Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-20-2025 
Cindy Pineda-Calix v. Attorney General United States of America 
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Recommended Citation 
"Cindy Pineda-Calix v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 140. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/140 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-2016 
____________ 
 
CINDY LISBETH PINEDA-CALIX, 
                                       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A220-934-265) 
Immigration Judge:  Nicole Lane 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 19, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, BIBAS and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 20, 2025) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
CHAGARES, Chief Judge.  
Cindy Lisbeth Pineda-Calix1 petitions for review of a decision by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying administrative closure and upholding the 
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
I.2 
 Pineda-Calix is a native and citizen of Honduras.  She entered the United States in 
August 2021 and shortly thereafter was served with a Notice to Appear charging her as 
removable for having entered the United States without being admitted or paroled.  The 
IJ sustained the charge of removability, and she applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and CAT protection.  The IJ denied relief.   
Pineda-Calix timely appealed to the BIA, claiming that the IJ erred in denying 
CAT protection.3  She also requested the BIA to administratively close her case.  The 
BIA issued its decision in May 2024.  It agreed that the IJ properly denied CAT 
protection, as the past harm to which Pineda-Calix testified did not meet the definition of 
torture and she did not establish a clear probability of future torture with the consent or 
acquiescence of the Honduran government.  The BIA also denied the request for 
 
1 Pineda-Calix’s minor child is a rider on her petition and does not assert any independent 
claims.  We therefore will refer only to Pineda-Calix in our discussion. 
2 We write for the parties and therefore recite only those facts pertinent to our decision. 
3 Pineda-Calix did not challenge the IJ’s denial of asylum or withholding of removal 
before the BIA.  She also has not presented any claims concerning asylum or withholding 
of removal in this Court.  Because the denial of asylum and withholding of removal are 
not before us, we will not discuss them in this opinion. 
3 
 
administrative closure because she “ha[d] not identified any form of relief that she [wa]s 
seeking separate and apart from these removal proceedings; nor ha[d] she identified an 
event that may affect the outcome of her case.”  Appendix (“App.”) 6 (citing Arcos 
Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2021)).  This timely petition for review 
followed. 
II.4 
 Pineda-Calix challenges the BIA’s denial of administrative closure and its dismissal 
of her appeal of the IJ’s CAT denial.  We address her claims in turn. 
A. 
Administrative closure is a form of discretionary relief permitting the BIA or IJ to 
“temporarily pause removal proceedings and place the case on hold because of a pending 
alternative resolution or because events outside the control of either party may affect the 
case.”5  Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 117 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Inestroza-Tosta v. Att’y Gen., 105 F.4th 499, 515–16 (3d Cir. 2024).  We review the 
denial of administrative closure for abuse of discretion.  Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 123.  
The BIA has explained appropriate considerations for administrative closure as follows: 
[W]hen evaluating a request for administrative closure, it is appropriate for 
an Immigration Judge or the Board to weigh all relevant factors presented 
in the case, including but not limited to: (1) the reason administrative 
 
4 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1). 
5 We generally lack jurisdiction to review discretionary determinations by the BIA.  See 
Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 2017).  We have authority to 
review the discretionary denial of administrative closure, however, because the BIA has 
constrained its discretion by setting forth factors to consider in evaluating an 
administrative closure request.  Inestroza-Tosta, 105 F.4th at 515–16. 
4 
 
closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to administrative closure; 
(3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, 
or other action he or she is pursuing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the 
anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility of either party, if 
any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate 
outcome of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the 
proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is recalendared 
before the Immigration Judge or the appeal is reinstated before the Board. 
Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 696 (B.I.A. 2012).  The BIA has discretion to 
weigh only relevant factors and it need not evaluate each one.  See Inestra-Tosta, 105 
F.4th at 517.   
Pineda-Calix contends that the BIA’s denial of administrative closure is erroneous 
because the BIA did not solicit the Government’s view, make findings of fact, or provide 
a reasoned explanation for denying relief.6  She also claims that she was denied “the 
opportunity to seek the benefit” of administrative closure.  Pineda-Calix Br. 17.  Her 
arguments are unpersuasive. 
Pineda-Calix had an adequate opportunity to pursue administrative closure before 
the BIA.  The BIA acknowledged its authority to direct administrative closure, cited 
relevant case law, and provided an analysis of the claim.  Its discussion of her claim, 
albeit brief, was sufficiently reasoned to permit our review. 
Pineda-Calix based her request for administrative closure on “the CAT facts 
 
