Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-22-2025 
Adam Urda v. Jeffrey Sokso 
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Recommended Citation 
"Adam Urda v. Jeffrey Sokso" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 582. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/582 
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PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 24-1804 
_______________ 
 
ADAM URDA 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY SOKSO, in his official and individual capacities, 
                                                 Appellant    
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3:21-cv-01178) 
District Judge: Hon. Karoline Mehalchick 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on July 8, 2025 
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 22, 2025) 
 
2 
 
Michael J. Scarinci 
PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE 
Strawberry Square 15th Floor 
Harrisburg, PA 17120 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Michael J. Ossont 
THE MATTIOLI LAW FIRM  
425 Biden Street 
Suite 300 
Scranton, PA 18503  
Counsel for Appellee 
 
______________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
Qualified immunity protects police officers who make 
wrong but reasonable judgment calls absent clearly estab-
lished law. In this case, Trooper Jeffrey Sokso filed a criminal 
complaint charging Adam Urda with acting recklessly after 
Urda poured fuel onto a smoldering fire, lighting himself and 
two bystanders on fire. Although the charges were later dis-
missed, Sokso’s conduct was reasonable in the circumstances. 
So he gets qualified immunity. 
3 
 
I. AFTER A FIERY EXPLOSION, 
 SOKSO FILES CHARGES THAT GET DISMISSED 
One Saturday afternoon, LaRae Bowen had some friends 
over, including her coworker Urda. The group headed down 
to a lake and tried to start a bonfire. But the wood was still 
wet from some rain and would not catch. Then one partygoer 
had an idea: He went to his truck and got a quart of motor oil 
and a jug of remote-controlled-racecar fuel. He handed the 
racecar fuel to Urda, who waited as his companion dumped 
the motor oil on the smoldering fire. But nothing happened.  
So Urda joined in, splashing the racecar fuel onto the fire 
over the motor oil. That triggered an explosion, lighting Urda, 
the other partygoer, and a four-year-old girl on fire. Engulfed 
in flames, the three had to jump into the lake to put out the 
fires. The little girl was hospitalized for a month and needed a 
ventilator and skin grafts 
Trooper Sokso investigated the explosion. After inspect-
ing the scene, interviewing witnesses, and speaking with 
Urda, he drafted a criminal complaint charging Urda with ag-
gravated assault and risking a catastrophe. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 2702(a)(8), 3302(b). He ran the complaint by an assistant 
district attorney, who approved the charges and recommended 
adding a third: recklessly endangering another person. 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2705. Sokso filed the complaint in state court 
with all three charges. A magistrate judge dismissed the first 
two charges but not the third. The Court of Common Pleas 
then dismissed the third charge too, finding no probable cause 
that Urda had committed the crime.  
4 
 
With the charges dismissed, Urda sued Sokso in federal 
court for unlawful seizure, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court granted 
Sokso summary judgment on the last two claims but not the 
rest, rejecting his qualified-immunity defense. We have juris-
diction over this interlocutory appeal from the denial of quali-
fied immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). 
We review de novo. Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 227 n.14 (3d 
Cir. 2023). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DEFINED  
THE RIGHT TOO ABSTRACTLY 
Urda’s surviving claims (unlawful seizure, false arrest, 
and malicious prosecution) share a common element that he 
must plead and prove: that Sokso charged him without proba-
ble cause to believe that he had committed a crime, thus vio-
lating his Fourth Amendment rights. 
Yet qualified immunity shields police from such claims 
unless they (1) violated a right (2) that was clearly established 
at the time. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
A right is clearly established if “it would be clear to a reason-
able officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), over-
ruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 236 (2009). Usually, that requires controlling precedent 
or a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” Ash-
croft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). But Urda has not cited a single case, either 
here or below, showing that the Fourth Amendment bans 
5 
 
what Sokso did in these circumstances. So his claim crashes 
into a roadblock. 
True, in rare circumstances, an officer’s constitutional 
“violation was so obvious” that no precedent is needed. Hope 
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734–35, 741–42 (2002) (handcuffing 
shirtless prisoner to hitching post to roast in the sun for seven 
hours); Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8–9 (2020) (per curiam) 
(forcing prisoner to live in a cell covered in “massive 
amounts of feces” and sleep naked in another, frigid cell 
awash in raw sewage for six days total (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
But Sokso’s actions do not even start to rise to that level. 
Urda claims that there was no probable cause to think that he 
had acted recklessly, a required element of each offense that 
Sokso charged him with. In other words, he insists that even 
though he poured fuel on a fire near bystanders, there was not 
even a “fair probability” that he had “consciously disre-
gard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk.” Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(b)(3). That 
is hardly clear. Indeed, an assistant district attorney had re-
viewed the charges and not only found them justified but told 
Sokso to add another one. So even if Sokso had violated Ur-
da’s right, the violation would not have been “so obvious” to 
a reasonable officer that we can overlook the lack of prece-
dent clearly establishing that right. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.  
The District Court denied qualified immunity because it 
held that it is clearly established that people cannot be arrest-
ed or prosecuted without probable cause. But the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly warned courts not to analyze rights so 
6 
 
