Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-20-2025 
Christopher Roberts v. Jennifer Gettle 
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Recommended Citation 
"Christopher Roberts v. Jennifer Gettle" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 510. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/510 
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CLD-141        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 23-3198 
___________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JENNIFER W. GETTLE; RICHARD A. LEWIS; 
EDWARD M. MARSICO, JR. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00790) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 1, 2025 
 
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 20, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
PER CURIAM 
Appellant Christopher Roberts, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s 
order adopting the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation and dismissing his 
complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim.  We will affirm.  
Roberts filed a complaint against Assistant District Attorney Jennifer W. Gettle 
and Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas Judges Richard A. Lewis and Edward M. 
Marsico, Jr. regarding a condition of his probation.  In January 2019 Roberts pled guilty 
to burglary, theft by unlawful taking, and aggravated cruelty to animals – torture.  As part 
of Roberts’ sentence, and upon request of ADA Gettle, Judge Lewis added a condition to 
Roberts’ probation that he was prohibited from having contact with animals.  Three years 
later, while Roberts was out on parole, a dog was discovered in his home in violation of 
this condition.  Judge Marsico therefore revoked Roberts’ parole and sentenced him to a 
term of not less than two-and-a-half to no more than seven years’ incarceration.  Judge 
Marsico also re-imposed the no-contact-with-animals condition.   
Roberts alleged in his complaint that the requirement he have no contact with 
animals violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act (RA), 
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  Roberts requested money 
damages and injunctive and declaratory relief setting this condition aside.  The District 
Court referred the complaint to a United States Magistrate Judge, who screened it 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  The Magistrate Judge then issued a report, 
recommending the District Court dismiss the complaint with prejudice because (1) the 
 
 
3 
named defendants were immune to civil suit, (2) abstention was proper pursuant to 
Younger v. Harris, and (3) Roberts failed to state a cognizable claim for relief under the 
ADA, RA or Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  On December 1, 2023, 
the District Court overruled Roberts’ objections to the report,1 set forth detailed reasoning 
and analysis as to why it was adopting the report and its recommendation, and dismissed 
Roberts’ complaint without leave to amend.  Roberts timely appealed the order.  In this 
Court, he has also requested appointment of counsel.  
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing Roberts’ complaint with 
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 
373 (3d Cir. 2020).  Dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B) are 
governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 
1999) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard in appeal of dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).  
This standard requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).  We must also 
draw all reasonable inferences in Roberts’ favor.  See Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp., 992 
F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 
 
1 Roberts asserted that absolute immunity does not apply to injunctive and declaratory 
relief and that he should have been given leave to amend his complaint.  
 
 
4 
(3d Cir. 2016)).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  See Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).   
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
actions performed as the state’s advocate.  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 
(1976).  This immunity shields all acts “intimately associated with the judicial phase of 
the criminal process.”  Id. at 430.  Judges are also immune from civil liability for acts 
taken in their judicial capacity.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–57 (1978).  
“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was 
done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability 
only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”  Id. at 356–57 (quotation 
marks omitted). 
ADA Gettle was operating in her official capacity as prosecutor during the judicial 
phase of Roberts’ case when she requested this probation condition be incorporated into 
his sentence.  Moreover, Judge Lewis’ sentencing, where he articulated on the record that 
this probation condition was tied to Roberts’ conviction for aggravated animal abuse, and 
Judge Marsico revocation of Roberts’ parole for violating this condition and re-
imposition of the condition, were acts taken in their judicial capacity.  Accordingly, ADA 
Gettle was entitled to absolute immunity and Judges Lewis and Marsico were entitled to 
judicial immunity to the extent that Roberts sought damages against them.   
Further, to the extent that Roberts sought, as injunctive relief, to have this part of 
his criminal judgment, imposed by the sentencing judge, set aside, his claim must be 
 
 
5 
pursued via habeas.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 651 (7th Cir. 
2018). 
Considering the foregoing, the District Court did not err in dismissing Roberts’ 
complaint without leave to amend after determining that further amendment would have 
been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Roberts’ motions 
for the appointment of counsel are denied.  See Tabon v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 
1993). 


Christopher Roberts v. Jennifer Gettle

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-1-2025 
Assata Hackman v. Inductev 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Assata Hackman v. Inductev" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 530. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/530 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3223 
__________ 
 
ASSATA ACEY HACKMAN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
INDUCTEV 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01438) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2025 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 1, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Assata Acey Hackman, proceeding pro se, appeals from orders granting a motion 
to dismiss in part and granting a motion for summary judgment in an action raising race 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
and sex-based employment discrimination and related claims. We will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.  
I. 
 Hackman was hired as a technician at InductEV (formerly Momentum Dynamics 
Corporation) in June 2021. In May 2022, she filed a pro se complaint with the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission alleging that she experienced sex and race-
based discrimination, harassment, and retaliation while working at InductEV. She later 
amended the complaint, and shortly thereafter the case was transferred to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  
In September 2022, Hackman participated in a private mediation with InductEV 
during which the parties reached an agreement: in exchange for Hackman’s resignation 
and release of her claims, InductEV would pay her $50,000 and provide a neutral 
reference for future employment. A few days later, after a disagreement over her request 
for two days of paid time off, Hackman refused to sign the written settlement agreement 
and InductEV, operating under the belief that she had resigned, terminated her 
employment. A few weeks later, Hackman filed an amended charge of discrimination 
with the EEOC, alleging several categories of violations, including that she was 
terminated in retaliation for filing her original complaint.  
The EEOC subsequently issued a Notice of Right to Sue, and in March 2023, 
proceeding pro se, Hackman filed an employment discrimination action against InductEV 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County. InductEV timely removed the action to 
federal court and moved to dismiss. The District Court partially granted the motion, 
3 
dismissing seven of Hackman’s twenty claims with prejudice and three without prejudice. 
It denied the motion to dismiss as to the remaining ten claims, and granted Hackman 
leave to amend her complaint as to the claims dismissed without prejudice. Hackman 
filed a motion for reconsideration regarding some of the claims dismissed with prejudice 
which the District Court denied.1 The District Court later granted the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment and dismissed the remaining claims, and Hackman timely 
appealed.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment de novo.” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288 
(3d Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 
418, 422–23 (3d Cir. 2006). We construe Hackman’s pro se filings liberally. See 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). 
Hackman’s opening brief challenges the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment with respect to her racial discrimination claims, Title VII and Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act (PHRA) hostile work environment claims, and Title VII and PHRA 
 
1 At this point, Hackman filed an interlocutory appeal (docketed in this Court at C.A. 
No. 24-1521) of the denial of her motion for reconsideration and the dismissal of certain 
claims with prejudice, which we dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  
4 
retaliation claims.2 Her arguments are difficult to parse, in large part because she 
provides minimal citations to the voluminous record available in the District Court. Of 
the citations she does provide, many either do not exist, are not what she says they are, 
lack sufficient context, or merely direct our attention to other citations to the record. See 
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (explaining that an appellant’s “argument . . . must 
contain . . . [the] appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the 
authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 28.3(c) 
(“All assertions of fact in briefs must be supported by a specific reference to the 
record.”). Nevertheless, we address each set of claims in turn. 
III. 
To establish her racial discrimination claims, Hackman needed to show (1) she is a 
member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she sought to attain or 
retain; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under 
circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. Makky v. 
Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). The District Court granted summary judgment on her claims 
 
2 Hackman’s opening brief does not make any arguments regarding the District Court’s 
dismissal of Counts II, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, and XX of her complaint, nor any of its 
orders denying her motions thereafter. She has thus forfeited these issues. See In re 
Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that litigants forfeit claims that they 
fail to develop in an opening brief). To the extent that she attempts to raise arguments 
regarding whether the defects noted by the District Court in Counts I, III, IV, and IX of 
her complaint were curable and whether she should have been granted leave to amend, 
she does so by reference to the brief from her interlocutory appeal (which she has 
included within the over 1200 pages attached as her index). Even if we were to consider 
these arguments, but see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8), they lack merit. 
5 
of racial discrimination because “the undisputed evidence shows that she was unqualified 
for the Senior Technician position,” ECF No. 168 at 7, and she failed to demonstrate that 
this nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting her to that position was pretextual. We 
agree. Hackman argues that the District Court misinterpreted her claim—rather than 
specifically seeking the Senior Technician position, she sought to be “reclassified” after 
being given job tasks “that were beyond [her] job description” and was denied, and that 
“the company had a history of . . . promoting or modifying contracts[] more often to 
white employees than black employees.” Appellant’s Brief at 29. But she fails to cite 
anything in the record that supports this version of the claim.3 
 To establish her hostile workplace environment claims, Hackman needed to prove 
the following: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination because of her race or sex; (2) 
the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally 
affected her; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the 
same race or sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. 
Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009).4 The 
District Court granted summary judgment on Hackman’s hostile work environment 
 
3 She cites to examples of what appear to be some kind of work product, as well as 
excerpts from the deposition of her husband Daniel Hackman, a former employee of 
InductEV, who explains that at some point she was assigned a project by her supervisor 
that was not expected of other technicians and was consistent with the work expected of 
an electrical engineer. But she does not direct our attention to anything else in the record 
which establishes the required elements for the claim in this context, and we decline to 
comb through the record and make her argument for her. 
 
