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2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-29-2025 
Ronaldo Lopez De Leon v. Attorney General United States of 
America 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
_______________________ 
 
No. 24-2064 
_______________________ 
 
RONALDO MARIANO LOPEZ DE LEON; ROSMERY FLORINDA 
 VELASQUEZ JUAREZ; L. M. L. V., 
     Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
BIA-1: A220-990-817 
BIA-1: A220-990-818 
BIA-1: A220-990-819 
Immigration Judge:  Jason L. Pope 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1 (a) 
April 11, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed April 29, 2025)      
__________________________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________________________
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Ronaldo Mariano Lopez De Leon, along with his wife, Rosmery Florinda 
Velasquez Juarez, and their child, L.M.L.V., are natives and citizens of Guatemala.  De 
Leon seeks judicial review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
affirming the denial by the Immigration Judge (IJ) of De Leon’s application for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1  We 
will deny De Leon’s petition for review.   
I. 
 De Leon was served with a Notice to Appear on August 12, 2021, charging him 
with being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present without being 
admitted or paroled.  At a hearing before the IJ, De Leon conceded he was removable but 
sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT.  He claimed that he 
had been persecuted on the basis of his political opinion and his membership in a 
particular social group (PSG).   
De Leon testified that, in September 2019, while driving a bus for his employer, 
two men boarded the bus and put a gun to his side.  The men told De Leon that they were 
from the Mara 18 gang and knew who he was.  They then demanded that he give them a 
large sum of money.  De Leon at that time had a newborn child with his wife-to-be. 
 
1 De Leon’s wife and child are both derivative beneficiaries of De Leon’s application.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A).  The IJ exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.2(b) and § 1240.1(a)(1).  The BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision 
under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and (9) and § 1240.15.  We have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).   
 
3 
 
AR133-34.  He claimed the men also knew that he had a family and somehow “thought 
we had lots of money.”  AR136.  De Leon explained that he paid the demand because he 
was afraid the men “would do something to my family” or even kill him.  Id.  According 
to De Leon, one of his coworkers had met such a fate in 2018 for refusing to pay an 
extortion demand.   
De Leon did not immediately return to work after this incident.  Having married 
the mother of his child in December 2019, he soon learned there was no work available in 
2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.  In February 2021, while he was driving a bus, 
another incident occurred. Four Mara 18 gang members boarded the bus, robbed him, 
informed De Leon they knew who he was, and demanded that he pay another large sum 
of money.  De Leon testified that his employer was angry that he had been robbed again, 
which prompted him to quit his job.   
At some point, De Leon started to drive a delivery truck for a different employer.  
In May of 2021, despite having changed his phone number, he received a phone call from 
a Mara 18 gang member who indicated that the gang had not “forgotten about [him] and 
that they had a surprise for [him] and [his] family.”  AR139.  De Leon testified that the 
surprise was that they were going to “kill me for not having paid the money they were 
trying to extort from me.”  Id. 
Because De Leon and his wife no longer felt safe, they moved with their daughter 
to another town.  Then, in July 2021, De Leon and his family fled to the United States to 
join his wife’s family.  Only after they arrived in the U.S. did De Leon learn that his in-
laws had fled to the United States when his wife was only two years old.  They had done 
 
4 
 
so because his father-in-law had also been a victim of extortion and had been beaten.  De 
Leon also learned that gang members had killed his father-in-law’s cousin in 2014 after 
he returned to Guatemala to work as a taxi-driver.   
De Leon did not report the 2019 or 2021 incidents in which he was involved to 
police.  He explained that police in Guatemala are corrupt and that they do not help 
citizens.  De Leon testified that if he and his family return to Guatemala, they will be 
killed.  De Leon attributed his mistreatment by the gang members to the fact that “I have 
family members in the U.S., and my wife does also.”  AR153.  Apparently because of 
that, he claimed:  “They thought that we had lots of money.”  Id.  
De Leon admitted that he had not been physically harmed in Guatemala.  His 
parents, who have remained in that country, have not been harmed.  His parents have 
noticed cars they do not recognize parked in front of their house.  Although they fear that 
gang members are looking for their son, they have not contacted police.   
In addition to De Leon’s testimony at the IJ hearing, the parties stipulated that Dr. 
Thomas Boerman qualified as an expert in the country conditions of Guatemala, 
specifically crime and corruption in its government.  Dr. Boerman opined that De Leon 
“would be at a high risk of egregious physical harm and death if returned to Guatemala 
based on his status as a member of his nuclear and extended families and for his defiance 
to the gang’s extortion demands.”  AR89.   
The IJ credited De Leon’s testimony.  Nonetheless, he concluded that De Leon 
had not established past persecution.  Specifically, the IJ concluded, inter alia, that De 
Leon did not show a nexus between the harm he alleges he would suffer and either De 
 
5 
 
Leon’s political opinion, or his membership in the PSG of “kinship ties” to his wife’s 
family.  AR97.  The IJ further found that De Leon did not prove that the Guatemalan 
government would be unable or unwilling to protect him.  De Leon also failed, according 
to the IJ, to meet his burden of establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution.  
Additionally, the IJ concluded that De Leon had not met his burden of showing that he 
was unable to internally relocate because he and his family moved within Guatemala and 
“nothing happened to them there.”  AR100.  For these reasons, the IJ denied both De 
Leon’s asylum and withholding of removal claims.  The IJ also denied De Leon’s CAT 
claim because he had failed to show that any harm he would suffer would constitute 
torture and that such harm would occur with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan 
government.   
De Leon timely appealed to the BIA.  The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s 
decision denying relief.  This timely petition for review followed.2 
II. 
De Leon challenges the denial of his asylum claim.  In his view, the IJ should have 
found past persecution, thereby establishing a presumption that he had a well-founded 
fear of future persecution.  De Leon contends the IJ erred by ignoring expert evidence 
 
2 Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, “we have authority to review” 
both determinations.  Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  We must 
uphold the BIA’s determination if “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 
(1992) (omitting citation).  “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless 
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(B).  “[W]e apply plenary review to legal issues.”  Shkembi v. Att’y Gen., 41 
F.4th 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2022). 
 
