Geological Observatory of Coldigioco
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The Unconscionably Short Warranty
No full textA typical consumer product warranty covers products for defects that appear before the warranty period expires. If the manufacturer warrants a vehicle for five years or 60,000 miles, whichever occurs first, problems that require repairs after the warranty period expires are outside the warranty and, therefore, the buyer\u27s problem. Advocates for consumers have developed a theory to escape the claim-barring consequence of expiration of the warranty period. They have argued with some success that the warranty period that would otherwise bar their claim is unconscionable and thus unenforceable under Uniform Commercial Code ( UCC ) section 2-302. The warranty period term, they contend, is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable because the manufacturer knew and failed to disclose the risk that the defect would appear only after the warranty period expired. In effect, the manufacturer has exploited its superior knowledge of the product and market power to impose a warranty period term that unconscionably shifted the risk of product failure to the consumer.
This Article considers this theory of the unconscionably short warranty period. It explains how UCC Article 2 and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act recognize and regulate the use of warranty period terms to limit the duration of express and implied warranties on consumer products. It explains the development of the unconscionably short warranty theory and critiques the Fourth Circuit\u27s key decision that recognized it in Carlson v. General Motors. It argues that the unconscionably short warranty theory is an inappropriate use of section 2-302 to circumvent the pleading and proof requirements necessary for a tort or statutory cause of action against a consumer product manufacturer for fraudulent misrepresentation by nondisclosure in bargaining
Tackled by the Federal Legislature?: Flaws in NFL Arbitration Policies Highlighted by Proposed Ending Forced Arbitration of Race Discrimination Act of 2023
No full textLewd, Rude, Obscene, and… Violent? Analyzing Student Clothing Depicting Firearms Under the First Amendment’s Obscenity Test
No full textToday’s national news and social media have repeatedly exposed our school-age children to the effects of shootings occurring within their schools and communities. Each shooting brings with it commentary, sometimes from the students themselves. While in-school student speech is more limited than speech levied in the outside world, students do not shed their speech rights at the “schoolhouse gate.” As a result, courts have failed to outline a consistent approach for when a student will be punished for wearing a shirt depicting a firearm to school. This Comment addresses this delicate balance by proposing a consistent three-part test framed by the United States Supreme Court’s obscene speech analysis. To begin, this Comment instructs schools to clearly define what constitutes a firearm on clothing in their dress code. From this point, courts are to consider whether the image on the clothing meets the definition. If it does, courts should examine whether the image appeals to any violent interests by applying a community standard analysis. Under this analysis, courts should consider factors advanced in the recent Seventh Circuit decision N.J. ex. rel Jacob v. Sonnabend. Finally, courts and schools should consider whether the work is patently violent or lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value by determining the “undeniable message” that the clothing conveys. This approach effectively puts parents, students, and school officials on notice of what images are allowed within their school, incorporates considerations important to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, and fits within a framework that is familiar to federal courts. Additionally, this test will enable courts to balance students’ interests in political speech with schools’ interest in preventing disruption arising from that speech
BIG WORDS, QUESTIONABLE LEGALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO RESTRICTING BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP
No full textThis article analyzes the nuances of Trump\u27s Day One executive order restricting the grant of birthright citizenship only to children whose parents possess either a green card or U.S. citizenship. The article discusses the constitutional impediments to this executive order, as well as prior caselaw and academic articles, positing that the executive order stands on rather shaky ground constitutionally