4 This analysis is the same under both Title VII and the PHRA. See Bowser v. Clarion 
Cnty., 206 A.3d 68, 75 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019). 
6 
claims because she “offers no evidence to support any of [her] allegations” of intentional 
discrimination. ECF No. 168 at 5. We agree with the District Court’s analysis of the 
evidence. Hackman argues that the District Court ignored several pieces of evidence she 
submitted. She fails to provide record citations for most of the examples she provides, 
and those for which she does provide citations fail for the same reasons as those analyzed 
by the District Court—they either fail to demonstrate intentional discrimination on the 
basis of her race or sex or are not severe or pervasive enough.  
Finally, to state a retaliation claim, Hackman needed to provide evidence that 
“(1) she engaged in [protected activity]; (2) the employer took an adverse employment 
action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between her participation in the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 
461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Sept. 13, 2006). The District Court 
granted summary judgment on Hackman’s retaliation claims because “the undisputed 
evidence shows that the company did not allow Hackman to return to work because it 
believed the matter had settled—not for a retaliatory motive.” ECF No. 168 at 9. We 
agree. In her brief, Hackman asserts that this is not true, but fails to cite to anything in the 
record that shows a genuine dispute as to whether her termination occurred because 
InductEV believed it was accepting her resignation as agreed at mediation, or that this 
reason was pretextual. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  


Assata Hackman v. Inductev

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-7-2025 
USA v. Souleymane Diarra 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Souleymane Diarra" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 540. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/540 
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Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
No. 22-3232 
_________________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
      
v. 
 
SOULEYMANE DIARRA, 
Appellant 
  ________________ 
 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2:19-cr-00392-002) 
 
___________ 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
___________ 
 
Present:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge; HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO, 
BIBAS, PORTER, MATEY, PHIPPS, FREEMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and 
CHUNG, Circuit Judges. 
 
 The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant in the above-entitled case having 
been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the petition for rehearing by the panel is GRANTED.  The Clerk is 
directed to file the amended opinion contemporaneously with this order.  As the revisions 
do not affect the disposition of the appeal, the judgment will remain as filed. 
 A majority of the judges of the circuit in regular service not having voted for 
rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the Court en banc is DENIED. 
2 
       BY THE COURT, 
       s/ Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves 
       Circuit Judge 
 
Dated: July 7, 2025 
Tmm/cc: Robert J. Livermore, Esq. 
                Lisa A. Mathewson, Esq. 


USA v. Souleymane  Diarra

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-8-2025 
USA v. Alan Womack 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Alan Womack" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 544. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/544 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 24-2263 
 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ALAN WOMACK, 
a/k/a “Mal,” 
a/k/a “Jamal,” 
a/k/a “Kevin Smaller,” 
        Appellant  
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00218-13) 
U.S. District Judge:  Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 7, 2025 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, FREEMAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 8, 2025) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
  
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
Alan Womack appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to suppress 
and his conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm.  
I1 
 Womack was a member of a drug trafficking organization that transported and 
sold marijuana from 2005 to 2016.  Among other things, the organization stored 
marijuana at a home in Philadelphia.  On one occasion, police received a 911 call 
reporting that five men were moving items through the home’s basement window.  
Officers arrived at the house, saw Dalion Baskerville and Womack standing near the 
property, and detained them.2  Police entered the house, conducted a sweep, and saw 
what appeared to be drugs in the basement.  Police thereafter obtained a search warrant 
and seized over two thousand pounds of marijuana from the basement.     
The drug trafficking organization used several methods for transporting drug sale 
proceeds to pay for marijuana and other expenses.  First, associates flew across the 
country carrying large amounts of hidden cash.  Second, tractor trailer drivers transported 
 
1 We recite only facts relevant to this appeal.  To assess Womack’s sufficiency-of-
the-evidence-challenge, we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most 
favorable to the Government.  See United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 120 (3d Cir. 
2023).   
2 At different times, Baskerville told police that the house belonged to his 
grandmother, his mother, and then himself, but his identification did not list the searched 
property’s address.  Although Womack claims that he had a key to unlock the padlock on 
the front door, and the Government conceded that Baskerville had a key for the padlock, 
there was no evidence adduced about the key during the suppression hearing.   
3 
 
large amounts of cash and marijuana to conspirators.  In fact, Womack himself traveled 
to Arizona to monitor tractor trailer shipments of drugs and cash and to Virginia to 
deliver cash to a driver.  Third, the organization recruited people to open bank accounts 
and funneled drug sale proceeds through those accounts.  Associates around Philadelphia 
would deposit the proceeds into these accounts and other associates in Arizona would 
withdraw the cash from them.  One such account reflected several deposits and 
withdrawals of $8,000 or less.  Phone records showed that Womack communicated with 
conspirators who managed these account transfers.  These records showed that Womack 
spoke with one of these conspirators over 200 times during a several week period.   
Womack and others were indicted for conspiracy to distribute marijuana and 
conspiracy to commit money laundering.  Before trial, Womack moved to suppress the 
drugs seized from the Philadelphia residence, claiming that the initial, warrantless entry 
into and sweep of the premises violated the Fourth Amendment.  The District Court 
denied the motion, holding that Womack lacked Fourth Amendment standing to 
challenge the search, and that even if he had standing, the entry and sweep were justified.  
After trial, a jury found Womack guilty of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and 
conspiracy to commit money laundering.  
Womack appeals.   
II3 
A 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
4 
 
We first address Womack’s challenge to the District Court’s order denying his 
motion to suppress evidence discovered during the search of the Philadelphia residence.4 
To challenge a search, a defendant must have Fourth Amendment standing, that is 
the search must have violated “his own Fourth Amendment rights.”  United States v. 
Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2010).  To do so, he must demonstrate that he had both 
a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the area searched.  United States v. 
Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 176 (3d Cir. 2015).  In certain circumstances, a person may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy within another’s home.  Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 
91, 98 (1990).  For example, an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the area where he is staying, but a visitor “who is merely present with the consent of 
the householder” has no such expectation and hence no Fourth Amendment standing.  
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).   
Womack fails to show that he had a subjective expectation of privacy within the 
searched home or that any such expectation was objectively reasonable.5  The 
suppression hearing record does not show (1) Womack’s relationship with the property 
owner or with someone with a possessory interest in the property, (2) how long he had 
 
4 When considering an order denying a suppression motion, “we review a district 
court’s factual findings for clear error” and its legal conclusions de novo.  United States 
v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200, 203 n.15 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Katzin, 769 
F.3d 163, 169 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc)).  
 
5 The Government did not forfeit its challenge to Womack’s Fourth Amendment 
standing as it raised this challenge in a post-suppression-hearing submission before the 
District Court ruled and at a time when Womack could have responded to the argument.  
See United States v. Dowdell, 70 F.4th 134, 141 (3d Cir. 2023).   
5 
 
been at the home, or (3) whether he had previously visited or stayed overnight at the 
home before the search—factors that may have shown he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the searched premises.6  Instead, the evidence revealed that Womack was 
merely present at the home for drug-related activities, which is insufficient to establish 
Fourth Amendment standing.7  See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90-91 (holding respondents lacked 
a privacy interest in an apartment where they were present for a few hours for business 
purposes); see also United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 337-38 (3d Cir. 2002) (similar).8  
The District Court therefore properly held that Womack lacked Fourth Amendment 
standing to challenge the search.   
B 
 We next consider Womack’s claim that the Government constructively amended 
the money laundering conspiracy charge in the indictment by presenting evidence and 
argument about bank transactions not mentioned in the indictment.9  An indictment is 
constructively amended when evidence or argument modifies “essential terms of the 
 
6 As the District Court found, Womack was likely not an overnight guest because 
the house was under construction.   
7 Contrary to Womack’s claim, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) is 
inapt.  There, the respondent was held to have standing to challenge the search of 
another’s room because the respondent had been given a key and permission to use that 
room and had entered the room on various occasions.  Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 50, 52.  None 
of those facts are present here.   
8 Womack’s suggestion that he had a privacy interest in the drugs is unavailing 
because “legal possession of a seized good is not a proxy for determining whether the 
owner had a Fourth Amendment interest.”  United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 
(1980). 
9 Womack failed to raise his constructive amendment argument before the District 
Court, so we review it for plain error.  See United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 
337 (3d Cir. 2014).   
6 
 
charged offense in such a way that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have 
convicted the defendant for an offense differing from the offense the indictment . . . 
actually charged.”  United States v. Centeno, 793 F.3d 378, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2006)).   
There was no constructive amendment here.  Womack was charged with and 
convicted of the same offense: conspiring to commit money laundering in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(h).  To prove such a conspiracy, the Government had to establish: (1) “an 
agreement between two or more persons to launder money;” and (2) that Womack 
“knowingly became a member of the conspiracy.”  United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 
115 (3d Cir. 2023).  “The agreement must be one that, if completed, would satisfy the 
elements of the underlying substantive offense”—here, promotional and concealment 
money laundering.10  Id.   
Proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is not an element of the 
crime.11  Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 219 (2005).  Accordingly, the 
 