abstractly. Instead, existing law must clearly establish that 
what this officer did in these circumstances violated the plain-
tiff’s rights. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–41 
(1987). Otherwise, plaintiffs could turn qualified immunity 
“into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleg-
ing violation of extremely abstract rights.” Id. at 639. As the 
Supreme Court has stressed, that framing is especially important 
for Fourth Amendment claims cause because probable cause 
depends heavily on each case’s facts. District of Columbia v. 
Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018). 
To be sure, one of our past cases seemed to analyze quali-
fied immunity at a high level of generality, stating that it is 
clearly established that people may not be arrested or prose-
cuted without probable cause. Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 
690, 705 (3d Cir. 2017). The District Court relied on that 
statement to define clearly established law at the same abstract 
level. But Andrews held only that the officer’s violation was 
clear “on the record of th[at] case.” Id. And that record—in 
which police had left material information out of an affidavit 
supporting their arrest-warrant application—was so different 
from this one that it cannot put the illegality of Sokso’s con-
duct “beyond debate.” Id. at 696, 703–05; al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 
at 741. Plus, Andrews cannot mean that courts may define 
clearly established law abstractly; that reading would conflict 
with a landslide of Supreme Court precedent. Anderson, 483 
U.S. at 639–41; Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 
(2004) (per curiam); al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742; Mullenix v. 
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam); White v. Pauly, 580 
U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam); Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64; City 
of Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42–43 (2019) (per 
7 
 
curiam); Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5–6 
(2021) (per curiam); see also United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 
533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that Third Circuit precedent 
that contradicts Supreme Court caselaw does not bind future 
panels). 
* * * * * 
The District Court denied summary judgment because it 
framed the question of law too abstractly. Framed correctly, 
the question here is whether preexisting law clearly estab-
lished that a police officer lacks probable cause to believe that 
a suspect acted recklessly when he poured fuel onto a smol-
dering fire with others nearby. The answer is no, so the officer 
has qualified immunity. The District Court should have grant-
ed him summary judgment on the remaining claims. We will 
thus reverse the order denying summary judgment on those 
claims. 


Adam Urda v. Jeffrey Sokso

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-23-2025 
Michael Aquino v. Michael Breede 
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Recommended Citation 
"Michael Aquino v. Michael Breede" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 587. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/587 
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Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 24-2941 
_______________ 
MICHAEL AQUINO, M.D., 
   Appellant 
v. 
MICHAEL EDWARD BREEDE 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3:23-cv-02459) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on July 8, 2025 
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: July 23, 2025) 
_______________ 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
2 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
Corporate breakups can be ugly. Frustration can spill from the boardroom into the 
courthouse. But it cannot be just any courthouse; it must be one with proper jurisdiction. 
Dr. Michael Aquino has tried to sue multiple times in courthouses on both coasts. But the 
New Jersey District Court properly held that Aquino’s third bid to find the right court fails. 
Because the proper court is in Connecticut, not New Jersey, we will affirm. 
Integrated Surgical LLC is a medical-device company formed in Connecticut and head-
quartered in California. It sought to develop a surgical pencil that doctors could use to 
remove smoke and fluid during surgery. Michael Breede, a Connecticut resident, was 
Integrated Surgical’s CEO and managing member. Aquino, a New Jersey resident, was a 
member of another LLC that owned 8% of Integrated Surgical. 
Integrated Surgical tried to sell its intellectual-property rights in the surgical pencil. A 
New York company was the only one to make an offer: $350,000. Breede emailed the 
board of Integrated Surgical, saying that Integrated Surgical would accept the offer. Aquino 
responded, offering to buy it himself for $360,000. After some back and forth, Breede 
signed the sale agreement but put the signature pages into escrow until Aquino could sign 
the agreement and wire the money into escrow. That evening, Breede sent an email saying, 
“I don’t have confirmation of the wire, but I think the deal is done.” JA 108 ¶ 62. Yet 
Aquino did not send the money or sign and return the agreement that day, as he was in the 
Adirondacks. Four hours later, Breede’s lawyer emailed Aquino’s lawyer to warn him 
“there is no agreement to sell the assets to Mike Aquino at this point” “since we didn’t get 
the wire or signature pages today.” JA 109–10 ¶ 66. 
3 
 
The next morning, Aquino faxed over the signed agreement. His lawyer then followed 
up, explaining that Aquino remained ready to close the deal. But Aquino still did not wire 
the money. For six more days, the lawyers exchanged emails and phone calls about the 
deal. Aquino never wired the money. Then Integrated Surgical sold the intellectual prop-
erty to the original bidder. 
Aquino first sued Breede, Integrated Surgical, and Integrated Surgical’s CFO and coun-
sel in California state court. After jurisdictional discovery, the court dismissed Breede for 
lack of personal jurisdiction. 
A month later, Aquino sued Breede again in California federal court. That court like-
wise dismissed him from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
More than three years later, Aquino sued Breede a third time in New Jersey federal 
court, alleging that Breede had tortiously interfered with his buying the intellectual prop-
erty. The District Court dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
explaining that Breede’s knowledge of Aquino’s residence was not enough to show that 
Breede aimed his allegedly tortious conduct at New Jersey. Aquino v. Breede, 2023 WL 
7195173, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2023). Aquino amended his complaint, and the District 
Court again dismissed without prejudice for the same reason. 
We review the dismissal de novo and the denial of jurisdictional discovery for abuse of 
discretion, accepting Aquino’s allegations as true. Control Screening LLC v. Tech. Appli-
cation & Prod. Co. (Tecapro), HCMC-Vietnam, 687 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2012); Toys 
“R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir. 2003).  
4 
 
