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2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-10-2025 
Daniel Andrews,Sr. v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
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Recommended Citation 
"Daniel Andrews,Sr. v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 478. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/478 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
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1 
DLD-073        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2885 
___________ 
 
DANIEL RUSSELL ANDREWS, 
              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; J. SPYKER, Correctional 
Coordinator Program Manager-SCI-Huntingdon; CO III GRASSMIRE; CO III 
MCCLOSKY; MS.  HAMMON, Library Assistant; CO I FRYE; ELLENBERGER, 
Hearing Examiner; CONNIE GREENE, Grievance Coordinator; CO V HOUSE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00077) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 30, 2025 
Before:  RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 10, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
PER CURIAM 
Daniel Russell Andrews, Sr., appeals the District Court’s September 26, 2024 
order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s order.1 
In the evening of January 17, 2020, Daniel Andrews, then incarcerated at 
Pennsylvania’s State Correctional Institution – Huntingdon, got into a verbal altercation 
with another prisoner, Guy Bicking. According to Andrews, this altercation occurred 
after Andrews requested help with a word processing program in the law library, to 
which an agitated Bicking responded by “offering [Andrews] his genitals,” loudly telling 
Andrews to perform a sexual act, and threatening to “f*** [Andrews] up.” A report filed 
by the only staff member to witness the altercation, Assistant Librarian Harmon, 
contradicted Andrews’ version of events, omitted any mention of the sexual threat, and 
instead reported that Andrews had threatened Bicking with a beating. After leaving the 
library, Andrews filed a complaint against Bicking under the Prison Rape Elimination 
Act (“PREA”) with Lieutenant Maxwell.   
The next day, Andrews was interviewed by Lt. Grassmyer2 and Program Manager 
Spyker regarding his complaint. Around the time of this interview, another corrections 
officer, Frye, overheard Andrews state “if he does that shit again I’m going to beat his 
 
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Summary action is appropriate if there is 
no substantial question presented in the appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4. 
2 As the District Court’s order granting summary judgment noted, Andrews’ documents 
spell defendants Grassmyer and McCloskey as “Grassmire” and “McClosky,” 
respectively.  
 
 
3 
ass,” prompting Frye to file a misconduct report. A subsequent investigation by 
Grassmyer and Spyker found that Andrews was the aggressor in the conflict with 
Bicking, based on review of the security footage, and the misconducts issued by 
Hammon and Frye. The misconduct was upheld on all levels of appeal, and Andrews was 
sentenced to a total of 60 days in restricted housing.  
After exhausting the prison grievance process, Andrews filed a timely complaint 
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the named state actors had violated 
his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3  Andrews’ operative amended 
complaint alleged that the named defendants had violated his First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by conspiring to file false misconducts against him and denying his 
disciplinary appeals and grievances, in part to cover for Hammon’s failure to promptly 
report the incident, but also in retaliation for his filing a PREA report against Bicking. He 
further alleged that Hammon had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to 
protect him from Bicking, and that Major House had violated his Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by ruling against him in misconduct hearings and sentencing him to a 
term in restricted housing.4 
 
3 Andrews was subsequently transferred to SCI-Frackville on June 14, 2022.  
 
4 Andrews’ amended complaint also attempted to re-plead his previously-dismissed 
conspiracy claims under state law. While the District Court did not address this claim in 
its subsequent opinions, it had previously rejected an identical version of this claim 
because Andrews’ complaint had not pled any factual basis to support the existence of a 
conspiracy. Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2009). Nothing 
in Andrews’ amended complaint or subsequent filings addressed this deficiency.  
 
 
4 
In screening Andrews’ amended complaint, the District Court dismissed all 
Fourteenth Amendment claims on the grounds that the imposed sanctions did not affect a 
protected liberty interest. See Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 
2011); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). This resulted in the 
complete dismissal of Ellenberger from the action, as well as the dismissal of Fourteenth 
Amendment claims against defendants Frye, Grassmyer, Spyker, and McCloskey. The 
Court also dismissed Major House from the action, because the sole basis for Andrews’ 
claim against him was an adverse ruling during the grievance process, and an adverse 
ruling, on its own, is insufficient to state personal involvement in any underlying 
constitutional claims. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).5  
After substantial discovery, the remaining defendants moved for summary 
judgment on all surviving claims, which the District Court granted. The Court granted 
summary judgment on all First Amendment retaliation claims, because Andrews was 
unable to point to evidence in the record which indicated that his PREA complaint 
 
5 The Court also rejected Andrews’ motions to amend his complaint, because Andrews 
sought to add claims under two criminal statutes which lacked a private right of action. 
ECF No. 63. While leave to amend should be freely given “…when justice so requires,” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a District Court may deny leave to amend if the amendment 
would be futile, as would be the case when a petitioner or plaintiff attempts to bring a 
claim which they lack a private right to pursue. “This is because, as the Supreme Court 
has observed, ‘in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially 
cognizable interest in the prosecution or non[-]prosecution of another.’” See United 
States v. Wegeler, 941 F.3d 665, 668 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Linda R.S. (“Linda”) v. 
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190-91 (1994) (noting that the Court is 
“quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from criminal prohibition alone…”). 
 