10 Promotional money laundering requires showing: (1) the defendant knowingly 
conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction; (2) the transaction involved the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity; (3) the defendant knew that the funds involved 
were proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; and (4) the defendant engaged in the 
financial transaction with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 
activity.  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i); United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291, 294 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  The elements of concealment money laundering are identical except the 
fourth element requires that the defendant know “the transactions were designed in whole 
or in part to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity.”  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); Omoruyi, 260 F.3d at 294-95. 
11 “An overt act is any act performed by any conspirator for the purpose of 
accomplishing the objectives of the conspiracy.”  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 
243 (3d Cir. 2007). 
7 
 
Government did “not modify ‘the elements of the crime charged,’” United States v. 
Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 534 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), where it offered proof at 
trial of a specific money laundering method (e.g., depositing proceeds in third party bank 
accounts) that was not alleged in the indictment.  See United States v. Rosario-Pérez, 957 
F.3d 277, 289 (1st Cir. 2020) (holding that offering “proof of an overt act relevant to the 
[drug] conspiracy” did not constructively amend the indictment as an overt act was not an 
element of the conspiracy offense).  Thus, there was no constructive amendment.  See 
Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 532.   
C12 
 The evidence adduced at trial proved that Womack conspired to commit both 
promotional and concealment money laundering and so his assertion that the evidence 
was insufficient fails.13   
Turning first to promotional money laundering, the evidence showed that 
Womack’s coconspirators agreed to engage in transactions with “an intent to promote the 
carrying on” of drug trafficking.  United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 
 
12 Because Womack failed to raise his sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument 
before the District Court, we review it for plain error.  United States v. Jabateh, 974 F.3d 
281, 300 (3d Cir. 2020).  Plain error warrants reversal when the insufficiency of evidence 
“resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,” which “occurs only where the record 
is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.”  United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 138 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  To determine whether this 
standard is met, “we examine the totality of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial,” 
and “credit all available inferences in favor of the [G]overnment.”  United States v. 
Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  
13 Womack challenges only proof of the fourth elements of promotional and 
concealment money laundering.   
8 
 
2001); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).  The “intent to promote” element is satisfied if 
transactions were intended to advance drug trafficking.14  See United States v. Conley, 37 
F.3d 970, 979 (3d Cir. 1994).  The evidence demonstrated that conspirators used drug 
proceeds to pay for marijuana and other expenses.  See United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 
634, 646 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding the promotional element proven where defendants used 
proceeds from selling prescription-less drugs to buy controlled substances).  The 
evidence also established that Womack was aware that the funds involved were derived 
from drug sales as he monitored cash payments and drug shipments and delivered cash to 
a tractor trailer driver associated with the organization.   
As for concealment money laundering, the evidence showed that Womack’s 
coconspirators agreed to and in fact engaged in transactions that were “designed in whole 
or in part to conceal” the nature and source of the drug trafficking proceeds.  Omoruyi, 
260 F.3d at 294-95; see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).  The evidence revealed that the 
organization took various steps to disguise the nature and source of its proceeds.  
Conspirators recruited third parties to open bank accounts, deposited funds in these 
accounts, rather than in accounts held under the conspirators’ names, and withdrew or 
 
14 Womack relies on Regalado Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008), and 
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008), to argue that “promote” must mean “grow, 
expand, or enhance the prosperity” of illegal activity.  Appellant Br. 46.  His argument 
fails.  First, neither Cuellar nor Santos supports his position.  Cf. United States v. 
Demarest, 570 F.3d 1232, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a defendant’s reliance on 
these cases as Santos’s narrow holding did not apply, and Cuellar had no impact on his 
promotional money laundering conviction).  Second, even if we applied his interpretation 
(which he acknowledges lacks support in our precedent), a jury could reasonably infer 
from the evidence that conspirators used the at-issue transactions to grow and expand 
their drug business.   
9 
 
deposited no more than $8,000 cash at a time, likely to avoid bank reporting 
requirements, and to conceal the nature and source of the funds.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 787 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding concealment money laundering 
proven where “transactions were in cash” and “deposits were below ten thousand dollars 
so as to avoid” bank reporting requirements that may “lead to unwanted attention”).  
Using third parties’ bank accounts and “structuring the transaction[s] in a way to avoid 
attention” provided the jury a basis to infer an intent to conceal.  Fallon, 61 F.4th at 117 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Moreover, the jury could reasonably 
infer that Womack knew about these transactions from phone records showing that he 
frequently contacted conspirators who managed the account transfers.   
 Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Womack conspired to commit both 
promotional and concealment money laundering.   
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 


USA v. Alan Womack

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-9-2025 
Jasper Frazier v. Victoria Kuhn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Jasper Frazier v. Victoria Kuhn" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 549. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/549 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1620 
__________ 
 
JASPER FRAZIER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
VICTORIA L. KUHN, Esq. Acting Commissioner; PATRICK NOGAN, Administrator; 
ANTHONY GONGI, Association Administrator, MARIO VERA, Ex Association; LT. 
BERRYMAN, Mailroom Supervisor, SGT. SAQUAY, Mailroom Supervisor, REGINA 
KING, Special Intelligent Division, GARY RIVERA, Senior Investigator, BRIAN 
BOSTICK, Senior Investigator; SGT. BYRD, Mailroom Supervisor; SGT. CISROW, 
Mailroom Supervisor; RONALD TOLOBONSKI, S.W.S.P. S.I.D.; JOHN JANE DOE, 
JPAY/GTL Liaison; JOHN/JANE DOE, Administrator; ROBERT E. CARTER, 
Commissioner, CHRISTOPHER HOLMES, Asst. Commissioner; AL SOLANIK, 
S.W.S.P. Administrator; ANTHONY DEGNER, S.W.S.P.; SGT. CURLY, S.W.S.P.; 
SGT. TANLIN, S.W.S.P.; OFFICER SHEPPARD; P. MCGILLIS, N.S.P. Asst. 
Administrator; SZUBA, N.S.P. S.I.D.; LT. S. HASSAN, N.S.P.; WESTRY N.S.P. 
Mailroom; R. FERGUSON, N.S.P. Mailroom; ; BURTON, Senior Correctional Police; 
ACOSTA, Senior Correctional Police; GAIL GILLISPE, Law Library Supervisor, 
PATRICK, N.S.P. G.T.L., Phone Service; RUSSO, E.J.S.P. Administrator; C. 
SWEENEY, E.J.S.P. Asst. Administrator; SANTIAGO, E.J.S.P. S.I.D.; SGT. 
MOUNTCASTLE-THOMAS, E.J.S.P. Mailroom; JOHN/JANE DOES E.J.S.P. JPAY; 
JOHN/JANE , E.J.S.P. G.T.L. Phone Service; BRIGS, N.S.P., Senior Correctional 
Police; SCPO NAROB; SCPO RODGURIEZ; SCPO SOBMAN; SGT. 
KIABART;SERGEANT 1741;SCPO PONTE, individually and in their official 
capacities; CHAPLAIN PHILLIP HARDEN; CHAPLAIN BRANTLEY, Northern 
State Prison; CHAPLAIN W. PIDEGON, East Jersey State Prison; DONNA SWEENEY, 
Interstate Compact 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-16842) 
District Judge: Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
____________________________________ 
2 
 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 7, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 9, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jasper Frazier appeals the denial of a motion for preliminary injunction. We will 
affirm.  
I   
 Frazier is a prisoner incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison. Frazier brought suit 
alleging numerous claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is proceeding against several 
individuals, mostly from the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC). In June 
2022, the District Court permitted certain claims in Frazier’s amended complaint to 
proceed and consolidated some of Frazier’s other cases with this case. His case remains 
pending and is ongoing in the discovery phase in District Court. 
Frazier observes the Moorish Scientific Temple of America religion. He claims 
that his rights under the First Amendment’s free exercise clause were violated because he 
could not order certain religious items related to his faith. These religious items included 
a fez and Moorish flag with metal clasps as well as a necklace medallion with a 29-inch 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
chain. The prison rejected the specific items ordered by Frazier for different reasons. 
With respect to the fez and the flag, the prison had safety concerns regarding the metal 
fasteners accompanying those items but permitted Frazier to obtain them with plastic 
fasteners. As to the medallion, the prison took issue with the 29-inch length of chain, but 
permitted Frazier to obtain such a medallion provided the chain was no longer than 24 
inches, also due to safety concerns.  
In addition to his religious claims, Frazier also claims that his legal mail was 
opened and confiscated. Frazier further asserts that certain Defendants failed to protect 
him when they labeled him a snitch to other inmates. These claims were permitted to 
proceed. The District Court dismissed without prejudice Frazier’s claim that NJDOC 
officials permitted inmates to use his JPAY password to access his emails and that they 
used that information to obtain fabricated images of him. 
In August 2023, Frazier filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. He sought an 
order directing Defendants to provide the religious items he asked for, to stop 
confiscating his mail, and to stop inmates from distributing fabricated images of him.   
Appellees opposed Frazier’s motion. The District Court denied Frazier’s motion. 
On the religious items claim, it determined that Frazier had not shown a likelihood of 
success on the merits. The District Court also determined that unresolved material factual 
issues prevented issuance of a preliminary injunction with regard to the remaining issues.   
II 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We “[r]eview the denial of a 
preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or a clear mistake in the 
4 
 
