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\u27I just like thinking about the moon and lighting candles\u27: 21st Century Witches on Instagram
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An Ethnography on the Experience of Autistic Children and their Families in Scotland
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Talk given at the Burn (Paper Summary): Moral Responsibility and Responding to Reasons
No full textOne prima facie plausible version of compatibilism regarding moral responsibility and determinism holds that an agent is morally responsible in performing some action just in case this action is performed for a reason. (See e.g. Fischer & Ravizza 1999). Intuitive enough: the account rightly says we aren’t responsible for what we do if we are hypnotized, or if we are robots, or if we don’t intend to act. Free will is important because it is important that we can conceive of ourselves as moral agents. So this is an account that, since acting for a reason is a way of being caused, rescues the important part of agency – moral responsibility – from the threat of determinism. But we shall see that any such account is problematic
What Motivated Epicurus to Say that Atoms Swerve?
Get PDFThe swerve is the most radical departure from Democritean philosophy that Epicurus makes. The different stance is emphasized by the fact that in their physics they are generally very similar. The most obvious account for this difference is that Epicurus saw significant problems with Democritean atomism that had to be solved. O\u27Keefe comments, Since the swerve appears nowhere in Epicurus\u27 extant writings, any suggestions about why he introduced the swerve are necessarily speculative. This paper will attempt to examine Epicurus\u27 reasons for his claim that atoms swerve.
In Lucretius\u27 account of Epicurus\u27 philosophy the swerve, broadly speaking, has both a cosmological and a psychological function.2 Whilst there is some debate as to the precise role the swerve plays, this essay will rstly outline O\u27Keefe\u27s interpretation of the cosmological role of the swerve. O\u27Keefe argues that Democritus\u27 account of atomic motion based solely upon collisions is inadequate. He argues that Epicurus had to introduce weight to account for atomic motion and the swerve to account for collisions within this account of motion. The psychological3 role of the swerve is even more contested. This essay shall outline Russell\u27s account of the swerve: that it makes dialectical space within atomism for freedom in what would otherwise have been a Laplacean determined world. It will be argued that these two accounts of the roles of the swerve are the truest to the evidence, and thus the roles that Epicurus wanted the atomic swerve to play. From this, it can be concluded that the lack of a full account of atomic motion, and the failure to account for free will, or responsibility for actions, within Democritus\u27 physics motivated Epicurus to say that atoms swerve
Can God Only Exist in the Present Moment?
Get PDFIn this paper, I will argue that presentism is inconsistent with the belief that God exists in time. The defence of my argument will be split into two sections. The first will show that if God exists in time and presentism is true, there are some true propositions about the future. The second will use truthmaker theory to show that these propositions require an existing future entity to be made true. As the first section states that some propositions about the future are true, it is the case that some future entities exist. Hence, if God exists in time then some future entities exist. This conclusion goes directly against presentism’s fundamental claim, proving it is inconsistent with the belief that God exists in time
Interpretation and Indexicality
Get PDFThe paper objects to the treatment of descriptive uses of indexicals proposed by Nunberg (1993). It is shown that the arguments Nunberg presents are ineffective against a pragmatic account of these uses such as that put forth by Recanati (1993). The conclusion is that there are good reasons to believe that the deferred interpretation in question are generated by non-semantic processes involving extralinguistic factors such as the speaker\u27s communicative intentions
Can Egoism Provide a Solid Basis for Morality?
Get PDFIt has often been argued that Egoism is by definition incompatible with morality. We will challenge this viewpoint in the following analysis, arguing that the assumption of incompatibility rests on a false premise. This will allow us to enquire whether or not Egoism can provide a basis for morality. To answer in the affirmative, it is sufficient to show that the claim that Egoism could be such a basis cannot in all cases be refuted
