DOCS@RWU

I\u27m a 2L at the School of Law. Making an impact in the legal realities of sex-trafficking is my ultimate aim in earning a JD. When I’m trying to avoid studying, you’ll most likely find me in the garden, open water swimming, reading, seeking out edifying/sharpening conversations & trying to enlist more snail mail pals

Epstein, Arielle

Handcu  it with a lack of curiosity,
Imprison it with vanity,
Torture it with your entitlement to it;
by withholding it from everyone else.
Kill it dead with an “I would never do what they did”—
Eulogize it with “I wish I’d…”
Accept you’ll be haunted
by what could’ve been done.
Hounded by the dual ease of its execution.
Or…
Resurrect it with a miracle: turn yourself around and ask,
“What can still be done?”
Welcome it in with a willingness to inconvenience yourself.
Nourish it by understanding the golden rule is just a start;
treat others how they teach you to treat them.
Still, set it free every and anywhere; watch it boomerang back to you.
Multiply it with forgiveness.
But “kill with kindness?“
I never understood that.


English

Kindness

Kishbaugh, Dr. Justin

“‘Go in Fear of Abstractions’: The Precision, Persuasiveness, and Power of Gender in Legal Writing”

Agreement between Faunce Corner Road Associates and WHALE.  Faunce Corner Road Associates, wishing to develop the land at Faunce Corner, donated the William Hart House to WHALE for preservation purposes

Roger Williams University 
DOCS@RWU 
Documentation 
Hart House: Faunce Corner Road Associates Agreement with 
WHALE 
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/baker_documentation 
 Part of the Historic Preservation and Conservation Commons 





Hart House: Faunce Corner Road Associates Agreement with WHALE

Dismantling William Hart House at 336 Faunce Corner for preservation and re-assembly. June 1987.https://docs.rwu.edu/baker_images/1985/thumbnail.jp

Hart House 070: Dismantling William Hart House

Dismantling William Hart House at 336 Faunce Corner for preservation and re-assembly. June 1987.https://docs.rwu.edu/baker_images/1983/thumbnail.jp

Hart House 060: Dismantling William Hart House

Enos, Catherine R.

Atmed Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 285 A.3d 352 (R.I. 2022)

Mooney, Grant E.

Noonan v. Sambandam, 296 A.3d 670 (R.I. 2023).

