Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

Nashyrah Day v. New Jersey Department of Corrections

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

Melody Olinger v. Commissioner Social Security

Philip Emiabata v. Brendan Shannon

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

Gwendolyn   Rice v. Secretary United States Navy

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-30-2025 
Daniel Stoffa v. Michael Zaken 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Daniel Stoffa v. Michael Zaken" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 614. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/614 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1638 
____________ 
 
DANIEL STOFFA, 
                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL ZAKEN, Superintendent SCI Greene; 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF FAYETTE COUNTY; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2:22-cv-00621) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Patricia L. Dodge 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
May 20, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  PHIPPS, CHUNG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 30, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
Daniel Stoffa appeals the District Court’s1 denial of his habeas petition.  Stoffa 
cannot overcome the deferential standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which allows relief only when a state court’s 
decision is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1).  We will therefore affirm the District Court.  
I. BACKGROUND2 
 
Daniel Stoffa was convicted by a jury in 2018 of multiple counts of rape, indecent 
assault, aggravated indecent assault, and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse for 
repeatedly raping three sisters, ranging in age from six to sixteen at the time of the 
crimes.  He was sentenced to 20–40 years’ imprisonment.  Stoffa appealed, and the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment.  Stoffa did not seek review by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  In May 2019, Stoffa filed a petition under the 
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), raising several claims including the 
ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim he raises now: that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because he should have removed a biased juror, Juror 400, for cause.   
During voir dire, the trial court asked prospective jurors, “[i]s there anything about 
the nature of this case or the crime itself, which would [cause] you to be biased in your 
deliberations against the defendant?” and several prospective jurors, including Juror 400, 
 
1 The term “District Court” in this opinion refers to the Magistrate Judge, who 
presided over this matter with the consent of the parties.   
2 Because we write for the parties, we recite only the facts pertinent to our decision. 
 
3 
 
raised their hands.  Appx. 50.  When asked, “[D]o you believe that you would be unable 
to serve as a fair and impartial juror?”, Juror 400 answered, “[p]robably.”  Id. at 52.  Juror 
400 also answered affirmatively when asked if he or a member of his household was 
“involved with any child advocacy group,” and raised his hand when the jurors who 
answered affirmatively were asked if their involvement with children would make them 
unable to serve fairly and impartially as a juror.  Id. at 53–54.  Stoffa’s counsel did not 
move to strike Juror 400 for cause.   
At the PCRA hearing, counsel explained that he thought Juror 400 falsely stated 
that he could not be fair because Juror 400 wanted to get out of jury duty.  Stoffa’s 
counsel further explained that the defense strategy was that the children were lying and 
that he told Stoffa that Juror 400 would be good for the defense because Juror 400 was a 
teacher and judged children daily.  The PCRA Court denied Stoffa’s petition, and the 
Superior Court affirmed.  In April 2022, Stoffa filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
in the Western District of Pennsylvania, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to strike Juror 400 after he said he could not be fair and impartial.  We issued a 
certificate of appealability and this appeal followed.   
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
II. DISCUSSION3 
 
To obtain habeas relief on his IAC claim, Stoffa must demonstrate that he can 
overcome AEDPA’s highly deferential standard of review.4  Specifically, Stoffa must 
show that the Superior Court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States.”  28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1).  Strickland v. Washington sets forth the 
“clearly established Federal law” regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.  466 U.S. 
668 (1984).  Under Strickland’s two-pronged test, a defendant must first show that trial 
counsel was deficient and, if so, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.  
Id. at 687.  At the first prong, trial counsel’s strategic decisions “made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts … are virtually unchallengeable[.]”  Id. at 690.  At the 
second prong, prejudice is shown if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
Id. at 694.   
 
3  The District Court had jurisdiction over the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 
and 2253.  We review the District Court’s decision de novo “because no evidentiary 
hearing was held.”  Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 845 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
4  When “considering a § 2254 petition, we review the ‘last reasoned decision’ of the 
state courts on the petitioner’s claims.”  Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231–32 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quoting Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289–90 (3d Cir. 2008)).  In this case, 
that would be the Superior Court’s decision.  We review the Superior Court’s decision 
under a “highly deferential standard … which demands that state-court decisions be given 
the benefit of the doubt.”  Eley, 712 F.3d at 845 (internal quotations omitted).   
 
