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Outline of an Adverbial Theory of Colour
Get PDFThe theory of colour defended in this paper might equally well be called a nihilism about colour, for I take it to be the case that nothing is coloured, and that properties such as being red are never exemplified. We might call the latter sort of property a colour property, and I will try to argue here that no such properties have exemplars. However, I hesitate to call my view ‘nihilistic’, because I also hold that there is an important species of property that does the theoretical work of colour properties, and whose members do have exemplars, these examples being human beings (more generally: sensing subjects). Furthermore, I call the view ‘adverbial’ because these properties, I take it, are such properties as sensing in a red fashion, which are often named by the use of adverbs in the literature (i.e. the property of ‘sensing redly’). Here I shall offer some positive arguments for my view, before addressing an especially pressing concern, this being the question of how statements concerning coloured objects can be true if colours do not exist
The Presuppositional Account of Category Mistakes
No full textCategory mistakes are a class of expressions which gain philosophical interest in virtue of their infelicity. They are grammatical and are composed entirely of sensible words; but, for some reason, still seem strange. A theory of category mistakes is tasked with identifying the route of this infelicity. In this paper, I consider Ofra Magidor\u27s pragmatic presuppositional account of category mistakes. I argue that it offers plausible accounts of the infelicity of category mistakes and can help to delineate the class of category mistakes. However, I raise two different kinds of objections. First, I suggest that the presuppositional account fails to account for all category mistakes. Second, Magidor\u27s theory requires that category mistakes are meaningful. I consider two of her arguments fail to establish this
THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES OF ANTHROPOLOGY AS A SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEINGS
Get PDFAtom, molecule, cell, neuron, social relation, institution, the universe: each has its experts. Is it only the human unit that does not have its own? Today, much philosophical thought is given over to consideration of twigs, dust, objects or nations, without establishing a hierarchy between beings. A philosopher can even add an extra level: being amazed by the fact that each of these units is there. He can look at them as things to which the fact of being is inherent
Panad? An Ethnographic Exploration of the Practice of Giving Tea (or coffee) to the Builders in North Wales
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