Leite, Maddi

Roger Williams University Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 4 Summer 2024 Article 19 
Summer 2024 
State v. DeCosta, 293 A.3d 297 (R.I. 2023). 
Maddi Leite 
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Evidence Commons, and the State and Local Government Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leite, Maddi (2024) "State v. DeCosta, 293 A.3d 297 (R.I. 2023).," Roger Williams University Law Review: 
Vol. 29: Iss. 4, Article 19. 
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol29/iss4/19 
This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. 
For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu. 
969 
Criminal Law.  State v. DeCosta, 293 A.3d 297 (R.I. 2023).  
Evidence of a defendant striking an individual, other than the vic-
tim, in an unrelated event prior to the victim’s assault, is inadmis-
sible.  It is not erroneous for a trial justice to fail to specifically refer 
to Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence when weighing 
the probative value of a piece of evidence against its prejudicial ef-
fect. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On December 2, 2017, after drinking alcohol and smoking ma-
rijuana, Dakota Migliori (Migliori) drove Michael DeCosta (De-
Costa) and his then-girlfriend Amanda Paulino (Paulino) in her 
minivan to a party.1  Upon their arrival, they were greeted by a 
group of people, including Joseph Napolillo (Napolillo).2  Through-
out his time at the party, DeCosta had various altercations with 
other partygoers.3  After Paulino and another partygoer had a dis-
agreement, DeCosta confronted the partygoer’s boyfriend.4  Later 
that night, DeCosta was overheard threatening to fight someone 
and had a small mix-up with Napolillo, who was also under the in-
fluence of alcohol and marijuana.5  After leaving the party to pur-
chase soda mixers for their alcohol, DeCosta, Paulino, and Migliori 
returned to a parking lot across the street from the party.6  DeCosta 
exited the minivan to speak with other partygoers, including Napo-
lillo, while Paulino and Migliori remained in the vehicle.7 
After the parking lot cleared out, DeCosta continued talking 
with Napolillo.8  While still in the minivan, Paulino heard DeCosta 
raise his voice, saw him and Napolillo raise their arms, and “heard 
1. State v. DeCosta, 293 A.3d 297, 298–99 (R.I. 2023).
2. Id. at 299.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
970 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
a bang and a thud.”9  DeCosta then entered the minivan with blood 
on his knuckles, declared that he had knocked someone out, and 
asked Migliori not to mention the incident.10  The three drove to 
another convenience store where DeCosta used water bottles to 
clean his hands and discarded his bloody sweatshirt.11  Migliori 
then dropped off DeCosta and Paulino at Paulino’s house.12  De-
Costa was arrested on December 12, 2017 in connection with the 
assault.13 
Back at the party, a friend of Napolillo looked outside the 
house, observed a car leaving the parking lot, and noticed some-
thing on the ground.14  A group of people walked to the parking lot 
and discovered Napolillo vomiting with his mouth and nose covered 
in blood.15  The group immediately brought Napolillo inside and 
called 911.16  When an officer reported to the party’s location, Na-
polillo claimed his injuries were the result of his tripping and fall-
ing.17  Napolillo did not state that he was assaulted until he was 
speaking with medical personnel in the hospital.18  However, when 
a law enforcement officer arrived at the hospital, Napolillo was no 
longer able to communicate.19  Napolillo suffered a traumatic brain 
injury resulting in multiple surgeries and the insertion of a feeding 
tube.20  He stayed in the intensive care unit for over a month and 
was “unable to walk, work, drive, or write” when he was discharged 
in February of 2018.21   
Napolillo gave his statement to the police on March 19, 2018.22  
In his statement, he remembered speaking with DeCosta outside, 
getting struck in the face by DeCosta, and waking up covered in 
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 300.
14. Id. at 299.
15. Id. at 299–300.
16. Id. at 300.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
2024] SURVEY SECTION 971 
blood.23  However, Napolillo did not remember anything that oc-
curred between the time he passed out at the hospital and the time 
he woke up on January 16, 2018.24  In his statement, he also 
claimed that DeCosta had hit an individual named Cloutier in an 
unrelated event earlier that night.25  
At trial, Napolillo could not recall his confrontation with De-
Costa in the parking lot or any details from after he arrived at the 
party, so counsel instructed him to read his police statement into 
the record.26  Defense counsel objected to multiple parts of the 
statement, including the part where Napolillo mentioned that De-
Costa hit Cloutier earlier that night.27  The defense also argued 
that “the evidence was inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 403 of 
the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence,” prohibiting character evidence 
offered for propensity and prejudicial evidence, respectively.28  Al-
ternatively, the state claimed the statement established DeCosta’s 
state of mind.29  Therefore, the trial justice admitted a redacted 
statement that included the part about the Cloutier assault as evi-
dence of DeCosta’s “common plan, scheme, or frame of mind” under 
Rule 404(b).30  The defense counsel objected, which led the trial jus-
tice to instruct the jury regarding the limited ways in which they 
could use the evidence.31  The jury found DeCosta guilty of the fel-
ony assault resulting in serious bodily injury charge, and DeCosta 
timely appealed.32 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, DeCosta argued that the trial justice erred in ad-
mitting portions of Napolillo’s police statement indicating that Na-
polillo had hit Cloutier earlier in the night because the evidence 
was inadmissible under Rule 404(b).33  DeCosta argued that the 
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 300–01.
28. Id. at 301.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
972 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
admission of Napolillo’s statement constituted a clear abuse of dis-
cretion because the unfair prejudice imposed on DeCosta substan-
tially outweighed the statement’s probative value.34  Further, De-
Costa asserted that this abuse of discretion warranted a new trial.35 
The Court noted that under Rule 404(b), evidence is not inad-
missible simply because it is prejudicial, and “prior acts of un-
charged conduct are admissible evidence for purposes other than 
propensity, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
or knowledge.”36  However, the Court also noted that evidence of a 
prior assault “is admissible to establish intent toward[] the victim[]” 
only when the prior assault “was against that same victim.”37  The 
proper standard of review for a trial justice’s admission of evidence 