 
5 
motivated the defendant to file misconducts against him. The Court further concluded 
that nothing in the record led it to infer causation, because none of the defendants had 
been named in any of Andrews’ civil complaints or grievances prior to this action, and 
Andrews had not pled any other facts which supported such an inference. Lauren W. ex 
rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267-68 (3d Cir. 2007); Farrell v. Planters 
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court also granted summary 
judgment on Andrews’ remaining Eighth Amendment claim after concluding that 
Hammon had not “know[n] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health and 
safety,” because by Andrews’ own admission, Hammon had no way of knowing that 
Bicking might pose a threat. Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 747 (3d Cir. 1997); see 
also Andrews Deposition, ECF No. 66-2 at 18-19 (establishing that Andrews never had a 
hostile interaction with Bicking prior to the incident at bar). 
There is little to add to the District Court’s thorough analysis of Andrews’ claims. 
Beyond Andrews’ bald allegations of “racial favoritism,” nothing in the record indicates 
that Andrews’ complaint against Bicking prompted any unconstitutional retaliation by 
staff at SCI-Huntingdon. Further, Andrews’ misconduct history indicates that his 
placement in restricted housing was the result of threatening comments he made towards 
Bicking after the exchange. See Misconducts, ECF Nos. 66-3 and 66-4. While Andrews 
has continued to baldly allege that these misconducts were secured through fraud or 
 
6 
conspiracy by the named defendants, the record is devoid of any evidence on which a 
rational trier of fact could infer such a conspiracy’s existence.6 
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4. 
 
6 We also agree with the District Court that allowing further amendment of Andrews’ 
complaint would have been futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 
(3d Cir. 2002). 


Daniel Andrews,Sr. v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-10-2025 
Jean Prillman v. George Parsons 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Jean Prillman v. George Parsons" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 477. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/477 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2960 
__________ 
 
JEAN PRILLMAN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GEORGE PARSONS, GM3B; VICTOR KOSZI, OM; ANEL VARGAS, HR; 
HEATHER LANZA, HR; JEREMY SCHMICK, OM; ROBERT WORRALL, 
Supervisor 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5:24-cv-00605) 
District Judge: Honorable John M. Gallagher 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 27, 2025 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 10, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Jean Prillman appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of her amended 
complaint.  We will affirm.  
 Prillman was terminated from her employment for gambling while at work.  
Prillman’s amended complaint alleged that she was falsely accused of gambling and that 
her employer wrongfully terminated her in violation of her civil rights.  She expressly 
stated that she was not suing for discrimination.  She alleged that when she was 
terminated, she had to borrow money to keep her apartment, and she was initially denied 
unemployment benefits and did not receive compensation until after an appeal.   
On the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the District Court liberally construed 
Prillman’s complaint as alleging a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim—that the 
defendants deprived her of a liberty interest in her reputation.  It concluded that the claim 
failed because Prillman made no allegations supporting a plausible inference that the 
defendants made stigmatizing statements publicly.1  The District Court dismissed any 
federal claims that Prillman purported to bring with prejudice and dismissed any state law 
claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Prillman appealed.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissal.  See St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. 
Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2020). 
Because Prillman is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe her filings.  See 
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).  But pro se litigants still must 
 
1 The District Court assumed for the purpose of its analysis that the defendants were state 
actors. 
3 
 
“abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.”  Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, 
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).  To present an issue for review, a litigant’s 
opening brief must include, among other things, a statement of the issues, the legal 
argument explaining why the district court decided the issues incorrectly, and the facts 
and legal authorities supporting that argument.  See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a).  Thus, an 
appellant’s failure to raise an issue in her opening brief, even when proceeding pro se, 
renders it forfeited.  See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(per curiam).   
Here, Prillman’s brief does not address the District Court’s reasoning at all, much 
less explain why its disposition was erroneous.  Instead, Prillman re-asserts that she did 
not gamble at work, and she requests that this Court examine evidence that she claims 
will prove her innocence.  She notes that she has already presented the evidence in her 
state unemployment proceedings, and that the unemployment hearing referee found that 
she was not gambling.  But that Prillman was not gambling at work does not change the 
fact that she failed to state a federal claim for relief in her amended complaint.  Prillman 
alleged no facts suggesting that the defendants made false statements about her publicly 
such that she could sufficiently state a “stigma-plus” claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Chabal v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 1216, 1223-24 (3d Cir. 1988).   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Prillman’s motions to 
reschedule oral argument, compel the appellee to submit footage, and submit pictures and 
documents as evidence are denied.   


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