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USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

USA v. James Perrin

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-27-2025 
G. W. v. Ringwood Board of Education 
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Recommended Citation 
"G. W. v. Ringwood Board of Education" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 716. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/716 
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                                                                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2048 
__________ 
 
G.W.; K.W.; *M.W., 
                        Appellants 
 
v. 
 
RINGWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION, DBA Ringwood School District; 
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; NEW JERSEY COMMISSIONER 
OF EDUCATION; NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
(*Dismissed Pursuant to Clerk Order dated February 12, 2025) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-20657) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jamel K. Semper 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 26, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 27, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 G.W. and K.W. (collectively, the “Appellants”) appeal pro se from the District 
Court’s order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss.  We will affirm. 
I. 
The Appellants are the parents of M.W., a New Jersey student who transferred into 
the Ringwood Board of Education (“Ringwood”) school system in 2015.  Ringwood 
evaluated M.W. and concluded that he was eligible for special education and related 
services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq. 
(“IDEA”).  Individual Education Plans (“IEPs”) were developed for M.W. for the 2015–
2016, 2016–2017, and 2017–2018 school years.   
The Appellants have not provided their consent to re-evaluate M.W. since 2016, 
and they withheld consent when Ringwood initiated a November 2019 re-evaluation 
meeting.  In January 2020, Ringwood filed a request for an administrative due process 
hearing and sought various forms of relief, including an injunction requiring the 
Appellants to consent to a re-evaluation of M.W.  The administrative law judge declined 
to issue the injunctive relief, but he ordered that as long as the Appellants withheld their 
consent, the IDEA and implementing regulations would limit the Appellants’ rights to 
raise challenges to M.W.’s placement and programming under the IDEA.  See Ringwood 
Bd. of Educ. v. K.W. & G.W., OAL No. EDS 02167-20, 2021 WL 8322401, at *4 (N.J. 
Adm. Sept. 24, 2021) (citing N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.3(c), (e)); see also 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.300(c). 
In December 2021, the Appellants filed a counseled complaint in the District 
Court.  The complaint named the Appellants and M.W. as plaintiffs; it named as 
3 
 
defendants the Appellees here, including Ringwood and various New Jersey state entities.   
The complaint challenged the administrative proceedings and raised claims under the 
IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), 
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 et seq. (“NJLAD”), and 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (“Section 504”).    
Ringwood filed an answer and counterclaims.  The District Court dismissed all of the 
counterclaims except Ringwood’s claim for attorney’s fees under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II–III).   
In July 2022, the Appellants’ counsel filed a motion to withdraw.  In October 
2022, the District Court issued an opinion and order granting the motion, providing the 
Appellants with 60 days to find substitute counsel or proceed pro se, and noting that 
M.W. could not proceed pro se in federal court.  After the Appellants and M.W. failed to 
secure counsel by the extended deadline of August 31, 2023, the defendants filed motions 
to dismiss.   
The District Court granted the motions and dismissed the complaint.  The District 
Court concluded that M.W. could not proceed pro se in federal court, that the Appellants 
lacked standing to bring any claims on behalf of M.W., and that the Appellants lacked 
standing to bring their own claims because they failed to allege an injury under the 
relevant statutes.  This timely appeal ensued.   
4 
 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 
602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010).1  “We exercise de novo review of a dismissal for a lack 
of standing, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”  Barclift v. Keystone 
Credit Servs., LLC, 93 F.4th 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).  We construe the 
Appellants’ pro se pleadings liberally.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 
(per curiam).  We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s order granting 
counsel’s motion to withdraw.  See Ohntrup v. Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu, 
760 F.3d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 2014). 
III. 
We agree with the District Court’s determination that the pro se Appellants cannot 
pursue any claims on behalf of their son, so we discuss only the issues that the Appellants 
have raised on appeal with respect to their own claims.  See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of 
Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882–83 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a non-lawyer appearing pro se 
“was not entitled to play the role of attorney for his children in federal court”).  Because 
the Appellants’ claims under Section 504, the ADA, and the NJLAD were based on 
alleged injuries to M.W., the District Court properly dismissed these claims for lack of 
 