consideration of proof.” Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 
2014) (internal quotations omitted).  
III 
 The primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to take whatever steps are 
necessary to prevent irreparable harm, but to maintain the status quo until the Court is 
able to determine the parties’ rights. See Del. State Sportsman’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Del. Dep’t 
of Safety & Homeland Sec., 108 F.4th 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2024). A preliminary injunction 
is extraordinary relief. To obtain a preliminary injunction, Frazier must show: (1) a 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a probability that he will suffer irreparable harm 
without injunctive relief; (3) that the balance of equities is in his favor; and (4) that the 
public interest is in his favor. See Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 33 (2008). The first two 
factors are critical and must be satisfied before a Court can then balance all four factors. 
See Del. State Sportsman’s Ass’n, Inc., 108 F.4th at 202 (citations omitted). 
 With regard to the religious items Frazier requested, in the prison context a central 
First Amendment inquiry is “whether the inmate has alternative means of practicing his 
or her religion generally, not whether the inmate has alternative means of engaging in any 
particular practice.” Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 518 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Dehart 
v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted)). Frazier does not explain 
why a shorter chain and plastic rather than metal clips impair his ability to freely practice 
his religion. He can thus show neither that he is likely to succeed on the merits nor that he 
will suffer irreparable harm without the granting of a preliminary injunction.  
5 
 
 Next, Frazier argued that prison officials have opened/confiscated his legal mail. 
A plaintiff may state a First Amendment claim against a defendant interfering with his 
legal mail if he shows there was a pattern or practice of interference. See Jones v. Brown, 
461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006). But, to obtain the extraordinary relief of a preliminary 
injunction, Frazier must show, first that he is likely to success on the merits, and second, 
that he will be irreparably harmed without injunctive relief. He has not made such a 
showing. Rather, the record indicates that Frazier regularly signed for receipt of mail. So, 
we cannot say that the District Court erred in denying him a preliminary injunction on 
this claim.  
With respect to denial of access to courts, Frazier must show that the denial caused 
actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). An actual injury occurs if 
Frazier demonstrates that a “non-frivolous” and “arguable” claim was lost because of the 
denial of access to the courts. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). 
Here, Frazier noted that he settled suits he had filed in Indiana. Furthermore, Frazier’s 
suit in the District of New Jersey is ongoing and active. Indeed, Frazier has aggressively 
pursued that litigation in the District Court as well as in this Court. He has neither shown 
that he is likely to succeed on the merits of this claim and/or that he will be irreparably 
harmed without a preliminary injunction.   
 The District Court aptly examined Frazier’s allegations regarding email and 
fabricated images under the lens of a failure to protect claim under the Eighth 
Amendment. To establish such a claim, Frazier needed to show (1) he was incarcerated 
under conditions posing a substantial risk of harm; (2) the officials were deliberately 
6 
 
indifferent to that substantial risk to Frazier’s health and safety; and (3) the officials’ 
deliberate indifference caused him harm. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 
2012).  
On the specific allegations related to this particular failure to protect, Frazier has 
not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of this claim, which the District Court 
dismissed without prejudice. Cf. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 
473 F.3d 237, 247 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that where a claim has been dismissed, there is 
no longer a basis to obtain a preliminary injunction). Further, regardless of whether 
Frazier can show a likelihood of success on this claim, he has not shown that he would be 
irreparably harmed without preliminary injunctive relief.  
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. Frazier’s pending motions before this 
Court are denied.   
 


Jasper Frazier v. Victoria Kuhn

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-10-2025 
USA v. Jonathan Michael 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jonathan Michael" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 555. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/555 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
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inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 24-1769 
_______________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
JONATHAN DEAN MICHAEL, 
   Appellant 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2:21-cr-00270-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Stephanos Bibas† 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on June 13, 2025 
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges. 
(Filed: July 10, 2025) 
_______________ 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
 
† The Honorable Stephanos Bibas, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 291(b). 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Jonathan Michael appeals his 2024 convictions for tax evasion and not filing a tax 
return. Michael objects to the jury charge, several evidentiary rulings, and the dismissal 
of a potential juror for cause, arguing that those alleged errors cumulatively deprived him 
of a fair trial. For the reasons below, we reject each of those challenges and will affirm. 
I 
Michael paid federal income tax and filed an annual tax return from 1988 to 2013. 
In 2012, Michael claimed a dubious $25,852 charitable-contribution deduction. The IRS 
questioned and ultimately disallowed that deduction, requiring Michael to pay 
$11,165.28 in back taxes. While the 2012 deduction was being evaluated by the IRS in 
2014, Michael submitted a Form W-4 to his employer falsely claiming that he was 
exempt from federal income tax withholding requirements.  
The basis of that claimed exemption is a supposed loophole created by 12 U.S.C. 
§ 411 that some online tax “experts” say makes paying federal income taxes optional. 
According to these advisors, individuals that demand their employer pay them in special, 
non-taxable dollars need not pay income tax. That is what Michael tried to do. On the 
Form W-4 Michael submitted to his employer, he wrote “Exempt—In Demand for 
Lawful Money 12 U.S.C. 41[1].” App. at 257. 
At first, Michael “got push-back from [the] payroll department.” App. at 1221. But 
after he told payroll to contact the legal department, his employer stopped taking federal 
withholdings from his income. Michael said that experience “reinforced” his belief and 
 
3 
 
“emboldened” him that what he was doing was legitimate. App. at 1224. In 2014, 
Michael’s employer withheld only $10,106, and in 2015, it withheld $0. 
In October 2016, the IRS sent his employer a “lock-in letter” asking it to override 
Michael’s request that none of his income be withheld. The IRS sent Michael a 
corresponding letter notifying him of the lock-in letter and that he was ineligible for a 
withholding exemption. In a mailed response, Michael wrote, “I owe you nothing nor do 
you have any jurisdiction over me” because “I am not a United States citizen.” App. at 
86. The IRS replied to that letter informing Michael that his position was “frivolous” and 
advising him to seek the advice of a “reputable tax practitioner or attorney.” App. at 178. 
Michael sent a letter to his employer’s payroll department that he was administratively 
contesting the lock-in letter and demanding that it “not [] alter my [W-4] form until this 
dispute is resolved.” App. at 258. That seemed to have worked because Michael’s 
employer withheld no federal income tax from 2016 to 2019.  
All this time, some of Michael’s conduct undermined the sincerity of his stated 
beliefs. In 2010 and 2015 Michael filed loan applications on which he answered “yes” to 
the question asking if he was a United States citizen. Also, in 2015, 2016, and 2017, 
Michael traveled with a United States passport.  
In 2021, Michael was indicted for one count of tax evasion in violation of 26 
U.S.C. § 7201, and five counts of failure to file a tax return for the years 2014 through 
2018 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. At trial, Michael’s defense focused on whether he 
acted willfully. A jury convicted Michael on all six counts. Michael timely appealed. 
II 
 
4 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III 
A 
Our review of jury instructions as to whether the District Court stated the correct 
legal standard is plenary. United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441, 449–50 (3d Cir. 2018). 
Our review as to the specific wording of jury instructions is for abuse of discretion. Id. at 
450. 
Michael first argues that the District Court erred by not granting his request for 
additional instructions on the willfulness and good-faith elements of the charged offenses. 
He does not argue that the District Court incorrectly stated the standard for willfulness 
and good faith, so our review is for abuse of discretion. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Michael’s request for 
additional instructions. At the charging conference, the District Court explained how 
Michael’s requested instructions might “confuse the jury.” App. at 1297. In fact, it was 
concerned that Michael’s requested instructions would mislead the jury to think that 
Michael carried the burden of proving that he did not act willfully. Id. 
When the District Court instructed the jury about willfulness, it articulated the 
correct legal standard. Its charge closely tracked the Supreme Court’s language in Cheek 
v. United States: “the statutory willfulness requirement is the ‘voluntary, intentional 
violation of a known legal duty.’ ” 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991); App. at 1339 (charging the 
jury that “‘[w]illfully’ means a voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal 
 