6 
 
that he was persecuted on account of his membership in a PSG, specifically his kinship 
with his wife’s family in the United States.  
We are not persuaded.  The IJ acknowledged the substance of Dr. Boerman’s 
opinion and by no means ignored his assessment.  But the IJ noted that in September 
2019 when De Leon had his first encounter with Mara 18, De Leon had no relatives in the 
United States.  While De Leon learned after coming to the United States that his father-
in-law had similarly been extorted and had been beaten while in Guatemala, the IJ 
explained that no evidence connected mistreatment of the father-in-law, more than 20 
years earlier, to De Leon’s encounter with the gang while driving a bus.  Furthermore, De 
Leon’s wife, who seemed the more likely target for extortion based on her parents’ 
residence in the United States, had not been subjected to extortion demands either before 
or after their marriage.  We conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding 
that De Leon failed to establish a nexus between his membership in a PSG and the 
mistreatment he endured.  In the absence of a nexus between De Leon’s mistreatment and 
his membership in his wife’s family, his asylum claim fails.  I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 
U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (emphasizing statutory requirement for asylum that persecution 
must be “on account of” a  protected characteristic). 
De Leon also contends that the IJ erred in concluding that he had failed to meet his 
burden of showing that Guatemala’s government was unable or unwilling to protect him 
and his family.  De Leon contends that his credible testimony about police corruption was 
sufficient to show that the Government was unable or unwilling to protect him.  Having 
weighed De Leon’s testimony and the country conditions report, the IJ permissibly 
 
7 
 
placed more weight on the country conditions report, which indicated that police 
investigate both crimes and gang activity, and that Guatemala had undertaken efforts to 
eliminate corrupt police officers.  See Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 366 (2021) 
(acknowledging that “the agency, like any reasonable factfinder, is free to ‘credit part of 
[a] witness’ testimony without’ necessarily ‘accepting it all’”) (omitting internal citation) 
(alteration in original).  The IJ also pointed out that De Leon never notified authorities of 
the extortion demands that were made upon him.  Nor had De Leon’s parents reported the 
cars that had been parked in front of their home.  Thus, De Leon did not offer persuasive 
evidence that showed that any report he might have made would have been futile.  We 
conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the IJ’s determination. 
De Leon also faults the IJ’s determination that De Leon failed to prove that he 
could not internally relocate within Guatemala, a determination which the BIA affirmed, 
The IJ acknowledged that De Leon and his family did not feel safe, but noted that they 
had not been harmed in any way after they relocated to San Pedro.  The BIA affirmed, 
noting that the IJ did not err in finding that they had relocated within Guatemala without 
incident.  Because the evidence does not compel a finding to the contrary, we will not 
disturb the BIA’s order.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  
In short, substantial evidence supports the denial of De Leon’s asylum claim. 
III. 
De Leon also asserts that the denial of his withholding claim was error.  He 
contends that the “IJ may have been relying on the asylum nexus standards” instead of 
applying the standard applicable to withholding claims.  Appellant’s Br. 21.   
 
8 
 
“To qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must establish a ‘clear probability 
of persecution,’ i.e., that it is more likely than not, that s/he would suffer persecution 
upon returning home” on account of a protected ground.  Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y 
Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 591 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 
(1984)); Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684 (3d Cir. 2015).  “[T]his 
standard is more demanding than that governing eligibility for asylum, [so] an alien who 
fails to qualify for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal.”  663 F.3d 
at 591.  Mindful of this higher standard, the IJ concluded that the denial of De Leon’s 
asylum claim meant that his withholding of removal claim also failed as a matter of law.  
We discern no error in this determination. 
IV. 
De Leon also applied for relief under the CAT.  He contends that the IJ erred in 
denying his claim by failing to consider country conditions.  The IJ’s decision belies De 
Leon’s assertion.  The IJ stated in his decision that he considered all evidence that had 
been admitted, regardless of whether it was “specifically mentioned.”  AR86.  The IJ also 
acknowledged Dr. Boerman’s expert report, which considered numerous sources.  And 
the IJ’s decision cited to the Guatemala 2021 Human Rights Report.  We reject De 
Leon’s contention that the IJ ignored the evidence of Guatemala’s country conditions in 
denying relief under the CAT. 
In sum, we will deny the petition for review. 


Ronaldo  Lopez De Leon v. Attorney General United States of America

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-5-2025 
David Pryce, III v. Primecare Medical 
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Recommended Citation 
"David Pryce, III v. Primecare Medical" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 358. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/358 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2685 
__________ 
 
DAVID PRYCE, III, 
    
v. 
 
PRIMECARE MEDICAL; CHESTER COUNTY; CHESTER COUNTY PRISON; 
GOURMET DINERS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-00753) 
District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 1, 2025 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 5, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 David Pryce, III, appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his second amended 
complaint.  We will affirm the judgment as modified.  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
I. 
 Pryce was a Pennsylvania state prisoner.  In 2023, Pryce filed a second amended 
complaint against Chester County Prison, Chester County, GD Correctional Services, 
LLC,1 Primecare Medical, Inc.,2 and other individuals.  Pryce alleged that he “got 
sentenced 2x for the same charge max out” and received the “wrong charge,” that he “got 
hit by a state employee,” and that he “got covid because the prison would not protect” 
him.  After defendants GD Correctional Services and Primecare Medical moved to 
dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Pryce provided 
additional detail to his allegations in response, including that he was beaten by his 
supervisor when he worked as a cook, the prison failed to treat his resulting injuries, and 
he was denied an inhaler for his asthma. 
The District Court liberally construed Pryce’s complaint as alleging excessive 
force and deliberate indifference claims and determined that Pryce failed to state a 
plausible claim for relief.  The District Court also determined that Pryce could not bring a 
civil complaint challenging his sentence because he failed to plead that the sentence had 
been previously invalidated.  The Court dismissed all claims against the defendants with 
prejudice, except for Pryce’s excessive force claims, which it dismissed without 
 
1 Although Pryce named “Gourmet Diners” in the complaint, Defendant GD Correctional 
Services, LLC, appeared and explained that the entity was improperly pleaded as 
“Gourmet Diners.”  GD Correctional Services contracted with Chester County to manage 
food services in the prison.   
 
2 Primecare Medical, Inc., contracted with Chester County to provide medical services to 
prison inmates.   
 
3 
 
prejudice.  The District Court gave Pryce time to file amended claims for excessive force 
against GD Correctional Services and Pryce’s supervisor. Instead of filing an amended 
complaint, Pryce filed a notice of appeal, in which he indicated his intent to stand on his 
second amended complaint.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3  Pryce arguably has forfeited some 
issues on appeal by failing to brief them, see Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 
n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam), but he does raise several issues that we will address.  We 
review the District Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo.  See Doe v. 
Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2022).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Because Pryce is proceeding pro 
se, the Court construes his claims liberally, but Pryce’s complaint still must contain 
sufficient facts to support a claim for relief.  See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d 
Cir. 2021).   
 