is whether the decision to admit the evidence amounted to “a clear 
abuse of discretion.”38  The Court held that, here, the trial justice 
abused his discretion when he admitted evidence of the prior as-
sault on Cloutier because there was no evidence suggesting that the 
Cloutier assault had any connection to DeCosta’s intent towards 
Napolillo.39 
The Court then determined whether the trial justice’s abuse of 
discretion impacted the jury’s decision or, instead, amounted to 
harmless error.40  For an abuse of discretion to be considered harm-
less, “there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt” that the im-
proper admission of evidence “did not contribute to the verdict.”41  
The Court listed factors that it considered when determining the 
harm of the Cloutier assault evidence, “including the relative de-
gree of importance of the witness testimony to the prosecution’s 
case, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contra-
dicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent 
of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength 
of the prosecution’s case.”42  
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing State v. Ciresi, 45 A.3d 1201, 1213 (R.I. 2012)).
37. Id. at 302.
38. Id. at 301 (quoting State v. Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012)).
39. Id. at 302.
40. Id. at 303.
41. Id. (quoting State v. Mercurio, 89 A.3d 813, 822 (R.I. 2014)).
42. Id. (quoting Mercurio, 89 A.3d at 822).
2024] SURVEY SECTION 973 
The Court suggested the evidence regarding the Cloutier as-
sault was not important to the prosecution’s case because “[t]he 
state referenced the statement only in passing in its closing argu-
ment.”43 Further, the Court noted that DeCosta’s counsel even ar-
gued that it was unnecessary to admit the statement due to the 
large amount of other evidence the state possessed.44  The Court 
also found that there was evidence corroborating the witnesses’ tes-
timony and that the witnesses were credible.45  Finally, the Court 
held that the prosecution’s case was so strong that the statement 
about the Cloutier assault would not influence a reasonable jury on 
the question of guilt.46  For the foregoing reasons, and because the 
trial justice’s instruction clearly advised the jury regarding its use 
of the statement, the Court was “convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the admission of Napolillo’s statement” was “harmless 
error.”47  
Finally, although the trial justice “did not explicitly refer to 
Rule 403 in his ruling,” the Court noted that he did balance the 
interests of the parties when deciding to admit the statement of the 
Cloutier assault.48  The Court found this evident in the trial jus-
tice’s “eliminat[ion] [of] a substantial part of [the] statement in an 
effort to be fair to [DeCosta]” and his explicit exclusion of other ev-
idence in the trial based on its undue prejudice.49  As such, the 
Court affirmed the decision and judgment of the Superior Court.50  
COMMENTARY 
This case addresses the limitations of a trial justice’s decision 
to admit evidence and the impact this decision has on the jury’s 
verdict.  The trial justice relied on Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 
404(b), which allows evidence of prior assaultive conduct to be ad-
mitted into evidence “for purposes other than propensity.”51  The 
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 303–04.
49. Id. at 304.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 301.
974 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
Court then relied on State v. Martinez,52 in which a statement about 
the defendant’s prior conduct was properly admitted to prove the 
defendant’s intent to harm the victim.53  In Martinez, however, the 
prior assaultive conduct was against the same victim.54  Here, in 
contrast, the prior assaultive conduct was unrelated to the interac-
tion between DeCosta and the victim entirely.55  The trial justice in 
Martinez also supplemented the admission with a warning that the 
Superior Court would be “extremely, extremely guarded” in the ex-
tent of the testimony it would admit.56  The Court here shared a 
guarded attitude toward this statement and found that the trial 
justice abused his discretion by extending the reach of Rule 404(b) 
to cover prior assaultive conduct against an individual other than 
the victim.57  However, due to the overwhelming amount of evi-
dence the state provided outside of the improperly admitted state-
ment, this abuse of discretion was deemed a harmless error, and 
the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.58  
Improper admissions of evidence under Rhode Island Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) are often considered harmless error despite the 
Court recognizing the potential for prejudice against defendants.59  
Rule 404(b) was adopted to prevent jurors from presuming that the 
accused is a “bad person” or choosing to convict a defendant because 
the evidence “indicate[s] an ongoing propensity in the accused to 
commit the charged crime.”60  However, the rule has far-reaching 
exceptions.61  Even when Rule 404(b) evidence is improperly admit-
ted under these exceptions, the admitted evidence must “so in-
flame[] the passions of the jury as to prevent their calm and dispas-
sionate examination of the evidence” in order to constitute 
reversible error on the part of the trial court.62  Thus, the “probative 
52. 59 A.3d 73, 87 (R.I. 2013).
53. DeCosta, 293 A.3d at 302 (citing Martinez, 59 A.3d at 87).
54. Martinez, 59 A.3d at 87.
55. DeCosta, 293 A.3d at 302.
56. Martinez, 59 A.3d at 87.
57. DeCosta, 293 A.3d at 302.
58. Id. at 303–04.
59. Mia Ruscetta, The Tangled Web of Other Bad Acts, R.I. B.J., June/July
2001, at 11, 50–52. 
60. Id. at 11.
61. Id.; R.I. R. EVID. 404(b). 
62. Ruscetta, supra note 59, at 51 (quoting State v. Fernandes, 526 A.2d
495, 498 (R.I. 1987)). 
2024] SURVEY SECTION 975 
value of evidence” admitted under the Rule 404(b) exceptions “most 
always” outweighs its “prejudicial effect.”63  Most Rule 404(b) ad-
missions withstand appeal in Rhode Island because of the rule’s ex-
tensive exceptions and the Court’s use of rigid standards to deter-
mine the admissions are frequently harmless errors.64 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a trial justice 
abuses their discretion when they admit evidence of a defendant’s 
prior assaultive conduct towards an unrelated individual in an un-
related altercation to the one at issue.65  Rhode Island courts have 
a guarded attitude toward admitting evidence of this type.66  Thus, 
evidence of a defendant’s prior assaultive conduct is more likely to 
be admitted when it is against the same victim in the case.67  The 
Court also held that an improper admission of this type of evidence 
may be deemed a harmless error when the prejudicial nature of the 
evidence is outweighed by a substantial amount of other evidence 
supporting the state’s case.68  
 Maddi Leite 
63. Id.
64. Id. at 52.
65. State v. DeCosta, 293 A.3d 297, 302 (R.I. 2023).
66. See State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 87 (R.I. 2013).
67. Id.
68. DeCosta, 293 A.3d at 303–04.


