austria and Switzerland. 
4. Implement a universal day care program and higher minimum wages 
which, along with a full-employment policy, are real in,centives to  get 
off welfare. 
People on income assistance are not lazy. And, they are not morally 
inferior. Please stop treating them as if they were. We would again empha- 
size, the problem is not a lack of the work ethic; it is a lack of jobs and a 
lack of intelligent government policy to deal with it. 
REFERENCES 
Goodin, Robert E. (1985). "Self-Reliance Versus the S$Jelfare State," Journal oj 
Social Policy, 14, 1: 25-47. 
Daily Gleaner, June 16, 1993. 
Judge, K., and J. Matthews (1980). Charging for Social Care. London: Allen 
and Unwin. 
No. 34, 1994 


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