Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-21-2025 
Terri Lauchle v. United Parcel Service 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Terri Lauchle v. United Parcel Service" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 155. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/155 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1487 
___________ 
 
TERRI LAUCHLE, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00533) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 20, 2025 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 21, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 Terri Lauchle appeals from the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in 
favor of United Parcel Service.  We will affirm. 
I. 
Lauchle is a former employee of UPS whom UPS fired, reinstated, and then fired 
again during the COVID-19 pandemic.  She later filed this suit through counsel.  Lauchle 
alleged that, although UPS told her that it was firing her for repeatedly refusing to 
comply with its masking policy, it really fired her because she is a woman and a 
Christian.  On that basis, she asserted claims of sex and religious discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. 
Following discovery, UPS moved for summary judgment on all claims and the 
District Court granted its motion.  The court first deemed UPS’s statement of material 
facts admitted on the ground that Lauchle’s counsel failed to properly respond to it as 
required by the court’s Local Rule 56.1.1  But the court went on to review the record and 
conclude that Lauchle had not presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could infer that UPS fired her—not because of its repeated and well-documented 
directives that she comply with its masking policy and her repeated and well-documented 
 
1 The court deemed counsel’s response so deficient that it also ordered him to show cause 
why he should not be sanctioned under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.  Counsel has appealed from 
that order at C.A. No. 24-1488, but we are separately dismissing that appeal because the 
court has not entered an appealable sanctions order.  Lauchle requests in her pro se brief 
on appeal that we sanction counsel ourselves, but we will not consider the issue of 
sanctions while it is still pending in the District Court and thus express no opinion on 
whether sanctions might be warranted. 
 
3 
refusals to do so—but because of her sex and religion.  Lauchle has discharged her 
counsel and appeals pro se.2  
II. 
 Lauchle argues that the District Court erred in entering summary judgment against 
her because UPS “singled her out” for termination as purportedly shown by its allegedly 
improper implementation and application of its masking policy.  As UPS argues in 
response, however, Lauchle has not cited any evidence of record in support of her 
arguments or her claims.3  We thus could deem them forfeited.  But UPS has briefed the 
merits and, having reviewed the record, we agree that Lauchle adduced no evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could infer discrimination as necessary to survive summary 
judgment.  We do so largely for the reasons that the District Court explained.4 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over Lauchle’s federal 
claims and had supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over her state-law 
claims.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 even though the issue of sanctions 
remains pending in the District Court.  See Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 864 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 1996).  We review the entry of summary judgment de novo.  See Crosbie v. 
Highmark Inc., 47 F.4th 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2022).  Summary judgment is appropriate 
when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 
3 The only evidentiary material on which Lauchle relies is an article regarding the 
Americans With Disabilities Act and masking policies that she attaches for the first time 
to her brief on appeal.  She argues that this article supports her position, and she asks us 
to admit it into evidence.  We construe her request as a request to expand the record on 
appeal and we deny it because, in the absence of circumstances not presented here, our 
review is limited to the record that was before the District Court.  See Acumed LLC v. 
Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 226 (3d Cir. 2009); Fed. R. App. P. 10(a).  
We nevertheless have reviewed the article, and it does not support Lauchle’s claims. 
4 The court recognized that Lauchle did not present any direct evidence of discrimination 
and thus properly applied the McDonnell Douglas framework that governed her claims 
 
4 
 We address two other points.  First, Lauchle argues that her counsel performed 
deficiently and that, once counsel’s alleged derelictions became apparent, the District 
Court should have given her the option of continuing with counsel, retaining new 
counsel, or proceeding pro se.  But “ineffective assistance of counsel is not a basis for 
appeal or retrial” in a civil action such as this.  Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 
1119 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 408 
(3d Cir. 1980).  Instead, the general rule in “our system of representative litigation” is 
that “each party is deemed bound by the acts of [her] lawyer-agent.”  Link v. Wabash 
R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962).  While that rule sometimes yields when counsel’s 
conduct prompts a court to consider the sanction of dismissal, see Hildebrand v. 
Allegheny Cnty., 923 F.3d 128, 132-33 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing, inter alia, Poulis v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984)); Knoll v. City of Allentown, 
 
under Title VII and Pennsylvania law.  See Qin v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 470 & n.2, 
472-73 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing, inter alia, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973)).  Under that framework, Lauchle bore the initial burden of making out a 
prima facie case by adducing evidence that she was terminated under circumstances 
raising an inference of discrimination.  See id. at 473.  Then, because UPS proffered a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination, Lauchle also bore the burden of 
adducing evidence that UPS’s stated reason was pretextual.  See id. at 474.  The District 
Court held that Lauchle did not meet her initial burden of adducing evidence raising an 
inference of discrimination.  We agree and add that she also did not meet her burden of 
adducing evidence that UPS’s stated reason for her termination was pretextual.  
Lauchle’s strongest evidence was that UPS also fired her daughter and her daughter’s 
(male) fiancé, both of whom are members of her church.  But the fact that UPS fired a 
male employee undercuts her claim that it targeted her because of her sex, and the fact 
that UPS has not fired other employees whom it knows are members of her same church 
undercuts her argument that it targeted her because of her religion too.  Lauchle argued 
that she “believes” UPS will fire those employees after this litigation, but she adduced no 
evidence to that effect or any other evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer 
discrimination or pretext. 
 
5 
707 F.3d 406, 410 (3d Cir. 2013) (same); Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 
805, 807-08 (3d Cir. 1986) (same), the court did not impose that sanction here.5  For 
similar reasons, the court did not err in entering judgment without sua sponte giving 
Lauchle a chance to obtain new counsel or proceed pro se.  Cf. Carter, 804 F.2d at 808. 
 Second, and relatedly, Lauchle argues that “key aspects” of her case were not 
presented because discovery was incomplete.  Lauchle appears to blame only her counsel 
for that alleged circumstance, and her argument thus does not state a basis for relief on 
appeal as just discussed.  But to the extent that Lauchle’s brief can be liberally construed 
to argue that the court itself erred in declining to allow more discovery, we perceive no 
abuse of discretion.  See Crosbie, 47 F.4th at 146.  As the court explained, although 
Lauchle suggested in her summary judgment brief that further discovery was warranted, 
she did not file an affidavit or declaration to that effect under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) or 
otherwise make the required showing.  See Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d 
 
5 Lauchle notes that the court, in directing her counsel to show cause why he should not 
be sanctioned, wrote:  “To the extent that Lauchle’s claims were meritorious, the failure 
to adequately respond to UPS’ Statement of Facts [as required by Local Rule 56.1], 
resulting in the entirety of UPS’ Statement being deemed admitted and obliging the Court 
to accept UPS’ version  of events, effectively resulted in the forfeiture of those claims.”  
(ECF No. 37 at 18.)  But the court did not actually deem any of Lauchle’s claims 
forfeited or base its summary judgment ruling solely on counsel’s failure to comply with 
Local Rule 56.1.  Instead, after applying the rule, the court went on to conduct the “full 
analysis” required before granting summary judgment despite violations of that rule.  
Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 2018).  For that reason, the 
court’s application of that rule—which was not an abuse of discretion, see id. at 613-14—
was not the kind of sanction that “effectively dictate[d] the result” and thus required a 
Poulis inquiry.  Knoll, 707 F.3d at 410.  Nor do we understand the court to have opined 
that Lauchle in fact had meritorious claims that might have prevailed but for counsel’s 
conduct.  We express no opinion on that issue other than to note that our review reveals 
nothing suggesting that she did. 
 