State v. DeCosta, 293 A.3d 297 (R.I. 2023).

Murray, Jillian L.

Roger Williams University Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 4 Summer 2024 Article 20 
Summer 2024 
State v. Leonard, 296 A.3d 111 (R.I. 2023). 
Jillian L. Murray 
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Murray, Jillian L. (2024) "State v. Leonard, 296 A.3d 111 (R.I. 2023).," Roger Williams University Law 
Review: Vol. 29: Iss. 4, Article 20. 
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol29/iss4/20 
This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. 
For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu. 
976 
Criminal Law.  State v. Leonard, 296 A.3d 111 (R.I. 2023).  
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a motion to pass the 
case is left to the discretion of a trial justice absent an abuse of dis-
cretion.  Further, the Court emphasized that a litigant must make 
appropriate, timely objections during lower court proceedings for 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court to hear an issue on appeal.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On September 18, 2015, the defendant Treven Leonard (de-
fendant) was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual as-
sault and one count of assault with a dangerous weapon.1  The com-
plaining witness (complainant) alleged that the defendant made 
several unwanted sexual advances towards her and threatened her 
with a knife multiple times during her brief employment as a wait-
ress at his restaurant.2  More particularly, the complainant alleged 
that the defendant violently assaulted her on April 8, 2015.3  After 
the assault, the complainant continued her shift as scheduled.4  She 
then worked her last shift on April 15, 2015, and reported the as-
sault to police two days later.5   
Pretrial motions concerning the state’s motion in limine were 
heard on February 7, 2020.6  The state sought to introduce evidence 
that the complainant was molested as a child in order to explain 
the delay between the alleged assault on April 8, 2015, and the fil-
ing of the report with police several days later.7  The trial justice 
allowed the state to present the evidence but proposed some re-
strictions; the state could not include the complainant’s age when 
she was molested, or mention that the perpetrator had been con-
victed.8 
1. State v. Leonard, 296 A.3d 111, 114 (R.I. 2023).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
2024] SURVEY SECTION 977 
During a four-day trial in the Superior Court, the complainant 
was asked how being molested as a child affected the way she re-
acted to the assault by the defendant.9  The complainant explained 
that when the defendant grabbed her, “it was surreal, like, an out-
of-body experience. . . . You’re detached. You don’t feel it emotion-
ally. . . . And that’s how I dealt with that incident that night.”10 
When the defendant testified at trial, he was asked on cross-
examination: “[The complainant] had no reason to make this up?” 
The defendant replied, “I have no idea.”11  Moreover, in closing ar-
guments, the prosecutor pondered what the complainant would 
have to gain by lying about the assault.12  The prosecutor then told 
the jury, “[t]his isn’t something she would do just for kicks. And 
even the defendant can’t come up with any reason that she would 
lie[].”13  In response to defense counsel’s objection, the trial justice 
cautioned the jury that the defendant does not have the burden of 
proof in this case.14  Rather, the state has the burden.15 
Defense counsel moved to pass the case during a sidebar due to 
the prosecutor’s burden-shifting comment.16  The trial justice de-
nied the motion on the ground that his immediate cautionary in-
struction to the jury was sufficient for them to understand that the 
state had the burden of proof.17  At this time, the trial justice made 
a second cautionary instruction to the jury, which repeated that the 
defendant does not have the burden of proof in the case.18  Ulti-
mately, the jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts of second-
degree sexual assault and a not guilty verdict on the count of as-
sault with a dangerous weapon.19 
Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial.20  
At the motion hearing, however, the trial justice rejected all of the 
9. Id. at 114–15.
10. Id. at 115.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 115–16.
19. Id. at 116.
20. Id.
978 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
defendant’s arguments.21  Those arguments included that (1) the 
prosecutor shifted the burden of proof during closing arguments; (2) 
evidence of the complainant’s childhood assault was “unfairly prej-
udicial” to the defendant; and (3)the state should have introduced 
expert testimony to explain the child molestation evidence.22  
The trial justice explained that the prosecutor introduced the 
childhood molestation evidence in compliance with his instructions, 
and the testimony was “short, to the point, relevant, and not so prej-
udicial as to require exclusion.”23  Further, in rejecting the defend-
ant’s expert witness argument, the trial justice said that the com-
plainant testified in lay person’s terms and did not use any medical 
terms or diagnoses that a jury member would not understand.24  
Notably, the trial justice said that the defense did not object to the 
prosecutor’s “expert assessment” during closing—defense counsel 
only objected to the burden-shifting comment.25  Again, the trial 
justice reaffirmed that he made two cautionary instructions to the 
jury on this issue, and the prosecutor’s argument did not reach the 
point of being “totally extraneous to the issues in the case and tend 
to inflame and aro[u]se the passions of the jury.”26 
The defendant was sentenced to eight years for each count, 
with one year to serve and the remaining time suspended on proba-
tion.27  The defendant filed a notice of appeal on October 26, 2020, 
and the conviction was entered thereafter.28  
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The court organized its analysis into two issues on appeal: (1) 
whether the trial justice committed reversible error by denying the 
defendant’s motion to pass the case in light of the prosecutor’s bur-
den-shifting statement during closing arguments;29 and (2) 
whether the trial justice erroneously admitted evidence regarding 
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bozzo, 223 A.3d 755, 761–
62 (R.I. 2020)). 
27. Id. at 117.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 117–20.
2024] SURVEY SECTION 979 
the complainant’s childhood trauma unduly prejudicing the defend-
ant, thus entitling him to a new trial.30 
A. Motion to Pass the Case
In Rhode Island, a motion to pass the case is identical to a mo-
tion for a mistrial.31  The Court began its inquiry by citing to State 
v. Alexis, which leaves the decision on a motion to pass the case “to
the sound discretion of the trial justice, and this Court will not dis-
turb the ruling on such a motion absent an abuse of discretion.”32
The Court acknowledged that “when ruling on a motion to pass, the
trial justice must determine whether the evidence in question was
of such a nature as to cause the jurors to become so inflamed that
their attention was distracted from the issues submitted to them.”33
The defendant argued that the prosecutor’s remark in her clos-
ing argument was so “egregious” in shifting the burden of proof onto 
the defendant that it “impeded his right to receive a fair trial.”34  
Additionally, the defendant averred that the two cautionary in-
structions given by the trial justice did not follow the standard held 
by State v. Taylor.35  In Taylor, the Court found that a: 
[C]autionary instruction must (1) identify the prosecutor’s
conduct as improper, (2) unequivocally indicate that the
jury must disregard it, and (3) unequivocally indicate that
since the defendant has no duty to present witnesses or any
other evidence, his failure to do so cannot be construed as
an admission that the evidence, if produced, would have
been adverse.36
The cautionary instructions in this case did not identify the 
prosecutor’s comment as improper and failed to clearly instruct the 
jury to disregard it.37  The cautionary instruction further failed a 
30. See id. at 120–22.
31. See State v. Robat, 49 A.3d 58, 83 n.28 (R.I. 2012).
32. Leonard, 296 A.3d at 117 (quoting State v. Alexis, 185 A.3d 526, 531
(R.I. 2018)). 
33. Id. (quoting State v. Alston, 47 A.3d 234, 250 (R.I. 2010)).
34. Id. at 118.
35. Id. (citing State v. Taylor, 425 A.2d 1231, 1235 (R.I. 1981)).
36. Taylor, 425 A.2d at 1235.
37. Leonard, 296 A.3d at 118.
980 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
requirement under Taylor because it was not given immediately af-
ter the prosecutor’s comment.38   
On the other hand, the state contended that the two cases that 