3 Because Pryce has clearly and unequivocally declined amendment and has stated that he 
seeks to proceed with this appeal by standing on the allegations in his second amended 
complaint, the District Court’s order is final and reviewable.  See Borelli v. City of 
Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); see also Weber v. McGrogan, 
939 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] clear and unequivocal intent to decline 
amendment and immediately appeal that leaves no doubt or ambiguity can allow us to 
exercise jurisdiction.”). 
 
 
4 
 
  To the extent that Pryce challenges the District Court’s dismissal of the excessive 
force claim against GD Correctional Services, we conclude that the District Court 
committed no error.  It is unclear from the pleadings whether the alleged assault occurred 
before or after Pryce’s conviction and sentence.4  But either way, Pryce failed to plead 
sufficient facts to allege plausibly that GD Correctional Services was responsible for 
Pryce’s injuries.  Pryce alleged no facts suggesting that any of GD Correctional Services’ 
policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation.  See Natale v. Camden 
Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003).  The District Court therefore 
did not err by dismissing the claim.  
 Next, the District Court did not err by dismissing Pryce’s deliberate indifference 
claims.  Pryce failed to identify which defendants denied him medical care.  See Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Moreover, he failed to allege that any 
of Primecare Medical’s customs or policies caused a constitutional violation.  See Natale, 
318 F.3d at 584.  To the extent that Pryce’s complaint and supplemental responses could 
be construed as bringing a claim for unconstitutional confinement conditions, Pryce did 
not state why his housing conditions were unconstitutional, other than the conclusory 
allegation that his placement was “unsafe,” and that he contracted COVID-19.  Cf. 
 
4 To state an excessive force claim for an event that occurred while the plaintiff was a 
pretrial detainee, the plaintiff must show “that the force purposely or knowingly used 
against him was objectively unreasonable.”  Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 
194 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 567 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015)).  For 
a convicted prisoner to state an excessive force claim, the plaintiff must additionally 
show that the force was imposed “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of 
causing harm.”  Id. at 193 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)); see 
also Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
5 
 
Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 372-74 (3d Cir. 2019). Thus, 
dismissal of these claims was appropriate. 
 Finally, the District Court correctly dismissed Pryce’s claims based on his 
sentence because he did not allege that he successfully challenged the judgment of 
sentence on appeal or by collateral attack, or that his sentence was otherwise held invalid.  
See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).  Dismissal of these claims with 
prejudice, however, was error.  See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(collecting cases explaining that dismissal of a Heck claim should be without prejudice).  
Accordingly, we will modify the order of dismissal regarding Pryce’s claims about his 
sentence to reflect that they are dismissed without prejudice to his ability to assert them if 
his sentence is invalidated.  See id.  
Because Pryce failed to state a plausible claim for relief, he was not entitled to 
discovery.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment as modified and deny any other relief sought on appeal. 


David Pryce, III v. Primecare Medical

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-7-2025 
USA v. Jordan Harmon 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jordan Harmon" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 373. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/373 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1797 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JORDAN DONYELL HARMON, 
  Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1:22-cr-00110-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Colm F. Connolly 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on March 3, 2025  
 
Before: MATEY, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  May 7, 2025) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
FREEMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Jordan Harmon challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 36-month 
sentence for making a false statement to acquire a firearm.  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm the judgment of sentence. 
I 
Between April 2020 and the summer of 2021, Harmon purchased 19 firearms from 
licensed firearm dealers.  One of those purchases served as the basis for the indictment in 
this case.   
On July 21, 2020, Harmon purchased a Smith & Wesson .40-caliber semi-
automatic pistol from a gun store in Delaware for $420.  On the same date, law 
enforcement intercepted telephone calls between R.D. (who was dating Harmon’s sister) 
and another individual, D.C., who was the subject of a government wiretap.  About ten 
minutes before Harmon purchased the Smith & Wesson, R.D. told D.C. he was “still 
waiting” for someone to arrive, and D.C. responded by saying he would not let R.D. 
“pay[] no outrageous for nothing.”  PSR ¶ 13.  And 30 minutes after Harmon purchased 
the Smith and Wesson, R.D. told D.C. that someone “just got a nice [] S and W” and was 
asking $700 for it.  PSR ¶ 14. 
Less than 20 hours after Harmon purchased the Smith & Wesson from the gun 
store, law enforcement arrested D.C. in Dover, Delaware, and recovered the Smith & 
Wesson pistol from him.   
 
3 
Nearly two years later, Delaware police arrested Harmon for the straw purchase of 
the pistol.  Harmon initially denied giving or selling the Smith & Wesson to anyone, and 
he gave other false answers to investigators’ questions.  When he allowed investigators to 
search his cell phone, they found text messages between Harmon and R.D.  In those text 
messages, the two men discuss the sale of a firearm and exchange greetings associated 
with the Crips gang, which was active in Dover.   
In November 2022, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Harmon 
with making a false statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) & 924(a)(2).  In a written plea agreement, Harmon pleaded 
guilty to the offense and agreed to forfeit any interest in the 19 firearms that he had 
purchased.  He acknowledged the statutory maximum term of imprisonment was 10 
years, and the government retained the right to make whatever sentencing 
recommendation it believed appropriate. 
By the date of his sentencing, Harmon no longer possessed any of the firearms he 
purchased, but law enforcement had recovered seven of them.  All seven were recovered 
during investigations of shootings or other criminal activity, and one was used in a 
shooting the day after Harmon purchased it. 
The Probation Office calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 12–18 months’ 
imprisonment, based on a total offense level of 13 and a Criminal History Category of I.  
Harmon was in the lowest criminal history category because he had only one criminal-
history point (from a conviction that post-dated his arrest in this case).  His total offense 
level included a four-level enhancement for an offense involving between 8 and 24 
 
4 
firearms, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B), and a three-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 
At the sentencing hearing, a police detective testified about several indications that 
Harmon was associated with members of the Crips gang.  The detective testified that 
certain phrases in Harmon’s text messages are greetings used by Crips members; social 
media photographs show Harmon making a hand gesture used by the Crips; and Harmon 
has a tattoo of a handicap symbol, which is associated with the Crips.  He also testified 
that R.D. is a member of the Crips, and Harmon and R.D. appeared together at a gang 
meeting. 
The District Court adopted the advisory Guidelines range of 12–18 months’ 
imprisonment, and then addressed the government’s motion for an upward variance to at 
least 36 months’ imprisonment.  After hearing arguments from the parties, the District 
Court granted the variance.  It said that the advisory Guidelines range did not capture the 
seriousness of the offense in two ways.  First, the enhancement for the number of 
firearms “applies to all the different gun crimes” and does not capture the severity of 
placing 19 guns on the street.  App. 191.  And this offense involved Harmon “putting 
guns in a dangerous community, knowing that the audience with whom he is speaking 
about the offense are gang members, or at the very least, people who want to emulate 
known dangerous gangs.”  App. 191–92.  Second, the Guidelines range did not reflect 
that seven of the guns Harmon purchased were later seized in connection to crimes, 
including shootings.   
 