New Jersey’s long-arm statute lets courts exercise personal jurisdiction over non-
residents as far as allowed by federal due process. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:4-30.68 (2016). 
Aquino does not contend that New Jersey has general jurisdiction over Breede. In any 
event, the District Court rightly held that it did not. Breede resides in Connecticut and does 
not have continuous or systematic contacts with New Jersey. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 
U.S. 117, 127 (2014).  
That leaves specific personal jurisdiction. Aquino does not argue that Breede satisfied 
the traditional specific-personal-jurisdiction test, which focuses on whether Breede had 
enough minimum contacts with New Jersey. See Ford Motor v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. 
592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021). Instead, Aquino relies on the “effects” test from Calder v. Jones, 
465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). He claims that the court had specific personal jurisdiction 
because (1) Breede had committed an intentional tort; (2) Aquino felt the brunt of the harm 
in New Jersey, where he lives; and (3) Breede had “expressly aimed” his tortious conduct 
at New Jersey such that New Jersey was “the focal point of the tortious activity.” IMO 
Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998). 
The third prong is often fatal. And it is fatal here too. Calder’s effects test does not 
“carve out a special intentional torts exception … so that a plaintiff could always sue in his 
or her home state.” Id. Instead, it asks whether the state was expressly targeted more than 
other jurisdictions. See Hasson v. FullStory, Inc., 114 F.4th 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2024). So we 
ask not just whether there were some contacts with New Jersey, but whether New Jersey 
was the focus of the alleged tortious interference. IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 268. It was not. 
5 
 
The focus of the alleged tort was Connecticut. Aquino accuses Breede of tortiously 
interfering with the sale of the surgical-pencil patents. For ownership of intangible rights 
like patents, we look to the state where the patent holder resides. Freres v. SPI Pharma, 
Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Del. 2009). Here, the patents were owned by a business 
run out of Connecticut by a Connecticut-resident defendant.  
Plus, though this is a tort case, “it is necessarily related to the contract … which is the 
subject of the alleged tortious interference.” Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 260 (3d 
Cir. 2001). The focal point of that contractual interference was not New Jersey. The alleged 
contract between Aquino and Breede was accepted in Connecticut. See First Camden Nat. 
Bank & Tr. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 132 F.2d 114, 116 (3d Cir. 1942) (looking to acceptance 
of a contract to determine its situs). Aquino’s payment (which never came) would have 
come from New York to Connecticut. Id. And the place of performance of the contract was 
to be California. Id. So New Jersey was not the focus of the alleged tortious interference.  
Indeed, the only connection to New Jersey is that it is Aquino’s home.  But Calder 
requires “additional facts” to link Breede to New Jersey beyond Aquino’s residence there. 
Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 299 (3d Cir. 2007). Aquino can offer none. It does not 
matter that Breede knew that Aquino might suffer harm in New Jersey. Id. The best that 
Aquino can do is point to a handful of emails and phone calls to him in New Jersey. But 
New Jersey’s involvement was incidental and only partial; Aquino got some of Breede’s 
emails while in the Adirondacks in New York. Intentional targeting requires more. See 
Remick, 238 F.3d at 260 (finding personal jurisdiction where the defendant unequivocally 
targeted a state). Aquino cites no case finding personal jurisdiction on such thin facts. 
6 
 
Finally, because Aquino did not present factual allegations showing the possibility of per-
sonal jurisdiction, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional 
discovery. Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 456. 
Breede never expressly aimed his alleged conduct at New Jersey, but rather at 
Connecticut. If Aquino wants to try yet again, he needs to sue Breede there. So we will 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal. 


Michael Aquino v. Michael Breede

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

English

USA v. Corrigan Clay

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-11-2025 
USA v. Daniel Teed 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Daniel Teed" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 119. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/119 
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inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
ALD-079       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3072 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL TEED, 
    Appellant 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2:18-cr-00036-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 6, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 11, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
Daniel Teed appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his motion for 
a reduction of his federal sentence. We will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
In 2017, Teed pleaded guilty in the Western District of Pennsylvania to conspiracy 
to commit sex trafficking of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c), and the District 
Court sentenced him to 120 months’ incarceration. Teed paid to participate in gang 
bangs, where he had sex at least three times with a girl that he knew was 16 years old. 
The District Court ordered Teed to register as a sex offender, and it granted Teed’s 
request to self-report to prison. Instead, Teed fled. After a six-week manhunt, he was 
arrested in Arizona.  
In 2018, Teed pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), and failing to surrender for service of his sentence, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2). The same District Judge sentenced him to two concurrent 18-
month sentences for those new convictions, to run consecutively to his 120-month 
sentence. At the time of sentencing, the recommended range under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) was 18 to 24 months.   
Teed did not file a direct appeal. Teed filed three motions for compassionate 
release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). The District Judge who sentenced him in both 
cases denied all three motions. Teed did not appeal from the denials of those motions. 
In July 2024, Teed’s court-appointed counsel filed a motion for reduction of 
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Counsel asserted that under Amendment 
821, Teed’s criminal history score would be lowered from Category III to Category II, 
 