5 
 
duty”). The District Court’s further explanation of willfulness correctly articulated the 
legal standard. See United States v. Phillips, 959 F.2d 1187, 1191 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating 
that it is not appropriate to reverse a district court’s denial to charge a specific jury 
instruction when the information was “substantially covered by the instructions given”). 
Moreover, the District Court had granted Michael’s request to provide the jury a 
preliminary instruction on willfulness and good faith at the start of trial. 
Next, Michael argues that the District Court erred by not instructing the jury that 
the total amount of Michael’s outstanding tax liability could not be used as evidence of 
his willfulness or lack of a good-faith belief. That argument goes to the correct legal 
standard, so our review is plenary. 
Again, the District Court did not err. Because “direct proof [of willfulness] is often 
unavailable,” circumstantial evidence can be appropriate. United States v. Kim, 884 F.2d 
189, 192 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (permitting other act evidence 
to prove motive, intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake). Circumstantial evidence 
makes a fact more likely without directly proving it. Although the District Court did not 
refer to it as “circumstantial evidence” at the charging conference, that is what Michael’s 
outstanding tax liability is. A large amount makes it more likely that Michael acted 
willfully, and the District Court’s determination that it could be used as evidence of 
willful conduct—or if the amount had been small, as evidence of non-willful conduct—
was sound. 
B 
 
6 
 
Our review of a district court’s evidentiary ruling is for abuse of discretion. United 
States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 2012). Michael challenges the admission of 
the following evidence: the audited $25,000 deduction, evidence of his failure to pay 
New Jersey state taxes, evidence of his failure to pay federal taxes after 2018, and his 
passport applications and travel records. Michael further challenges the District Court’s 
decision not to admit evidence of tax enforcement alternatives to criminal prosecution. 
1 
Michael challenges the audited $25,000 deduction as irrelevant. That argument 
fails because the 2012 deduction (audited by the IRS in 2013) makes it more likely that 
Michael’s later failures to file (2014 through 2018) were willful. First, that Michael paid 
the IRS back taxes at the time he was asserting exemption from federal income taxes 
suggests that he did not really believe he was exempt from federal income taxes. As the 
government said at a pretrial hearing, “[i]f you are someone that genuinely believes that 
you are not subject to the authority of the IRS or genuinely believes that you are not 
required to pay federal income taxes, why are you sending a $9,000 check to the IRS two 
years after you start to claim exemption?” App. at 510. 
Second, Michael started claiming to be exempt from federal tax laws around the 
time the IRS audited and then imposed back taxes relating to the 2012 deduction. Prior to 
that incident, Michael had paid his taxes. Michael’s sudden change in behavior suggests 
that he did not have a good-faith misunderstanding but became motivated to avoid paying 
federal taxes. 
 
7 
 
This Court’s decision in United States v. Daraio is on point. 445 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 
2006). There, we explained that “[i]n cases involving violations of federal tax laws such 
as tax evasion, ‘[a] defendant’s past taxpaying record is admissible to prove willfulness 
circumstantially.’ ” Id. at 264 (quoting United States v. Ringwalt, 213 F. Supp. 2d 499, 
506 (E.D. Pa. 2002)). As in Daraio, the District Court here “repeatedly issued limiting 
instructions regarding the Rule 404(b) evidence in which the court emphasized the 
limited purpose for which the evidence was admissible, thereby minimizing any 
prejudicial effect.” Id. at 265. 
2 
Michael challenges the District Court’s ruling that evidence of his failure to pay 
New Jersey state taxes was admissible. But the government never introduced that 
evidence at trial, so any error is harmless. See United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 
172 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Non-constitutional error is considered harmless when 
‘it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.’ ”) (quoting United 
States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
3 
Michael challenges the introduction of evidence of (1) his failure to pay taxes or 
file a tax return after 2018, (2) his passport applications, and (3) his travel records as 
unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Those arguments fail because 
Michael does not explain how that evidence unfairly prejudiced him. See United States v. 
Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2012) (distinguishing between “unfair prejudice,” 
which is “based on something other than [the evidence’s] persuasive weight” and 
 
8 
 
evidence that hurts a defendant’s case) (quoting United States v. Cruz-Garcia, 344 F.3d 
951, 956 (9th Cir. 2003)) (emphasis omitted). 
4 
Michael’s last evidentiary challenge asserts that the District Court erred by not 
permitting him to introduce testimony of alternative-enforcement options the government 
could have leveraged to collect his outstanding taxes. That argument fails because the 
availability of alternatives “is irrelevant to the issue of criminal liability” and “would 
serve only to confuse the jury.” United States v. Buras, 633 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 
1980); see also DeMuro, 677 F.3d at 565. 
C 
Our review of a district court’s dismissal of a potential juror for cause is for 
“manifest error—a most deferential standard.” United States v. Nasir, 17 F.4th 459, 467 
(3d Cir. 2021). 
During voir dire, potential jurors were asked whether they “hold any belief, feeling, 
or opinion regarding the tax laws, the IRS, or these types of prosecutions such that you 
could not sit as a fair and impartial juror in this case.” App. at 552. One potential juror 
responded, “I guess one thing is that I don’t believe in federal income tax; but aside from 
that, no.” App. at 685. In follow-up questioning, this potential juror stated that he “d[idn’t] 
think the federal government has the right to impose a direct tax on anybody” and that he 
would “do [his] best to follow the evidence and the law.” App. at 686–87. Asked whether 
he could “judge a case like this fairly,” he responded, “Yes, I think so. I believe so.” Id. at 
 
9 
 
687. Given those stated beliefs and equivocal responses, we detect no error, much less 
manifest error, in the District Court’s for-cause dismissal.1 
D 
Lastly, Michael argues that the District Court’s several errors together entitle him 
to a new trial. He raises that argument for the first time on appeal, so our review is for 
plain error. United States v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 312 (3d Cir. 2016). Because he has 
demonstrated no error, his cumulative-error challenge necessarily fails.  
* * * 
For these reasons, we will affirm. 
 
1 The government also argues that a district court’s decision to grant a motion to remove a 
potential juror for cause is not reviewable on appeal. Red at 40–41. Its argument is that the 
Sixth Amendment only guarantees “the right to . . . an impartial jury,” not the right for a 
particular impartial potential juror to be a member of the jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI 
(emphasis added). Accepting the government’s argument would unnecessarily break new 
ground where we have already determined that the District Court did not err in dismissing 
the potential juror that equivocated as to his ability to put aside his belief that the federal 
government cannot impose a direct tax. There is a developing circuit split on the issue, 
however. The Seventh Circuit has adopted the government’s position, United States v. 
Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 973 (7th Cir. 2016), whereas the Eighth Circuit has rejected it, 
United States v. Whitworth, 107 F.4th 817, 821 n.4 (2024). This Court expressed agreement 
with the Seventh Circuit’s approach in United States v. Green, 664 F. App’x 193, 197 (3d 
Cir. 2016), but has yet to address the issue in a precedential opinion. 