5 
The District Court acknowledged Harmon’s lack of criminal history at the time of 
the offense, but it said Harmon had not taken advantage of the opportunities his 
supportive parents made available to him.  It also said it needed to deter Harmon from 
committing crimes in the future and deter members of the public who have clean criminal 
records from becoming straw purchasers for gang members in the increasingly crime-
riddled city of Dover.  It made several comments about its view that gang activity and 
gun violence have “ruined Dover” making it “no longer a safe place to go out and 
walk. . . .  It’s a tragedy.”  App. 192. 
The District Court also opined that Harmon was “essentially gun trafficking,” 
App. 195, and had not shown remorse for his conduct.  It concluded, “I have to send a 
message of 36 months,” and imposed that term of imprisonment.  App. 195.  Harmon 
timely appealed.   
II1 
When a defendant challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, we 
review the sentence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 
(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Under this deferential standard, we will affirm the sentence 
unless the defendant demonstrates that “no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on [him] for the reasons the district court provided.”  Id. at 
568. 
 
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 
6 
Harmon argues that his 36-month sentence is unreasonable because the District 
Court placed too much weight on the seriousness of the offense and the need to afford 
adequate deterrence.  As to the seriousness of the offense, he argues that the four-level 
enhancement to his total offense level already accounted for the number of firearms 
involved in the offense, and that the parties agreed before sentencing that a separate 
firearm-trafficking enhancement did not apply.  As to deterrence, Harmon contends that 
the District Court put too much weight on the dangers and violence in Dover and the need 
to deter gun trafficking generally.  He argues that “[i]mposing a one hundred percent 
upward variance to deter gun trafficking generally in a case that does not involve gun 
trafficking is unreasonable.”  Opening Br. at 19.  
We cannot say that no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed a 36-
month sentence on Harmon for the reasons the District Court provided.  The record as a 
whole “reflects rational and meaningful consideration” of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
factors, which is “the touchstone of reasonableness.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (cleaned 
up).  When the District Court addressed the seriousness of the offense, it reasonably 
considered that the enhancement for the number of firearms involved in the offense did 
not differentiate between Harmon’s conduct and less culpable conduct involving the 
same number of firearms.  For instance, the same enhancement would have applied if 
Harmon had possessed 19 firearms.  See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1) (providing increased 
offense levels for the unlawful receipt, possession, or transportation of multiple firearms).  
But here, the District Court found that Harmon put 19 firearms onto the streets; Harmon 
discussed those firearm transactions with people who, at a minimum, emulated a violent 
 
7 
street gang; and seven of the firearms Harmon put onto the streets were later linked to 
criminal activity.  The District Court also observed that no one knows what harms were 
caused by the remaining 12 unaccounted-for firearms.  And while the District Court 
heavily weighed the need for general deterrence, that weight was not unreasonable on this 
record.  That Harmon’s conduct did not qualify for a firearm-trafficking enhancement 
does not undermine the District Court’s rationale for seeking to deter straw purchasing.  
* * * 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  


USA v. Jordan Harmon

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-8-2025 
Robert Harriott v. Attorney General United States 
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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 20-2144 
___________ 
 
ROBERT MICHAEL HARRIOTT, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A097-428-091) 
Immigration Judge: Alice Song Hartye 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 6, 2021 
 
Before:  MCKEE**, SHWARTZ and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 8, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Robert Michael Harriott petitions pro se for review of a final order of removal.  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
** Honorable Theodore A. McKee, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, 
assumed Senior Judge Status on October 21, 2022. 
2 
 
For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part. 
I. 
Harriott is a citizen of Jamaica.  He entered the United States in 1996, when he 
was 25 years old, and became a conditional lawful permanent resident in January 2005 
after he married a U.S. citizen.  Harriott and his spouse subsequently divorced in July 
2005. 
In 2007, Harriott applied to remove the conditional status on his permanent 
residency, maintaining that although his marriage had ended in divorce, it was entered 
into in good faith.  His conditional status was ultimately terminated in 2009, retroactive 
to 2007, after he sought to reschedule an in-person interview but ultimately did not do so 
within the permitted time period. 
Harriott was issued a notice to appear in 2019, charging him as removable on two 
grounds: (1) because his conditional residency status was terminated; and (2) because he 
was convicted in 2008 of two controlled substance possession offenses involving crack 
cocaine under 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(16).  Harriott applied for a waiver to remove the 
conditional status on his permanent residency pursuant under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4), 
again arguing that his marriage was entered into in good faith. 
An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained Harriott’s charges of removability after 
Harriott admitted that his permanent residency status was terminated in 2007 and 
3 
 
admitted to his 2008 convictions.  After holding an individual hearing, the IJ denied 
Harriott’s waiver application. 
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), Harriott challenged his 
removability due to his convictions and argued that he had been in a good faith marriage 
for purposes of his waiver application.  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that 
Harriott was removable due to his convictions.  In doing so, the BIA applied the modified 
categorical approach to determine that Harriott was convicted of possessing crack 
cocaine, which constitutes a controlled substance for purposes of the removal statute.  
The BIA did not address Harriott’s other ground for removability, which Harriott had not 
challenged.  The BIA also agreed with the IJ that based on the record, Harriott had not 
established that his marriage to his wife was entered into in good faith.1  Harriott timely 
petitioned for review. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction to review Harriott’s final order of removal pursuant to U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1), subject to the discussion below.  We retain jurisdiction to review Harriott’s 
colorable constitutional claims and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); 
 
1  Harriott also initially applied for cancellation of removal.  The IJ denied that 
application, concluding both that Harriott was statutorily ineligible and that he did not 
warrant cancellation in the exercise of discretion.  The BIA concluded that Harriott 
waived this issue on appeal, and Harriott does not raise it in his brief.  Harriott also 
argued before the IJ that he was entitled to a waiver on other grounds in addition to his 
marriage, but he did not challenge the denial of relief on those alternative grounds before 
the BIA and does not raise them in his brief. 
4 
 
see also Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005). 
III. 
 On review, Harriott challenges the agency’s determination that he was convicted 
of a removable controlled substance offense.  He does not challenge the agency’s 
decision to apply the modified categorical approach.  Instead, he appears to argue that the 
agency misapplied that approach.  Specifically, he argues that his record of conviction 
did not specify which controlled substance he possessed, that the substance he possessed 
was field tested inaccurately because police tests are biased, and that he agreed only to a 
general plea that did not specify a controlled substance. 
The administrative record does not support Harriott’s arguments.  His guilty plea 
documents explicitly state that he pleaded guilty to two crack cocaine possession 
offenses.2  See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 (2013) (“[A] court may 
determine which particular offense the noncitizen was convicted of by examining . . . the 
plea agreement, plea colloquy, or some comparable judicial record of the factual basis for 
the plea.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Harriott’s charging 
documents also specify that the substances he was found to possess were field tested and 
 