the defendant cited, State v. Corleto39 and Taylor, fall under the 
“empty chair” doctrine and, therefore, do not apply.40  Further, the 
state argued that this case is more analogous to State v. 
Cavanaugh, which clearly rules that the three-standard test de-
scribed in Taylor regarding cautionary instructions applies only 
when the prosecutor inappropriately mentions the empty chair doc-
trine.41  
The Court found that, although the trial justice’s cautionary 
instruction did not meet the Taylor standard, the prosecutor’s com-
ment during closing arguments did not reference the empty chair 
doctrine.42  Rather, the prosecutor commented about the defend-
ant’s own performance as a witness and limited the commentary to 
his testimony.43  The prosecutor did not refer to the defendant’s 
specific failure to present evidence concerning the theory that the 
complainant falsely reported the assault.44  Also, the Court explic-
itly reinforced the Cavanaugh holding argued by the state: the 
three-part standard in Taylor only applies to cautionary instruc-
tions when the prosecutor inappropriately references the empty 
chair doctrine.45  
In conclusion, the trial justice’s cautionary instructions were 
effective in removing any prejudicial taint from the jurors’ minds, 
and the prosecutor’s comment did not inappropriately reference the 
empty chair doctrine.46  Moreover, the Court noted that the jury 
could not have been “so inflamed that their attention was distracted 
38. Id. (citing Taylor, 425 A.2d at 1236).
39. 161 A.3d 504 (R.I. 2017).
40. Leonard, 296 A.3d at 118 n.4 (“The empty-chair doctrine permits a trial
justice to charge a jury that it may draw an inference from a litigant’s unex-
plained failure to produce an available witness who would be expected to give 
material testimony on the litigant’s behalf.” (quoting State v. D’Agostino, 691 
A.2d 561, 563–64 (R.I. 1997))).
41. Id. at 119 (citing State v. Cavanaugh, 158 A.3d 268, 277 (R.I. 2017)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 118–19.
44. Id. at 118.
45. Id. at 119.
46. Id.
2024] SURVEY SECTION 981 
from the issues submitted to them” because the jury acquitted the 
defendant of the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon.47 
B. Motion for a New Trial
The defendant articulated that his motion for a new trial
should have been granted for the following reasons: the trial justice 
erroneously allowed the evidence regarding the complainant’s 
childhood trauma which the state introduced merely to attain sym-
pathy from the jury; the child molestation evidence was irrelevant; 
the state should have presented expert testimony; and the prosecu-
tor made comments during closing arguments that were similar to 
an “expert assessment” when explaining the complainant’s delayed 
reaction to the assault.48 
In response, the Court simply cited the “well settled raise or 
waive rule” and said litigants must make timely and appropriate 
objections.49  The Court also emphasized that objections must be 
made at the time counsel identifies a statement as objectionable.50  
In waiting to raise the expert-testimony issue until after the trial 
in his motion for a new trial, the Court said that the defendant 
“missed the boat.”51 
Next, the Court considered the defendant’s challenges to the 
relevance and unfairly prejudicial nature of the evidence, which 
were properly preserved for appeal.52  Relevance is a low bar to 
meet.53  Therefore, since the state’s evidence of the complainant’s 
childhood trauma can serve as one explanation for her delayed re-
sponse to the assault, the evidence is relevant under Rhode Island 
Rules of Evidence 401.54  
Lastly, the Court considered the trial justice’s decision to admit 
the state’s evidence that the complainant was molested as a child 
to determine if it complied with Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 
403.55  The Court held that the trial justice properly evaluated and 
47. Id. at 117, 119 n.5.
48. Id. at 120.
49. Id. at 120–21 (quoting State v. Davis, 131 A.3d 679, 701 (R.I. 2016)).
50. Id. at 121.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 122.
982 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
admitted the state’s evidence because he implemented a balancing 
test to ensure that the evidence’s probative force was not “substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”56  The appli-
cation of the balancing test is seen through the restrictions the trial 
justice implemented on the presentation of the evidence—the state 
was not allowed to indicate the complainant’s age when she was 
molested, or that the perpetrator was convicted.57  The Court 
viewed these restrictions as the trial justice’s effort to alleviate the 
danger of any unfair prejudice.58  Therefore, the Court determined 
that there was no abuse of discretion.59 
COMMENTARY 
This case includes an analysis of the empty chair doctrine. 
Though the doctrine itself seems to be fairly simple, applying it can 
be intricate.60  Here, the defendant implies that when the prosecu-
tor allegedly shifted the burden of proof during closing arguments 
by saying, “even the defendant can’t come up with any reason that 
she would lie—,” the prosecutor inappropriately referenced the 
empty chair.61  
However, we are not faced with the complexities of the empty 
chair doctrine in this case.  The Court simply explained that, “there 
was no empty chair in this case; in fact, defendant took the stand.”62  
Rather, the Court focused on the defendant’s failure to timely object 
during cross examination when the defendant was asked if he had 
any reason that the complainant might “make up” the sexual as-
sault.63  In effect, the defendant waived the opportunity to preserve 
the issue for appeal, and the Court noted that the defendant’s tes-
timony was “fair game” for the prosecutor to mention in her closing 
argument since it was part of the evidence presented during the 
trial.64  
56. Id. at 121–22 (quoting R.I. R. EVID. 403) (citing State v. Perry, 182 A.3d
558, 571–72 (R.I. 2018)). 
57. Id. at 114.
58. Id. at 122.
59. Id.
60. See generally State v. Taylor, 425 A.2d 1231 (R.I. 1981).
61. Leonard, 296 A.3d at 115.
62. Id. at 119.
63. Id.
64. Id.
2024] SURVEY SECTION 983 
Further, the Court explained that prosecutors have “consider-
able latitude” during closing arguments to make their final appeal 
to the jury.65  This “considerable latitude,” however, does not allow 
a prosecutor to “cross that line” by mentioning something that was 
not specifically addressed during the defendant’s testimony.66  In 
this case, the Court correctly held that the prosecutor did not “cross 
the line” during her closing argument because she merely men-
tioned what the defendant said on cross examination, and defense 
counsel failed to timely object.67  
This case also emphasizes the issues of potentially prejudicial 
evidence and the lack of an expert witness.  To the former issue, the 
Court declined to disturb the decision of the trial justice in allowing 
the childhood molestation evidence.68  Although “most evidence of-
fered at trial is inherently prejudicial.  Only unfairly prejudicial ev-
idence is barred under [Rhode Island Rules of Evidence] Rule 
403.”69  The Court properly acknowledged the balancing test imple-
mented by the trial justice and his restrictions on presenting the 
childhood molestation evidence.70  In turn, the evidence was not 
unfairly prejudicial because of the trial justice’s careful considera-
tion of the sensitive nature of the evidence. 
As to the latter issue, the Court again cites the raise-or-waive 
rule.71  The defendant simply waited too long to object to the pros-
ecutor’s theory which connected the complainant’s childhood 
trauma to her delayed response of reporting the assault.72  The 
Court suggests that the objection to this potential “expert assess-
ment” should have been made contemporaneously instead of in his 
motion for a new trial.73  
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a trial justice main-
tains authority to decide on a motion to pass the case so long as 
65. Id. (citing State v. Farley, 962 A.3d 748, 757 (R.I. 2009)).
66. See State v. Lastarza, 203 A.3d 1159, 1166 (R.I. 2019).
67. See Leonard, 296 A.3d at 119.
68. Id. at 122.
69. State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 148–49 n.12 (R.I. 2009).
70. See Leonard, 296 A.3d at 122.
71. Id. at 121.
72. Id.
73. Id.
984 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
their ruling is absent of an abuse of discretion.  Importantly, the 
Court reinforced the holding in Cavanaugh which declared that the 
three-part standard in Taylor only applies to cautionary instruc-
tions when the prosecutor inappropriately references the empty 
chair.  Further, the Court held that a litigant must make timely 
objections during lower court proceedings in order for this Court to 
consider the issues on appeal.  
Jillian L. Murray 