6 
Cir. 2015).  Nor did the court abuse its discretion in previously denying, for lack of good 
cause, Lauchle’s motion to further extend the discovery deadline.  See Lehman Bros. 
Holdings, Inc. v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs., L.P., 785 F.3d 96, 102 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  Finally, even if the court had erred in either respect, Lauchle has not shown 
the prejudice necessary for relief on that issue.  See Crosbie, 47 F.4th at 146.  Lauchle 
does not argue on appeal whether or how any particular additional discovery might have 
allowed her claims to survive summary judgment, and her counseled arguments in the 
District Court reveal nothing more than speculation on that point.  See id.6 
III. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Lauchle’s 
requests for relief in her opening brief are denied.  See nn.1 & 3, supra. 
 
6 Lauchle argued in her summary judgment brief that she wanted more discovery 
regarding (1) harassment that she claims to have suffered by various UPS employees 
after she was terminated, and (2) a Muslim UPS employee whom she claims “walked off 
the job” because of UPS’s masking policy and who thus should have been fired but was 
not.  (ECF No. 34 at 6-7, 14-15.)  On the first point, Lauchle has raised nothing 
suggesting that the alleged harassment was tied to any protected ground or otherwise 
supports her claims.  On the second point, UPS presented evidence that the incident 
regarding the Muslim employee was not related to masking.  Lauchle then claimed to 
have “numerous witnesses that will testify that [the Muslim employee] walked off the job 
as a result of the masking policy being enforced in 2021” (ECF No. 30 at 14), but she did 
not raise any reason why she could not have made an evidentiary showing on that point.  
And the only other discovery she claimed to require on that point was “additional 
depositions of the CEO of UPS and/or other people in the hierarchy of UPS.”  (Id. at 15.)  
But Lauchle did not specify what she believed such depositions would have yielded, let 
alone whether or how they might have supported her claims regarding the Muslim 
employee or otherwise. 


English

Terri Lauchle v. United Parcel Service

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

USA v. Joseph Cammarata

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-16-2025 
Luis De La Cruz-Leonardo v. Attorney General United States of 
America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Luis De La Cruz-Leonardo v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 493. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/493 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2715 
___________ 
 
LUIS RAMON DE LA CRUZ-LEONARDO, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A045-451-584) 
Immigration Judge:  William McDermott 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 2, 2025 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 16, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Luis Ramon De La Cruz-Leonardo, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, petitions 
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
of an Immigration Judge’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.  For the following 
reasons, we will deny the petition for review in part and dismiss it in part.   
De La Cruz-Leonardo was admitted to the United States in 1996 as a conditional 
resident.  He later became a lawful permanent resident.  In 2023, De La Cruz-Leonardo 
was convicted in federal court of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.  Thereafter, 
the Government charged De La Cruz-Leonardo with removability for having been 
convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and for having been 
convicted of a controlled substance offense, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).1   
Proceeding pro se, De La Cruz-Leonardo applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture.  After 
granting two of De La Cruz-Leonardo’s requests for continuances, the Immigration Judge 
scheduled a merits hearing for April 9, 2024.  De La Cruz-Leonardo moved for another 
continuance.  The IJ denied that request on January 5, 2024, noting that the case had 
already been continued twice, that De La Cruz-Leonardo had been given around five 
months to prepare for the hearing, that he had already applied for relief, and that he did 
not provide a reason why a continuance was needed.  
Following the merits hearing, the IJ sustained the charges of removability, denied 
De La Cruz-Leonardo’s applications for relief, and ordered that he be removed to the 
 
1 We note that De La Cruz-Leonardo’s conviction remained final for immigration 
purposes despite the pendency of any collateral attack.  See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 
F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
 
3 
 
Dominican Republic.  That decision, issued on April 16, 2024, notified De La Cruz-
Leonardo that his appeal was due by May 16, 2024.  Although De La Cruz-Leonardo 
reserved his right to appeal, he did not file a timely appeal. 
Instead, on May 10, 2024, De La Cruz-Leonardo asked the IJ to reconsider the 
decision, arguing that his request for a continuance was “never addressed by the court in 
my hearing” and asking that the IJ “formally issue a written decision to accompany the 
oral decision so that [he] can preserve his appeal rights.”  The IJ denied the motion on 
May 16, 2024, noting that he had rejected De La Cruz-Leonardo’s motion for a 
continuance in the order of January 5, and had done so again at the merits hearing in 
response to De La Cruz-Leonardo’s renewed request.  The IJ also stated that he would 
not provide De La Cruz-Leonardo “with a written decision in addition to the previously 
provided oral decision.”2   
On June 5, 2024, De La Cruz-Leonardo filed an appeal with the BIA, seeking 
review of the IJ’s original removal order of April 16, 2024, and the IJ’s May 16, 2024, 
denial of his motion for reconsideration.  The Government filed a motion for summary 
affirmance.  Thereafter, De La Cruz-Leonardo submitted a brief in support of his appeal.  
The Board dismissed the appeal, holding that De La Cruz-Leonardo did not properly 
appeal the IJ’s order of April 16, 2024, and that he did not establish any error in the IJ’s 
denial of his request for a continuance.  De La Cruz-Leonardo filed a pro se petition for 
 
2 The IJ had issued an “Order” summarizing the oral decision, but the record did not 
contain a copy of the oral decision until it was produced following our grant of De La 
Cruz-Leonardo’s motion for transcripts.  
  
 
4 
 
review.   
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the BIA’s decision 
dismissing the appeal of the IJ’s denial of the motion to reconsider.3  See Borges v. 
Gonzalez, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that denial of a motion to reconsider 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion).  Because De La Cruz-Leonardo is removable for 
having committed an offense identified in § 1252(a)(2)(C), our jurisdiction is limited to 
constitutional claims, “pure questions of law,” and “issues of application of law to fact, 
where the facts are undisputed and not the subject of challenge.”  Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 
420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).    
In his brief, De La Cruz-Leonardo argues that the “Board clearly violated [his] 
right of due process” “[b]y summarily dismissing the case.”  This allegation, read in 
context and liberally construed, pertains to the Board’s conclusion that he did not 
properly appeal the order of April 16, 2024.  The record indicates that De La Cruz-
Leonardo attempted to file a timely notice of appeal from that decision, but that the BIA 
rejected it because he did not pay the fees or move for a fee waiver.  The regulations 
regarding appeals to the BIA state that a “Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR-26) must be 
 
3 We cannot, however, reach De La Cruz-Leonardo’s challenges to the IJ’s order of April 
16, 2024, which sustained the charges of removability, denied his applications for relief, 
and ordered that he be removed to the Dominican Republic.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) 
(providing that a court may review final order of removal only if “the alien has exhausted 
all administrative remedies available to the [non-citizen] as of right”); Santos-Zacaria v. 
Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 419 (2023) (holding that § 1252(d)(1) is a non-jurisdictional but 
mandatory claims-processing rule).  As the Government argues, De La Cruz-Leonardo 
did not exhaust those challenges by appealing the IJ’s ruling to the BIA, nor has he 
explained why he could not have raised his claims in such an appeal. 
 