2  Harriott’s guilty plea was set out in two documents: an entry of plea filing, and a guilty 
plea agreement.  Each document was signed and dated by Harriot and his attorney on the 
same date.  The former specified that Harriott was pleading guilty to two counts of § 780-
113(a)(16) for possessing crack cocaine, while the latter memorialized the specific terms 
of his plea agreement.  Harriott bases his arguments on the latter document but does not 
acknowledge that he signed and filed the former document.  He also does not challenge 
the agency’s reliance on his entry of plea filing in concluding that he had committed a 
removable controlled substance offense. 
5 
 
found to contain cocaine.  See United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(concluding that a court properly applied the modified categorical approach to a 
conviction under 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) when it “looked to the charging 
document to determine which alternative element had been proved” and determining that 
it “specified that the drug at issue was crack cocaine”).  Taken together, these documents 
make clear that Harriott pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine.  Accordingly, the 
agency did not err in concluding that Harriott was convicted of crack cocaine offenses 
and was removable on that basis. 
Harriott next challenges the agency’s denial of a waiver of his conditional 
permanent residency status due to his marriage.  Because the agency appears to have 
correctly analyzed Harriott’s challenge to his removability based on his controlled 
substance convictions per 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), our jurisdiction is limited to 
constitutional claims and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); Sambare 
v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 925 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2019).  Further, we lack jurisdiction 
to review “the discretionary denial of waivers under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4).”  Urena-
Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2004). 
Harriott maintains that a letter from his ex-wife should have been sufficient to 
support his waiver application, that it was difficult to remember events from 15 years 
ago, that he was unprepared for the hearing, and that he could have provided additional 
testimony that he did not provide during his hearing.  However, we lack jurisdiction to 
consider Harriott’s factual challenges to the agency’s determination. 
6 
 
Harriott also briefly claims that there were unidentified issues with the video 
footage during his individual hearing, that the government attorney was aggressive, and 
that the judge did not give him a lot of time to explain his case.  Beyond those 
generalized statements, Harriott provides no details about any specific issues during his 
individual hearing, and none are apparent from the record.  Under these circumstances, 
Harriott has not raised any colorable legal or constitutional claims regarding his waiver 
application that we have jurisdiction to review. 
Accordingly, we will deny Harriott’s petition to the extent that he challenges his 
removability, and dismiss it to the extent that he challenges the denial of a § 1186a(c)(4) 
waiver. 


Robert Harriott v. Attorney General United States

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-19-2025 
USA v. Wilbert Wilson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Wilbert Wilson" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 416. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/416 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 24-2699 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
WILBERT WILSON, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1:22-cr-00082-001) 
U.S. District Judge: Honorable Maryellen Noreika 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2025 
______________ 
                                                                
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  May 19, 2025) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Wilbert Wilson appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm as a convicted 
felon.  His counsel has filed a motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
738 (1967).  Because there are no nonfrivolous issues warranting review, we will grant 
his counsel’s motion and affirm.  
I 
In 2021, Wilson, a previously convicted felon, sold a firearm and ammunition, and 
arranged to sell methamphetamine, to confidential informants.  A grand jury indicted 
Wilson for possession of a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 
924(a)(2).   
Wilson pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.  Before Wilson entered his 
plea, the District Court explained to him and determined that he understood the nature of 
the charges, the maximum penalties he faced, his right to plead not guilty, his trial rights, 
the Sentencing Guidelines, and the Court’s sentencing obligations.  The Court thereafter 
sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment.  Wilson appealed.  The Government 
conceded that there was an error that increased Wilson’s Guidelines range, and we 
thereafter vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.   
At the resentencing, the parties jointly requested a sentence of 66 months’ 
imprisonment, which was within the recalculated the advisory Guidelines sentencing 
range of 63 to 78 months, the District Court summarized its prior analysis of the 
§ 3553(a) factors, and the Court imposed the requested sentence without objection.   
3 
 
Wilson appeals and his counsel moved to withdraw under Anders.1 
II2 
Our local rules allow a defendant’s counsel to file a motion to withdraw and an 
accompanying brief under Anders when he concludes, upon review of the record, that 
“the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit.”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  When 
counsel submits an Anders brief, we must determine: “(1) whether counsel adequately 
fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record 
presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Brookins, 132 F.4th 659, 666 (3d Cir. 
2025).3   
A 
To determine whether counsel has fulfilled his Anders obligations, we examine his 
brief to see if it (1) shows that he thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable 
issues and identified those that arguably support the appeal, , and (2) explains why any of 
 
1 Although he was permitted to do so, Wilson did not file a pro se brief.    
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In conducting an Anders analysis, we exercise plenary review to 
determine whether there are any nonfrivolous issues for appeal.  Penson v. Ohio, 488 
U.S. 75, 80-83 & n.6 (1988).  
3 An issue is frivolous if it “lacks any basis in law or fact.”  McCoy v. Ct. of 
Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988); see also Brookins, 132 F.4th at 
665 (explaining that “[i]f there is an issue that is ‘arguable’ on its merits, then the appeal 
is not frivolous”). 
4 
 
the identified issues are frivolous, Brookins, 132 F.4th at 666; United States v. Marvin, 
211 F.3d 778, 780-81 (3d Cir. 2000).  Wilson’s counsel has fulfilled these obligations. 
Because Wilson pleaded guilty, his appealable issues are limited to (1) the District 
Court’s jurisdiction, (2) the voluntariness of his plea, and (3) the legality and 
reasonableness of his sentence.  See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (per 
curiam); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  Counsel’s 
brief confirms that the District Court had jurisdiction and explains why any challenge to 
Wilson’s plea would be frivolous.  In a separate letter, counsel stated that Wilson does 
not challenge the lawfulness or reasonableness of his sentence.  Accordingly, because 
counsel has explained why any of the possible appealable issues would be frivolous, he 
has fulfilled his Anders obligations.  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. 
B 
 We next independently review the record to confirm that no nonfrivolous 
appealable issues exist.  When, as here, counsel satisfies Anders’s requirements, “we may 
limit our review of the record to the issues counsel raised.”  United States v. Langley, 52 
F.4th 564, 569 (3d Cir. 2022).  We have reviewed the record and agree with counsel that 
any challenge to the District Court’s jurisdiction or to Wilson’s plea would be frivolous. 
 First, the District Court had jurisdiction because Wilson was charged with 
possession of a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 
5 
 
