University of California Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository (University of California, Hastings College of the Law)Not a member yet
18514 research outputs found
Sort by
Monopolization by Exploiting People’s Inertia? On the DOJ’s 2020 Complaint Against Google and Revenue Sharing Agreements as Non-Compete Arrangements
No full textIn October 2020, the Department of Justice sued Google for paying Apple and several other search engine distributors to set Google as its users’ default. The complaint alleges that Google’s agreements constitute de facto exclusive dealing arrangements because people only rarely change defaults. Although the complaint correctly asserts that this arrangement violates antitrust law, it misapprehends the mechanism of the anticompetitive harm.
The Google–Apple agreement is more accurately modeled as an arrangement that deters actual competitors from reaching a significant distribution channel and discourages a key potential competitor from entering search. If a potential competitor is paid for a preferred slot but then decides to compete with Google in the search market, the potential competitor will suffer the punitive effect of losing Google’s default provider payments. This last part is neglected in the DOJ’s complaint, which also overlooks that a monopolist has incentives to bid higher than any potential competitor for a vital distribution channel—because monopoly profits are higher than duopoly profits. Not every provider is its distributor’s potential competitor. This Article offers guidelines to distinguish between sound and speculative potential competition claims, suggesting an actual potential competitor has (i) the objective capability and (ii) strong incentives to enter the relevant market. Apple is Google’s potential competitor.
We all pay the cost of a monopolistic ads market with higher prices. Yet given the current state of competition in the search market (in contrast with the competition that might exist in the absence of disincentives caused by these default agreements), the evidence is that most Apple users prefer Google. The default agreements, therefore, direct most consumers to the provider they prefer. Nevertheless, there are less restrictive alternatives to reach said efficiency. While forced choice strategies, such as choice screens, have shown to be ineffective in “leveling the field” among competitors, they can effectively ensure that Google does not hinder potential competition by paying a key potential competitor not to enter the market
Restoring Reasonable Expectations to Privacy at Work in the Face of Modern Electronic Monitoring Practices
No full textThis Note argues that stronger legal protections are necessary in California to protect workers’ dignitary interests in the workplace in the face of prevalent electronic monitoring. In particular, those protections should be grounded in a respect for a worker’s personhood rather than property rights relating to worker data collected by employers. In California, workers have some limited privacy and autonomy protections found in common law, the state constitution, and various statutes. Caselaw and legislative enactments have recognized the value of protecting personhood. The passage of the California Privacy Rights Act in 2020 marked a shift toward privacy protections grounded in data as property. This Note critiques the ability of that law to protect workers’ dignitary interests. Moving past the critique, this Note offers suggestions for improving California work standards under the law today, in addition to proposing legislation to strengthen protections for workers in the future based on personhood rather than property interests
The Racial Triangulation of Asian American Achievement
No full textThis Essay employs Professor Claire Jean Kim’s racial triangulation framework to examine how Asian Americans are racialized via academic achievement. It argues that there are two components to the racial triangulation of Asian American achievement. On one hand, Asian Americans are valorized as a “model minority”. We are praised for our achievement and cast as a model for other groups of people of color to follow. This ignores both the different histories of oppression that various groups of color have faced and the vast diversity of experiences among Asian Americans. But on the other hand, Asian Americans are also viewed as a threat to White dominance precisely because of our high achievement. For many privileged White Americans, we become a “peril of the mind”—a menacing foreign presence in elite educational spaces. This Essay focuses mainly on the peril of the mind phenomenon, which is much less widely acknowledged and theorized than the model minority. It examines peril of the mind in both higher education and K-12 education, examining affirmative action, admissions controversies, and the “new White flight”. It argues that conservatives have thus far acknowledged and addressed animus against Asian American achievement more than progressives, and that they have used both model minority and peril of the mind stereotypes to attack affirmative action and racial equity initiatives. Ultimately, the Essay is a call for progressive advocates of these initiatives to be more vigilant in recognizing that Asian Americans are not weaponized as model minorities, but that we are also viewed as a threat because of our achievement