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Bridging the Gap: The Creation of the New Adult Category and its Impact on Young Adults Books.
IMMIGRANT WRITERS AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY: The Journey from Immigration to Published Author.
It’s an Authors Market Now: Today’s Publishing Options and the Emerging Roles of Self-Publishing.
Distribution Sales and Retail Marketing: How Does a Sales Department Function at a “Big Five” Publisher?
Amazon: Their Past, Present, And Future And How They Are Changing Traditional Publishing.
Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute: Did the New York Court of Appeals\u27 Misapplication of Unjustified Policy Fears Lead to A Miscarriage of Justice and the Creation of Inadequate Precedent for the Proper Use of the Empire State’s Long-Arm Statute?
This article discusses CPLR section 302(a)(1) as applied by the New York State Court of Appeals in Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute. The Paterno Court failed to properly apply a statutory jurisdictional analysis by conflating it with a due process inquiry. Also, the Court unnecessarily balanced the interests of the Empire State\u27s citizens in having a forum for access to justice with unjustified policy fears of potential costs to the state from assertions of in personam jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court\u27s policy focus4 on the protection of medical doctors from lawsuits and the prevention of “floodgate” litigation which would adversely affect the medical profession was not justified by the record and created poor precedent for subsequent judicial application of the state\u27s long-arm statute.
This article will examine CPLR section 302(a)(1), under Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute and some of its predecessors, to demonstrate that sometimes overarching policy concerns get in the way of a strict statutory analysis under CPLR section 302(a)(1). We analyze how the Court of Appeals in Paterno conflated the jurisdictional basis and due process analyses and determine that the Court, based on a faulty statutory analysis, erroneously decided that there was no statutory jurisdiction.
Our article is divided into six parts. Part II briefly discusses the history of the CPLR and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction through Sections 301 and 302, focusing mainly on long-arm jurisdiction. Part III discusses and analyzes leading cases, which involve the application of CPLR 302 in obtaining personal jurisdiction. Part IV discusses a recent case, Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute, in great detail, and Part V engages in a critical analysis of Paterno with reference to a similar case, Grimaldi v. Guinn. Part VI addresses policy considerations and Part VII concludes with a discussion of how the Paterno Court entangled its jurisdictional analysis and where the Court may be headed with its future application of CPLR section 302(a)(1)
“Finding the \u27Public\u27 in \u27Public Disrepute” – Would the Cultural Defense Make a Difference in Celebrity and Sports Endorsement Contract Disputes? - The Case of Michael Vick and Adrian Peterson
This article will explore this issue by engaging in case studies of the Vick and Peterson scandals to see what would have happened had the two men taken their claims against Nike to court. Part One will discuss the cases in more depth and elaborate on how they might be viewed through the lens of cultural relativity theory and the cultural defense. Part Two will elaborate on what morals clauses are and the legal standards courts use to enforce them. In addition to examining the Mendenhall decision, several other court cases will be discussed, each of which places differing levels of emphasis on how much evidence is needed to meet the public disrepute requirement. Except for the judge in the Mendenhall case, all of the judges in these additional cases were white. This is mentioned because it is possible that the race of the judge may bear some relation to the level of openness they may have to entertaining the cultural defense. Part Three will apply the aforementioned legal standards to the Vick and Peterson cases, with special attention paid to the extent to which courts discussed in Part Two might be open to entertaining the cultural defense in these kinds of disputes.
Part Four will contain my conclusion, which is that most judges will probably not give extra weight to the cultural defense in situations of the type discussed here. There will be a range of approaches to how courts might define public disrepute in these cases, but the overall outcome will be the same. On one side will be a small number of judges, like the judge in Mendenhall, who require both sides to produce detailed evidence to show if expressed minority viewpoints favoring talent outweigh viewpoints that disfavor talent. However, since white football fans outnumber blacks, this will mean that black talent like those discussed here won\u27t benefit from the cultural defense. On the other side will be judges who base their decisions on their own personal take on what the majority of people do (or should) think about the matter. In the main case discussed here where such an approach took place, the judge ruled against talent. Thus, regardless of the rationale for the decision-making expressed in these cases, most talent in these kinds of situations will lose. Nevertheless, there may still be some judges and endorsement company managers who do want to take into account the social dimensions that give rise to the cultural defense in the interests of fairness. My conclusion at the end of the paper will suggest some possible approaches they can adopt to achieve this result
The Challenge of Blocking Malvertising
This poster invited Research Days attendees to learn more about malvertising--the practice of hiding malicious code within online advertisements--and the challenges of detecting and preventing it