5 
 
The Superior Court resolved Stoffa’s claim by focusing on the second Strickland 
prong and found that Stoffa failed to establish prejudice.  It found that, even if Juror 400 
were removed and replaced with an unbiased juror, there was no reasonable probability 
that his trial’s outcome would have been different due to the overwhelming evidence 
against Stoffa.  Stoffa argues that this was error, not because there was a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome, but because juror bias is a structural error and as such, 
the Superior Court should have presumed he suffered prejudice.5   
We read Stoffa’s argument to be that the Superior Court’s finding was “contrary 
to” “clearly established law” because it “contradict[ed] [] governing law” that, Price v. 
Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (internal quotations omitted), upon collateral review 
of an ineffectiveness claim, prejudice is presumed for structural errors that lead to 
fundamental unfairness at trial, even when there is no reasonable probability that the 
outcome of trial would have been different absent the error.  In order to prevail on that 
argument, Stoffa must first demonstrate that there is clearly established law, i.e., a 
Supreme Court holding, that a finding of prejudice upon collateral review of an 
 
5  “[T]he defining feature of a structural error is that it affects the framework within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than being simply an error in the trial process itself.”  
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017) (internal quotations omitted).  While 
some errors are considered structural because they lead to “fundamental unfairness,” 
other errors are considered structural for different reasons (e.g., the error is of a type that 
its “effects are simply too hard to measure.”)  Id. at 295–96.  “An error can count as 
structural even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case.”  Id. at 
296. 
In making this argument, Stoffa assumes that Juror 400 was biased.  We do not 
decide that issue and proceed on the same assumption. 
 
6 
 
ineffectiveness claim is mandatory when defense counsel fails to object to the seating of a 
biased juror.  Andrew v. White, 145 S. Ct. 75, 81, 82–83 (2025) (“A legal principle is 
clearly established for purposes of AEDPA if it is a holding of [the Supreme] Court,” 
including if the legal principle is “indispensable to the decision[.]”).  Stoffa must then 
demonstrate that the Superior Court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable 
application of, that Supreme Court holding.  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 
(2011). 
Stoffa identifies no Supreme Court holding clearly establishing that trial counsel’s 
failure to strike a biased juror creates a presumption of prejudice, obviating the need to 
establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome – the burden a petitioner must 
ordinarily meet to gain relief.  Instead, he cites Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 
(2017), and claims that the Supreme Court has clearly established the more general 
proposition that a finding of prejudice is mandatory in all instances where structural error 
leads to fundamental unfairness.   
This argument was first raised in Stoffa’s appellate reply brief and is accordingly 
doubly forfeited, having never been raised before the District Court nor in Stoffa’s 
opening brief here.  See Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Norris v. Brooks, 794 F.3d 401, 406 (3d Cir. 2015).  Even if this argument were not 
forfeited, it would fail because Weaver does not stand for the proposition asserted by 
Stoffa, much less clearly establish it.  The Supreme Court in Weaver did not hold that 
habeas “relief [] must be granted if … [a structural error] rendered the trial fundamentally 
unfair,” “even if there is no showing of a reasonable probability of a different 
 
7 
 
outcome[.]”  Weaver, 580 U.S. at 300.  Rather, the Supreme Court assumed that relief 
was due under those circumstances for “analytical purposes[.]”  Id.; see also id. at 306 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  Thus, Stoffa cannot rely on Weaver to demonstrate that a 
Supreme Court holding clearly established that a finding of prejudice was mandatory in 
his case. 
While Stoffa also cites a number of circuit court decisions as clearly establishing 
Federal law that the seating of a biased juror alone is enough to establish prejudice, see, 
e.g., Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 463–64 (6th Cir. 2001), the Supreme Court 
has “repeatedly emphasized [that] circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly 
established Federal law’” for AEDPA purposes.  Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 24 (2014) 
(quoting § 2254(d)(1).  Moreover, “Circuit precedent cannot ‘refine or sharpen a general 
principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that [the Supreme] 
Court has not announced.’”  Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 7 (2014) (quoting Marshall v. 
Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013)).   
In sum, Stoffa fails to establish that the Superior Court unreasonably applied 
clearly established Federal law in determining that Stoffa did not demonstrate Strickland 
prejudice and we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of his petition.6  
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
6  Because we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal based on Strickland’s second 
prong, we need not consider the first prong issue of deficient performance. 