924(a)(2), which is a federal offense.4  See 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Thus, any challenge to the 
District Court’s jurisdiction would be baseless. 
 Second, any challenge to the voluntariness of Wilson’s plea would lack merit.  
The Constitution and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 require courts, before 
accepting a guilty plea, to “advise the defendant . . . of the waiver of certain constitutional 
rights[,] . . . the nature of the charges to which he . . .is pleading guilty, the ‘maximum 
possible penalty’ to which he . . .is exposed, [and] the court’s ‘obligation to apply the 
Sentencing Guidelines’” as well as its discretion to depart from them.  United States v. 
Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)).   
The District Court’s plea colloquy complied with these requirements.5  The Court 
placed Wilson under oath and explained that the Government could use any statement he 
made under oath against him.  The Court confirmed Wilson’s competence and that he had 
not been forced to enter a guilty plea.  The Court then explained Wilson’s constitutional 
rights, including his rights to (1) plead not guilty and proceed to trial with the assistance 
of counsel who could confront, cross examine, and subpoena witnesses; (2) testify or not 
testify at trial; and (3) be presumed innocent unless the Government proved his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court also described the elements of the charged 
offense, the maximum penalty and other consequences he might face, and the Sentencing 
 
4 Our review of jurisdictional issues is plenary.  United States v. Williams, 369 
F.3d 250, 252 (3d Cir. 2004). 
5 Because there were no objections to the plea before the District Court, we review 
for plain error.  United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). 
6 
 
Guidelines.  The Court also confirmed that there was a factual basis for Wilson’s plea.  
Thus, the record shows that the plea proceeding complied with the Constitution and Rule 
11 and it supports the Court’s finding that the plea was knowing and voluntary.  
Therefore, there is no issue of arguable merit concerning the plea’s validity. 
 Finally, counsel represents that because Wilson appeals “from [his] conviction 
only,” “[t]here are no sentencing issues in this appeal.”  Dkt. 20.  Even if he had raised 
sentencing issues on appeal, our review of the record confirms that Wilson would have 
no nonfrivolous challenges to his sentence.6  Wilson’s sentence is procedurally 
reasonable because the District Court (1) accurately calculated the applicable Guidelines 
range, (2) had no departure motions before it, and (3) meaningfully considered all the 
relevant § 3553(a) factors.  See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Moreover, because Wilson’s sentence falls within the Guidelines range, we may 
presume its substantive reasonableness, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-47 
(2007), and nothing in the record suggests that no reasonable sentencing court would 
impose the same sentence, see United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(en banc).  Therefore, Wilson and his counsel appropriately did not challenge the 
procedural or substantive reasonableness of his sentence. 
 
6 Because Wilson did not object to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence 
before the District Court, we review for plain error.  United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 
F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  We review the substantive reasonableness of his 
sentence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Pawlowski, 27 F.4th 897, 911 (3d Cir. 
2022). 
7 
 
 Accordingly, there are no nonfrivolous issues on appeal. 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm. 


USA v. Wilbert Wilson

USDC for the District Court of the Virgin Island

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-20-2025 
EHI Acquisitions LLC v. USA 
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Recommended Citation 
"EHI Acquisitions LLC v. USA" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 420. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/420 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 24-2319 
_________________ 
 
EHI ACQUISITIONS, LLC, 
  Appellant 
      
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  ________________ 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. No. 3:22-cv-00044) 
Circuit Judge: Honorable Cheryl Ann Krause* 
________________ 
Argued May 2, 2025 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and McKEE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 20, 2025)  
 
______________ 
 
OPINION** 
______________ 
 
 
 
 
*The Honorable Cheryl Ann Krause, Circuit Judge sitting by designation pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 291(b). 
 
**This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.   
 
2 
 
Julien A. Adams [ARGUED] 
Gregory S. Dovel 
Dovel & Luner 
201 Santa Monica Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Santa Monica, CA 90401 
 
Craig M. O’Shea  
Dudley Newman & Feuerzeig 
1000 Frederiksberg Gade 
P.O. Box 756 
St. Thomas, VI 00802 
  Counsel for Appellant  
 
Adam Sleeper [ARGUED] 
Aysha Gregory 
Office of United States Attorney 
5500 Veterans Drive 
United States Courthouse, Suite 260 
St. Thomas, VI 00802 
Counsel for Appellee 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
EHI Acquisitions, LLC appeals the District Court’s grant of Defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment.   
In her well-reasoned and thorough opinion, Judge Krause explained why EHI is 
not entitled to relief and why the Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1   
As Judge Krause detailed, even if the relevant indenture is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence 
makes the result clear.  We can add little to Judge Krause’s analysis and discussion, and 
we will therefore affirm the District Court’s order substantially for the reasons set forth in 
that opinion.  
 
1 EHI Acquisitions, LLC v. United States, No. 3:22-CV-00044, 2024 WL 1717090, at *8–
9 (D.V.I. Apr. 22, 2024) (caption misspelled in the opinion). 


EHI Acquisitions LLC v. USA

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-20-2025 
USA v. Shakira Martinez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Shakira Martinez" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 418. 
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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
_____________ 
No. 23-1449 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v.  
 
SHAKIRA MARTINEZ, 
                   Appellant 
 
____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1:17-cr-00047-004) 
Circuit Judge:  Honorable Stephanos Bibas* 
____________ 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 17, 2025 
___________ 
 
* The Honorable Stephanos Bibas, Circuit Judge for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting 
by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(b).   
2 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and 
RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 20, 2025) 
 
 
Mark E. Cedrone, Esq. 
Saxton & Stump 
123 S Broad Street 
Suite 2800 
Philadelphia, PA 19109 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
David C. Weiss 
Jennifer K. Welsh 
Jesse S. Wenger 
Meredith C. Ruggles  
Office of United States Attorney 
1313 N Market Street 
Hercules Building, Suite 400 
Wilmington, DE 19801 
 
Counsel for Appellee 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
3 
CHAGARES, Chief Judge. 
 A jury in the District of Delaware convicted Shakira 
Martinez of numerous money laundering offenses related to 
her involvement in a drug trafficking operation run by her 
husband and co-defendant Omar Morales Colon.  The District 
Court sentenced Martinez to 108 months of imprisonment.  
After the sentencing, the United States Sentencing 
Commission enacted a retroactive amendment to the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) 
allowing certain offenders with no criminal history a two-point 
reduction in total offense level.  Martinez argues that our 
general appellate authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 permits us 
to vacate her sentence and remand the matter for resentencing 
in light of the retroactive Guidelines amendment.  We agree 
and hold that when a defendant is entitled to seek the benefit 
of a retroactive Guidelines provision by filing a motion for a 
reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), our Court 
may, in an exercise of its discretionary authority under § 2106, 
vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing 
in light of the retroactive amendment.  Because granting relief 
in this case promotes judicial economy and serves the interest 
of justice, we will vacate Martinez’s sentence and remand so 
that the District Court may resentence her in a manner 
consistent with the retroactive Guidelines amendment.    
 