5 
 
accompanied by the appropriate fee or by an Appeal Fee Waiver Request (Form EOIR-
26A).”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(d).  In addition, “[a]n appeal is not properly filed unless it is 
received at the Board, along with all required documents, fees or fee waiver requests, and 
proof of service, within the time specified in the governing sections of this chapter.”  8 
C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1).  De La Cruz-Leonardo does not allege that he submitted the fee or 
a fee waiver request.  Accordingly, the BIA did not violate his due process rights by 
concluding that he failed to properly appeal from the order entered on April 16, 2024.4 
To the extent that De La Cruz-Leonardo challenges the denial of his request for a 
continuance, we lack jurisdiction.  Generally, “the denial of a continuance is a 
discretionary decision, which does not raise a constitutional claim or question of law.”  
Mirambeaux v. Att’y Gen., 977 F.3d 288, 293 (3d Cir. 2020).  Although a denial of a 
continuance arguably could, in certain circumstances, violate due process, see Hoxha v. 
Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 163 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009), De La Cruz-Leonardo has not raised a 
colorable due process claim.  He asserts that the IJ “violated [his] right of due process by 
clearly expediting the proceedings[,]” but the true nature of his objection is to IJ’s 
exercise of discretion.  See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“Recasting challenges to factual or discretionary determinations as due process or other 
constitutional claims is clearly insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction under 
 
4 In addition, although the BIA has held that the 30-day deadline for filing a notice of 
appeal is subject to equitable tolling, In re Morales-Morales, 28 I. & N. Dec. 714, 716 
(BIA 2023), such tolling was not warranted here.  De La Cruz-Leonardo has not 
identified “some extraordinary circumstance [that] prevented timely filing” of an appeal.  
Id. at 717. 
 
6 
 
[§ 1252(a)(2)(D)].”); see also Ogunfuye v. Holder, 610 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that criminal alien’s argument that “the IJ abused its discretion by not granting 
her a continuance does not present a constitutional claim or issue of law that this court 
has jurisdiction to consider.”).   
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review in part and dismiss 
it in part.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
5 De La Cruz-Leonardo’s “Motion to Reiterate the Petitioner’s Respectful Request for the 
Honorable Court to Appoint Him Counsel” is denied. 


Luis De La Cruz-Leonardo v. Attorney General United States of America

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-17-2025 
USA v. James King 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. James King" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 499. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/499 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 22-3290 
_____________ 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
JAMES EDWARD KING, 
Appellant 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 4:20-cr-00158-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 12, 2025 
______________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 17, 2025) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
CHAGARES, Chief Judge. 
James King was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  The methamphetamine 
attributed to King and his co-conspirator, Christopher Brown, was seized — pursuant to a 
search warrant — from a United Parcel Service (“UPS”) package that was labeled with a 
fictitious name and Brown’s address.  King challenges the District Court’s denial of his 
motion for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to contest the 
validity of the search warrant.  But we, like the District Court, conclude that King had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the package and will therefore affirm.  
I.1 
 On October 4, 2019, Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) were advised by a 
confidential informant that a UPS package containing one pound of methamphetamine 
would be delivered to Brown’s residence and that Brown and King would work together 
to retrieve the package.  The informant also told PSP that the package label would list 
someone else’s name.  In coordination with a UPS distribution center, law enforcement 
officers confirmed that there was a package due to arrive that day at Brown’s residence, 
verified that the named addressee had no affiliation with the delivery address (and, in 
fact, was likely not a real person), and arranged to meet the UPS driver who was 
transporting the package.   
 
1 We write primarily for the parties, and so we recite only the facts necessary to decide the 
case. 
3 
Two PSP troopers stopped the UPS truck to speak with the driver and investigate 
the suspected package.  At the request of PSP, a Union County Sheriff’s Office deputy 
accompanied by a drug detection dog (hereinafter, “canine unit”) arrived at the truck 
shortly thereafter.  Upon arrival, the deputy expressed concerns that, given the windy 
conditions in the now-opened truck trailer where the suspected package was located 
(alongside other, non-suspected packages), any odor was likely “destroyed” and the 
officers would not “get an indication” from the canine unit.  Appendix (“App.”) 206.  The 
officers proposed moving the package inside the truck, closing the trailer, and letting the 
package “sit [t]here for 40 minutes” to “build its odor back,” but this was not feasible 
given the UPS driver’s time constraints.  App. 706.  The officers opted to allow the 
canine unit to inspect the packages anyway, which yielded “no indication . . . on any of 
the packages.”  App. 208.   
With the consent of the UPS driver, who received approval from his supervisors, 
the officers transferred the UPS package to a nearby police barracks where the canine 
unit performed a second inspection.  This time, the canine unit “indicated on it,” which 
suggested the presence of “illegal narcotic[s] in th[e] package.”  App. 213.  One of the 
PSP troopers promptly sought a warrant to search the package.  The trooper submitted an 
affidavit in support of the warrant application, which detailed the tip from the 
confidential informant, PSP’s corroboration of the information provided by the 
informant, and the positive indication by the canine unit.  The affidavit did not mention 
the initial canine unit deployment that did not result in a positive hit.  A judge issued a 
search warrant later that day.   
4 
Pursuant to the search warrant, PSP searched the package, discovered the pound of 
methamphetamine therein, seized the methamphetamine, and arranged for a controlled 
delivery of a noncontrolled substance, which resulted in the arrest of both Brown and 
King.  A federal grand jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania subsequently returned 
a two-count indictment against King charging him with conspiracy and attempt to 
distribute methamphetamine. 
King and Brown filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the seizure 
and search of the UPS package and, in particular, to obtain a Franks hearing regarding the 
validity of the search warrant.  The District Court denied these motions.  Drawing upon 
Supreme Court precedent and that of other courts, the District Court observed that a 
constitutionally cognizable “expectation of privacy can apply [to en route mail] even 
where the intended recipient uses a fictitious name,” but “a defendant cannot claim a 
reasonable expectation of privacy over a package mailed to a third party.”  App. 24.  
Thus, while Brown was ultimately denied relief, the District Court held that he at least 
“possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the UPS package” since he resided at 
the delivery address and admitted that the package bearing the fictitious name was 
intended for him.  App. 25.  But the District Court held that King, who was neither the 
sender nor addressee, could not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package 
based on his mere assertion that he was the individual for whom the package was 
“ultimately intended.”  App. 26.   
5 
After a four-day trial, a jury found King guilty on the conspiracy count and not 
guilty on the attempt count.  The District Court sentenced King to 210 months of 
imprisonment.  King timely appealed. 
II.2 
 King raises several arguments as to why he was entitled to a Franks hearing to 
prove that the affidavit supporting the search warrant for the UPS package was 
insufficient, but he overlooks that his “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment depends . . . upon whether . . . [he] ha[d] a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the invaded place.”  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).  King bears the 
burden of proving that he had an expectation of privacy and that his expectation was 
reasonable.  United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2010).  He has not carried 
this burden, so we may start and end our analysis there. 
“Senders enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their letters 
and packages.”  Walker v. Coffey, 905 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2018).  The same 
reasonable expectation of privacy is enjoyed by addressees of a package — fictitious or 
otherwise.  See, e.g., United States v. Givens, 733 F.2d 339, 341–42 (4th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Pierce, 959 F.2d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir. 1992).  The same is not true for 
third parties like King, who “was neither the sender nor addressee of the package.”  
United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 846 (7th Cir. 1988).  And while King may have 
 
