University of California Hastings College of the Law
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Saving the Permit Streamlining Act: The California Supreme Court Must Depart from Horn v. County of Ventura
No full textThe Permit Streamlining Act (PSA) ensures swift resolution of permit applications by simplifying the processing of permits for development projects. To achieve this end, the California Legislature set forth various time limits within which local permitting bodies must approve or disapprove of a complete application. After the time expires, the PSA provides that a project shall be “deemed approved” so long as affected landowners are given “public notice required by law.” The PSA’s statutory framework butts up against Horn v. County of Ventura—a 1979 California Supreme Court case that is inconsistent with California due process principles. The Horn decision has led to the appellate courts’ split that this paper explores. It begins by detailing the differing treatment of the PSA’s public notice provision between appellate courts. Some courts have treated this as adequate for due process purposes; others disagree. It next deconstructs the Horn decision, demonstrating that its due-process theory is dicta and therefore not binding. Finally, it suggests that Horn’s due-process dicta is inconsistent with California’s due-process jurisprudence because it fails to balance the competing interests at stake. And, even if Horn’s due-process dicta struck a reasonable balance in the 1970s, the balance weighs differently in favor of the governmental interests at issue today, considering the Legislature’s priority in addressing the housing crisis. This paper’s primary goal is to unfold the appellate courts’ split and save the PSA from utter curtailment, so that it remains free to fulfill its legislative purpose: streamlining the permitting process to prevent unjust governmental delays that threaten housing development
One Nation, Under Dobbs: How Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Impacts Data Privacy for All
No full textThe Supreme Court has gone against the fundamental principle of Stare Decisis in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, holding that the constitution confers no right to an abortion. The aftermath of Dobbs shines a spotlight on how reproductive and feminine health data are exploited to target women. From geolocation monitoring to abortion clinics, to women’s search history and private messages being used in her prosecution, the dystopian prospect of surveillance capitalism is now reality for women in the United States. The immediate impact of Dobbs illuminates the need for greater and clearer data privacy protections have never been more necessary.
However, Dobbs’ impact will reach far beyond women seeking reproductive health care or abortions. While the aftermath of Dobbs has already resulted in an attack on women’s data privacy rights, I argue that the complacency with government and private actor’s intrusion -largely due to underdeveloped data privacy legal rights- into women’s most intimate information will inevitably diminish everyone’s data privacy protections over time. Specifically, I argue that the exploitation of such personal data to target women seeking an abortion sets a precedent that will allow countless other groups to have their personal data exploited for whatever their state deems to be a “legitimate government interest.” This paper highlights the importance of developing more comprehensive data privacy laws and regulations
Procedural Pluralism: A Model for Enforcing Internal Administrative Law
No full textMuch of our federal administrative law relies upon supposedly mandatory procedures that agencies often ignore. So, can the administrative state achieve legitimacy if it is bound by laws that it rarely, if ever, complies with? New data shows that agencies simply ignore administrative procedures without recourse because compliance ultimately depends on who holds power in the administrative state––not congressionally delegated rules or procedures imposed by the President. This article refutes the prevailing assumption that, as the sole powerholder of the entire executive department, the President is responsible for the current state of administrative non-compliance and underenforcement because the President decides not to enforce rules. This presidentially-centered argument relies on two variables: presidential discretion and judicial deference to that discretion. However, in this article, I present new empirical evidence showing that public interest groups influence the enforcement of administrative procedures notwithstanding presidential discretion––even overriding congressional attempts to cabin agency decision-making and sometimes judicial oversight. If these parties can shape how the President can exercise enforcement discretion, then power in the administrative state is in fact pluralistic, rather than presidentially centered. This article contributes not simply to our understanding of internal administrative law, but also illustrates how noncompliance with internal procedures has real world consequences for regulated parties and the federal government at large