6 Pineda-Calix also claims that the IJ erred by failing to consider administrative closure.  
Yet the Government correctly observes that she did not request administrative closure 
before the IJ.  To the extent she implies that only an IJ may consider an administrative 
closure claim, we disagree.  The BIA is empowered to consider administrative closure.  
See Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 116–17.  Indeed, in July 2024 (after this case was 
decided), the BIA’s authority to grant administrative closure was formally codified.  See 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), (l)(1).   
5 
 
testified to.”  Pineda-Calix Br. 9.  In other words, she did not claim to be pursuing relief 
outside of her immigration proceeding to satisfy the third Avetsiyan factor, and instead 
argued that her allegations of mistreatment by the gangs in Honduras provided a basis to 
administratively close her case.  No response from the Government or factfinding was 
necessary for the BIA to reach its determination that Pineda-Calix was not pursuing relief 
outside of her removal proceeding, as she conceded that fact.  The BIA thus relied on a 
relevant and undisputed Avetisyan factor in denying relief.  Pineda-Calix has not 
established that the BIA abused its discretion by rejecting her administrative closure 
claim on that basis.     
B.  
To prevail on her CAT claim, Pineda-Calix was required to show, among other 
things, that she “more likely than not” will be tortured if she returns to Honduras.  
Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 349 (3d Cir. 2008).  “Torture” refers to an 
intentionally inflicted harm that causes severe physical or mental pain or suffering, done 
for an illicit purpose with the consent or acquiescence of a public official, not arising 
from lawful sanctions.  See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Considerations include whether she experienced torture in the past and whether the gangs 
specifically intend to single her out for torture in the future.  See Hernandez Garmendia 
v. Att’y Gen., 28 F.4th 476, 484 (3d Cir. 2022); Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 166 
(3d Cir. 2010); Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002).  We review the 
denial of the CAT claim for substantial evidence.  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 350.  We 
therefore will uphold the decision unless the evidence compels an opposite result.  Kang, 
6 
 
611 F.3d at 164. 
In support of her application for CAT relief, Pineda-Calix testified that, on about 
five occasions from June 2017 through December 2020, armed gang members frisked 
her, robbed her, and ran away.  She did not testify about any physical injuries resulting 
from these crimes, although she did receive medical treatment for her nerves.  She also 
described the fear and harm inflicted by the gangs on her entire community, testifying 
that they “go around assaulting everybody that passes by them.”  AR 125.  She stated that 
she does not want to return to Honduras because she continues to fear gang assault. 
Pineda-Calix claims the BIA erred in determining that these experiences did not 
amount to torture because “[d]iscounting menacing threats where financial gain is 
involved is error.”  Pineda-Calix Br. 28.  Her claim is unpersuasive.  While the robberies 
she experienced were surely frightening, she does not cite evidence of record compelling 
a conclusion that those crimes rose to the level of torture or that the gangs targeted her 
personally such that she more likely than not will experience torture in the future.  We 
therefore will deny her claim.7   
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
7 Pineda-Calix also claims she established that the Honduran government is “unable or 
unwilling to provide law and order.”  Pineda-Calix Br. 31.  The BIA found, in contrast, 
that she failed to show a clear probability of torture “at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity 
in Honduras.”  App. 6.  We need not reach this issue because a failure to establish a 
likelihood of future torture is dispositive of the CAT claim. 


English

Cindy Pineda-Calix v. Attorney General United States of America

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-20-2025 
In Re: NFL Players Concussion Injury Litigation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: NFL Players Concussion Injury Litigation" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 148. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/148 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 23-1585 
____________ 
 
 
IN RE: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS CONCUSSION INJURY 
LITIGATION 
 
 
YVONNE SAGAPOLUTELE; MARGRIT DYKO; ANDRE HOWARD; DONNA 
MARTIN; RHONDA DUNCAN; LENORE STEHOUWER; NINA HUNTER; 
HOLLY OLIVER; MINDY STUBBS; GARY SCHUH; RONA TAYLOR; LISA 
CHAMBERLIN; GWENDOLYN DANIELS; WANDA CAYOLLE-PAYNE; JOHN 
H. BAKER, III; ELLEN MORIN; SEXTON HOLMES; AND ELLA MCGILL, 
 
Appellants 
 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:12-md-02323) 
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody 
____________ 
 
Argued on January 17, 2025 
 
Before: PHIPPS, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 20, 2025) 
 
 
2 
David J. Campbell  [ARGUED]  
Thompson & Horton 
8300 N. MoPac Expressway 
Suite 220 
Austin, TX 78759 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
Lynn B. Bayard 
Bruce A. Birenboim 
Brad S. Karp 
Kannon K. Shanmugam [ARGUED] 
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP 
1285 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10019 
 Counsel for Appellees 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________
 
 
FREEMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The representative claimants of eighteen retired NFL players sought compensation 
under the NFL Concussion Settlement Agreement.  They asserted that the retired players 
had been diagnosed with Death with Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“Death with 
CTE”).  The Claims Administrator denied their claims, the Special Master affirmed that 
decision, and the District Court denied the claimants’ objections.  We will affirm the 
District Court’s order. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
3 
I1 
Under the approved final Settlement Agreement for this class action, retired NFL 
players or their representative claimants may receive compensation if the retired players 
have certain qualifying diagnoses.  See In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion 
Inj. Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 423–24 (3d Cir. 2016) (“NFL 2016”).  One such diagnosis is 
Death with CTE.  The Settlement Agreement describes this as “a post-mortem diagnosis 
of CTE made by a board-certified neuropathologist.”  App. 1835. 
In February 2019, eighteen representative claimants sought compensation based 
on diagnoses of Death with CTE.  The claimants filed materially identical two-page 
letters from a board-certified neuropathologist, Dr. Ronald Hamilton.  The letters were 
undated.  In each letter, Dr. Hamilton stated the number of seasons the retired player had 
played in the NFL, provided a summary of CTE research, and opined “that it is more 
likely than not” that the retired player had CTE on his date of death.  App. 2453–54.  Dr. 
Hamilton did not examine the retired players’ brain tissue to render these diagnoses.  
The Claims Administrator denied each claim for lack of evidence that Dr. 
Hamilton conducted a brain-tissue examination to confirm his CTE diagnosis.  The 
claimants appealed to the Special Master, who affirmed the denials because of the lack of 
 