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court 
has jurisdiction to review King’s conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
6 
been one of “the intended recipients of th[e] package,” King Reply Br. 1, he cannot claim 
an expectation of privacy in a package sent under a fake name to someone else’s address.  
We also see no objective facts in the record surrounding his purported privacy interest 
aside from his participation in an unlawful conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.  
But a defendant must possess independent, legitimate “[e]xpectations of privacy and 
property interests” in order to challenge a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  
United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 82 (1993).  The existence of “the conspiracy itself 
neither adds to nor detracts from” this Court’s analysis of King’s Fourth Amendment 
standing.  Id.  
 In sum, the District Court correctly held that King lacked a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the UPS package that was seized and searched, which constitutes sufficient 
grounds to affirm its ruling that he was not entitled to a Franks hearing.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  


USA v. James King

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-18-2025 
Luis Tubon Guangatal v. Attorney General United States of 
America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Luis Tubon Guangatal v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 506. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/506 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 23-2151 
_____________ 
 
LUIS GONZALO TUBON GUANGATAL; MARIA JOSEFINA IZA CHADAN, 
                Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a  
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals  
(BIA-1: A201-508-704) 
(BIA-1: A201-508-705) 
Immigration Judge: Joseph C. Scott 
 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 5, 2025 
_____________ 
 
Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 18, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
 
2 
 
Petitioners Luis Gonzalo Tubon Guangatal and Maria Josefina Iza Chadan, both 
citizens of Ecuador, seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (BIA) decision to 
affirm the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of their applications for cancellation of removal.  
We cannot grant relief because the agency’s determination that the petitioners’ minor son, 
J.A.T.I., will not experience exceptional or unusual hardship in Ecuador is supported by 
substantial evidence.  Although the petitioners raise other issues on appeal, the agency’s 
hardship determination is dispositive.  We will therefore deny their petition for review.   
I. 
Petitioners married in Ecuador and both entered the United States unlawfully.  
According to their testimony, Tubon Guangatal entered in August 2001 and Iza Chadan 
arrived in September 2003.  In January 2019, Tubon Guangatal applied for asylum and 
withholding of removal.  After his interview with an asylum officer, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against the petitioners, charging 
each with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  In August 2019, the 
petitioners conceded removability and applied for cancellations of removal.  At a hearing 
held May 6, 2022, both petitioners testified in support of their applications.  The IJ issued 
its opinion denying the applications on May 19, 2022.  
Relevant to this appeal, both petitioners testified that, if removed, their 7-year-old 
U.S. citizen son J.A.T.I. would move with them to Ecuador.  Both alleged the relocation 
would cause him “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” under 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1)(D) because his medical treatments would be inaccessible and cost prohibitive.  
 
3 
 
Iza Chadan testified that J.A.T.I. suffers from persistent asthma and allergic rhinitis, a 
flexible flat feet condition, abnormal vision, and obesity.  J.A.T.I. uses a Flovent pump 
daily, as well as other medications, to treat his asthma.  With medication, his symptoms are 
mostly controlled.  J.A.T.I.’s foot condition makes it difficult for him to balance, and he 
has received both orthotic inserts and physical therapy.  It was unclear at the time of the 
hearing when he would need new inserts or if more physical therapy would be necessary.  
J.A.T.I. also sees a pediatrician for obesity management.  Iza Chadan described J.A.T.I. as 
very intelligent and able to speak both English and Spanish but stated his reading and 
writing skills were limited to English.   
Both Tubon Guangatal and Iza Chadan testified that, if removed, they would return 
to their hometown of Quisapincha.  Although Quisapincha is small and remote, the 
petitioners own a home there and would live close to other family members.  Iza Chadan 
admitted they have significant assets in the United States but testified their money would 
eventually run out and, given Ecuador’s poor economy and low wages, they would be 
unable to make more.  Tubon Guangatal testified that the hospital they would need is two 
hours from Quisapincha, and he heard from his sister that medications in Ecuador are 
expensive.  
The IJ found that J.A.T.I.’s medical conditions were cumulatively serious, but that 
the petitioners provided an “insufficient foundation and corroboration for [their] claims 
that adequate medical care for [J.A.T.I.’s] conditions cannot be available in Ecuador.”  A15.  
The judge was not persuaded by the letters from petitioner’s sisters because he found their 
 
4 
 
reports of the high cost of Ecuadorian medical care unsubstantiated.  He noted that, 
contrary to Iza Chadan’s testimony, Ecuador has a free national health system and, in any 
event, the petitioners failed to demonstrate that they could not afford to move closer to a 
hospital or pay for private care.   
Further, the IJ found that J.A.T.I. would not experience financial hardship beyond 
what was to be expected by a deportation.  It noted both petitioners have experience 
working in depressed economies, already own a home in Ecuador, and would be entering 
the country with assets they could utilize.  Regarding J.A.T.I.’s education, the IJ found that 
he could likely adapt to schooling given his fluency in Spanish and that the petitioners did 
not establish that they could not afford comparable schooling in Ecuador.1 
Following the IJ’s denial of their applications for cancellations, the petitioners 
appealed to the BIA.  The Board dismissed the appeal, adopting the IJ’s reasoning and 
affirming its decision.  In so doing, it held that the petitioners failed to raise any arguments 
or identify any errors that would justify overturning the IJ’s decision to deny cancellation.  
Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision without an opinion, we will treat the IJ’s decision 
 
1 The IJ found the claim that J.A.T.I. had a serious psychological condition was not 
credible.  It observed that J.A.T.I.’s medical and school records did not reference a 
psychological condition, and there was no indication the petitioners had ever sought 
counseling or other services to address any psychological symptoms.  The IJ determined 
the evidence did not show that J.A.T.I. had a psychological condition that would result in 
hardship beyond what would be expected with deportation.  We will uphold this 
determination.   
 
5 
 
as the final agency determination.  Wilkinson v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 131 F.4th 134, 138 (3d Cir. 
2025).  Iza Chadan and Tubon Guangatal petitioned this Court for review.  
II. 
The petitioners contend that they satisfied the statutory requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b and therefore qualify for cancellation of removal.2  The Immigration Judge 
disagreed, finding inter alia that the petitioners did not satisfy the prerequisite of 
establishing that their removal will cause a family member who is a United States citizen 
or permanent resident an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”  Id. at § 
1229b(b)(1)(D).  The Supreme Court recently decided that we have jurisdiction to review 
the IJ’s hardship determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) because it presents a mixed 
question of law and fact.  Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 217–18 (2024) (citing 
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 225 (2020)).  We review the IJ’s hardship 
 
2 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D) allows for the cancellation of removal if the individual: 
 
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous 
period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date 
of such application; 
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; 
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 1182(a)(2), 
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title, subject to paragraph (5); 
and 
(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, 
who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence. 
 