State v. Leonard, 296 A.3d 111 (R.I. 2023).

Whaley, Erica

Roger Williams University Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 4 Summer 2024 Article 23 
Summer 2024 
State v. Joseph, 297 A.3d 490 (R.I. 2023). 
Erica Whaley 
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, and the State and Local 
Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Whaley, Erica (2024) "State v. Joseph, 297 A.3d 490 (R.I. 2023).," Roger Williams University Law Review: 
Vol. 29: Iss. 4, Article 23. 
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol29/iss4/23 
This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. 
For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu. 
1011 
Criminal Law.  State v. Joseph, 297 A.3d 490 (R.I. 2023).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court decided an issue related to what con-
stitutes reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop beyond its 
mission of issuing a traffic citation.  In Rhode Island, the total du-
ration of the traffic stop is an important factor in determining 
whether an officer impermissibly prolonged a stop absent reasona-
ble suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.  Although judges need 
not ignore race as a potential reason for an officers prolonging of a 
traffic stop, the judge may not raise such issues sua sponte.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
At approximately 5:30 PM on Thursday, June 21, 2018, Rhode 
Island State Police Trooper Andrew Elsing conducted a traffic stop 
on a minivan after observing erratic driving.1  At the onset of the 
stop, Elsing observed nervous behavior from the driver, defendant 
Figaro, and separated Figaro from passengers Anaika Whyles and 
defendant Joseph for questioning.2  While separated, Figaro told 
Elsing that he and Joseph were returning from Virginia where they 
went to visit family.3  Joseph also claimed the two were returning 
from Virgnia but stated that they made the trip to pick up an en-
gine, which Elsing observed in the rear of the vehicle.4  When asked 
to identify his passengers, Figaro could only offer their first names: 
“JJ” (Joseph) and Anaika.5  Approximately ten minutes later, 
Rhode Island State Police Corporal Daniel O’Neil arrived on scene.6  
While checking the occupants’ driver’s licenses, O’Neil found that 
Joseph had provided him with false identification and had an arrest 
in Massachusetts under a different first name and date of birth.7  
Elsing returned to the vehicle and began questioning Figaro again.8  
1. State v. Joseph, 297 A.3d 490, 492, 494 (R.I. 2023).
2. Id. at 493.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 493, 495.
7. Id. at 493–94.
8. Id. at 494.
1012 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
Elsing requested to search the vehicle multiple times, and Figaro 
declined.9  Because of Figaro’s nervousness, Jospeh’s false identifi-
cation, and their conflicting statements as to their purpose of travel, 
Elsing decided to conduct a dog sniff.10  When the search revealed 
a firearm, armor-piercing bullets, and a bullet proof vest, Elsing de-
tained Figaro and Joseph and read them their Miranda rights.11 
On April 19, 2019, based on the above facts, Joseph was 
charged with “one count of carrying a firearm without a license in 
a vehicle, one count of possession of a stolen firearm, one count of 
importing or transferring armor-piercing bullets, and one count of 
giving a false driver’s license to police.”12  Figaro was charged with 
“one count of importing or transferring armor-piercing bullets.”13  
Figaro filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the gun, ammo, 
and bulletproof vest, alleging that Elsing exceeded the scope of the 
mission of the traffic stop by performing a dog sniff absent reason-
able suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.14  Joseph filed his 
own motion to suppress and joined the memorandum in support of 
Figaro’s motion.15 
On April 7, 2021, the court held a hearing on the defendants’ 
motion, and the parties presented arguments three weeks later.16  
Despite the facts that both defendants conceded that the basis for 
the stop was valid and neither raised any claim of racial animus or 
selective prosecution, the hearing justice asked Officer O’Neil if he 
noticed increased nervousness in people of color as opposed to oth-
ers when conducting a traffic stop, to which O’Neil replied that in 
“‘every traffic stop no matter who it is, the person is always in crisis’ 
because their routine has been disrupted.”17  Later in the hearing, 
Joseph’s counsel cited the precedent supporting the proposition 
that “hand shaking, sweating, [and] rapid speech . . . are all height-
ened in a person who spends their life encountering police.”18 
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 492.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 492, 495.
17. Id. at 495 (alteration in original).
18. Id. at 501 n.4 (alteration in original).
2024] SURVEY SECTION 1013 
On May 10, 2021, the court granted both defendants’ motions 
to suppress.19  The hearing justice opened his decision by discussing 
racial disparity in policing, citing the Stanford Open Policing Pro-
ject and a similar Rhode Island study.20  He expressed that he was 
unable to ignore the impact of race and implicit biases in evaluating 
the case.21  He then concluded that the totality of the circumstances 
revealed that Elsing lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activ-
ity necessary to investigate beyond the scope of Figaro’s erratic 
driving that initiated the stop.22  An order granting the defendants’ 
motion to suppress was entered on January 5, 2022, and the state 
filed an appeal on May 28, 2021.23 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in an opinion issued by Chief 
Justice Suttell, affirmed the hearing justice’s decision granting the 
defendants’ motions.24  The Court held that the hearing justice cor-
rectly applied Rodriguez v. United States,25 and the totality of the 
circumstances revealed that Elsing lacked reasonable suspicion to 