1 Because we write primarily for the parties, we recite only the facts necessary to our 
decision. 
 
4 
brain-tissue examinations.2  The claimants objected to the Special Master’s rulings, and 
the District Court denied the objections in a summary order.  
The District Court later issued an explanation for its ruling.  It relied on two 
sources of information to conclude that Death with CTE can be properly diagnosed only 
after a review of brain tissue.  First, it looked to the language of the Settlement 
Agreement.  It addressed two terms: “neuropathologist” and “post-mortem.”  It noted that 
a neuropathologist is a doctor who specializes in studying cells and tissue samples under 
a microscope, and a neuropathologist can only examine a retired player’s brain tissue 
after the player’s death.  Second, it looked to two prior judicial opinions addressing the 
Settlement Agreement.  Both opinions addressed the science underlying a Death with 
CTE diagnosis.  In the District Court’s 2015 opinion granting final approval to the 
Settlement Agreement, it wrote that “no one can conclusively say that someone had CTE 
until a scientist looks at sections of that person’s brain under a microscope to see if 
abnormally phosphorylated tau protein . . . is present, and if so whether it is present in a 
reportedly unique pattern.”  In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 
307 F.R.D. 351, 397 (E.D. Pa. 2015).  And in this Court’s 2016 opinion affirming the 
final approval, we made similar observations.  See NFL 2016, 821 F.3d at 421–22 (noting 
that “CTE involves the build-up of ‘tau protein’ in the brain”; that “it is only diagnosable 
post-mortem”; and that “diagnosis requires examining sections of a person’s brain under 
 
2 The Special Master also affirmed the Claims Administrator’s denial of the claims on a 
second ground: that the claims were untimely.  The District Court did not reach that 
issue, and the claimants did not address it their appeal to us.      
 
5 
a microscope to see if abnormal tau proteins are present and, if so, whether they occur in 
the unique pattern associated with CTE”).  Based on all this, the District Court concluded 
that the claims were properly denied for lack of brain-tissue examinations. 
The claimants timely appealed.    
II3 
The Settlement Agreement is a contract subject to the principles of contract 
interpretation.  Rainbow v. Swisher, 527 N.E.2d 258, 259 (N.Y. 1988); App. 1820 
(selecting New York state law to govern the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement).  
When a contract is “clear, complete and subject to only one reasonable interpretation” 
(i.e., when the contract is unambiguous), it must be enforced according to the plain 
meaning of its language without reference to extrinsic evidence.  Brad H. v. City of New 
York, 951 N.E.2d 743, 746 (N.Y. 2011); Rainbow, 527 N.E.2d at 259.  However, when a 
contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation (i.e., when the contract 
is ambiguous), courts may consider extrinsic evidence.  Brad H., 951 N.E.2d at 746. 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s interpretation of the Settlement 
Agreement’s terms for clear error, and we apply plenary review to its construction of the 
Settlement Agreement.  Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Inj. Litig., 923 F.3d 
96, 107 n.8 (3d Cir. 2019).  Under the clear error standard, we will not interfere with the 
District Court’s decision unless, after reviewing the evidence, we are “left with a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  In re Cendant Corp. Prides 
Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Various Articles of 
Merchandise, 230 F.3d 649, 655 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 
 
6 
The District Court treated the Settlement Agreement as ambiguous and considered 
extrinsic evidence (two judicial opinions referring to scientific information) when it 
interpreted the Settlement Agreement’s requirement of a Qualifying Diagnosis of Death 
with CTE.  We need not resolve whether the Settlement Agreement is ambiguous or not 
because, either way, we will affirm the District Court’s order.  To the extent that the 
Settlement Agreement is unambiguous, its terms—read together and in context—mean 
that a Death with CTE diagnosis can be made only after examining brain tissue under a 
microscope.  But even if we were to conclude that the Settlement Agreement is 
ambiguous, the District Court’s reading of the scientific sources was reasonable.4 
*  * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying the 
claimants’ objections.5 
 
4 In their appellate brief, the claimants argued that the District Court’s interpretation of 
the Settlement Agreement conflicts with their due process rights as absent class members.  
Those due process arguments do not sway our conclusion that the District Court properly 
denied these claims for compensation.  Further, as claimants acknowledged at oral 
argument, any independent due process claim is beyond the scope of this appeal. 
5 Judge Chung joins in the judgment.  She would conclude that the contract 
unambiguously does not require a particular method of diagnosing Death with 
CTE.  However, she would still affirm the District Court’s order because the Settlement 
Agreement requires that a diagnosis of Death with CTE be obtained within, at the latest, 
270 days of final approval of the Settlement Agreement.  This effectively requires a brain 
examination, as that was the only way to diagnose Death with CTE at the relevant 
time.  See NFL 2016, 821 F.3d at 421–22; In re Nat’l Football League Players 
Concussion Inj. Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 397. 


