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Class v. United States: An Imperfect Application of the Menna-Blackledge Doctrine to Post-Guilty Plea Constitutional Claims
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Too Big to Fail — U.S. Banks’ Regulatory Alchemy: Converting an Obscure Agency Footnote into an “At Will” Nullification of Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of the Multi-Trillion Dollar Financial Swaps Market
Get PDFThe multi-trillion-dollar market for, what was at that time wholly unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives (“swaps”) is widely viewed as a principal cause of the 2008 worldwide financial meltdown. The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law on July 21, 2010, was expressly considered by Congress to be a remedy for this troublesome deregulatory problem. The legislation required the swaps market to comply with a host of business conduct and anti-competitive protections, including that the swaps market be fully transparent to U.S. financial regulators, collateralized, and capitalized. The statute also expressly provides that it would cover foreign subsidiaries of big U.S. financial institutions if their swaps trading could adversely impact the U.S. economy or represent the use of extraterritorial trades as an attempt to “evade” Dodd-Frank. In July 2013, the CFTC promulgated an 80-page, triple-columned, and single-spaced “guidance” implementing Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial reach, i.e., that manner in which Dodd-Frank would apply to swaps transactions executed outside the United States. The key point of that guidance was that swaps trading within the “guaranteed” foreign subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were subject to all of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulations wherever in the world those subsidiaries’ swaps were executed. At that time, the standardized industry swaps agreement contemplated that, inter alia, U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers’ foreign subsidiaries would be “guaranteed” by their corporate parent, as was true since 1992. In August 2013, without notifying the CFTC, the principal U.S. bank holding company swaps dealer trade association privately circulated to its members standard contractual language that would, for the first time, “deguarantee” their foreign subsidiaries. By relying only on the obscure footnote 563 of the CFTC guidance’s 662 footnotes, the trade association assured its swaps dealer members that the newly deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries could (if they so chose) no longer be subject to Dodd-Frank. As a result, it has been reported (and it also has been understood by many experts within the swaps industry) that a substantial portion of the U.S. swaps market has shifted from the large U.S. bank holding companies swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed “foreign” subsidiaries, with the attendant claim by these huge big U.S. bank swaps dealers that Dodd-Frank swaps regulation would not apply to these transactions. The CFTC also soon discovered that these huge U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were “arranging, negotiating, and executing” (“ANE”) these swaps in the United States with U.S. bank personnel and, only after execution in the U.S., were these swaps formally “assigned” to the U.S. banks’ newly “deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries with the accompanying claim that these swaps, even though executed in the U.S., were not covered by Dodd-Frank. In October 2016, the CFTC proposed a rule that would have closed the “deguarantee” and “ANE” loopholes completely. However, because it usually takes at least a year to finalize a “proposed” rule, this proposed rule closing the loopholes in question was not finalized prior to the inauguration of President Trump. All indications are that it will never be finalized during a Trump Administration. Thus, in the shadow of the recent tenth anniversary of the Lehman failure, there is an understanding among many market regulators and swaps trading experts that large portions of the swaps market have moved from U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed foreign affiliates where Dodd- Frank swaps regulation is not being followed. However, what has not moved abroad is the very real obligation of the lender of last resort to rescue these U.S. swaps dealer bank holding companies if they fail because of poorly regulated swaps in their deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries, i.e., the U.S. taxpayer. While relief is unlikely to be forthcoming from the Trump Administration or the Republican-controlled Senate, some other means will have to be found to avert another multi-trillion-dollar bank bailout and/or a financial calamity caused by poorly regulated swaps on the books of big U.S. banks. This paper notes that the relevant statutory framework affords state attorneys general and state financial regulators the right to bring so-called “parens patriae” actions in federal district court to enforce, inter alia, Dodd- Frank on behalf of a state’s citizens. That kind of litigation to enforce the statute’s extraterritorial provisions is now badly needed
Assessing the Current State of Net Neutrality and Exploring Solutions in Creating and Maintaining Open, Available, and Innovative Internet and Broadband Services
Get PDFThis article examines the current state of net neutrality regulation in the United States. Debates surrounding net neutrality are varied and layered. They include legal questions regarding how the internet should be classified under existing statutes, and the level of authority for federal agencies when regulating internet service providers. The Article will provide an extensive background of net neutrality in the United States, discussing the pertinent case law and legislation that shaped the modern Internet regulatory landscape. It will conclude by discussing the current state of the law, focusing on the perspectives of proponents and opponents of the law as it currently stands under the Restoring Internet Freedom Order. Finally, it will analyze examples of measures that opponents of the Restoring Internet Freedom Order are taking to repeal it
Colgate v. JUUL Labs, Inc.: Addressing the Preemptive Scope of the Tobacco Control Act for Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems
Get PDFBringing Candor to Charitable Solicitations
Get PDFThe American public donates a staggering amount of money to nonprofit charities. These charities routinely solicit and receive money from donors for specific, earmarked purposes. Often, however, charities ignore their obligations to use money for these designated uses. In many circumstances, even a seemingly benign redirection of earmarked gifts for other charitable purposes could constitute fraud and misrepresentation.
Breaking the implicit or explicit promise to use money in a designated manner harms donors, charities, and the public. Prospective donors assess the value of charitable donations in a manner similar to the way they value consumer goods and services and can be swayed by false claims. Accordingly, allowing distortions of perceived value misleads donors when they are directing their charity.
In light of detailed examinations of charitable-organization spending practices, this Article will propose that charities should adhere to a new, higher level of candor in their public communications. Maintaining a renewed, scrupulous approach to disclosure would, in Chief Justice John Marshall’s parlance in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, ensure “that the charity will flow . . . in the channel” that the donors expressly choose