prolong the traffic stop and conduct a dog sniff on the vehicle.26  The 
Court noted, however, that while a judge need not ignore the poten-
tial implications of race and bias on an officer’s decision to prolong 
a traffic stop, it was improper for the hearing justice to interject 
those issues sua sponte.27  However, because the hearing justice’s 
decision was “amply supported by the evidence adduced at the hear-
ing,” the Court found the imposition of racial issues by the judge to 
be a harmless error and affirmed the ruling.28 
19. Id. at 495.
20. Id. at 495, 500.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 496–97.
23. Id. at 497.
24. Id. at 500.
25. 575 U.S. 348, 354–55 (2015) (holding that the permissible duration of
a traffic stop is the amount of time and reasonable inquiry necessary to com-
plete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation that justified the initial 
stop). 
26. Joseph, 297 A.3d at 499.
27. Id. at 500.
28. Id. at 501.
1014 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
A. Reasonable Suspicion
The Court began its inquiry by noting that the lower court’s
determination that reasonable suspicion did not exist must be re-
viewed de novo.29  In reviewing a traffic stop, a court must first de-
termine whether the stop itself was justified before turning to the 
issue of whether the conducting officer had reasonable suspicion to 
prolong the stop and investigate matters beyond its initial scope.30  
Under Rodriguez, the reasonableness of the duration of a traffic 
stop is determined by its “mission,” similar to a Terry stop in-
quiry.31  If a traffic stop exceeds the time required to complete the 
mission of issuing a traffic citation, the stop is impermissibly pro-
longed.32  The mission encompasses corollary inquiries, including 
reviewing the driver’s identification, proof of insurance, and regis-
tration, but investigations into additional matters, such as a dog 
sniff, must be supported by reasonable suspicion of such criminal 
activity.33   
The state argued on appeal that the hearing justice misapplied 
Rodriguez by failing to view Figaro’s nervousness and Joseph’s false 
identification in conjunction with the inconsistencies among the de-
fendant’s statements and Figaro’s inability to provide his passen-
ger’s full names.34  According to the state, had the hearing justice 
viewed the facts in their totality, he would have found Elsing had 
reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff.35  The Court disa-
greed, finding that the trial justice did review all of the facts on the 
record but concluded that even cumulatively, there was little to sup-
port Elsing’s argument that he reasonably suspected the defend-
ants were trafficking drugs.36  The Court explained that, unlike the 
state’s assertion that the defendants gave conflicting statements as 
to their travel, the statements were relatively consistent.37  That 
29. Id. at 497 (quoting State v. Santos, 64 A.3d 314, 319 (R.I. 2013)).
30. Id. at 495 (quoting United States v. Orth, 873 F.3d 349, 353–54 (1st
Cir. 2017)). 
31. Id. at 498 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354
(2015)). 
32. Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354–55).
33. Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).
34. Id. at 498–99.
35. Id. at 498.
36. Id. at 499.
37. Id.
2024] SURVEY SECTION 1015 
the defendants cited different purposes for their trip to Virginia did 
not render their statements inconsistent, nor did it render either 
statement false.38  The Court also agreed with the trial justice’s de-
termination that Figaro’s nervousness—manifested by his exces-
sive sweating and fast speech—did not support reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity.39  Rather, Corporal O’Neil’s own testimony 
supports the proposition that such nervousness is quite normal in 
any traffic stop and does not per se indicate criminal activity is 
afoot.40 
Additionally, the Court noted that the mission of the traffic 
stop concluded long before Elsing conducted the dog sniff.41  The 
Court explained that although the officers could have placed Joseph 
under arrest for providing them with a false license and issued 
Figaro a traffic citation for his erratic driving, they chose not to.42  
The Court agreed with the hearing justice’s conclusion that after 
nearly an hour of inquiries and having been refused consent to 
search the car twice, Elsing “detain[ed] [the] suspect[s] and em-
bark[ed] upon an expedition for evidence in the hope that some-
thing might turn up.”43  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial 
justices ruling granting the defendants’ motion to suppress the ev-
idence obtained during the vehicle search.44 
B. Racial Bias
The Court found that it was improper for the hearing justice to
address, sua sponte, the potential implications of racial biases on 
Elsing’s decision to prolong the traffic stop.45  The Court explained 
that by opening his decision with a discussion of the Stanford Open 
Policing Project and the similar Rhode Island study, it was evident 
that such factors shaped the hearing justice’s decision to grant the 
motions to suppress.46  The Court stressed that race and implicit 
biases are important issues, and judges need not ignore that such 
38. Id.
39. Id. at 498.
40. Id. at 496, 498.
41. Id. at 499–500.
42. Id. at 499.
43. Id. at 499–500 (alterations in original).
44. Id. at 500.
45. Id.
46. Id.
1016 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
factors may contribute to an officer’s decision to conduct and/or pro-
long traffic stops.47  However, “a trial justice should address those 
considerations when they are argued and raised,” not sua sponte.48  
Despite finding the hearing justice acted improperly in including a 
racial analysis in his decision, the Court held that the evidence am-
ply supported his finding that Elsing lacked reasonable suspicion 
and, therefore, affirmed his decision granting the motions.49   
COMMENTARY 
Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion under the Fourth 