Regardless of how many applicants meet these requirements, cancellation of removal is 
granted to no more than 4,000 individuals in any fiscal year.  Id. at § 1229b(e)(1).  
 
6 
 
determination under the deferential substantial evidence standard.  Wilkinson, 131 F.4th at 
142.  Under this standard, “we will uphold the IJ’s determination ‘unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude the contrary.’”  Id. (quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 
590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)).  
As this Court noted in Wilkinson, relief for “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is limited “to ‘truly exceptional’ 
circumstances.’”  Id. (quoting In re Monreal-Agunaga, 231 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 
2001)).  Subsection 1229b(b)(1)(D) “permits relief only where the hardship goes beyond 
that which is inherent in forced deportation.”  Id. at 143.  
The IJ properly focused on how the petitioners’ deportation would affect J.A.T.I., 
the petitioners’ qualifying U.S. citizen relative.  It considered the hardship factors for 
J.A.T.I. and found that the petitioners had not “met their burden to show the requisite 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship even cumulatively to their 7-year-old son.”  
A33.  Considering the substantial evidence in this case and applying the required level of 
deference to the IJ’s determination, we conclude that the petitioners have not established 
the agency erred in denying relief under subsection 1229b(b)(1)(D).  
The petitioners argue that the IJ erred by “disregarding” the letters written by their 
sisters, alleging that J.A.T.I.’s medical treatments would not be available in Ecuador.  They 
essentially claim that the IJ improperly weighed the sisters’ letters in evaluating whether 
J.A.T.I. would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” due to an alleged lack 
of medical care.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).  But this argument falls under subsection 
 
7 
 
1251(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdictional bar because it concerns the IJ’s factual determinations. See 
Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225 (“For instance, an IJ’s factfinding on credibility, the seriousness 
of a family member’s medical condition, or the level of financial support a noncitizen 
currently provides remain unreviewable.”).3 
III. 
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that petitioners were ineligible for cancellation 
of removal because their evidence did not demonstrate that their son would experience 
exceptional or extremely unusual hardship beyond that ordinarily associated with removal.  
Under our deferential review, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s 
determination.  We will therefore deny the petition for review. 
 
3 To the extent that the petitioners argue that the IJ committed legal error by not considering 
all the relevant evidence in the record, this claim fails.  The IJ stated that he had considered 
the entire record, “even if not explicitly referenced in [his] decision.”  A13.  The petitioners 
do not effectively challenge the veracity of this statement on appeal.  Because we have held 
the agency need not discuss “every piece of evidence,” the IJ’s statement is sufficient to 
settle any such claim.  Green v. Att’y Gen U.S., 694 F.3d 503, 509 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Huang v. Att’y Gen U.S., 602 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010)).   


Luis Tubon Guangatal v. Attorney General United States of America

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-20-2025 
Ester Villalta-Portillo v. Attorney General United States of America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Ester Villalta-Portillo v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 509. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/509 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 24-2620 
______________ 
 
ESTER NOEMY VILLALTA-PORTILLO, G.E.R.-V., 
  Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Nos. A220-384-285, A220-384-286)  
Immigration Judge: Laura Pierro 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
June 12, 2025 
 
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 20, 2025) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
_______________ 
 
  
 
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
2 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Ester Noemy Villalta-Portillo and her minor son (“Petitioners”), both citizens of El 
Salvador, petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order denying 
their motion to reopen removal proceedings. For the reasons below, we will deny the 
petition in part and dismiss the petition in part. 
I 
In August 2021, Petitioners entered the United States unlawfully. That December, 
they applied for asylum and withholding of removal. In later filings, they additionally 
sought protection under the Convention Against Torture. 
An Immigration Judge denied Petitioners’ application and ordered that they be 
removed to El Salvador. On April 10, 2024, the BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s 
order. 
More than ninety days later, Petitioners moved to reopen their BIA proceeding. The 
BIA denied that motion as untimely because it was filed after the ninety-day window to do 
so. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  
Petitioners argued that their motion should nevertheless be reopened based on two 
exceptions to the ninety-day filing window: (1) the ineffective assistance of their former 
counsel and (2) a change in country conditions. The BIA rejected both arguments and also 
declined Petitioners’ request to sua sponte reopen the proceeding. This petition followed.1 
 
1 The BIA had jurisdiction over the motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. We have 
jurisdiction over the petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
 
3 
 
II 
A2 
In their petition for review, Petitioners once again argue that reopening was 
warranted due to a change in country conditions. The time limitation for filing motions to 
reopen does not apply to motions seeking reopening “based on changed country conditions 
arising in the country of nationality” and supported by material evidence that was not 
available during the previous removal proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). But Petitioners have not presented any such evidence 
warranting reopening.  
Petitioners claim to have “[n]ew evidence regarding country conditions” that 
“show[s] that MS-13 gang members have become more dangerous, aggressive and 
unhinged,” and “have been involved in killing babies and young children.” Pet’rs Br. at 7 
(citing Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 49–50). But, as the BIA found, all but one of the 
articles predated the Petitioners’ December 5, 2023 hearing and therefore could have been 
discovered and presented at the previous proceeding. See A.R. 4; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i). The single article postdating the BIA’s 
removal decision does not support the claim that there has been a change in El Salvador’s 
conditions since December 2023. The article quotes Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele 
 
2 Motions to reopen are “especially disfavored.” Darby v. Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 159 (3d 
Cir. 2021). “As a general rule, motions to reopen are granted only under compelling 
circumstances.” Id. (quoting Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004)). We 
review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion “and will not disturb 
the BIA’s determination unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Id. 
 
4 
 
describing MS-13’s violent conduct, but notes it to be an ongoing problem since at least 
2017. A.R. 48–49. Accordingly, the BIA did not err in determining that country conditions 
had not changed.3  
B 
Petitioners also challenge the BIA’s refusal to reopen the matter sua sponte. Because 
such decisions are discretionary and “functionally unreviewable,” we generally lack 
jurisdiction to review them. Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 2017). 
We have jurisdiction only where the BIA’s decision was based on an incorrect legal 
premise or departed from a settled practice. Id. at 651–52.  
Petitioners submit that “exceptional circumstances” warrant sua sponte reopening. 
They assert that their previous attorney should have provided additional documentation to 
support their positions and that the Immigration Judge failed to sufficiently develop the 
record at their proceedings. Pet’rs Br. at 14–15. But Petitioners fail to raise a recognized 
exception to the jurisdictional bar to reviewing the denial of a motion to reopen sua sponte. 
The BIA did not rely on an incorrect legal premise and did not depart from a settled course 
 
3 Petitioners forfeited any argument that the BIA abused its discretion in denying their 
motion to reopen for failure to comply with the procedural requirements in Matter of 
Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988), because they do not address it in their opening 
brief. See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 495 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012). 
5 
 
of adjudication in its handling of the case. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review the 
BIA’s decision. 
* * * 
Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition with respect to the motion for sua sponte 
reopening and deny the petition in all other respects.  