In Re: NFL Players Concussion Injury Litigation

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-27-2025 
Emile Dominique, IV v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New 
York Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Emile Dominique, IV v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York Inc" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 173. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/173 
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CLD-071        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3089 
___________ 
 
EMILE J. DOMINIQUE, IV, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY (Jehovah’s Witnesses); DONALD 
TRUMP; MIKE JOHNSON; RING; COMCAST; THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY; 
INSTAGRAM LLC 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Action No. 2:24-cv-05626) 
District Judge:  Honorable John M. Younge 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 23, 2025 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 27, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Emile Dominique IV appeals pro se from the District Court’s October 31, 2024 
dismissal order under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We will summarily affirm. 
 Dominique’s complaint asserts various federal and state law claims against 
defendants Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, President Donald Trump, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives Mike Johnson, Ring LLC, Comcast, the Walt Disney 
Company, and Instagram LLC. Those claims, and the factual bases provided, are difficult 
to follow, but generally revolve around alleged campaigns of harassment and defamation 
by each defendant. Dominique asserted that the District Court possessed diversity 
jurisdiction over the state law claims.  
 The District Court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 
dismissed the federal claims with prejudice as factually frivolous. It also dismissed the 
state law claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after declining to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction and concluding that Dominique had not sufficiently 
pleaded diversity jurisdiction. This timely appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s 
sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a 
substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
3 
 
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Dominique’s federal claims as 
frivolous. “To be frivolous, a claim must rely on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ 
or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” Mitchell v. Horn, 
318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 
(1989)); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992). The claims are based 
on allegations that the defendants have all, in various ways, engaged in campaigns of 
harassment and defamation against Dominique. For example, the complaint alleges that 
Comcast “targeted [Dominique] massively in commercials, movies, books, podcast, and 
all other media” in an effort to “persuade others to believe that [Dominique is] ‘Satan.’” 
Complaint at 15. The District Court did not err in dismissing these claims as frivolous. 
With respect to claims that Dominique sought to bring under state law, the District 
Court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, No. 23-677, 
2025 WL 96212, at *5 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2025); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 
172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). And because Dominique failed to plead complete diversity of 
citizenship between the parties, no independent basis for jurisdiction over the state law 
claims existed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 
800 F.3d 99, 106 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
4 
 
8(a)(1), plaintiffs are required to plead the basis for federal jurisdiction).1 Given the 
nature of Dominique’s filings in the District Court and in this Court, we conclude that 
providing leave to amend the complaint would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
 
1 The complaint avers that Dominique is a citizen of Georgia, and for each corporate 
defendant, lists the state in which they are incorporated and the state(s) in which they 
“currently operate.” Complaint at 8 & 9. It does not list where any of the corporations 
have their principal place of business, nor does it identify the citizenship of any of the 
members of the LLC defendants. See Lincoln Benefit, 800 F.3d at 104-05. It also does 
not allege that the defendants are “not . . . citizen[s] of [Dominique]’s state of 
citizenship.” Id. at 107.  


Emile Dominique, IV v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York Inc

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-7-2025 
Servis One Inc v. OKS Group International PVT Ltd 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Servis One Inc v. OKS Group International PVT Ltd" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 189. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/189 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1301 
____________ 
 
SERVIS ONE INC, d/b/a BSI Financial Services, Inc.; BSI FINANCIAL HOLDINGS, INC.; 
ENTRA SOLUTIONS PVT LTD; GAGAN SHARMA, 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
OKS GROUP LLC; OKS GROUP INTERNATIONAL PVT LTD; VINIT KHANNA 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2:20-cv-04661) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 10, 2024 
____________ 
 
Before:  BIBAS, CHUNG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed March 7, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION1 
____________ 
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. 
This case turns on whether lawyers had their client’s express authorization to enter 
 
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
into a settlement agreement.  The District Court found that they did not, and because this 
finding is not clearly erroneous, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND2 
 
Servis One, Inc., d/b/a BSI Financial Services, Inc. (“BSI”) hired OKS Group, 
LLC (“OKS”) to provide data entry support in India.  When BSI ended the relationship, 
OKS responded by accusing BSI of misappropriating trade secrets and breaching their 
contract.  OKS brought its claims against BSI via three actions: (1) an arbitration 
proceeding in Philadelphia, (2) a civil action in India, and (3) a criminal complaint in 
India.  In connection with these actions, OKS hired U.S. attorneys from Duane Morris 
LLP.  OKS also hired Indian attorney Aditya Wadhwa to assist in the criminal action.   
In July 2018, the night before arbitration was to begin, the parties seemingly 
agreed to a settlement in principle.  The settlement would have resolved all three actions.  
However, Wadhwa advised OKS’s CEO and lawyers from Duane Morris that OKS could 
not withdraw or settle the Indian criminal action without running afoul of Indian law and 
suggested that OKS “handle the Indian disputes independently.”  JA1341.  Accordingly, 
the parties never signed the agreement.   
Attempting to enforce the July 2018 settlement in principle, BSI sued OKS in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in August 2019.  In 
response to that action, OKS argued that though the parties had reached a settlement in 
 
2 Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision.  
While BSI challenges several of the District Court’s findings of fact, we rely here only 
upon uncontested factual findings or facts drawn directly from the record. 
 