Daniel Stoffa v. Michael Zaken

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-31-2025 
USA v. Jashawn Mackall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jashawn Mackall" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 619. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/619 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 23-3040 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JASHAWN ANTHONY MACKALL, 
 
        Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. No. 2:22-cr-00111-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on January 31, 2025 
 
Before:  KRAUSE, PORTER and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 31, 2025) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 Jashawn Anthony Mackall was convicted of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He appeals the District 
Court’s denial of his amended motion to dismiss the indictment on constitutional 
grounds.  We will affirm.  
I. 
In August 2021, Mackall took police on a high-speed chase after refusing to pull 
over for traffic violations.  Following a successful vehicle-immobilizing maneuver by 
police, Mackall admitted he had a gun in the car, and he was arrested.  At the time, he 
was on state parole in Pennsylvania for two felony convictions after he shot a person in 
the leg in an aggravated assault with an unlawfully possessed firearm.  In April 2022, 
Mackall was charged with one count of being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm 
and ammunition, in violation of § 922(g)(1).1  Mackall pleaded guilty without a plea 
agreement.  Afterwards, Mackall filed and later amended a motion to dismiss the 
indictment on constitutional grounds.  The District Court denied his motion and 
sentenced him to 57 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.   
II.2 
According to Mackall, the Constitution requires us to vacate his conviction and 
 
1 Mackall’s criminal record included felony convictions in 2013 and 2016 for carrying 
firearms without a license, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a), and a 2016 felony 
conviction for aggravated assault, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).   
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo review over constitutional challenges to 
federal criminal statutes.  United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2011). 
3 
 
remand for the District Court to dismiss the indictment.  He first argues that § 922(g)(1) 
is an invalid exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause.  He then argues 
that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment both as applied to him 
and on its face.  He further contends that § 922(g)(1) is void for vagueness under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  We disagree.  
A. 
We begin with Mackall’s argument that Congress exceeded its powers under the 
Commerce Clause in enacting § 922(g)(1).3  We have previously addressed this exact 
same issue and reached the exact opposite holding.4  Mackall does not identify any 
intervening Supreme Court authority that “has ‘undermine[d] the rationale’ of our 
precedent,” so we cannot reevaluate that precedent “without having to resort to an en 
banc rehearing.”5  Thus, our precedent prevents us from entertaining Mackall’s 
Commerce Clause challenge.  We reject it.6    
B. 
We next turn to Mackall’s Second Amendment challenges.  Citing New York State 
 
3 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
4 See United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2001).  
5 See Erie Ins. Exch. by Stephenson v. Erie Indem. Co., 68 F.4th 815, 819 (3d Cir. 2023) 
(alteration in original) (quoting DiFiore v. CSL Behring, LLC, 879 F.3d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 
2018)).  Mackall relies heavily on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), but we considered those decisions in 
Singletary.  Mackall also cites United States v. Rahimi, but the Supreme Court 
“decline[d] to consider Rahimi’s Commerce Clause challenge because he did not raise it 
below.”  602 U.S. 680, 765 n.6 (2024) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  While Justice Thomas 
expressed “doubt that § 922(g)(8) is a proper exercise of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause,” id., a footnote in the dissent of an 8-to-1 decision is not precedential.     
6 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 618 F.3d 404, 410 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). 
4 
 
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen7 and United States v. Rahimi,8 he claims that 
§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because there is no historical tradition of 
disarming “people” like him without either a hearing on his right to possess a firearm or a 
determination that he presents a credible threat of violence to another person.  However, 
in United States v. Quailes,9 we held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a 
convict on state parole.10  Because Mackall was on state parole when he unlawfully 
possessed the firearm for which he was federally charged, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as 
applied to him.  As a result, his facial challenge also fails.11  Thus, we reject Mackall’s 
Second Amendment challenges.   
C.  
Lastly, we consider Mackall’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is void for vagueness 
under the Due Process Clause.12  To bring a facial vagueness challenge to a criminal 
statute, Mackall must first show that it is vague as applied to his own circumstances.13  
He does not attempt to do so.  Instead, he argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutionally 
vague on its face because, after Bruen, there are people covered within its text who 
 
7 597 U.S. 1 (2022).  
8 602 U.S. 680 (2024).  
9 126 F.4th 215 (3d Cir. 2025).  
10 Id. at 221–23. 
11 See United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266, 273 n.5 (3d Cir. 2024) (dismissing facial 
challenge to § 922(g)(1) where an as-applied challenge failed, because the challenger 
could not “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid” (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693)). 
12 See U.S. Const. amend. V.  
13 See United States v. Harris, --F.4th--, 2025 WL 1922605, at *9 (3d Cir. July 14, 2025) 
(“If a statute clearly warns an ordinary person that his own conduct is a crime, he cannot 
dodge liability just because it might not be clear as to someone else.”). 
5 
 
“cannot be constitutionally disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment,” and that 
“there is no way for an individual to know, in advance of indictment and conviction, 
whether he falls on one side or the other of the constitutional line.”14  Because Mackall 
does not argue that the statute is vague as applied to his own conduct, his challenge fails. 
III. 
  For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Mackall’s  
amended motion to dismiss the indictment.  
 