Ester Villalta-Portillo v. Attorney General United States of America

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-23-2025 
Lucrecia Taylor v. Commissioner Social Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Lucrecia Taylor v. Commissioner Social Security" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 512. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/512 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
No. 24-2940 
_________________ 
LUCRECIA TAYLOR, 
Appellant 
v. 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
  ________________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:23-cv-03664) 
Magistrate Judge: Jose R. Arteaga 
________________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 17, 2025 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and McKEE, Circuit 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: June 23, 2025) 
______________ 
OPINION* 
______________ 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
 
2 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
Lucrecia Taylor appeals the District Court’s order upholding the Administrative 
Law Judge’s denial of her claim for social security benefits. For the following reasons, 
we must affirm.1 
The ALJ found that Taylor has the following severe impairments: major 
depressive disorder, an unspecified anxiety disorder, a posttraumatic stress disorder, 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, sarcoidosis, and lumbago with sciatica. The ALJ 
nevertheless determined that Taylor had “the residual functional capacity to perform light 
work . . . except with occasional postural activities; avoidance of dust, fumes, toxins, etc. 
. . . limited to simple repetitive tasks with only occasional changes in the work setting and 
occasional contact with the public, coworkers and supervisors.”2 The ALJ therefore 
concluded that Taylor was not disabled and thus denied her disability benefits due to the 
existence of a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Taylor could 
perform. 
Taylor contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate evidence that she had 
more severe mental symptoms when determining her residual functional capacity. She 
also argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider the medical opinion of her primary 
care provider.  
 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 AR 21. 
 
3 
 
In its well-reasoned and thorough opinion, the District Court explained that the 
ALJ had properly evaluated the evidence and medical opinions, and concluded that the 
ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.3 Although we are not 
unsympathetic to Taylor’s claim, given this record and the strength and thoroughness of 
the District Court’s analysis, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling substantially for 
the reasons as set forth in its thoughtful opinion.  
Nevertheless, we also briefly explain in the margin our agreement with the District 
Court’s conclusion that the ALJ did not err by failing to address a letter from Joana 
Bueno, Taylor’s primary care provider.4  
 
3 See Lucrecia T. v. O’Malley, No. CV 23-3664, 2024 WL 3824859 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 
2024). 
4 Bueno submitted a one-page letter that provided Taylor’s diagnoses, medications, and 
frequency of medical appointments. It also contained a two-sentence opinion about 
Taylor’s mental health: 
Ms. Taylor has a mental health condition resulting in severe impairment to 
her executive function, which includes her ability to think clearly, manage 
emotions, make decisions, and relate to others. For this reason, Ms. Taylor’s 
mental health condition substantially limits her major life activities such as 
maintaining employment. 
AR 1147. The District Court found that the ALJ was not required to refer to Bueno’s 
letter because it only addressed “issues which are exclusively reserved for the 
Commissioner to determine.” Lucrecia T., 2024 WL 3824859, at *8. Taylor concedes 
that Bueno’s statement determining she was unable to work “can be rejected without the 
need for any analysis or explanation.” Opening Br. 29. She argues, however, that the ALJ 
should have considered the remainder of the letter.  
“The ALJ—not treating or examining physicians . . . —must make the ultimate 
disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 
(3d Cir. 2011). “Statements that you are or are not  . . . able to work” and “[s]tatements 
about whether or not you have a severe impairment[]” are “[s]tatements on issues 
reserved to the Commissioner” that are “inherently neither valuable nor persuasive” and 
do not require “any analysis.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c); see also Jones v. Dudek, 134 
F.4th 991, 997–98 (7th Cir. 2025) (finding “the ALJ had no obligation . . . to provide any 
analysis” of a doctor’s opinion “concerning ‘issues reserved to the Commissioner’” 
 
4 
 
 
(quoting § 404.1520b(c)(3))); Staheli v. Comm’r, SSA, 84 F.4th 901, 906 (10th Cir. 2023) 
(finding “the ALJ was not required to analyze” a doctor’s statements “to the extent they 
addressed the ultimate issue of disability” (citing § 404.1520b(c)(3)(i))). The only 
opinion Bueno offered was that Taylor had a “severe impairment” that made her unable 
to “maintain[] employment.” AR 1147. Because these statements were reserved solely for 
the Commissioner, the ALJ was not required to provide any analysis.  
Even if the ALJ should have addressed the letter, any error was harmless. See 
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding remand unnecessary 
because error “would not affect the outcome of the case”). The ALJ discussed and 
considered the medical records that Bueno provided, and agreed with Bueno’s assessment 
that Taylor’s mental conditions were “severe impairments,” AR 18, that “impaired [her] 
executive functioning,” AR 25. Based on substantial evidence, the ALJ concluded that 
Taylor was “limited to simple repetitive tasks with only occasional changes in the work 
setting and occasional contact with the public, coworkers and supervisors.” AR 21. 


Lucrecia Taylor v. Commissioner Social Security

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-24-2025 
Emmanuel Folly v. City of Philadelphia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Emmanuel Folly v. City of Philadelphia" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 515. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/515 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1523 
__________ 
 
EMMANUEL FOLLY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT; VILMA 
CUBIAS, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE; SYIBL MURPHY, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 
PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-00305) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kai N. Scott 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 20, 2025 
Before:  HARDIMAN, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 24, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
Emmanuel Folly appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm.  
I. 
Folly filed a civil rights action against the City of Philadelphia (“City”), the 
Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”), and Assistant District Attorneys Vilma Cubias 
and Sybil Murphy in January 2025.  The incidents relevant to this complaint began in 
2016 when the PPD’s Special Victims Unit (“SVU”) initiated an investigation of alleged 
child pornography possession and dissemination affiliated with a specific IP address.  
SVU traced the IP address to a residence in Philadelphia and, while executing a search 
warrant on the property, discovered that a PPD officer, later determined to be Folly, 
resided there.  Approximately one year later, Folly was arrested and charged with 
possession of child pornography, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6312(d), and dissemination of child 
pornography, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6312(c).  The PPD placed Folly on a 30-day suspension and 
subsequently dismissed him permanently, effective May 22, 2017.  In January 2022, 
Folly was acquitted of all criminal charges.  Nonetheless, the PPD did not reverse his 
dismissal.  The Fraternal Order of Police filed a grievance contesting Folly’s termination 
and requesting he be reinstated to his former position with the PPD.  The matter 
proceeded to arbitration with the City and in January 2023, the arbitrator upheld Folly’s 
termination decision and denied the grievance.  Folly filed suit in the District Court two 
years later.   
3 
 
Folly’s complaint alleges that the defendants subjected him to an unlawful search 
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  He also challenges the arbitration decision denying his 
request for reinstatement with the PPD, claiming it was improperly based on biased 
proceedings and violated his due process rights.  The District Court screened Folly’s 
complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), determined all claims therein were facially untimely, 
and dismissed it with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted.  This timely appeal followed.1 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a dismissal 
for failure to state a claim de novo, applying the standard articulated by Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007), and reiterated in Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009).  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (explaining that when dismissing complaints for failure to state a claim under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the standard of review is the same as under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6)).2   
 
1 The City of Philadelphia and Philadelphia Police Department are not participating in the 
appeal.   
 
2 Although the running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, if 
that defense is apparent on the face of the complaint, a court may dismiss a time-barred 
complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.  See 
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). 
 