3 
 
which would lower his applicable USSG range from 18 to 24 months to 15 to 21 months 
of incarceration. The Government agreed, but the parties contested whether a reduction of 
Teed’s sentence would be consistent with the sentencing factors enumerated at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a). The District Court denied the motion, finding that although it was authorized 
to reduce Teed’s sentence by up to three months, a sentence reduction was unwarranted 
based on the § 3553(a) factors. Teed timely appealed. The Government has filed a timely 
motion for summary action, and Teed has opposed the motion.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we generally review the District 
Court’s denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 
Thompson, 825 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2016). We may summarily affirm the District 
Court’s order if an appeal presents no substantial question for our review. See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6.  
Section 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if 
the defendant was sentenced “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the [United States] Sentencing Commission,” but only if “the reduction is 
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”   For 
that reason, a district court proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) must first “follow the 
Commission’s instructions in [applicable policy statement] §1B1.10 to determine the 
prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the reduction 
authorized.” See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821 (2010). If a sentence 
modification is authorized, then the District Court must “consider any applicable § 
3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized . . . is 
 
4 
 
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” See id. at 
827. Section 3553(a) requires courts to (1) consider, among other factors, the 
circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s history and characteristics, and (2) 
impose a sentence that sufficiently reflects the offense’s seriousness, promotes respect for 
the law, provides just punishment, deters criminal conduct, protects the public from the 
defendant’s further crimes, and provides the defendant with needed correctional 
resources. 
The parties agree that the District Court correctly determined that a sentence 
reduction of up to three months was warranted under policy statement §1B1.10 and 
Amendment 821. However, Teed argues that the District Court did not appropriately 
weigh all of the § 3553(a) factors before deciding that his 18-month sentence is 
appropriate.  
We find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Teed’s § 
3553(a) motion, and we are satisfied that the District Court “has considered the parties’ 
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making 
authority.” See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 113 (2007) (quoting Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007), in the context of a § 3582(c)(2) motion). The 
District Court was not required to provide a detailed analysis of every possibly applicable 
§ 3553(a) factor, particularly where (1) the District Judge asserted in a form (AO-247) 
order that he “considered” Teed’s motion and “the policy statement set forth at USSG § 
1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are 
applicable,” see ECF No. 68; (2) the same District Judge imposed the underlying 
 
5 
 
sentence and has consistently recited similar arguments in denying Teed’s three 
compassionate release motions; and (3) the District Judge imposed a sentence that is 
within the new, lower USSG range. Cf. Chavez-Meza, 551 U.S. at 113-14, 117-20. Here, 
the District Court went a step further than the district judge in Chavez-Meza by providing 
an opinion. The District Court reasonably determined that an 18-month sentence was “an 
appropriate (additional) amount of time” to punish Teed’s “attempt[] to avoid punishment 
for his original crime.” See ECF No. 67 at 6. The District Court emphasized that Teed’s 
cross-country flight and failure to register as a sex offender not only reflected his 
“inability to accept responsibility for his criminal actions” and “utter lack of respect for 
the law,” but also posed an ongoing danger to the public. See id. at 5-6. It does not follow 
from the opinion’s emphasis on certain § 3553(a) factors that the District Court ignored 
other factors. 
Teed’s other arguments are unpersuasive. First, he asserts that “[i]t would be 
reasonable to assume” that the court would have imposed a 15-month sentence if the 
bottom of the applicable range was 15 and not 18 months. See C.A. No. 11 at 6. But there 
is no presumption that a judge will resentence a defendant to a point within the new lower 
USSG range that is “proportional” to the point chosen in the older USSG range. See 
Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 116-17.  
Second, Teed contends that the District Court ignored evidence of his post-
sentence rehabilitation efforts in his seven years of incarceration. The District Court did 
not expressly address Teed’s rehabilitation argument in the opinion denying his § 
3582(c)(2) motion. However, the same District Judge considered the same or very similar 
 
6 
 
rehabilitation evidence in rejecting Teed’s third motion for compassionate release, 
reasoning that Teed “may be commended for the numerous education classes he has 
taken while incarcerated,” but his post-conviction rehabilitation efforts did “not negate 
nor even come close to counterbalancing” the same § 3553(a) factors that the District 
Judge emphasized in denying Teed’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. See ECF No. 59 at 8; Chavez-
Meza, 585 U.S. at 118-19 (reasoning that a reviewing court may consider the record as a 
whole for evidence of the district court’s consideration of § 3553(a) factors, because a § 
3582(c)(2) motion does not result in a “plenary resentencing proceeding”). To the extent 
that Teed asserts that he has more recent evidence of rehabilitation beyond what appears 
in the District Court record, the District Court can hardly be faulted for failing to consider 
evidence that was never presented to it.1  
 Consequently, there is no substantial question for our review, and we grant the 
Government’s motion to summarily affirm the District Court’s decision.  
 
 
1 Absent exceptional circumstances, we generally would not consider Teed’s argument or 
additional evidence for the first time on appeal. See Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel 
Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 88 n.12 (3d Cir. 2013). 