14 Appellant Br. at 25.  


USA v. Jashawn Mackall

Keith Slatowski v. Sig Sauer Inc

USDC for the District Court of the Virgin Island

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-12-2025 
In Re: Stefan Michalopoulos 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Stefan Michalopoulos" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 640. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/640 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
BLD-191 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
No. 25-2158 
___________ 
In re:  STEFAN MICHALOPOULOS, 
Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands 
(Related to D.V.I. Civ. No. 1:25-cv-00017) 
____________________________________ 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
July 31, 2025 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: August 12, 2025) 
_________ 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se petitioner Stefan Michalopoulos seeks a writ of mandamus asking us to 
intervene in his civil action filed in the District Court. To the extent that Michalopoulos’s 
petition is not moot, we decline to issue the requested writ. 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
 
2 
 
Michalopoulos filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act in the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands alleging that the FBI has been subjecting him to warrantless 
mind reading and chemical torture.1 He sought damages, moved for a temporary 
restraining order, which he claims was required under the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture to stop the Government from reading his mind and drugging him with 
chemicals, and requested early discovery so that he could demonstrate his entitlement to a 
preliminary injunction.  
The Magistrate Judge recommended denying Michalopoulos’s requests for a 
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and early discovery. Michalopoulos 
objected, and he moved for default judgment because the Government had not answered 
his complaint. He also filed motions requesting a status conference, a hearing on his 
restraining order request, and criminal charges against everyone allegedly involved in 
torturing him.  
 While those motions were pending, Michalopoulos filed this petition for a writ of 
mandamus, seeking our assistance because, he claims, the District Court is being 
“out-powered and manipulated” by the Government and is being forced to commit fraud. 
He seeks a permanent restraining order to stop the Government’s alleged torture, as well 
as criminal charges against everyone involved in his case.2  
 
1 He also attempted to redress these harms in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California. 
 
2 After he filed this mandamus petition, the District Court dismissed Michalopoulos’s 
complaint with prejudice and denied his pending motions as moot.  
 
 
3 
 
“The writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy reserved for only the most 
extraordinary situations.” In re Abbott Labs., 96 F.4th 371, 379 (3d Cir. 2024) (citation 
modified). To obtain relief, the petitioner must show: “(1) a clear and indisputable abuse 
of discretion or error of law, (2) a lack of an alternate avenue for adequate relief, and (3) 
a likelihood of irreparable injury.” Id. (citation omitted). Michalopoulos has not made 
that showing here.  
To the extent that Michalopoulos seeks an order compelling the District Court to 
rule on his complaint and motions, that request is now moot. See Blanciak v. Allegheny 
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir. 1996). To the extent that Michalopoulos 
challenges actions taken in the District Court, he has not shown that an appeal from the 
District Court’s judgment would be an inadequate remedy. See Abbott Labs., 96 F.4th at 
385. To the extent that the mandamus petition seeks other relief, including the restraining 
order and criminal charges, Michalopoulos’s baseless allegations do not support 
mandamus relief, and there is no clear and indisputable right to require the Government 
to initiate criminal proceedings. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); 
cf. Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379, 383 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(affirming dismissal of a complaint in mandamus to compel the United States Attorney to 
investigate, arrest, and prosecute state officials for committing federal offenses).3 For 
these reasons, to the extent the mandamus petition is not moot, we will deny it. 
 
3 Finally, to the extent that Michalopoulos seeks our intervention in the case that he filed 
in the Eastern District of California, we lack the authority to consider the relief requested. 
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 1294(1). 
 


In Re: Stefan Michalopoulos

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

Villanova University

Not a member yet

Nashyrah Day v. New Jersey Department of Corrections

Melody Olinger v. Commissioner Social Security

Philip Emiabata v. Brendan Shannon

Gwendolyn Rice v. Secretary United States Navy

Daniel Stoffa v. Michael Zaken

USA v. Jashawn Mackall

Keith Slatowski v. Sig Sauer Inc

In Re: Stefan Michalopoulos

Paul Taylor v. Commissioner of Pennsylvania D

Stephanie Murrin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

40,620

41,076