USA v. Jonathan Michael

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-11-2025 
In Re: In The Matter of Richard L. Abbott 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 24-2985 
_______________ 
IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD L. ABBOTT, 
    Appellant 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1:23-mc-00524) 
District Judge: Hon. Maryellen Noreika 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on July 8, 2025 
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: July 11, 2025) 
_______________ 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
Calling something a Soviet show trial does not make it so. Attorney Richard Abbott 
appeals the District Court’s order disbarring him from practicing law in the District of 
Delaware. The District Court imposed that reciprocal discipline after Abbott was disbarred 
by the Delaware Supreme Court. On appeal, Abbott launches a battery of attacks against 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
2 
the District Court’s decision, contending that the state proceeding gave him Soviet-style 
justice. But all his attacks misfire, so we will affirm.  
This saga begins with shrubs. The Delaware Chancery Court ordered Abbott’s client—
and his successors, heirs, and assigns—to trim the shrubs on his properties. But Abbott’s 
client did not want to. So Abbott told him that he would be “off the hook” if he transferred 
the land to his wife and then had her transfer it back after a few years. In re Abbott, 308 
A.3d 1139, 1153–54 (Del. 2023). Abbott failed to tell the client that the order would bind 
his successors, heirs, and assigns. With Abbott’s help, the client and his wife went ahead 
with the transfers. Later, the client testified that he had the same control over the properties 
as he did before the transfer. The presiding Vice Chancellor found that Abbott’s sham 
transfer violated the Court’s order, held him in contempt, and referred him to Delaware’s 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel. That office then notified Abbott that it intended to investi-
gate him.  
Outraged, Abbott filed a bevy of lawsuits and ethical complaints against those involved. 
He alleged in filings that the Vice Chancellor had launched “a last minute, surprise Star 
Chamber proceeding” against him. Id. at 1158 (cleaned up). He claimed that the Vice Chan-
cellor had “[p]sychological conditions,” “concocted a fairytale story” to punish him for 
doing his job, and “manufacture[d] a record to further his diabolical plot to destroy” him. 
Id. at 1159–60. And he accused the disciplinary office of “acting in bad faith,” succumbing 
to “the vindictive urging of the emotionally unhinged Vice Chancellor.” Id. at 1160 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  
3 
The disciplinary office then notified Abbott that it intended to present a petition to dis-
cipline him for violating four Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct. Abbott 
tried to nip the petition in the bud. He sent a motion to the justices of the Delaware Supreme 
Court, asking them to dismiss the proceedings and accusing them of turning “a blind eye 
to the corruption … infect[ing]” the disciplinary office. Id. at 1161. He then sued all of 
them and several disciplinary-office officials in federal district court, asserting claims un-
der the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state 
law. The District Court dismissed all claims, and we affirmed. Abbott v. Mette, 2021 WL 
5906146, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2021). 
Eventually, a panel of the Board of Responsibility held a seven-day hearing, where 
Abbott testified and put on evidence and witnesses in his defense. The panel concluded 
that Abbott had violated multiple Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct. A 
majority of the panel recommended suspending him for two years, while the panel chair 
recommended disbarment. The Delaware Supreme Court opted to disbar him.  
That triggered the federal District Court to act too. The District Court issued an order 
for Abbott to show cause why it should not impose the same penalty. See D. Del. L.R. 
83.6(b)(1). Under the District Court’s rules, reciprocal discipline was automatically imposed 
unless Abbott could show that (1) the state proceeding violated due process, (2) there was 
inadequate proof showing his misconduct, (3) imposing reciprocal discipline would work 
a grave injustice, or (4) the misconduct warranted “substantially different discipline” in 
federal court. D. Del. L.R. 83.6(b)(5). The first three elements track the federal require-
ments for imposing reciprocal discipline in federal court. In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 231 
4 
(3d Cir. 2003). To avoid disbarment, Abbott had the burden of showing by clear and con-
vincing evidence that one of those elements was met. Id. at 232. In a thorough opinion, the 
District Court found that Abbott had not carried his burden and should be disbarred in the 
District. Our review of that decision is “extremely limited.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). We will reverse only if the District Court abused its discretion by making legal 
errors or clearly erroneous factual findings. Id.; Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 653 F.3d 299, 
304 (3d Cir. 2011). It did not.  
First, the District Court did not err in holding that Abbott had gotten due process in the 
state proceedings. Abbott was notified of the misconduct charges against him, had the 
chance to file a response in writing, and put on testimony and witnesses at a hearing in his 
defense. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Abbott says he was barred from 
obtaining some of the discovery and witnesses that he wanted. But he sought discovery he 
was not entitled to, such as information about the mental state of judicial officers and priv-
ileged evidence. Due process does not entitle someone to all possible evidence that he 
wants. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947) (privileging attorney work-
product).  
Abbott also contends that the proceeding was inherently prejudicial and unfair because 
it was motivated only by animus toward him. But there is no credible evidence of animus 
in the state-court record. Plus, Abbott says the Delaware Supreme Court refused to consider 
his federal and state RICO claims. But it did. It explained that Abbott failed to “properly 
assert[ ] any objections to the Panel’s handling of” those claims, thus forfeiting the argu-
ment. In re Abbott, 308 A.3d at 1167 n.57.  
5 
Abbott also levies two rule-specific due-process challenges. For one, he says that the 
text of Delaware’s Rule 3.5(d) did not give him fair notice that it had forbidden his conduct. 
Even if that goes to the fairness of the proceedings, Abbott’s claim fails. Lawyers may not 
“engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal or engag[ing] in undignified or discour-
teous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal.” Del. Rules Pro. Conduct 3.5(d). Abbott has 
no credible argument that making degrading comments and levying unfounded accusa-
tions at members of a tribunal would not plausibly fall within the Rule. Next, he contends 
that the state proceedings did not give him fair notice about the basis for the charge under 
Rule 8.4(c), which bars dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. But the discipli-
nary petition told him that he was accused of making two false statements about the prop-
erty transfer in a letter to the Chancery Court. Abbott says those were just omissions. But 
even if they were, incomplete or misleading statements also violate the rule. Id. So Abbott 
got fair notice.  
Second, the District Court did not err in concluding that Abbott had failed to carry his 
burden of providing sufficient proof that the state court’s decision was infirm. In re Surrick, 
338 F.3d at 231–32. On appeal, Abbott mainly tries to relitigate arguments that the Dela-
ware Supreme Court rejected in determining that he had violated Delaware’s Rules. But 
the District Court rightly deferred to the state Supreme Court as the expert on its rules and 
reviewed in detail the facts supporting each violation. So we discern no abuse of discretion.  
Third, the District Court properly concluded that Abbott had failed to meet his burden 
of showing that reciprocal discipline would cause a grave injustice or that substantially 
different discipline was warranted. True, disbarment is a significant punishment. But in 
6 
deciding that Abbott’s conduct warranted it, the Delaware Supreme Court used the exact 
same guide that we use “as a model for determining the appropriate sanctions for lawyer 
misconduct.” In re Mitchell, 901 F.2d 1179, 1184 (3d Cir. 1990); see In re Abbott, 308 
A.3d at 1166 (citing ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2005)). And after 
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it found that disbarment was fit-
ting. In re Abbott, 308 A.3d at 1186–88. So Abbott cannot show that imposing the same 
discipline in federal court is unjust.  
Still, Abbott says the District Court erred because ABA Model Rule 3.5(d) does not 
perfectly track Delaware Rule 3.5(d). See D. Del. L.R. 83.6(d) (“[A]ll attorneys admitted 
or authorized to practice before this Court . . . shall be governed by the Model Rules.”); In 
re Mitchell, 901 F.2d at 1187 (looking to the Model Rules to determine misconduct). The 
Delaware Rules bar “undignified or discourteous conduct” that degrades the tribunal, even 
if unintentionally. Del. Rules Pro. Conduct 3.5(d); In re Abbott, 308 A.3d at 1185 & n.159. 
By contrast, the Model Rules may bar such conduct, but only if it is done with the intent to 
disrupt the tribunal. Model Rules Pro. Conduct 3.5(d) & cmt. 4 (ABA 2020). 
 In any event, that distinction is immaterial. Abbott was disbarred in the state court not 
because he had violated Delaware Rule 3.5(d) but because he had violated Delaware Rule 
3.4(c) and others like it that warrant presumptive disbarment. In re Abbott, 308 A.3d at 1184. 
Delaware Rule 3.4(c) tracks the Model Rules perfectly. Compare Del. Rules Pro. Conduct 
3.4(c), with Model Rules Pro. Conduct 3.4(c). And the District Court expressly concluded 
that Abbott had failed to show, based on the “grave injustice” or “substantially different 
7 
discipline” prongs, that it should impose a different punishment for the Rule 3.4(c) viola-
tion. That was not an abuse of discretion.    
Abbott also says the District Court should have considered that he has never been dis-
ciplined before in the District Court. But as the District Court noted, Abbott did not have a 
spotless record. He had earlier faced discipline by the Delaware bar.  
Finally, Abbott raises two constitutional challenges. First, he argues that disciplining him 
for his speech violates the First Amendment. But that Amendment is consistent with disci-
plining a lawyer for baselessly attacking a judge. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th 
Cir. 1995). Second, he says his disbarment was selective prosecution in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. But the Delaware Supreme Court held that Abbott failed to raise 
any credible evidence supporting that claim. In re Matter of Abbott, 308 A.3d at 1181. 
Abbott does not meaningfully contest that holding. So the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that imposing the same punishment would not work a grave injustice.  
We will thus affirm. 


In Re: In The Matter of Richard L. Abbott

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-24-2025 
USA v. Safehouse 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Safehouse" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 591. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/591 
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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 24-2027 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SAFEHOUSE, a Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation; 
JOSE BENITEZ, as President and Treasurer of Safehouse, 
  Appellants 
_______________ 
 
SAFEHOUSE, a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; MERRICK B. 
GARLAND, in his official capacity as Attorney General of 
the United States; and JACQUELINE C. ROMERO, in her 
official capacity as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00519) 
2 
 
District Judges: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh 
_______________ 
 
Argued on April 9, 2025 
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 24, 2025) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
Ronda B. Goldfein 
Adrian M. Lowe 
AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania 
1211 Chestnut Street 
Suite 600 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
 
Ilana H. Eisenstein [ARGUED] 
DLA Piper 
1650 Market Street 
One Liberty Place, Suite 5000 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
Ben C. Fabens-Lassen 
DLA Piper 
2000 Avenue of the Stars 
Suite 400, North Tower 
Los Angeles, CA 90067 
 
Peter Goldberger 
3 
 
Law Office of Peter Goldberger 
P.O. Box 645 
Ardmore, PA 19003 
 
Seth F. Kreimer 
University of Pennsylvania 
School of Law 
3400 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
Counsel for Appellants 
 
Sarah W. Carroll 
United States Department of Justice 
Civil Division Appellate 
Room 7511 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 
Washington, DC 20530 
 
Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr. [ARGUED] 
United States Department of Justice 
Civil Division 
Room 7241 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 
Washington, DC 20530 
 Counsel for Appellees 
 
Devin S. Sikes 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 
2001 K Street NW 
Washington, DC 20006 
Counsel for Amicus Faith Leaders 
  
