SelectedWorks @ Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law
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The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior: An Introduction
No full textBehavioral economists accept many of the premises of traditional economic thought: that situational outcomes are the result of individual decisions, taking place in a particular economic environment. But behavioral economists go a step further, arguing that the human action is shaped not only by relevant economic constraints, but is highly affected by people\u27s endogenous preferences, knowledge, skills, endowments and a variety of psychological and physical constraints. Incentives matter and incentives drive human behavior, but incentives are often more than simple monetary gain. The rise of behavioral economics and the findings of experimental economics, have led to a clash between the theory of rational-choice and those who believe that this idea does not properly account for the montage of human emotions, biology and attitudes. However, it may be possible to end the intellectual tug of war between rational choice theorists and behavioralists without turning it into a zero-sum game. In this Introduction we consider the contributions of twenty-eight authors who have joined together to present such a possibility. Covering a wide range of fields from neuroscience, to economics, to law and sociology, these distinguished academics have presented an array of valuable contributions that, aware in their own application that rational choice theory can no longer be bought in a wholesale fashion, aim at revisiting its basic premises in such a way as to ensure a more rigorous analytical model. These authors then proceed to offer a practical application of this modified theory to a variety of economic and legal problems that have bedeviled traditional economic thought
The Unconstitutionality of Class-Based Statutory Limitations on Presidential Nominations: Can a Man Head the Women\u27s Bureau at the Department of Labor?
No full textCan a man be the Director of the Women’s Bureau at the Department of Labor? According to Congress, the answer is no. Congress has stated by statute that a woman must be the nominee to head the Women’s Bureau at the Department of Labor. The key questions are: (1) even if it makes sense on policy grounds, is it constitutional? and (2) if we accept such a statutory limitation power what are the potential precedential consequences for other appointment matters? This Article’s case study is particularly relevant today, examining just how far Congress can go to limit the discretion of Executive authority. This Article examines instead the statutory ability to, ex ante, limit the President’s choice of nominees. It examines the role of the Senate and Congress in the pre-selection criteria for nominees of the President to fill Officer positions within the United States government. Can sex, race, sexual orientation, economic status, or whether a nominee is a member of a particular organization be statutorily mandated (or prohibited) to limit the discretion of Presidential nominations for any particular position for Officers of the United States? Any such preferences can be taken into account as to whether the Senate will provide its advice and consent to any particular nomination, but it is unconstitutional to place such class-based preferences in statutory, pre-nomination mandates and restrictions. This Article argues that class preferences belong in the decision whether to provide advice and consent and not in pre-nomination statutory restrictions. This Article uses one example, the pre-nomination, statutory limitation regarding the Women’s Bureau at the Department of Labor, to demonstrate the illegitimacy of statutory limitations on the President’s nomination power based on class preferences. The place for the invocation of preferences is in the post-nomination/advice and consent process – not in statutory mandates. This Article concludes that the Constitution precludes Congress from placing limitations on the presidential nomination power. Mandatory, statutory pre-nomination limitations are simply beyond the Senate’s advice and consent power
When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non-Cooperation
No full textPeople can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research has pointed to both intentions and incentives as sources of this effect. This paper reports data from a novel experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior in a personal exchange environment. Subjects play a one-shot investment game in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees and request a return on this investment and, in some treatments, are given the option to threaten sanctions to enforce this return request. The decisions of trustees who face credible threats intentionally imposed (or not) by their investors are compared to the decisions of trustees who face credible threats randomly imposed (or not) by nature. When not threatened, trustees typically decide to return a positive amount that is less than the investor requested. When threatened with sanctions this decision becomes least common. In particular, under severe sanction threats most trustees return the desired amount, while under weak threats the most common decision is to return nothing. These results do not depend on whether trustees are threatened intentionally by their investors or randomly by nature. We suggest that credible sanction threats generate a cognitive shift that crowd-out norm-based social behaviors and increase the likelihood of income-maximizing decisions
Escogedoras and Molineras in Veracruz, Mexico (1928-32): Exploring the Political Role of Popular Women in Post-Revolutionary Society
No full textThis article suggests that during Revolutionary state formation (1928-32) in Mexico, Veracruzano women had active roles in state politics. This political participation existed despite women in Mexico being denied legal rights to vote or to hold political office. This essay demonstrates how escogedoras (coffee sorters) and molineras (maize grinders) used their economic influence to negotiate with central and regional governments in Mexico. For escogedoras their participation in an export industry provided \u27negotiation power\u27 to participate in politics. For molineras working in an industry which dramatically decreased a woman\u27s work-week from 30 plus hours to 4 hours provided them with similar negotiation power
Market Power and Price Movements over the Business Cycle
No full textThis paper develops and tests implications of an oligopoly-pricing model. The model predicts that during a demand expansion, the short run competitive price is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium but in a recession, firms set prices above the competitive price. Thus, price markups over the competitive price are countercyclical. Prices set during a recession are more variable than prices set in expansions because firms employ mixed strategy pricing in recessions. The empirical analysis utilizes Hamilton\u27s time series switching regime filter to test the predictions of the model. Fourteen out of fifteen industries have fluctuations consistent with this oligopoly-pricing model