USA v. Daniel Teed

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-11-2025 
Peter Sauers v. Oak Property Management LP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Peter Sauers v. Oak Property Management LP" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 121. 
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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 24-2468 
__________ 
 
PETER SAUERS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OAK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LP; ASHLEY MANAGEMENT CO.; *COUNTY 
BUILDERS, INC.; MIKE MEISTER; KEVIN RILEY 
 
(*Amended Per Clerk Order of 8/28/24) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-05146) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 7, 2025 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 11, 2025) 
 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
Peter Sauers, proceeding pro se, appeals a post-judgment order of the District 
Court issued in his civil rights action.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 Sauers filed a complaint against Oak Property Management LP, Ashley 
Management Company, County Builders, Inc., and two individuals arising from the 
development of townhomes near his home.  Sauers claimed violations of his 
constitutional rights and state law.1  In an Order dated June 10, 2024, the District Court 
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.  The District Court explained in 
an accompanying opinion that res judicata barred Sauers’ claims under the First, Fifth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  It also ruled that he did not state a claim for relief under 
the Seventh Amendment.  The District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Sauers’ state law claims, which were dismissed without prejudice to his 
pursuing them in state court.   
 On June 27, 2024, Sauers filed a document titled “Motion for Extension of Time 
to Respond to Motion to Dismiss to MEMORANDUM KEARNEY, J. June 10, 2024, to 
Amend Complaint Rule 15.”  He asserted that the District Court erred in dismissing his 
complaint and presented arguments in support of his claims.  The District Court denied 
the motion, stating that Sauers had already filed a response to the motion to dismiss, 
which it had considered before issuing its June 10 decision.   
 
1 This was Sauers’ second federal complaint against these defendants.  The first was 
dismissed because Sauers had not adequately alleged that the defendants were state actors 
for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We affirmed that judgment.  Sauers v. Oak Prop. 
Mgmt. LP, 849 F. App’x 378, 380-81 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (non-precedential). 
3 
 
 On July 26, 2024, Sauers filed another document alleging error by the District 
Court and claiming that the defendants had committed fraud in state court.  As relief, he 
asked the District Judge to send his case back to state court and order a state court judge 
to take certain action.  On the same date, the District Court denied the requested relief.   
This appeal followed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The scope of our review is 
limited to the District Court’s July 26, 2024, post-judgment order.  Sauers did not file a 
timely notice of appeal from the District Court’s June 10, 2024, order (entered June 11, 
2024) dismissing his complaint.  Even if we were to construe his June 27, 2024, motion 
as a timely motion for reconsideration that tolled the time to appeal the dismissal order, 
see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), the District Court denied that motion in an order entered on 
June 28, 2024.  Sauers did not file a timely notice of appeal from that order.  While he 
argued in his July 26, 2024, filing that the District Court erred, he requested relief from 
the District Court.  His filing does not evince an intent to appeal, and it is best construed 
as a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).2  Sauers’ notice of appeal, 
filed on August 7, 2024, is timely only as to the District Court’s July 26, 2024, order.  We 
review that order for abuse of discretion.  See Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 
2014) (stating standard of review for denial of relief under Rule 60(b)). 
Sauers does not present a clear argument on appeal challenging the District 
Court’s denial of post-judgment relief.  He reiterates assertions he made in his July 26 
 
2 This filing also cannot further extend the time to appeal the underlying order as a 
request for re-reconsideration.  See Turner v. Evers, 726 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1984). 
4 
 
filing that the District Court erred in dismissing his complaint without instructing him 
how to remedy its deficiencies.  He also appears to reiterate that there was fraud in state 
court.  Sauers, however, has not raised a question as to the District Court’s dismissal 
order or shown any extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  
See Cox, 757 F.3d at 120 (requiring such circumstances for relief under the catch-all 
provision of Rule 60(b)(6)).  He also has not shown that he qualifies for relief under any 
of the other provisions of Rule 60(b), including Rule 60(b)(3), which provides for relief 
based on fraud in the underlying action.  And, to the extent Sauers has not already 
pursued his state law claims in state court, the District Court’s order does not preclude 
him from doing so. 
Sauers also argues that he established that the defendants were state actors for 
purposes of bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Sauers did not raise this argument 
in his post-judgment motion.  Even if his argument were properly before us, it lacks merit 
because the District Court did not dismiss his complaint in this case for lack of state 
action. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 


Peter Sauers v. Oak Property Management LP

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-12-2025 
Kevin Marsh v. Attorney General United States of America 
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"Kevin Marsh v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 126. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
 
________________ 
 
No. 24-1722 
________________ 
 
 
KEVIN ANTHONY MARSH,  
                                                    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the   
Board of Immigration Appeals   
BIA-1 : A060-010-154 
Immigration Judge: Pallavi Shirole 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 January 23, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
I. 
Kevin Marsh seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision 
denying his motion to reopen his final removal order.1 We will dismiss in part and 
otherwise deny the petition on procedural grounds. 
II. 
Marsh is a Jamaican citizen who came to New York as a conditional resident 
in 2008, eventually becoming a permanent resident in 2010. In May 2019, Marsh 
pled guilty to a 2017 drug offense in violation of New Jersey Code Annotated §§ 
2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-5b(10)(b) and was sentenced to three years in prison. Shortly 
after completing his sentence, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice 
To Appear charging him with removability under 1) 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as 
a non-citizen convicted of a controlled substance offense; and 2) 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony.  
We include only a brief summation of the procedural events. Marsh retained 
Stephanie Norton to represent him in the immigration proceedings. Norton appeared 
before the Immigration Judge and contested Marsh’s removability based on the 
theory that his conviction was not a categorical match for either charge of 
 
1 This Court has jurisdiction over the petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(D). See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 250 (2010) (affirming that courts of appeals 
“retain jurisdiction to review” the Board’s decisions on motions to reopen). 
 