4 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Safehouse, a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation, was 
established in 2018 to address the abuse of opioids in 
Philadelphia. It seeks to provide overdose prevention services, 
including supervised illegal drug use. According to Safehouse, 
what it calls “medically supervised consumption” is salutary 
because opioid overdoses can be mitigated if trained staff are 
nearby. 
This is the second time we have considered the legality 
of Safehouse’s proposed activities. We previously determined 
that, as a provider of supervised illegal drug use, Safehouse 
would violate 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). Safehouse argues that its 
Board members’ shared religious belief in the value of human 
life motivates it to provide “evidence-based public-health 
interventions” and that government intervention with those 
services substantially burdens its religious exercise. 
The District Court rejected Safehouse’s argument. It 
reasoned that non-religious entities are not protected by the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. As we explain below, 
that was reversible error. 
I 
An opioid overdose can occur minutes after drug use. 
And tragically, it too often does. The Pennsylvania Department 
of Health estimates that last year 702 opioid overdose deaths 
occurred in Philadelphia County.1 Fentanyl—a synthetic 
 
1 Drug Overdose Surveillance Interactive Data Reports, 
Pennsylvania Department of Health Office of Drug 
5 
 
opioid 50-to-100 times more potent than heroin and often laced 
into more popular drugs—has further exacerbated the opioid 
problem. 
Safehouse urges several “harm reduction strategies.” 
App. at 190. Harm reduction is a term of art for interventions 
that focus on mitigating the bad effects of harmful behavior 
rather than stopping the harmful behavior itself. Providing drug 
users sterile syringes is a classic example and one of the 
services that Safehouse proposes. Safehouse’s other harm-
reduction strategies include offering to test drugs for fentanyl 
and inviting drug users to take illegal drugs in a specially 
designated “consumption room” under its supervision. App. at 
192. 
According to Safehouse, supervised drug use is 
appropriate because it means that staff can be ready to reverse 
an overdose by administering Naloxone. Naloxone is easy to 
administer as a nasal spray, but one who is overdosing cannot 
reliably self-administer. And sometimes, multiple doses of 
Naloxone, intramuscular injections of Naloxone, or oxygen 
and respiratory support are required. Safehouse would not 
provide any illegal drugs or allow drugs to be sold or 
 
Surveillance and Misuse Prevention, 
https://www.pa.gov/agencies/health/healthcare-and-public-
health-professionals/pdmp/data.html (click “Drug Overdose 
Surveillance”; then go to the tab labelled “OD - Drug 
Specificity”; then filter for Philadelphia, County in the year 
2024 at the top of the page and click on “Any Opioids” in the 
graph titled “Most common drug classes contributing to cause 
of death, *Preliminary* 2024) (last visited May 19, 2025).  
6 
 
exchanged on its property. Instead, drug users would bring 
their own illegal drugs to use within its facilities. 
In 2019, the Department of Justice began this lawsuit 
against Safehouse and its then-Executive Director seeking a 
declaration that supervised illegal drug use violates 21 U.S.C. 
§ 856(a)(2). Later, the Department of Justice amended its 
complaint to name José Benitez, President of Safehouse, as a 
defendant. Safehouse and Benitez argued that § 856(a) does 
not reach their proposed conduct, that § 856(a) exceeds 
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, and that application of 
§ 856(a) violates their rights under RFRA. 
The District Court determined that § 856(a) did not 
reach Safehouse’s proposed conduct. United States v. 
Safehouse, 2020 WL 906997, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2020). 
Section 856(a) makes it unlawful to “manage or control any 
place . . . and knowingly and intentionally . . . make available 
for use . . . the place, for the purpose of unlawfully . . . using a 
controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). The District 
Court read “for the purpose of” as referring only to the purpose 
of whoever “manage[s] or control[s]” the “place” at issue. 
United States v. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2021) 
(Safehouse I). A divided Panel of this Court rejected that 
construction, read the language to refer to the purposes of third 
parties, and declined Safehouse’s related invitation to 
“harmonize” our reading of the plain text with recent federal 
efforts to combat the opioid epidemic.2 Id. at 234–39. 
 
2 The Panel unanimously rejected Safehouse’s argument that 
§ 856(a)(2) exceeded Congress’ power to regulate interstate 
commerce. Safehouse I, 985 F.3d at 239; id. at 243 n.1 (Roth, 
J., dissenting in part). 
7 
 
On remand, the District Court was left to consider 
Safehouse’s RFRA and Free Exercise counterclaims.3 The 
government moved to dismiss those counterclaims, and the 
District Court granted its motion. Safehouse timely appealed. 
The government argues that Benitez lacks appellate standing 
and Safehouse asserts that the District Court erred by not 
granting it leave to amend its complaint. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1345, and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
We exercise plenary review of a District Court’s order 
dismissing a party’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Nichole Med. 
Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., 694 F.3d 340, 350 
(3d Cir. 2012). Of particular importance here, we are required 
to “consider only those facts alleged in the complaint and 
accept all of the allegations as true.” Id. (quoting ALA, Inc. v. 
CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
III 
The District Court dismissed Safehouse’s RFRA and 
Free Exercise counterclaims because “Safehouse is not a 
religious entity.” United States v. Safehouse, 729 F. Supp. 3d 
451, 454 (E.D. Pa. 2024). That was error because RFRA’s 
plain text and Free Exercise doctrine are clear that those 
statutory and constitutional protections extend to non-natural 
persons, including so-called non-religious entities. In so 
 
3 Safehouse amended its complaint on remand to include a Free 
Exercise counterclaim. See App. at 184–225. 
8 
 
holding, we express no view about whether threatened 
prosecution of Safehouse substantially burdens its exercise of 
religion. We likewise decline Safehouse’s invitation to 
determine in the first instance whether it has plausibly stated 
RFRA and Free Exercise claims. We only address the proper 
object of RFRA’s and the First Amendment’s protections: that 
object includes a non-natural entity allegedly exercising 
religion, even if the entity itself is not religious. 
A 
Our analysis of RFRA “begins and ends with the 
ordinary meaning of” its plain text. United States v. Johnson, 
114 F.4th 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2024). RFRA says the 
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability,” unless it furthers “a compelling 
governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means of 
furthering” that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) 
(emphasis added). RFRA’s object is “persons,” so Safehouse 
is protected if it is a “person” under RFRA. 
Neither RFRA nor its sister statute, the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, define “person,” but the 
Dictionary Act does. It says that in “any Act of Congress, 
unless the context indicates otherwise,” “the words ‘person’ 
and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, 
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as 
well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. The Supreme Court in 
Hobby Lobby “s[aw] nothing in RFRA that suggests a 
congressional intent to depart from the Dictionary Act 
definition” and neither do we. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 708 (2014). Safehouse is therefore a 
“person” under RFRA and eligible for its protections. 
9 
 
The government argues that Congressional reports in 
RFRA’s legislative history made “no mention of protecting 
non-religious entities.” Appellee’s Br. at 11. As we said earlier, 
“when the text is clear, we will not look beyond it to 
lawmakers’ statements.” Safehouse I, 985 F.3d at 239. But the 
government’s argument goes a step further. It asks us to 
conclude the plain text of a statute does not reach what 
Congress did not enumerate in the several Congressional 
reports generated during the legislative process. We decline to 
draw that inference. If an entity reasonably fits within the 
statutory language, it is of no moment that Congress did not 
name it in the legislative history. “ ‘[T]he fact that [a statute] 
has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by 
Congress’ does not demonstrate ambiguity; instead, it simply 
‘demonstrates [the] breadth’ of a legislative command.” 
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 674 (2020) (quoting 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)). 
If there was any doubt as to whether Safehouse is a 
“person” under RFRA, Hobby Lobby eliminated it. There, the 
Supreme Court explained that “[n]o known understanding of 
the term ‘person’ includes some but not all corporations,” so 
three closely held for-profit corporations were entitled to 
RFRA’s protections. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 708. 
The government in Hobby Lobby conceded that 
nonprofit corporations are persons under RFRA. Id. at 708 
n.20. And though the Court split 5-4 on whether for-profit 
corporations are “persons,” it was unanimous that nonprofit 
corporations are. Id. at 751–53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The 
majority went further. It suggested that even “large, publicly 
traded corporations” are RFRA persons, though it would be 
“unlikely” for “corporate giants” to assert such claims in the 
10 
 