4 
 
We must also accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all 
reasonable inferences in Folly’s favor.  See Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 204 
(3d Cir. 2021) (citing Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016)).  
Although pro se pleadings must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “pro se litigants still 
must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”  Mala v. Crown Bay 
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). 
III. 
After our de novo review of the record, we agree that the District Court properly 
dismissed Folly’s complaint as untimely.  Folly does not challenge the determination that 
he untimely filed his complaint, and has therefore forfeited any such argument.  See 
Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 146–47 (3d Cir. 
2017).  Nor is any error apparent to us.  See generally Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 
271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that § 1983 claims are subject to two-year statute of 
limitations); PG Publ'g, Inc. v. Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh, 19 F.4th 308, 319 (3d Cir. 
2021) (explaining that challenge to an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act 
must be brought 90 days after the award is issued). 
On appeal, Folly argues that his difficulties securing counsel entitle him to 
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.  However, this argument fails on the merits, 
as equitable tolling is appropriate only in limited circumstances.  Difficulty obtaining 
counsel, or proceeding pro se, does not warrant the extraordinary remedy of tolling the 
5 
 
statute of limitations.  See Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 799–800 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The 
fact that a petitioner is proceeding pro se does not insulate him from the ‘reasonable 
diligence’ inquiry and his lack of legal knowledge or legal training does not alone justify 
equitable tolling.”) (citing Brown v. Shannon, 322 F.3d 768, 774 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also 
Socha v. Boughton, 763 F.3d 674, 685 (7th Cir. 2014).   
Folly also claims that the District Court should have given him the opportunity to 
file an amended complaint so he could address the deficiencies in his original filing.  
However, the only amendment Folly seeks to present concerns his equitable-tolling 
argument, which we have already determined lacks merit.  Therefore, we agree with the 
District Court that amendment of his complaint would have been futile.  See Jablonski v. 
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that 
“[a]mendment of the complaint is futile if the amendment will not cure the deficiency in 
the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion to 
dismiss”).   
Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 


Emmanuel Folly v. City of Philadelphia

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-24-2025 
Thomas Traumann v. James Funt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Thomas Traumann v. James Funt" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 516. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/516 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2599 
__________ 
 
THOMAS TRAUMANN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JAMES A. FUNT; CAROLINE A. CINQUANTO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00486) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joshua D. Wolson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 18, 2025 
Before:  HARDIMAN, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 24, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Appellant Thomas Traumann appeals the District Court order dismissing his 
complaint as barred by the statute of limitations.  Because the District Court properly 
dismissed the complaint as time barred, we will affirm.  
I. 
Traumann brought his complaint against his former criminal defense lawyers, 
James Funt and Caroline Cinquanto, on January 30, 2024.  He filed the operative 
amended complaint in June 2024, which alleged tortious legal malpractice, among other 
claims.  Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint.  The District Court dismissed 
Traumann’s complaint, finding that it was barred by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of 
limitations for criminal legal malpractice claims.1  Traumann timely appealed.2   
II. 
 On appeal, Traumann argues that the District Court erred in determining the 
statute of limitations on his legal malpractice claims began to run no later than July 6, 
2021, the date he filed his pro se Compassionate Release Motion.  Traumann contends 
that Pennsylvania’s doctrine of fraudulent concealment and discovery rule equitably 
 
1  While Traumann’s amended complaint named a variety of claims, the District Court 
concluded all of his claims sounded in legal malpractice.  Traumann has not challenged 
that conclusion, so we will follow suit.  See, e.g., Lara v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, 125 
F.4th 428, 432 n.5 (3d Cir. 2025) (reiterating that “[a]n issue is [forfeited] unless a party 
raises it in its opening brief” (quotation marks omitted)).   
2  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a dismissal under 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is plenary.  Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 
F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2016). 
3 
 
tolled the statute of limitation until February 2022, “when the injury was brought to his 
attention by his prison legal advisors,” thus making his complaint timely.   
Under Pennsylvania law, legal malpractice claims sounding in tort or “trespass” 
have a two-year statute of limitations.  42 Pa. C.S. § 5524(7); see also Bailey v. Tucker, 
621 A.2d 108, 116 n.17 (Pa. 1993).  The statute of limitations begins to run “at the time 
the harm is suffered or, if appropriate, at the time the alleged malpractice is discovered.”  
Bailey, 621 A.2d at 115 (citation omitted).  Specifically, for criminal legal malpractice 
claims, the injury is the conviction, and is deemed to have occurred at the time of 
sentencing.  Id. at 116.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court appreciated that defendants 
may not immediately know whether it was their own actions or their attorney’s actions 
that caused the injury.  Id.  It thus held that “the appropriate starting point [for the statute 
of limitations] [wa]s the termination of the attorney-client relationship, since at that point 
the aggrieved defendant is aware of the injury (i.e., the conviction), and is on clear notice 
to investigate any alternate cause of that harm which he believes to exist.”  Id.; see also 
Robbins & Seventko Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Geisenberger, 674 A.2d 244, 247–48 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (explaining that Bailey “applied the discovery rule tolling the 
statute of limitations until the defendant became aware that his attorney was responsible 
for the harm,” which “occurred when the attorney client relationship was terminated”). 
Here, the District Court properly determined that the statute of limitations began to 
run no later than July 6, 2021, the date the criminal trial court docket reflects Traumann 
4 
 
filed his pro se Compassionate Release Motion.3  Traumann argues that date is irrelevant 
to the question of the statute of limitations because his motion did not attack his 
conviction or his attorneys’ action.  However, his filing of a pro se motion indicates that 
by that date, Appellees’ representation of him had ceased, and thus created “the 
appropriate starting point” for the statute of limitations.  See Bailey, 621 A.2d at 116 
(“On November 3, 1978, appellant filed a pro se petition to vacate his sentence.  
Accordingly, at least as of that date, appellee [attorney’s] services had been terminated, 
and the statute of limitations . . . had begun to run.”).   
Traumann’s arguments regarding the discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment are similarly unavailing.  He argues that he could not have brought his 
claims until he learned in prison about an amendment to his statute of conviction.4  But 
 
3  Statutes of limitations are affirmative defenses that may only be addressed on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion if a claim’s untimeliness is apparent on the face of the complaint. 
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014).  “[A] court must consider only the 
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as 
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these 
documents.”  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, the District 
Court properly looked to the criminal trial docket, as a “matter[] of public record” to 
determine when the statute of limitations began to run on Traumann’s claims.  See Orabi 
v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014). 
4  As we explained in affirming the denial of Traumann’s motion for compassionate 
release: “The amended version is facially broader than the version to which Traumann 
pleaded guilty and appears to have codified the longstanding interpretation of the prior 
version that the Government need not prove that the defendant’s sole purpose in traveling 
was to engage in sexual activity.  United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 
2004).  There is no reason to believe that Traumann would have received a more 
favorable outcome—or would not have pleaded guilty—under the amended statute.”  
United States v. Traumann, No. 23-2985, 2024 WL 4357746, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 2024) 
(non-precedential). 
5 
 