3 
 
removability because the New Jersey statute categorized more drugs as controlled 
substances than federal law and was indivisible as to the identity of the substance. 
The IJ sustained the removability charges and ordered Marsh to be deported to 
Jamaica. The Board affirmed the IJ’s decision in a final ruling on July 19, 2021.  
On July 28, 2021, Marsh filed a pro se petition for review with our Court 
appealing the Board’s dismissal. Norton also filed a motion to reconsider with the 
Board on August 18, 2021, for Marsh. On August 24, 2022, the Board denied the 
motion.  
In September 2022, Norton realized she could have argued before the IJ that 
the New Jersey definition of marijuana at the time of conviction was broader than 
the federal definition of marijuana, i.e. a “hemp overbreadth” argument. To correct 
her oversight, she helped Marsh draft and file a Rule 28(j) letter to this Court 
explaining the new argument. On February 14, 2023, we deemed the argument 
unexhausted and denied the petition for review.  
On June 16, 2023, represented by new counsel, Marsh filed a motion to reopen 
with the Board asserting that Norton had provided him ineffective assistance of 
counsel by overlooking the hemp overbreadth argument. The Board denied Marsh’s 
motion on March 22, 2024. It concluded that the motion was untimely because it 
was “filed more than 90 days after we dismissed the underlying administrative 
appeal” in violation of 8 U.S.C § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). AR 003. It also determined that 
 
4 
 
Marsh was not entitled to equitable tolling and had failed to meet the procedural 
requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Finally, the Board 
refrained from reopening the case sua sponte because there were no “exceptional” 
circumstances as required under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  
III. 
Before us, Marsh asserts that the Board erred by finding that his motion to 
reopen was untimely and procedurally defective. We turn first to Marsh’s equitable 
tolling argument. Notably, without a determination that tolling should be applied, 
Marsh missed the 90-day filing deadline by over a year.  
There are two substantive requirements that must be met before we can apply 
equitable tolling: “(1) that [a petitioner] has been pursuing his rights diligently, and 
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 
544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 
(1990)). 
We need not consider the first requirement, Marsh’s diligent pursuit of his 
rights, because he clearly fails to satisfy the second. Ineffective assistance of counsel 
can indeed be an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of equitable tolling. 
Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). But the requirement was not met here 
 
5 
 
because Marsh failed to comply with the procedural steps a non-citizen must take to 
use an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to equitably toll a deadline.2 
To bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a non-citizen must comply 
with three procedural requirements outlined in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
637, 638–40 (BIA 1988). Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2001). A non-
citizen must 1) include an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts; 2) inform former 
counsel of the allegations and provide counsel with the opportunity to respond; and 
3) state whether a complaint has been filed against the prior attorney with the 
appropriate disciplinary authority and “if not, why not.” Id. at 639. 
Marsh failed to complete the second Lozada requirement as he gave Norton 
only one day to respond to his pending motion to reopen, a timeline he himself 
admits was insufficient. And his claim that the defect is of no moment because the 
purposes of the Lozada requirements were met is unpersuasive. This was not a mere 
technical lack of compliance; it was a complete failure to provide Norton with any 
chance to tell her side of the story.   
Marsh also asserts that the Board erred by declining to reopen proceedings 
sua sponte and failing to provide a detailed reason for its decision. But the Board’s 
 
2 Even if Marsh had satisfied the procedural requirements to bring an ineffective-assistance 
claim, he likely was not prejudiced by the purported error because his argument is 
effectively foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 
101 (2024). Marsh himself concedes that “[u]nfortunately, [his] case is factually similar to 
that of Brown  . . . .” Appellant’s Br. 33. 
 
6 
 
decision to decline to reopen proceedings sua sponte is “functionally unreviewable” 
by us because of the Board’s “essentially unlimited” discretion in this area. Sang 
Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 651, 655 (3d Cir. 2017). So we will dismiss 
this part of Marsh’s petition for review because we lack jurisdiction over it. Id. at 
656. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will otherwise deny the petition for review. 