I. 
 
In a second superseding indictment returned on August 
7, 2018, a grand jury in the District of Delaware charged 
Martinez and Colon each with one count of conspiracy to 
conduct a transaction involving and intended to conceal the 
proceeds of a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in 
4 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), one count of 
engaging in a transaction in property derived from unlawful 
activity and of a value greater than $10,000, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1957, and seven counts of conducting a transaction 
involving and intended to conceal the proceeds of unlawful 
activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).1  The 
grand jury also charged Martinez with three counts of 
structuring a transaction with a financial institution to avoid the 
reporting requirements established by 31 U.S.C. § 5313 and 
related regulations.  After a twelve-day trial, a jury convicted 
Martinez and Colon of all counts charged.  The evidence at trial 
established that Martinez had assisted in the laundering of over 
$900,000 in drug proceeds.     
  
Sentencing occurred on February 23, 2023.  The District 
Court determined that Martinez’s total offense level was 30, 
that her criminal history score under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 was 
zero, and that her criminal history category under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.1 was I.  Martinez’s recommended sentencing range 
under the Guidelines was therefore 97 to 121 months of 
imprisonment.  Martinez requested that the court grant a 
downward variance in light of an expert’s finding that she 
suffered from several psychological disorders that may have 
influenced her participation in Colon’s trafficking activities.  
The court declined to grant a downward variance and 
sentenced Martinez to 108 months of imprisonment.     
    
 
1 In the same indictment, the grand jury also charged Colon 
with several drug trafficking offenses.  The District Court 
severed the drug trafficking charges from the money 
laundering charges for purposes of trial.     
5 
Martinez timely filed a notice of appeal on March 9, 
2023.  The Clerk consolidated Martinez’s appeal with the two 
appeals taken by her co-defendant Colon.  At the request of 
Colon and Martinez, the Court entered an order on May 30, 
2023, staying the issuance of a briefing schedule until 90 days 
after trial transcripts became available to counsel.  The Court 
issued a briefing schedule on October 26, 2023, which directed 
the appellants to file their opening briefs by November 27, 
2023.  Again at the appellants’ request, the Court later 
modified the briefing schedule to allow the appellants until 
February 26, 2024, and then April 26, 2024, to file their 
opening briefs.   
 
During this period of abeyance, the Sentencing 
Commission promulgated significant amendments to the 
Guidelines and designated two of them for retroactive 
application.  See Sentencing Guidelines for United States 
Courts, 88 Fed. Reg. 28254, 28281 (May 3, 2023); Sentencing 
Guidelines for the United States Courts, 88 Fed. Reg. 60534, 
60535 (Sept. 1, 2023).  Martinez filed her opening brief on 
April 26, 2024, asking us to vacate her sentence and remand so 
that she could receive the benefit of one of these retroactive 
provisions.        
II.2 
 
Section 4C1.1 of the Guidelines, which took effect on 
November 1, 2023, provides for a two-point reduction in the 
total offense level of a defendant who has “not receive[d] any 
criminal history points” and who meets certain other criteria.  
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.   
6 
U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 4C1.1(a)(1) (U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n 2024).  By an amendment to the Guidelines that also 
took effect on November 1, 2023, the Sentencing Commission 
authorized courts to apply § 4C1.1 retroactively.  See 88 Fed. 
Reg. at 60535 (codified at U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual §§ 
1B1.10(a)(1), (d) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2024)).  The 
Government acknowledges that Martinez may seek the benefit 
of § 4C1.1 by filing a motion for a reduction in sentence under 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  But the Government insists that a 
motion under § 3582(c)(2) is Martinez’s only means of 
demonstrating her entitlement to the reduction afforded by § 
4C1.1. 
 
We disagree.  Under the general appellate authority 
provided to us by 28 U.S.C. § 2106, we “may affirm, modify, 
vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a 
court lawfully brought before [us] for review, and may remand 
the cause and . . . require such further proceedings to be had as 
may be just under the circumstances.”  The text of § 2106 
plainly authorizes us to vacate a sentence such as Martinez’s 
and, if “just under the circumstances,” to remand the matter for 
“further proceedings” such as resentencing.  28 U.S.C. § 2106; 
see also United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 
2000) (noting that a court must enforce a statute’s plain 
meaning).  Nothing in the statutory text suggests that the 
availability of relief under § 3582(c)(2) limits our ability to 
provide the same relief pursuant to our general appellate 
authority under § 2106.   
 
We hold, therefore, that when a defendant such as 
Martinez is entitled to seek the benefit of a retroactive 
Guidelines provision by filing a motion under § 3582(c)(2), our 
Court may, on direct appeal, exercise its discretion under § 
7 
2106 to vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for 
resentencing in light of the retroactive Guidelines provision.  
We note that our holding regarding the scope of possible relief 
under § 2106 accords with that of the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit.  See United States v. Claybron, 88 F.4th 1226, 
1231 (7th Cir. 2023); cf. United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 
367, 374 (4th Cir. 2008) (concluding that a court “need not 
remand for resentencing” in light of a retroactive Guidelines 
amendment, given the availability of a motion under 
§ 3582(c)(2)).   
 
