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From Seisin to Sit-In: Evolving Property Concepts
On June 17, 1960, twelve Negro college students entered a restaurant in Baltimore, Maryland. The manager approached and informed them of the restaurant\u27s policy not to serve Negroes. Disregarding the manager, the young men sat down at tables and waited for service. The manager again asked them to leave, but they remained quietly seated. A police officer was summoned and, in his presence, the manager requested the Negroes to leave. They refused to answer and remained in their places. Thereupon they were arrested and indicted under a Maryland statute which, as interpreted by the Maryland Court of Appeals, made it a misdemeanor for one to remain on another\u27s premises after having been directed to leave. During the non-jury trial in Baltimore Criminal Court, the defendants asserted constitutional defenses, invoking the fourteenth amendment\u27s due process and equal protection clauses. These defenses were rejected by the trial court, and the Negro students were convicted of criminal trespass.The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the constitutional arguments
Baier\u27s Test for Practical Rules Re-Examined
In his recent book, Kurt Baier proposed two methods for the testing of moral rules. One method consists in applying the fundamental criteria for such rules: those criteria determined by the formal condition of “universal teachability,” and those criteria (“reversibility” and “universalizability”) which are determined by the material condition that moral rules be “for the good of everyone alike.” But Baier’s analysis of practical reasoning allows for many sorts of rules, not all of which are “moral.” The second method of testing is most generally applicable, and is intended to be sufficient for the validation of every sort of practical, action-guiding rule. In view of the increased attention given to the role of rules in practical deliberation, it would seem that any proposal of a universally sufficient test for practical rules would enjoy serious and sympathetic consideration. Unfortunately, however, most of the written commentary on Baier’s test methods seems to have been preoccupied with a shocking – and I think misleading – statement of Baier’s regarding his second, the more general test. I should like to suggest a new interpretation of this test in order, first, to rebut the presumption that it rests essentially on a logical blunder, and second, to point out where criticism of the test should properly be directed
State Taxation of Bankruptcy Liquidations: Federalism Misconceived
ONCE viewed as immune property within the custody of the federal sovereign, a bankrupt\u27s estate is now generally subject to the same state and local taxes as are the property and activities of an individual. Judicial recognition that government services subsidized by state property taxes were ratably extended to property in the hands of the bankruptcy trustee engendered the initial inroad on this immunity. Subsequent federal legislation relegates agents or officers conducting businesses by authority of United States courts to the status of private parties for purposes of taxation. However, some courts have denied the imposition of state and local taxes on trustee-conducted liquidation sales. Holding the waiver statute inapplicable, they have asserted that allowing such taxes might interfere with Congress\u27s paramount authority over bankruptcy by burdening the court process through which that authority is exercised. Other courts, reasoning that taxes levied against the buyer at a liquidation sale rather than the trustee are irrelevant to the court process, have upheld these taxes without reliance on the statute