Amendment to justify prolonging a traffic stop remains a grey area 
of the law by which the Rhode Island Supreme Court continues to 
clarify on a case-by-case basis.  In Joseph, the Court clarified the 
amount of weight given to several factors in a reasonable suspicion 
analysis, including the duration of the stop prior to ordering a dog 
sniff and a defendant’s nervousness. 
In State v. Li, the Court held that an officer did not exceed the 
Fourth Amendment by issuing a dog sniff, noting that a traffic stop 
had only lasted fifteen minutes when the officer decided to conduct 
the sniff,50 whereas in Joseph, the Court emphasized that Elsing 
had been investigating Figaro and Joseph for nearly an hour before 
claiming reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and therefore 
was using the dog sniff to impermissibly prolong the stop.51  Ac-
cordingly, the duration of the stop is an important factor in deter-
mining whether an officer has independent reasonable suspicion to 
pursue an investigation separate from the violation that prompted 
the traffic stop or whether the officer is merely prolonging the stop 
in hopes something else may turn up.52 
47. Id.
48. Id. at 500–01 (emphasis omitted).
49. Id. at 501.
50. 297 A.3d 908, 915.  The Court in Li primarily focused on whether offic-
ers may use marijuana odor as a basis for reasonable suspicion now that ma-
rijuana is legal.  See id. at 923–24.  Accordingly, the strong odor of marijuana 
played the biggest role in finding reasonable suspicion.  See id.  However, the 
Court still addressed other factors in the totality analysis which the lower court 
found were insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.  See id. at 
924–26. 
51. 297 A.3d at 496.
52. Id. at 499–500.
2024] SURVEY SECTION 1017 
Additionally, although a defendant’s nervousness may be a fac-
tor in a reasonable suspicion analysis, some degree of nervousness 
is normal in any traffic stop and is, therefore, insignificant.53  In Li, 
the Court noted that nervousness should not be viewed in isolation, 
but rather in totality, when determining whether reasonable suspi-
cion exists.54  There, the Court emphasized that they must give def-
erence to the officer’s personal knowledge and experience when giv-
ing weight to nervousness as a factor, and “abnormal and 
increasingly nervous behavior,” when coupled with other circum-
stances, may support a finding of reasonable suspicion.55  In Jo-
seph, however, the Court found that although the defendant was 
talking rapidly, sweating, and pacing, he was also polite, not eva-
sive, and complied with all requests, and therefore, his nervousness 
was insufficient, even among other factors, to justify a narcotics in-
vestigation.56 
The Court’s discussion of the hearing justice’s use of race and 
implicit biases aligns with the well-developed precedent that a 
judge may not address issues not raised by the parties.57  However, 
the Court did not dismiss the fact that officer bias sometimes does 
play a role in their decision to conduct or prolong a traffic stop.58  
Accordingly, the Court attempted to strike a delicate balance by 
holding that while a judge may not raise issues of race sua sponte, 
they need not ignore the fact that race may have prompted an of-
ficer to act.59  By this, the Court leaves room for the judge to con-
sider and weigh race as a factor should the parties raise such is-
sues.60  
The Court’s decision, while aligned with developed precedent, 
overlooks (or ignores) the hearing justices point—race plays a role 
in an officer’s decision to conduct or prolong a traffic stop, irrespec-
tive of whether the parties raise the issue.  The Stanford Open 
53. Id. at 498–99.
54. 297 A.3d at 925–26.
55. Id.
56. 297 A.3d at 498–99.
57. See id. at 500–01 (first citing D’Alessio v. State, 101 A.3d 1270, 1278
(R.I. 2014); and then citing Providence J. Co. v. Convention Ctr. Auth., 824 
A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I. 2003)).
58. Id. at 500.
59. Id.
60. Id.
1018 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:4 
Policing Project, as cited by the hearing justice, found that “in 
nearly every jurisdiction . . . [B]lack and Hispanic drivers are 
searched more often than white drivers.”61  Moreover, the Project 
found that “police require less suspicion to search black and His-
panic drivers than white drivers.”62  Based on this information, the 
hearing justice candidly stated that he was “mindful of these is-
sues” in determining whether the officer’s had reasonable suspicion 
to prolong the stop by conducting a dog sniff.63  Accordingly, the 
Court held that the judge had impermissibly raised the issue of race 
sua sponte.64  However, the Court could have held that courts may 
consider race as a factor when determining whether an officer im-
permissibly prolonged a traffic stop, just as courts consider officer 
knowledge and experience.65  Perhaps this was the hearing justice’s 
goal.  
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a trial justice’s deter-
mination that an officer lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong a 
traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff and, accordingly, affirmed 
the decision to grant the defendants’ motion to suppress physical 
evidence obtained during the stop.  Moreover, the Court held that a 
trial justice may not insert, sua sponte, potential issues of race 
and/or implicit biases in determining reasonable suspicion. 
 Erica Whaley 
61. Findings, STAN. OPEN POLICING PROJECT 2023, https://openpolic-
ing.stanford.edu/findings/ [https://perma.cc/2MW2-XC73] (last visited Jan. 5, 
2023).  
62. Id.
63. Joseph, 297 A.3d at 500.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 498 (“[T]his Court has enumerated factors that contribute to a
finding of reasonable suspicion, including . . . the personal knowledge and ex-
perience of the police officer.” (quoting State v. Ditren, 126 A.3d 414, 419–20 
(R.I. 2015)). 


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