first place. Id. at 717. In such cases, the applicability of RFRA 
would likely hinge on sincerity. Id. 
The District Court thus erred in determining that 
Safehouse can never qualify for the protections of RFRA 
because it is a non-religious entity. The District Court properly 
recognized that “corporations can be considered ‘persons.’ ” 
Safehouse, 729 F. Supp. 3d at 456. But it improperly asked 
whether Safehouse is a “religious entity,” id. at 454, 456, 
focusing on statements in Safehouse’s incorporating 
documents, its website, in its application for tax-exempt status, 
id. at 455, and aspects of Pennsylvania corporate law, id. at 
456–57. The government defends that approach on appeal. At 
oral argument, the government proposed the following test: a 
corporate entity like Safehouse is eligible for protection under 
RFRA only if its corporate documents bind it to operate in 
accordance with a religious purpose. 
Whatever the merits of this framework, it has no basis 
in RFRA’s plain text. “RFRA applies to ‘a person’s’ exercise 
of religion” and Safehouse is a “person” claiming to exercise 
religion, so it is eligible for RFRA’s protections. Hobby Lobby, 
573 U.S. at 707 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)). Just as 
Safehouse’s compassion did not shield it from the plain text of 
§ 856(a)(2), concerns about its proposed services do not 
withdraw the protections of RFRA. 
B 
Safehouse is also protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 
As Hobby Lobby recognized, “free-exercise claims brought by 
nonprofit corporations” are nothing new. Id. at 708; see also 
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 
617, 625 (2018) (“[a] baker, in his capacity as the owner of a 
11 
 
business serving the public” is protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause). That provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to 
corporate entities is “well-established.” Metro. Life Ins. v. 
Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985); see, e.g., Citizens United 
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 353 (2010) (Free 
Speech Clause); Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 
(1978) (Warrant Clause). Against that backdrop, there is no 
“non-religious entities” carveout from the First Amendment. 
After all, the purpose of extending rights to corporate persons 
is to protect the rights of natural persons acting through the 
corporate form. Hobby Lobby, 503 U.S. at 706–07. That 
purpose is no less true for religious exercise than it is for other 
rights. 
IV 
Next, the government contends that José Benitez lacks 
appellate standing because, it argues, only Safehouse asserted 
RFRA and Free Exercise counterclaims. That is correct. 
Benitez asserted RFRA as an affirmative defense, but not as a 
counterclaim. App. at 108, ¶3. Thus, Benitez was not aggrieved 
by the District Court’s order and lacked standing to appeal the 
District Court’s dismissal. 
V 
Finally, Safehouse argues that the District Court erred 
by dismissing its counterclaims without addressing its request 
for leave to amend its complaint. Because we reverse the 
District Court’s holding that the protections of RFRA and the 
First Amendment do not extend to Safehouse, we need not 
address whether the District Court erred by not granting leave 
to amend. 
12 
 
* * * 
For the reasons above, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order that Safehouse is not protected by RFRA and the 
Free Exercise Clause as a non-religious entity and remand for 
it to consider whether Safehouse has plausibly pleaded RFRA 
and Free Exercise counterclaims. Because Benitez was not 
properly joined to this appeal, we will dismiss this appeal as to 
him. 


USA v. Safehouse

Wang, Xinyu

Koneru, Sai

Venkit, Pranav Narayanan

Frischmann, Brett

Rajtmajer, Sarah

The unappreciated role of intent in algorithmic moderation of abusive content on social media

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-13-2025 
Dynza Mackey v. Attorney General United States of America 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3377 
___________ 
 
DYNZA MACKEY, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A027-723-646) 
Immigration Judge: Adam Panopoulos 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 4, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  August 13, 2025) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se petitioner Dynza Mackey seeks review of a final order of removal.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
Mackey is a citizen of the Bahamas.  He entered the United States in 1978 on a 
non-immigrant visa and remained here.  In 2023, DHS served Mackey with a Notice to 
Appear, alleging that he overstayed his visa.  In his deportation proceedings, Mackey 
claimed to have been granted lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status and, as a result, 
wrongly charged with removability.  He also filed a Form I-360 petition with the United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), requesting classification as the 
abused spouse of a U.S. citizen. 
After several hearings, an immigration judge (“IJ”) concluded that Mackey had 
not shown that he was an LPR and that he was thus removable for the reason given by 
DHS.1  USCIS denied Mackey’s I-360 petition before the IJ rendered his decision; the 
denial explained the appeal process within USCIS.   
 
1  The IJ also denied Mackey’s request for voluntary departure and his request for a 
continuance.  Mackey does not address these decisions in his opening brief and has thus 
forfeited any challenge to them.  See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016).  To 
the extent that Mackey seeks to raise challenges regarding these or any other issues for 
the first time in his reply brief, we do not consider them.  See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. 
of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 
3 
 
Mackey appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), 
which dismissed his appeal.  Mackey has timely petitioned for review.2 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  We review the IJ’s and 
BIA’s decisions together, as the BIA both relied on the IJ’s conclusions and provided its 
own analysis.  See Thayalan v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 132, 137 (3d Cir. 2021).  We review 
factual findings for substantial evidence and may not disturb them “unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  Id. (citation omitted).  We 
review legal rulings de novo.  See Manuel-Soto v. Att’y Gen., 121 F.4th 468, 471 (3d 
Cir. 2024). 
III. 
 Mackey challenges the agency’s conclusion that he never adjusted his status to 
become an LPR.  He maintains that documents in the record support his position and, in 
the alternative, that he detrimentally relied on a representation by the agency that led him 
to believe he was an LPR.  
The administrative record does not support Mackey’s arguments.  Although the 
record shows that Mackey filed an application for adjustment of status and that his wife 
filed an I-130 petition on his behalf, both were denied in 1990.  Those decisions stated 
 
2  After filing his petition for review, Mackey sought a stay of removal, which we denied.  
He has since been removed. 
 
4 
 
that the denials were for lack of prosecution. 
Mackey contends that a set of documents in the record — three copies of Form I-
181, a Memorandum of Creation of Record of Lawful Permanent Residence — support 
his position.  These documents are partially filled out with some of Mackey’s information 
but are not signed, formally dated, or stamped by any agency authority.  There is nothing 
to indicate that these documents were ever finalized by the agency, as DHS argued before 
the IJ.  There are medical records that appear to have been submitted in support of 
Mackey’s application, but no information about a personal interview. There are no other 
documents in the record to suggest that Mackey’s application was ever granted, and DHS 
represented that it had no such information in its files.   
Instead, the record contains letters explicitly denying Mackey’s application and 
the application filed on his behalf by his wife.  Accordingly, substantial evidence 
supports the agency’s factual determination that Mackey was never granted LPR status.3  
See Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (considering 
whether an agency factual finding is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole” in reviewing for substantial evidence) 
 
3  At an early hearing, the IJ initially thought that Mackey’s claim regarding his LPR 
status had merit based on the limited record that was available.  Mackey argues that those 
initial comments by the IJ provide support for his argument.  However, the IJ gave DHS 
an opportunity to go through the paper record and provide any additional relevant 
documentation.  Once all the documentation was submitted, it became clear that 
Mackey’s applications to adjust his status were never granted.  Mackey conceded during 
a subsequent hearing that he never received a green card.   
 
5 
 
(citation omitted). 
Next, Mackey argues that he detrimentally relied on a representation by the 
agency such that he thought he was an LPR.  “To prevail on . . . a claim [of equitable 
estoppel], the plaintiff must establish (1) a misrepresentation; (2) upon which he 
reasonably relied; (3) to his detriment; and (4) affirmative misconduct.”  Lall v. DHS, 
117 F.4th 87, 95 (3d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Mackey claims that on February 11, 1986, an agency official told him at a 
scheduled appointment that his LPR application was granted.  However, he has provided 
no evidence in support of his argument, and the record contradicts it.  Mackey received 
an extension of his employment authorization on February 24, 1986 — stamped by the 
district director after his February 11, 1986 appointment — and was told to come back 
for another appointment in March 1986.  The notice stated that his application or petition 
would be deemed abandoned if he failed to respond.  Mackey also wrote to the agency in 
October 1989 stating that he had not had an appointment on his application since 1987, 
explaining that his employment authorization had expired several times and that he 
needed to have his final appointment.  Accordingly, there is no evidence that the agency 
made a misrepresentation about Mackey’s status or engaged in any affirmative 
misconduct.4 
 
4  Mackey vaguely claims that the issue of his LPR status was raised and decided by the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in the course of 
adjudicating his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  However, it does not appear 
 
6 
 
Mackey also sought to challenge the denial of his I-360 petition, but his petition 
was denied by USCIS, and those denials go through a separate administrative appeals 
process, as was explained to Mackey in his denial letter.  See 8 C.F.R § 1003.3(a)(2).  
Finally, Mackey sought review of his detention and the denial of bond, which he needed 
to raise in a separate bond appeal or in a habeas proceeding.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19.  
The BIA appropriately declined to consider these issues.5 
Accordingly, we will deny Mackey’s petition for review. 
 
that this issue was ever addressed in those proceedings.  Rather, in its order regarding the 
bond hearing Mackey requested, the District Court explained that it had no jurisdiction 
over any challenge Mackey sought to raise relating to the adjudication of his removal 
proceedings.  
 
5  Although Mackey mentions due process concerns in his brief, he does not explain how 
he believes the agency violated his due process rights in these proceedings, and no 
constitutional violation is apparent from the record.  See Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Att’y 
Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To establish a violation of due process, . . . 
petitioners must show that substantial prejudice resulted from the alleged procedural 
errors.”). 


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