3 
principle, they had both operated under a mutual mistake of law concerning OKS’s 
ability to withdraw the Indian criminal action.   
Meanwhile, the parties continued to try to reach a settlement.  Attempts at 
settlement intensified beginning in December 2019 and continuing through March 10, 
2020.  During that time, the attorneys for the parties negotiated through a series of emails 
and phone calls.  The negotiations primarily focused on how the settlement agreement 
would address the Indian criminal proceeding.  Throughout this period, the Duane Morris 
attorneys continued to communicate with OKS through its CEO and their discussions 
likewise focused on addressing the Indian criminal action, as well as other OKS 
demands.   
The Duane Morris attorneys and OKS’s CEO scheduled a call for March 10, 2020, 
to discuss the settlement agreement and the CEO’s concerns relating to the Indian 
criminal proceedings.  Despite concerns about potentially “jump[ing] the gun,” less than 
two hours before the call with their client, a Duane Morris attorney authorized BSI’s 
attorney to sign and file a letter notifying the Court that the parties had agreed to a 
settlement.  JA642–43.  Believing the case was settled, the Court dismissed the case with 
prejudice.   
OKS’s CEO continued to communicate with the Duane Morris attorneys, 
expressing concerns with the settlement, particularly with respect to the Indian criminal 
action, and requesting changes to it.  Unbeknownst to OKS, these requests were futile 
because the case had already been dismissed.  OKS’s CEO was not made aware of the 
dismissal until months later.   
 
4 
BSI filed this action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enforce the alleged 
new 2020 settlement agreement.  The Court held a bench trial and heard testimony from 
BSI’s attorney, OKS’s CEO, and two Duane Morris attorneys.  The Court found that 
“OKS had not authorized a settlement as of Friday, March 6, 2020,” JA13 (FOF 56), nor 
did OKS authorize the Duane Morris attorneys to agree to the March 10 settlement.   
BSI timely appealed.  BSI argues that a settlement agreement was formed between 
BSI and OKS on either February 20 or March 4 of 2020.  Thus, BSI challenges the 
District Court’s finding that “OKS had not authorized a settlement as of Friday, March 6, 
2020.”  JA13 (FOF 56). 
II. DISCUSSION3 
 
This background belies a relatively simple factual issue:  did the Duane Morris 
attorneys have express authorization from OKS to enter into the purported settlement 
agreement?  The District Court concluded that the answer was “no,” and because this was 
not clear error, we will affirm. 
Under Pennsylvania law,4 a lawyer can bind a client to a settlement agreement 
only if the client has expressly authorized the lawyer to do so.  Reutzel v. Douglas, 870 
A.2d 787, 789–90 (Pa. 2005).  The scope of an agency relationship, including the 
presence of express authority, is a question of fact.  Volunteer Fire Co. of New Buffalo v. 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
4 We apply state law to determine the scope of an attorney’s authority to enter into a 
settlement agreement.  Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1032–33 (3d Cir. 1991).  Both 
parties assume that Pennsylvania law applies, and we agree.   
 
5 
Hilltop Oil Co., 602 A.2d 1348, 1351–52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); see Gillian v. Consol. 
Foods Corp., 227 A.2d 858, 861 (Pa. 1967); King v. Driscoll, 296 A.3d 1178, 1185 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2023).  Therefore, we review the District Court’s finding that the Duane 
Morris attorneys lacked express authority for clear error.  United States v. U.S. Sugar 
Corp., 73 F.4th 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2023).  A finding is clearly erroneous when we are “left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between 
them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
First, BSI argues that on February 20, 2020, the parties entered into an oral 
settlement agreement with express authority from OKS.  The Duane Morris attorneys do 
not dispute that they called attorneys for BSI and orally agreed to terms offered by BSI.5  
These attorneys did so after they explained newly proposed terms of the settlement to the 
CEO of OKS and he “responded by saying something like ‘that’s fine.’”  JA8 (FOF 
35.b).  Wadhwa was not on the call.  According to BSI, this utterance was a grant of 
 
5 Apart from any issue of express authority, the parties dispute whether the February 
20 oral agreement was an enforceable final settlement.  OKS also contends that BSI 
cannot raise its argument that an enforceable agreement was reached on February 20 
because it failed to make that argument in the District Court.  Because we hold that the 
District Court did not clearly err in finding that the Duane Morris attorneys were not 
authorized to enter into a final settlement agreement on February 20, we need not 
determine whether the February 20 phone call would have constituted a final settlement 
agreement or if BSI can even raise this argument. 
 