Kevin Marsh v. Attorney General United States of America

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-12-2025 
USA v. Bruce Evans, Sr. 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Bruce Evans, Sr." (2025). 2025 Decisions. 128. 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 23-2534 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BRUCE EVANS, SR., 
            Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3:19-cr-00009-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 21, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 12, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Bruce Evans, Sr., appeals his judgment of conviction for Clean Water Act 
violations and wire fraud. We will affirm. 
I 
 Evans served concurrently as a supervisor in Greenfield Township, Pennsylvania, 
and as the manager of the Township Sewage Authority. During his tenure, there were 
several sewage overflows and Clean Water Act violations. Evans also owned a private 
business, and he used Authority funds to pay George Everett for work on behalf of the 
business. 
 As a result of that conduct, Evans was charged with violating the Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., and committing wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
 At trial, the Government called Daniel App, an employee of First National Bank 
of Pennsylvania, to prove the wire fraud charge. He testified that First National, like most 
banks in the United States, converts checks into images before processing them 
electronically. App confirmed that First National did this for the two checks payable to 
Everett. 
Upon conclusion of the prosecution’s case, Evans moved for a judgment of 
acquittal, arguing that the Government introduced insufficient evidence that he 
knowingly caused a wire transfer by paying Everett with checks. The District Court 
denied the motion. 
 Taking the stand in his own defense, Evans testified that he never read the 
Authority’s permit. Consistent with that testimony, defense counsel argued that the jury 
 
3 
 
had to find that Evans knew he was violating a permit condition to convict him under the 
Clean Water Act. The District Court disagreed, concluding that the statute established a 
general intent crime. The Court instructed the jurors that they needed to find that Evans 
acted knowingly, that is, voluntarily and intentionally. They were not required to find that 
Evans knew his conduct was illegal or that he had read the permit. 
 The jury found Evans guilty of most charges, and Evans appealed. 
II1 
 Evans first argues that the District Court erroneously instructed the jurors about 
the requirement that he “knowingly violate[d]” a “permit condition.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(c)(2)(A). He claims that the jury had to find that he knew the permit’s conditions. 
Our precedent says otherwise. 
 The District Court’s instructions were consistent with our decision in United 
States v. West Indies Transport, Inc., 127 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1997). There, we approved of 
the following instruction in a case involving § 1319(c)(2)(A): “An act is done knowingly 
if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other 
innocent reason. The purpose of adding the word ‘knowingly’ is to insure that no one will 
be convicted for an act done because of mistake, accident, or other innocent reason.” Id. 
at 310. As this instruction shows, the knowledge requirement refers to the defendant’s 
actions—not his knowledge of a permit’s conditions. See id.; see also United States v. 
Int’l Mins. & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 560, 562 (1971) (interpreting the phrase 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
4 
 
“knowingly violates [applicable regulations]” in a different statute and concluding that it 
refers to “specific acts or omissions which violate” the statute (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). So the District Court’s instruction was not erroneous. 
III 
 We now turn to Evans’s challenge to his wire-fraud convictions. Evans claims the 
Government introduced insufficient evidence that he knowingly caused a wire transfer. In 
support, he relies on United States v. Bentz, 21 F.3d 37 (3d Cir. 1994). There, a broker in 
New York used a computer to pay the defendant in Pennsylvania with checks for steel. 
Id. at 38. We held that the use of a wire communication was not reasonably foreseeable 
because the “use of the wire by a scrap metal storage facility in Pennsylvania which 
issues checks drawn on a Pennsylvania bank [was] not self-evident.” Id. at 41. And there 
was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant “should reasonably have 
anticipated” a wire transmission. Id. 
Evans’s reliance on Bentz is misplaced. Here, App testified that First National 
Bank, like most banks in the United States, converts every check into a digital image 
before they are electronically processed. There was no such testimony in Bentz. App’s 
testimony permitted the jury to find that the use of a wire communication could 
“reasonably be foreseen, even though [it was] not actually intended.” United States v. 
Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 529 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Bentz, 21 F.3d at 
41 (explaining that the “content of reasonable foreseeability must inevitably keep pace 
with advances in technology and general awareness of such advances” (citation omitted)). 
 
5 
 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 


USA v. Bruce Evans, Sr.

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-20-2025 
In Re: Bruce Aikins 
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Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Bruce Aikins" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 143. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1695 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  BRUCE R. AIKINS, 
         Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-02899) 
District Judge: Honorable Georgette Castner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on February 18, 2025 
 
Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 20, 2025) 
____________________________________  
2 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
In March 2022, Bruce Aikins filed a pro se Chapter 7 petition in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. Two days later, ETC Equities, LLC 
(“ETC”) moved for relief from 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)’s automatic stay so that it could proceed 
with an ejectment action that it had brought against Aikins in New Jersey state court. In 
May 2022, the Bankruptcy Court granted ETC’s motion. Aikins then appealed that order 
to the District Court.1 While that appeal was pending, the proceedings in the Bankruptcy 
Court moved forward.2 
In March 2024, the District Court dismissed Aikins’s appeal for lack of prosecution 
based on his failure to file a brief. He then appealed to us, challenging the District Court’s 
judgment. Around the same time, the Bankruptcy Court entered a final decree in his Chap-
ter 7 case. That final decree stated that Aikins’s estate had been fully administered, 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 That order was immediately appealable. See Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 
589 U.S. 35, 37–38 (2020).  
 