1 The District Court’s dismissal for lack of standing is a final order which was properly 
entered without prejudice.  See Thorne v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc., 980 F.3d 
879, 896 (3d Cir. 2020).  The pending IDEA attorney’s fees issue does not divest our 
Court of jurisdiction.  See H.E. v. Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning Partners 
Charter Sch., 873 F.3d 406, 412 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017).   
5 
 
standing, as the Appellants failed to allege that they suffered any legally cognizable 
injury for these causes of action.  See generally Barclift, 93 F.4th at 146. 
The District Court properly explained that while the Appellants have substantive 
rights under the IDEA that they could pursue pro se, see Winkelman ex. rel. Winkelman 
v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007), the Appellants failed to allege any 
injury based on the alleged violations of those rights.  In their brief, the Appellants devote 
only two pages to their alleged IDEA injury, arguing that the state administrative 
proceedings somehow removed M.W.’s right to a free appropriate public education 
(“FAPE”) “retroactively.”  Appellants’ Br. at 27–28.  But the Appellants have failed to 
allege or explain how M.W.’s right to a FAPE was impeded.  In fact, Ringwood initiated 
the due process hearing because it wanted to obtain the consent required to re-evaluate 
M.W. for the services needed to provide him with a FAPE.  The administrative law judge 
determined that as long as consent was not provided, the IDEA and implementing 
regulations would limit the Appellants’ rights to bring certain challenges regarding the 
provision of a FAPE.  See Ringwood, 2021 WL 8322401, at *4.  Under these 
circumstances, the Appellants have not shown that any alleged procedural errors in the 
administrative process (which they participated in) are actionable under the IDEA, as 
they have not alleged how any such error “result[ed] in a loss of educational opportunity 
for the student, seriously depriv[ed] parents of their participation rights, or caus[ed] a 
deprivation of educational benefits.”  D.S., 602 F.3d at 565. 
The majority of the Appellants’ brief is dedicated to challenging the District 
Court’s order permitting the Appellants’ attorney to withdraw.  See Appellants’ Br. at 
6 
 
11–27.  We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s well-reasoned opinion 
and order which explained, among other things, that there was an undisputed breakdown 
in communication and that, given the early stage of the proceedings and the time 
permitted to find replacement counsel, the Appellants would not suffer prejudice.  See 
ECF No. 50 at 5–7; see also LabMD Inc. v. Boback, 47 F.4th 164, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2022). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 


G. W. v. Ringwood Board of Education

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-4-2025 
Salissou Karim-Seidou v. CMA CGM America LLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Salissou Karim-Seidou v. CMA CGM America LLC" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 733. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/733 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of 
Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1005 
___________ 
 
SALISSOU KARIM-SEIDOU, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CMA CGM (AMERICA) LLC; TROY CONTAINER LINES LTD 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-12579) 
District Judge: Honorable Jamel K. Semper 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on July 1, 2025 
 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 4, 2025) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Salissou Karim-Seidou appeals from the District Court’s 
dismissal of his claims.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
I. 
Karim-Seidou’s claims stem from a 2018 transaction involving goods shipped 
from New York to Lomé, Togo.1  Karim-Seidou is the president of Karimas Import 
Export, LLC (“Karimas”).  In 2018, Karimas entered into an agreement with a freight 
forwarder to load goods onto a cargo container and arrange for their transport to Togo.  
The freight forwarder contracted with Troy Container Lines Ltd. (“Troy”) to book the 
shipment, and Troy booked the shipment with CMA CGM America LLC (“CMA 
CGM”).   
Issues with documentation prevented Karimas’ goods from shipping for several 
weeks and resulted in the accumulation of daily storage fees for the container.  The 
container ultimately arrived in Togo several months later, but it was not released to 
Karim-Seidou because of the accumulated fees, which Karim-Seidou contends he should 
not have had to pay.   
 
1  Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary for 
this discussion.  These facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 
 
3 
 
Karimas brought a counseled lawsuit in state court regarding this conflict against 
CMA CGM, Troy, and the freight forwarder; it was removed to federal court.  In 2021, 
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut concluded that Karimas 
was bound by the forum selection clause in CMA CGM’s and Troy’s bills of lading, 
making the Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille in France the sole proper forum for 
Karimas to pursue its claims.  See Karimas Imp. Exp., LLC v. Guaranteed Int’l Shipping 
LLC, No. 3:19-cv-01447, 2021 WL 9409508, at *8-9 (D. Conn. July 27, 2021).  
Accordingly, the District Court did not address the merits of its claims.  Karimas did not 
appeal. 
In 2023, Karim-Seidou initiated the underlying pro se federal lawsuit on his own 
behalf against Troy and CMA CGM.  In his initial complaint, he claimed that defendants 
(1) committed larceny, “false pretenses [l]arceny,” and fraud in violation of 10 U.S.C. 
§ 921 and 41 U.S.C. § 6503, and (2) breached their contract in violation of “article 1170 
of the United States civil code.”  Compl. at 10-18.  Karim-Seidou then filed an amended 
complaint in which he instead raised two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting 
that his constitutional rights were violated by defendants’ actions.  On defendants’ 
motions, the District Court dismissed Karim-Seidou’s claims with prejudice and without 
leave to amend.  Karim-Seidou timely appealed.  Dkt. No. 104. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
 