 
6 
express authority to settle.   
In Pennsylvania, express authority “must be the result of explicit instructions 
regarding settlement.”  Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1033 (citing Senyshyn v. Karlak, 299 A.2d 
294, 297 (Pa. 1973)).  We cannot conclude that the District Court clearly erred in finding 
that “something like ‘that’s fine’” fell short of this standard.  JA8 (FOF 35.b).  In the 
context of the record of prolonged negotiations, “that’s fine” may have signaled approval 
of one or more specific proposed changes6 discussed on the call, yet fallen short of 
providing “explicit instructions regarding settlement,” especially when considering the 
consistent concerns voiced by OKS and Wadha that the Indian criminal matter be kept 
separate from the settlement.  While the District Court could have found that “that’s fine” 
was express approval, it did not and its finding is a permissible view of the evidence that 
is, therefore, not clearly erroneous.  See Scully, 238 F.3d at 506.7 
Turning to March 4, 2020, the analysis is much the same.  BSI claims that the 
Duane Morris attorneys entered into a written settlement agreement via a series of emails 
 
6  These proposed changes included deleting a clause regarding the criminal case and 
adding a clause permitting BSI to terminate the settlement if police in India prosecuted 
BSI.   
 
7 We do not consider two arguments forfeited by BSI.  One argument is forfeited 
because BSI did not raise it below (arguing that Duane Morris attorneys’ reasonable 
belief they received express authorization to settle itself established express authority) 
and the other is forfeited because it was raised for the first time in BSI’s reply brief 
(arguing that OKS ratified settlement by not repudiating emails from the Duane Morris 
attorneys stating that the parties were “in conceptual agreement” and had “verbally 
acceded in principle,” BSI Reply Br. 9 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Doe v. 
Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2017) (arguments not raised in the 
District Court); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 204 n.29 (3d Cir. 
1990) (arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief). 
 
7 
on March 3 and 4 of 2024.  BSI argues that this agreement was expressly authorized 
because, on March 2, 2020, the Duane Morris attorneys told the CEO of OKS that they 
would “respond to BSI’s counsel, advising that we are amenable to the settlement 
agreement as drafted, with the exception of a request for clarification.”  BSI Op. Br. 33 
(quoting JA12 (FOF 48)).  The CEO responded by stating “Keep it simple,” cutting and 
pasting the Duane Morris attorneys’ language explaining their proposed course of action, 
and then writing “OK.”  Id. (quoting JA12 (FOF 49)). 
Again, we perceive no clear error in the District Court’s choice between two 
permissible views of the CEO’s email; namely that it fell short of the required “explicit 
instructions regarding settlement.”  Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1033 (citing Senyshyn, 299 A.2d 
at 297).  Like the statement on February 20, this language could be read to signal 
approval of a specific proposed change, rather than explicitly approving a final 
settlement.  This is especially apparent when examining the immediately preceding 
emails between OKS’s CEO and the Duane Morris lawyers, which reveal persistent 
disagreement and concerns by OKS regarding the impact of the settlement on the Indian 
criminal action.   
The same can be said regarding BSI’s argument that OKS ratified the agreement 
when OKS’s CEO responded to a Duane Morris email containing the Duane Morris 
attorneys’ counteroffer to BSI with the words “Understood” and “Works.”  BSI Op. Br. 
34 (quoting JA1614).  Again, “Understood” and “Works” do not render the District 
 
8 
Court’s choice between two permissible findings clearly erroneous.8 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
8 BSI also argues that the District Court clearly erred in describing the terms of the 
settlement agreement proposed at various times.  BSI Op. Br. 42–47.  Even assuming 
such errors were made, they do not affect our conclusion that the District Court did not 
clearly err in determining that OKS did not expressly authorize the Duane Morris 
attorneys to settle the case.  In other words, any error was harmless because “it is highly 
probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case.”  Brennan v. Norton, 350 
F.3d 399, 416 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 


Servis One Inc v. OKS Group International PVT Ltd

Alvaré, Helen M.

Religious Freedom and the Status/Conduct Problem in Nondiscrimination Cases

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

Linda Atiyeh v. Borough of Gettysburg

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-18-2025 
Christopher Forman v. District Attorney Philadelphia 
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Recommended Citation 
"Christopher Forman v. District Attorney Philadelphia" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 213. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/213 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 23-2587 
_____________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER FORMAN, 
Appellant 
v. 
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA; 
SUPERINTENDENT FRACKVILLE SCI 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2:21-cv-04707) 
District Judge: Hon. Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2024 
_____________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 18, 2025) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
  
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Eliezer Colon returned home to find his front door deadbolted from the inside. At 
the back door, two men were dragging away his gun safe. Both fled, but Colon pursued 
and restrained Christopher Forman until police arrived. A jury convicted Forman of 
burglary of an “occupied structure . . . in which at the time of the offense any person is 
present.” See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502(a)(1)(ii). This aggravated form of burglary carried 
an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence because Forman had been convicted of a 
crime of violence before his arrest. See 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 9714(a)(1).  
Forman appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence that anyone was present 
inside the home during the burglary. Commonwealth v. Forman, No. 3389 EDA 2019, 
2020 WL 6281755, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2020). The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court rejected this argument by analogizing to its prior holding that “when a homeowner 
is seated on the back porch of her home at the time it is burglarized, the homeowner is 
present ‘within the structure.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 585 A.2d 
533, 534 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)). And “the potential for greater mischief and violence,” 
the statutory scheme’s purpose, was “actually realized” when Colon caught Forman in 
the act. Id. at *5. Forman then timely filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising 
the same challenge. The District Court denied Forman’s petition but issued a certificate 
of appealability.1  
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Where, as here, the District Court did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, our review is plenary. Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 99 (3d Cir. 
2005).  
3 
 