The Government suggests that this holding is 
inconsistent with our recognition in previous opinions that we 
may consider an amendment to the Guidelines only if it is 
“clarifying” rather than “substantive.”  United States v. 
Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 267 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S. 
Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2) (U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n 2003)); see also United States v. Spinello, 265 F.3d 
150, 160 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 
488, 490 (3d Cir. 1998).  We see no such inconsistency.  The 
Sentencing Commission has, to be sure, advised courts as a 
general matter to “use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the 
date that the defendant is sentenced.”  U.S. Sent’g Guidelines 
Manual § 1B1.11(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2024).  But the 
Commission has also advised courts entertaining a request for 
a reduction in sentence to apply “the amended guideline range 
that would have been applicable to the defendant if the 
amendment(s) to the guidelines [that the Commission 
designated for retroactivity] had been in effect at the time the 
defendant was sentenced.”  Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1).  In allowing 
remand for resentencing according to a retroactive amendment 
to the Guidelines, we do no more than heed the advice the 
Commission provided in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1).   
8 
 
We are also unmoved by the Government’s contention 
that a remand under § 2106, unlike a motion for a reduction in 
sentence under § 3582(c)(2), would allow Martinez to receive 
plenary review of her sentence by the District Court.  When, as 
here, a district court has not committed sentencing error3 and 
the only basis for an adjustment in sentence is the retroactive 
application of a subsequent Guidelines amendment, we may 
instruct the district court that, on remand, the defendant’s 
sentence is to be adjusted to no greater extent than it would be 
were the court applying U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) when ruling on 
a motion under § 3582(c)(2).  Such an instruction will ensure 
that, on remand just as on motion under § 3582(c)(2), a court 
“shall substitute only the [retroactive] amendments . . . for the 
corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the 
defendant was sentenced” but otherwise leave “[a]ll other 
 
3 Martinez argues that the District Court committed procedural 
error by failing to consider meaningfully a forensic report 
stating that Martinez’s participation in Colon’s drug trafficking 
operation could be attributed in part to the fact that she suffers 
from several psychological disorders.  Martinez forfeited this 
claim of procedural error by neglecting to bring it to the 
District Court’s attention when her counsel was asked, after the 
court had pronounced the sentence, to note any item that the 
court might have “overlooked.”  Joint Appendix 1431; see 
United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(en banc).  Our review is therefore for plain error.  Flores-
Mejia, 759 F.3d at 256.  Because the record indicates that the 
District Court thoroughly considered the forensic report, we 
see no basis for concluding that the District Court committed 
procedural error, plain or otherwise, in its treatment of the 
report.     
9 
guideline application decisions . . . unaffected.”  U.S. Sent’g 
Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10 cmt. n.2 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 
2024).  Even a court subject to such an instruction may, 
however, account for nonretroactive changes to the Guidelines, 
as well as any other intervening changes to the law or the 
defendant’s circumstances, when discharging its duty to 
consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (providing that “the court may 
reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the 
factors set forth in section 3553(a)”); Concepcion v. United 
States, 597 U.S. 481, 498 n.6 (2022) (recognizing that, under 
the First Step Act, “[a] district court cannot . . . recalculate a 
movant’s benchmark Guidelines in any way other than to 
reflect the retroactive application” of the relevant provisions, 
but “may . . . consider postsentencing conduct or 
nonretroactive changes in selecting or rejecting an appropriate 
sentence”);  U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10 cmt. 
n.1(B)(i), (iii) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2024); Claybron, 88 F.4th 
at 1231. 
 
 Our authority under § 2106 to vacate a sentence and 
order a remand is discretionary.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 
(providing that a “court of appellate jurisdiction may . . . vacate 
[a sentence] . . . and may remand the cause” (emphases 
added)).  Vacating Martinez’s sentence and ordering a remand 
serves the interest of justice in this case by ensuring that she is 
sentenced expeditiously under the Guidelines applicable to her.  
And granting this relief promotes “judicial efficiency” by 
eliminating “the necessity of . . . a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c).”  United States v. Ralston, 110 F.4th 909, 924 (6th 
Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Jackson, 678 F.3d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also United 
States v. Marcello, 13 F.3d 752, 756 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994) (seeing 
10 
“no need to force [the defendant] to take th[e] additional step” 
of filing a motion under § 3582(c)(2) when the defendant 
sought the benefit of a retroactive Guidelines amendment on 
direct appeal), superseded on other grounds by U.S. Sent’g 
Guidelines Manual § 5K2.20 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2000), as 
recognized in Spinello, 265 F.3d at 160; United States v. Jones, 
567 F.3d 712, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (observing that remand for 
resentencing promotes “administrative efficiency” because it 
“save[s] the defendant the ‘additional step’ of petitioning the 
district court for a sentencing modification.” (quoting United 
States v. Wales, 977 F.2d 1323, 1328 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992))).  We 
therefore exercise our discretion to vacate Martinez’s sentence 
and remand the matter for resentencing.  
  
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate Martinez’s 
sentence and remand with instructions that she be resentenced 
in a manner consistent with U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 and U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.10(b).   


USA v. Shakira Martinez

Campo, Marina

Pressure in the Pipeline? Hidden Tensions Beneath the Surface in the D.C. Circuit\u27s Analysis of Alabama Municipal Distributors Group v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-3-2025 
In Re: Aaron Mazie 
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ALD-156        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1785 
___________ 
 
IN RE: AARON CORBIN MAZIE, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
May 22, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 3, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se petitioner Aaron Mazie seeks a writ of mandamus relating to a restraining 
order issued by the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division of Morris County.  He 
also alleges a variety of constitutional violations by other parties.  In his petition, Mazie 
asks us to direct the District of New Jersey to review his pending state-court motion for 
reconsideration and requests numerous writs to remedy the asserted violations.  We 
decline to issue the requested writs.   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, we have the authority to “issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of [our jurisdiction] and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  
A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary circumstances.  
See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  Traditionally, 
we issue such writs only “as the means to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of 
its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do 
so.”  United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 893 (3d Cir. 1981) (cleaned up).  A writ 
should not issue unless the petitioner has “no other adequate means to attain the relief 
desired,” and has shown that his right to the writ is “clear and indisputable.”  In re Diet 
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d at 378-79 (cleaned up).1 
With respect to his constitutional claims, Mazie has not shown that he has no other 
adequate means to obtain relief; he can file a complaint in the District Court.  Cf. 
O’Hanlon v. Uber Techs., Inc., 990 F.3d 757, 763 n.3 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing the 
established principle that the Court is “a court of review, not of first view” (cleaned up)).  
Moreover, to the extent that Mazie asks us to direct the state court to take action, we lack 
authority to grant such relief.  See In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 781 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that federal courts of appeal ordinarily “lack appellate jurisdiction over their 
state counterparts, thus making writs of mandamus generally inappropriate”). 
  
 
1  Mazie also requests a writ of prohibition, but that standard is the same.  See United 
States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 593–94 (3d Cir. 1992).  
 
3 
 
For these reasons, we will deny the mandamus petition.2 
 
2  To the extent Mazie’s petition seeks additional relief, it is denied.  He has also filed 
various motions in this Court.  Those are denied.   


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