556 research outputs found
Sort by
A Mighty Wind: the Turbulent Times of America\u27s First Offshore Wind Farm and the Inverse of Environmental Justice
Get PDFIn 2001, Cape Wind Associates announced its proposal to construct America’s first offshore wind farm in the federal waters of Nantucket Sound. This declaration touched off a storm of law suits, fund raising, and protests in the press that still rages to this day. Political pundits and environmental groups of every stripe have taken some surprising positions, based solely on the location of the renewable energy source. The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, posing as an environmental concern, has risen as the archrival to the wind farm. Interestingly, a closer look under the surface of this group reveals a financial juggernaut of fossil fuel funding, and instead of trying to preserve Nantucket Sound, the real issue that arises is classic NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard).
A timeline, starting from the announcement in 2001 and spanning to the selection of construction contractors in 2012, summarizes the astounding scope of litigation, politics and electrical utility contracts. Together with analysis of the major cases intended to block Cape Wind, is a look at the history of the Environmental Justice (EJ) movement. With the late entrance of Native American Tribes into the fray, the significance of EJ in current state and federal policy is now being used in reverse as a weapon to strike against Cape Wind, for the benefit of Cape Cod’s well-heeled residents
Professor Kingsfield in Conflict: Rhetorical Constructions of the U.S. Law Professor Persona(e)
Get PDFAt least since the 1960s, a “‘two cultures’ phenomenon” has become quite apparent within the legal field in the United States. On one hand, some lawyers, usually those within the university, have been more academically oriented, and, on the other hand, other lawyers, usually those in legal practice or sitting on the bench, have been more pragmatically oriented. Problems arise when these two groups begin to talk differently from each other. In a way, the field of law has developed into at least two different legal professions, and, not surprisingly, scholars and practitioners have experienced tension because of this situation. The problem comes to a head when, through rhetoric, lawyers envision their ideal role(s) for the law professor. Calling upon rhetorical theory, this article traces the contours of the conflict over the construction of the role(s), or persona(e), of the U.S. law professor from 1960 to the present. The article draws an initial line at 1960 because, by the 1960s, law schools in the United States had matured to the point at which they clearly were thinking of themselves as graduate programs within the university system. After a discussion of persona theory and persona analysis, this article addresses the two major personae that have emerged in the conflict, the law professor as scholar and the law professor as practitioner. As appropriate, each subsection of the article that considers a persona also addresses the type of rhetoric that lawyers have employed in developing their preferred persona. In this study, the term lawyers refers to both practicing lawyers and academic lawyers. A concluding section synthesizes some of the communication problems that have emerged in this ongoing conflict, usually due to a heavy reliance on traditional Aristotelian rhetoric, or persuasion, as a rhetorical strategy. Although descriptive in nature, the current article sets the stage for a subsequent article, normative in nature, that will open the door to an alternative approach to this ongoing conflict
Modern Odysseus or Classic Fraud - Fourteen Years in Prison for Civil Contempt without a Jury Trial, Judicial Power without Limitation, and an Examination of the Failure of Due Process
Get PDF
Selling Land and Religion
Get PDFThousands of religious monuments have been donated to cities and towns. Under Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, local, state, and federal governments now have greater freedom to accept religious monuments, symbols, and objects donated to them for permanent display in public spaces without violating the Free Speech Clause. Now that governments may embrace religious monuments and symbols as their own speech, the obvious question arises whether governments violate the Establishment Clause by permanently displaying a religiously significant object. Fearing an Establishment Clause violation, some governmental bodies have privatized religious objects and the land beneath them by selling or transferring the objects and land to private parties. Some transactions have included restrictive covenants that require the buyer to maintain the religious object or reversionary clauses that allow the government to reclaim the land. Others have sold or transferred the religious object without soliciting bids from other buyers. This article provides an in-depth analysis of five cases in which governmental bodies resorted to privatizing public land to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. Drawing from Establishment Clause jurisprudence involving religious displays, this article utilizes the Lemon and Endorsement tests as analytical tools for resolving the constitutionality of land dispositions involving religious displays. This article considers the purported secular government purposes for selling or transferring land to private parties. The government has sought to justify these land dispositions as a means to provide memorials that honor veterans or promote civic-mindedness, to preserve the religious object in order to avoid showing disrespect to religion, and to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. I argue that these purported government purposes are secondary to a religious interest because there are other alternatives to achieve the government’s purposes. I also examine the effects of these land dispositions on the reasonable observer. The Herculean efforts exerted by the government to save the religious monument send a message of government endorsement of religion. Restrictive covenants that require the private owner to maintain the religious monument and reversionary clauses that allow the government to reclaim the monument and underlying land perpetuate state action and excessively entangle the government. I conclude that the best measure to avoid the Establishment Clause is to simply remove the religious object. Removing the religious object will protect the dilution of sacred religious symbols through their secularization and will provide greater inclusiveness in public spaces for religious minorities and nonbelievers