A petitioner challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for a state criminal 
conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is entitled to relief if “upon the record evidence 
adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). But the findings “must 
be gauged in the light of applicable [state] law defining the element.” Id. And “it is not 
the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-
law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). 
Based on his unrebutted testimony, a rational jury could conclude that Colon 
stepped onto the porch and attempted to enter his home during the burglary. Forman 
agrees but argues that because Colon never made it across the threshold, he was merely 
present at his house and not in it. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered, 
and rejected, Forman’s construction of the statute. Forman, 2020 WL 6281755, at *5. We 
lack the authority to reconsider that determination of Pennsylvania law on habeas 
review.2 See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 
2 To the extent Forman raises a constitutional challenge based on the insufficiency 
of the evidence to support his conviction, this argument fails. As stated above, under the 
relevant Pennsylvania burglary statute, a person is “present” when he returns home after 
the defendant has already entered his home. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stepp, 652 A.2d 
922, 923–24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). “[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution,” see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, any rational trier of fact could have found 
that a person was “present” at the time of the burglary, based on the evidence that the 
victims 1) returned home during the offense, 2) attempted to enter their home but could 
not, 3) drove to the back of their home where they encountered Forman, and 4) ultimately 
chased and apprehended him. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the 
conviction. 


Christopher Forman v. District Attorney Philadelphia

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-21-2025 
Emile Dominique, IV v. DOD 
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Recommended Citation 
"Emile Dominique, IV v. DOD" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 223. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/223 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
ALD-102        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3087 
___________ 
 
EMILE J. DOMINIQUE, IV, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-05752) 
District Judge:  Honorable John M. Younge 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 13, 2025 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 21, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 The District Court dismissed Emile J. Dominique IV’s complaint as frivolous 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We will summarily affirm. 
 Dominique’s complaint asserts various federal constitutional claims against the 
United States Department of Defense (DOD) and seeks $40 trillion in compensatory and 
punitive damages. The complaint alleges that the DOD engaged in targeted, continuous, 
publicly broadcasted surveillance of Dominique, who claims to be the Messiah. The 
District Court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it 
with prejudice as factually frivolous. This timely appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s 
sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a 
substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Dominique’s complaint as 
frivolous. “To be frivolous, a claim must rely on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ 
or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 
F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 
(1989)); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992). The complaint relies 
on a clearly baseless or delusional factual scenario, alleging that the DOD placed 
Dominique “on live TV[] that anyone could access” and allowed the public to watch 
Dominique’s everyday activities, all in an effort “to ensure that [C]hristianity[] gets 
 
3 
 
wiped out as a whole.” Complaint at 6. The District Court thus did not err in dismissing 
these claims as frivolous. 
Given the nature of Dominique’s filings in the District Court and in this Court, we 
conclude that providing leave to amend the complaint would have been futile. See 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 


Emile Dominique, IV v. DOD

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-21-2025 
David Hatchigian v. Exelon Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"David Hatchigian v. Exelon Corp" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 224. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/224 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
ALD-100        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2776 
__________ 
 
DAVID HATCHIGIAN; JOAN RANDAZZO; BRIDJETTE CANNADY; MARIO 
RULLO; JACLYN MAHONEY; JOSEPH J. BRANCONI; MICHELLE D. MAHONEY, 
TYRONE ZACHARY; LETICA S. MARKS; JOHN GARDNER; TIMMY SMITH; 
LARRY VELENTE; CHRIS GROGAN; GABRIEL R. SAFFIOTI; ROBERT H. LEVY; 
CAROLYN BOXMEYER; JOHN J. FLANNERY; OLIVER YOUNG 
 
DAVID HATCHIGIAN  
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
EXELON CORP.; MUNICIPAL INSPECTION CORP.; PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC 
UTILITY COMMISSION; GLADYS BROWN DUTRIEUILLE, in her capacity as 
Chairman and Commissioner of PAPUC; JOHN F. COLEMAN, in his capacity as Vice 
Chairman and Commissioner of PAPUC; RALPH V. YANORA, in his capacity as 
Commissioner of PAPUC; PECO ENERGY CO., an Exelon Co. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-2170) 
District Judge:  Honorable Chad F. Kenney 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6 
March 13, 2025 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 21, 2025) 
___________ 
 
 
2 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant David Hatchigian appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion 
for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). For the 
following reasons, we will affirm.  
I 
 In 2022, after failing to obtain relief in state court and before the Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission (PUC), Hatchigian filed what purported to be a class action in 
the District Court against the Appellees arising out of the loss of electrical service to a 
multi-occupant house he owned and rented. The Appellees filed motions to dismiss, 
which the District Court granted on July 12, 2023. Hatchigian did not appeal.   
 Hatchigian moved for relief from judgment almost a year later, on July 10, 2024, 
under Rule 60(b)(1). He claimed: (1) the District Court erred in dismissing his claims 
against PECO for lack of state action; (2) the amended complaint sufficiently alleged that 
PUC was a state actor; and (3) the District Court overlooked his malicious prosecution 
and abuse of process claims. 
On September 3, 2024, the District Court denied the motion on the grounds that it 
was untimely. The District Court determined that Hatchigian was attempting to use Rule 
60(b)(1) improperly as a substitute for an appeal and that as such it was untimely. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
3 
 
Hatchigian then filed this appeal. Appellees have filed a timely motion for summary 
affirmance to which Hatchigian has not responded.  
 