2 “[W]hen a notice of appeal has been filed in a bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy court 
retains jurisdiction to address elements of the bankruptcy proceeding that are not the sub-
ject of that appeal.” In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 580 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002); see 
In re Castaic Partners II, LLC, 823 F.3d 966, 968–69, 969 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) (indicating 
that it was permissible for bankruptcy court to proceed despite the pendency of an appeal 
from its order granting relief from the automatic stay). 
3 
 
discharged the Bankruptcy Trustee, and closed the Chapter 7 case. Aikins did not appeal 
from that final decree, and the time for him to do so has expired. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
8002(a)(1) (providing 14-day appeal period). 
Because Aikins’s Chapter 7 case is finished, the appeal before us, which stems from 
the Bankruptcy Court’s order granting relief from the automatic stay, is moot. See, e.g., 
Olive St. Inv., Inc. v. Howard Sav. Bank, 972 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) 
(“Once the bankruptcy proceeding is dismissed, neither the goal of a successful reorgani-
zation nor the debtor’s right to the automatic stay continues to exist. Accordingly, it no 
longer serves any purpose to determine whether the bankruptcy court properly lifted the 
automatic stay; the appeal has become moot.”); In re Income Prop. Builders, Inc., 699 F.2d 
963, 964 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“Once the bankruptcy was dismissed, a bankruptcy 
court no longer had power to order the stay or to award damages allegedly attributable to 
its vacation. A remand by us to the bankruptcy court would therefore be useless.”). Ac-
cordingly, we will (and must) dismiss this appeal on that basis. See generally Blanciak v. 
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur 
during the course of adjudication that . . . prevent a court from being able to grant the 
requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.”). 


In Re: Bruce Aikins

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-21-2025 
In Re: Caleb McGillvary 
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Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Caleb McGillvary" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 149. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/149 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
DLD-054 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
No. 24-3177 
___________ 
IN RE: CALEB L. MCGILLVARY, 
Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to 1:22-cv-04185) 
____________________________________ 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
December 19, 2024 
Before:  RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: February 21, 2025) 
_________ 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
In June 2022, Petitioner Caleb McGillvary filed a petition with the District Court 
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  On March 30, 2023, the State filed 
its answer.  On May 15, 2023, McGillvary filed a reply to the State’s answer.   He also 
filed a motion for summary judgment, which the State opposed.  On August 15, 2023, in 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2 
a text order, the District Court denied the motion for summary judgment as improperly 
filed.  See D.Ct. ECF No. 25 (citing cases).   
Thereafter, McGillvary petitioned for a writ of mandamus, asking this Court to 
compel the District Court to rule on the merits of his motion for summary judgment.  We 
denied the petition, noting that McGillvary’s “dispute is more akin to one concerning the 
District Court’s case management, which is a matter of its discretion, and not a basis for 
mandamus relief.”  In re McGillvary, Nos. 23-2660, 23-2820 (3d Cir. Nov. 28, 2023) 
(citations omitted).  
In July 2024, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(b), McGillvary’s pending habeas 
petition was transferred to an out-of-district judge for disposition.  See D.Ct. ECF No. 40.  
McGillvary filed a new motion for summary judgment, see D.Ct. ECF No. 44, which was 
referred to a magistrate judge for appropriate further action, including the issuance of a 
report and recommendation, see D.Ct. ECF No. 45.  The State once again opposed the 
motion for summary judgment.  On November 5, 2024, the Magistrate Judge issued a 
report recommending that McGillvary’s habeas petition be denied.  See D.Ct. ECF No. 
55. 
McGillvary filed written objections to the report and recommendation.   Among 
other arguments, McGillvary complained that the report and recommendation “ignores 
the allegations in the reply and undisputed facts in the summary judgment motion, which 
entitle Petitioner to habeas relief,”  D.Ct. ECF No. 58 at 4, and “erroneously denies the 
summary judgment motion as duplicative,” id. at 11.  Those objections remain pending 
before the District Court.  
 
3 
 
On November 14, 2024, the same date that McGillvary executed his written 
objections to the report and recommendation, he also executed a writ of mandamus to this 
Court.  See 3d Cir. ECF No. 1.  Although his objections were pending, McGillvary 
complains that the “District Court obstinately refuses to adjudicate the allegations 
contained in the Habeas Traverse and Reply as a pleading.”  3d Cir. ECF No. 1 at 9.  He 
asks this Court to “issue the writ of mandamus and order the U.S. District Court for the 
District of New Jersey to recognize the traverse and reply as a pleading, and give the 
allegations within it and the Statement of Material Facts not in Dispute filed in ECF 44 
due consideration and adjudicate the merits thereof.”  Id. at 22.  
A writ of mandamus will issue only in extraordinary circumstances.  See Sporck v. 
Pei, 759 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1985).  McGillvary must show that he has a clear and 
indisputable right to the relief sought, and that a writ of mandamus from this Court is the 
only available remedy.  See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976).   
McGillvary has failed to make such a showing.  As McGillvary has raised similar 
concerns in his pending objections to the report and recommendation, he clearly has a 
remedy available through the District Court.  Further, as this Court has previously 
explained to McGillvary, his allegations regarding the District Court’s handling of his 
filings concern the District Court’s case management, which is a matter of its discretion, 
see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982), and not a basis for 
 
4 
 
mandamus relief, see Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (per 
curiam).   Accordingly, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.1        
 
 
1 McGillvary’s multiple motions for relief pursuant to Rule 27(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure are denied.    


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