4 
 
over the District Court’s dismissal of Karim-Seidou’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Dismissal is appropriate “if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the 
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court 
finds that [the] plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen 
Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).  We may affirm on any basis in the record.  See 
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Karim-Seidou’s claims.  As the 
District Court properly concluded, he cannot bring § 1983 claims against private entities 
Troy or CGM CMA, as he has not provided factual allegations suggesting that they were 
state actors for purposes of § 1983.  See Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 
165, 169-73 (3d Cir. 2004).  Karim-Seidou made conclusory statements that Troy and 
CGM CMA acted under color of state law, but that is insufficient to avoid dismissal.2  
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
Karim-Seidou now contends that the District Court misunderstood his amended 
complaint to be replacing his initial set of claims with § 1983 claims, as he argues that he 
 
2  We note that Karim-Seidou filed a reply brief and an amended reply brief without 
requesting leave to file the amended brief.  Regardless of which filing we consider, 
however, we do not consider arguments and allegations Karim-Seidou raises for the first 
time in reply to appellees’ briefs.  See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. 
Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 
5 
 
did not understand the implications of framing his claims in this way.  He contends that 
the original framing of his claims would withstand dismissal. 
However, even if the District Court had considered the claims Karim-Seidou had 
brought in his original complaint, dismissal would have been appropriate.  The statutes 
that he purported to rely on in bringing his claims have no connection to his allegations.  
See 10 U.S.C. § 921 (defining larceny under the Uniform Code of Military Justice); 41 
U.S.C. § 6503 (describing remedies in the event of a breach of required contract terms 
involving a contract with a United States agency).  His remaining citation — to “article 
1170 of the United States civil code” — does not refer to any federal statute.  See Compl. 
at 16, 18.  Accordingly, his original complaint also did not present any claims for which 
relief could be granted. 
Finally, Karim-Seidou had two opportunities to properly frame his claims in this 
case and has not otherwise raised anything in the District Court or on appeal suggesting 
that he could state a claim if given another chance.  Under these circumstances, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Karim-Seidou further leave to 
amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.3 
 
3  We grant Appellees’ motions to file supplemental appendices with additional 
documents that were part of the District Court record. 


Salissou Karim-Seidou v. CMA CGM America LLC

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

Transource Pennsylvania LLC v. Steven DeFrank

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-18-2025 
In Re: James Tice 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: James Tice" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 133. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/133 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
ALD-084        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1086 
___________ 
 
In re: JAMES ROBERT TICE, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to W.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 1:24-cv-00044 & 1:24-cv-00046) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 21 
February 13, 2025 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: February 18, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se petitioner James Tice seeks a writ of mandamus relating to two cases, a 
civil rights case and a federal habeas case, both of which he filed in the District Court in 
February 2024.  Tice asks us to direct the District Court in those actions, and the state 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
court in his underlying criminal matter, to take a variety of actions, such as vacating his 
adult state court convictions, reversing the dismissal of his civil rights complaint, and 
granting his habeas petition.  Because Tice has not demonstrated that he is entitled to 
such relief, we will deny his petition. 
In his civil rights case, the District Court dismissed Tice’s complaint upon 
defendants’ filing motions to dismiss and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Tice v. 
Wilson, No. 24-cv-44, 2024 WL 4336306, at *1 (September 27, 2024).  Tice filed an 
appeal that is currently pending before us and in which he has already filed his brief.  In 
Tice’s habeas petition, the Magistrate Judge issued a recent report and recommendation 
to which Tice filed objections on the same day he filed this petition.  See Tice v. Wilson, 
No. 24-cv-00046.  The District Court has yet to rule on the report and Tice’s objections.  
See id.   
“The writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy reserved for only the most 
extraordinary situations.”  In re Abbott Labs., 96 F.4th 371, 379 (3d Cir. 2024) (cleaned 
up).  It is not a substitute for the appeal process.  In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 353 F.3d 
211, 219 (3d Cir. 2003).  We have the discretion to grant a writ only if the petitioner 
shows: “(1) a clear and indisputable abuse of discretion or error of law, (2) a lack of an 
alternate avenue for adequate relief, and (3) a likelihood of irreparable injury.”  In re 
Abbott Labs., 96 F.4th at 379 (cleaned up).   
 
3 
 
Tice does not meet those standards.  He has not identified any reason that he 
cannot obtain the relief he seeks concerning his civil-rights case in his ongoing direct 
appeal or the relief he seeks concerning his habeas matter either in the District Court or, 
if necessary, on appeal.  See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d at 219 (“If, in effect, an 
appeal will lie, mandamus will not.”).   
Finally, to the extent that Tice asks us to direct the state court to take action, we 
lack authority to grant such relief.  See In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 781 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that federal courts of appeal ordinarily “lack appellate jurisdiction over their 
state counterparts, thus making writs of mandamus generally inappropriate”); White v. 
Ward, 145 F.3d 1139, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (explaining that a federal court 
“lack[s] jurisdiction to direct a state court to perform its duty”). 
 For these reasons, we will deny the mandamus petition. 


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USA v. James Perrin

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