Robbins explained that Bailey already “applied the discovery rule” when it tolled the 
statute of limitations in criminal legal malpractice claims from the date of sentencing to 
the date when the attorney-client relationship is terminated.  See Robbins, 674 A.2d at 
247–48.  Moreover, “[t]he polestar of the Pennsylvania discovery rule is not a plaintiff’s 
actual acquisition of knowledge,” DiDomizio v. Jefferson Pulmonary Assocs., 280 A.3d 
1039, 1046 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022) (quotation marks omitted), and the termination of his 
relationship with Appellees “placed [him] on notice to discover” the cause of any injury, 
Bailey, 621 A.2d at 116.  Finally, Traumann has not showed that the fraudulent-
concealment doctrine applies.  See generally Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang, 839 
A.2d 437, 443 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 860 (Pa. 2005).   
III.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.5 
 
 
5  Both Appellees and Appellant filed motions for leave to file a supplemental appendix.  
We grant both motions.  However, although we are following our usual practice by taxing 
costs in favor of Appellees as the prevailing party, taxable costs shall not include the 
costs of Appellees’ supplemental appendix because those documents were already 
included in Appellant’s appendix.  


Thomas Traumann v. James Funt

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-26-2025 
Dewayne Bulls v. FBI 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Dewayne Bulls v. FBI" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 525. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/525 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
DLD-155        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1800 
___________ 
 
DEWAYNE BULLS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (FBI); 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, (DOJ); FBI AGENTS, 
(JOHN/JANE DOE); DOJ OFFICIALS, (JOHN/JANE DOE) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-00407) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christy Criswell Wiegand 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 22, 2025 
Before:  RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 26, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Dewayne Bulls sought to file an in forma pauperis complaint against the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and unnamed FBI 
and DOJ officials.  He claimed that they engaged in “an ongoing, systemic criminal 
enterprise,” conducting surveillance of him under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act in order to obstruct legitimate criminal investigations of “FBI[] malfeasance” that he 
has uncovered.  ECF No. 7 at 1.   
Bulls further alleged that they had “fabricated” his use of the drug MDMA and 
“planted illicit substances,” including MDMA, in his drink.  Id. at 3, 4.  He explained that 
once he saw a “nondescript white pickup truck” near where he was “savoring a meal” in a 
“public space,” which he identified (loudly and “without hesitation”) as “the FBI.”  Id. at 
5.  He stated that, after he finished his meal, the FBI picked his discarded items from the 
trash, and “these seemingly innocent remnants were twisted . . . into false ‘evidence.’”  
Id.  And Bulls stated that, another time, he opened a water bottle outside a homeless 
shelter, and a video, if reviewed, would reveal misconduct by the FBI because it shows 
no tampering by him.  Id. at 5-6.  He blamed the FBI for curtailing his drug-testing 
regimen, reducing the number of drug tests he takes from five to one per week.  Id. at 6.  
And Bulls further alleged that the FBI altered his drug test results, using caffeine and 
other substances to suggest his MDMA use despite a “negative MDMA result.”  Id. at 7.   
He sought a declaration that the defendants violated federal law; an injunction preventing 
further FISA surveillance; a cease-and-desist order directing the defendants to stop 
3 
 
“unlawful surveillance, evidence fabrication, and perjury”; criminal referrals; and 
damages.  Id. at 8.  Presenting similar and additional allegations (including ones relating 
to FBI forgeries and impersonations of people in high levels of government), Bulls also 
filed separate requests for preliminary injunctive relief.1 
 After Bulls was granted in forma pauperis status, a Magistrate Judge prepared a 
report and recommended dismissing the complaint with prejudice, because, inter alia, 
Bulls’s allegations were frivolous and failed to state a claim.  In another report and 
recommendation, she advised denying several of the motions for injunctive relief.  Over 
Bulls’s objections, the District Court adopted the first report and recommendation and 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  On the same day, the District Court separately 
dismissed all Bulls’s other motions as moot.  Bulls filed a timely notice of appeal. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s order dismissing Bulls’s complaint.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
 
1 More specifically, he sought additional comparable cease-and-desist orders plus orders 
to release funds related to his 2023 state tax return, which, he contended, were being 
withheld by the FBI; to overcome FBI interference with his access to PACER; to address 
problems that he encountered entering a federal courthouse and interacting with 
employees in a clerk’s office; and to enjoin obstruction of his efforts to communicate 
with a U.S. Attorney’s Office (he noted that he has gotten out-of-service messages when 
he called there from a homeless shelter’s telephone).  ECF Nos. 4, 6, 10, & 11. 
 
2 We will not review the denial of Bulls’s motions for a preliminary injunctive relief 
because this appeal is moot to the extent that he challenges the ruling on those motions.  
See Hankins v. Temple Univ., 829 F.2d 437, 438 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
4 
 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Upon review, we will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment because no substantial issue is presented on appeal.3  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011) (per curiam) (explaining that we may affirm on any basis supported by the record).   
 We agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss Bulls’s complaint.  Bulls’s 
claims of a wide-ranging FBI conspiracy against him in order to obstruct criminal 
investigations challenge credulity.  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 
(1989) (explaining that a complaint is considered frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in 
law or fact).   
Furthermore, even assuming the truth of some of his allegations, other pleading 
defects plague his complaint.  He cannot impose civil or criminal liability under the 
criminal statutes he cites.  See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a “bare 
[federal] criminal statute”).)  We do not recognize any implied action under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), that he may propose.  See Egbert 
 
3 Before coming to this conclusion, we have reviewed the informal brief that Bulls 
submitted, which we construe as a document in support of his appeal, as well as his 
opposition to summary action and other filings.  In response to his concern that the FBI 
authored the report and recommendation adopted by the District Court and impersonated 
this Court to notify him that we would consider summary action, we assure him that the 
report and recommendation and the notice of possible summary action are authentic court 
documents, issued by a Magistrate Judge and this Court’s Clerk’s Office, respectively, 
without the involvement of the FBI.   
5 
 
v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 490-91 (2022) (listing three types of cases for which the remedy 
is available); Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 204–06 (3d Cir. 2024) (analyzing 
the import of Egbert).  While he also relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he described actions by 
federal, not state, actors.  Section 1983 “protects against acts attributable to a State” and 
requires action under color of state law.  Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194-95 (2024); 
see also Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (requiring a plaintiff to allege 
“that [he] was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor”).  
And some of his claims are just not supported by his allegations.  For example, he 
maintained that the FBI violated his Fourth Amendment rights by trash-picking items he 
discarded, but no Fourth Amendment “seizure” occurs when the FBI appropriates 
abandoned property.  Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960). 
Lastly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
that amendment would be futile under the circumstances.  See Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-14 (3d Cir. 2002).  
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.4   
 
 
4 We deny Bulls’s motion to expedite review, see 3d Cir L.A.R. 4.1, and his other 
requests for relief.   


Villanova University

Not a member yet