II 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Summary action is appropriate if 
there is no substantial question presented in the appeal. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4. We review 
a district court’s denial of a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) for abuse of discretion. See 
Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). 
III 
Under Rule 60(b)(1), a party may move for relief from judgment based on a 
“mistake,” which includes legal error. See Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533-34 
(2022). Such a motion, however, must be filed within a reasonable time and no more than 
one year after entry of the judgment that is challenged. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). But 
absent exceptional circumstances, Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal. See Morris v. 
Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 1999). Where allegations of legal error could have been 
raised on appeal, they should not be raised instead in a Rule 60(b)(1) motion filed after 
the time to appeal has expired. See Kemp, 596 U.S. at 538; Blitch v. United States, 39 
F.4th 827, 834 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that “a Rule 60(b) motion filed after the time to 
appeal has run that seeks to remedy errors that are correctable on appeal will typically not 
be filed within a reasonable time”) (citation omitted). As the District Court explained, all 
of the arguments in Hatchigian’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion could have been raised on appeal. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.     
 
4 
 
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we grant the 
Appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.   
 


David Hatchigian v. Exelon Corp

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-21-2025 
USA v. Anderson Coutinho-Silva 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Anderson Coutinho-Silva" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 225. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/225 
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ALD-101        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2247 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANDERSON JOSE COUTINHO-SILVA, 
    Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Criminal No. 2:10-cr-00002-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable John M. Younge 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 13, 2025 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 21, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Anderson Jose Coutinho-Silva appeals pro se from the District Court’s denial of 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
his motions for a sentence reduction.  The Government has filed a motion for summary 
action.  For the reasons that follow, we grant the Government’s motion and will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
Coutinho-Silva is serving a 207-month sentence for his convictions for Hobbs Act 
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), using a firearm during and in relation to a 
crime of violence under § 924(c), and being an alien in possession of a firearm under 
§ 922(g)(5)(A).  His convictions stem from the October 8, 2009 armed robbery of a 
Philadelphia pizza shop, when he shot a customer in the chest. 
In December 2023 and May 2024, Coutinho-Silva filed motions for a sentence 
reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), arguing that retroactive changes to the 
Sentencing Guidelines allowed him to qualify for a reduction to his sentence.  In 
response, the Government acknowledged that Coutinho-Silva was eligible for a reduction 
but argued that the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against granting 
any reduction.  The District Court agreed and denied Coutinho-Silva’s motion on that 
basis. Coutinho-Silva has appealed.   
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a district court’s 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary, while our review of the ultimate 
decision to grant or deny an authorized sentence reduction is for abuse of discretion.  See 
United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).  We may summarily affirm a 
district court’s decision if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
We grant the Government’s motion for summary action.  The parties do not 
 
3 
 
dispute that Coutinho-Silva was eligible for a sentence reduction.  However, as required 
by § 3582(c)(2), the District Court then considered the sentencing factors under 
§ 3553(a).  See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010) (explaining that, after 
determining whether a litigant is eligible for a sentence modification, “§ 3582(c)(2) 
instructs a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in 
its discretion, the reduction authorized . . . is warranted in whole or in part under the 
particular circumstances of the case”).  Those factors include “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), as well as the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, . . . to provide just punishment for the offense,” 
“to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C). 
The District Court noted that Coutinho-Silva was given a sentence at the highest 
end of the guideline range to reflect the severity of his offense, as he near-fatally shot the 
bystander victim during a robbery.  The victim needed extensive rehabilitation to recover 
from the shooting and strongly opposes Coutinho-Silva’s early release. Coutinho-Silva 
was also on probation for a burglary offense at the time that he committed this robbery.   
Further, the District Court discussed Coutinho-Silva’s extensive post-incarceration 
disciplinary record, which suggests that he continues to pose a danger to the public, as he 
has been repeatedly disciplined for setting fires, assault, fighting and disruptive behavior, 
and failure to comply with orders.  The District Court concluded that all of these factors 
weighed strongly against a sentence reduction and showed that Coutinho-Silva’s original 
 
4 
 
sentence appropriately reflected the seriousness of his conduct. 
On appeal, Coutinho-Silva argues that he is not a danger to the community 
because he will be deported once his sentence is complete, and because he insists that 
none of his post-incarceration disciplinary infractions were serious. However, he provides 
no evidence in support of those arguments, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the 
District Court’s decision to deny a sentence reduction under the circumstances of this 
case. 
We are satisfied that the District Court “carefully articulated its reasons for not 
granting [a] reduction” and thus undertook the kind of “reasoned appraisal to which we 
defer on review.”  See United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Because this appeal does not present a substantial 
question, we grant the Government’s motion for summary action, and we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.1 
 
1  The Government’s request to be excused from filing a brief is granted. 


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