Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-22-2025 
Diptiben Patel v. Attorney General United States of America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Diptiben Patel v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 586. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/586 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-2083 
_____________ 
 
DIPTIBEN DIPAKKUMAR PATEL;  
DIPAKKUMAR DASHARATHLAL PATEL; S.D.P., 
  Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Case Nos. A240-075-093, A240-046-727, A240-075-094) 
Immigration Judge: Steven Mannion 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2025 
_______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 22, 2025) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
 
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
 2 
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioners Diptiben Dipakkumar Patel, her husband Dipakkumar Dasharathlal 
Patel, and their minor son S.D.P. seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA)’s denial of their claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Seeing no error, we will deny the petition.  
I. 
Petitioners are natives and citizens of India. In 2016, while residing in Kalol, 
Gujarat, Ms. Patel put up posters and banners before political rallies for the Congress 
Party. In 2017, four men confronted her and urged her to join the rival Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP). When she refused, the men told her to “think about it, or something 
untoward may result.” A.R. 62. Two years later, six men wearing BJP shirts on bikes 
bearing BJP stickers approached Ms. Patel after she had been campaigning for the 
Congress Party. They also told her to join the BJP. When Ms. Patel refused, one of the 
men pushed her to the ground and three others began kicking and punching her. “[O]ne of 
the men said that they will kill her and her entire family.” A.R. 62. In 2021, five men 
stopped Ms. Patel at the market. “They said that she was very active and worked for the 
Congress party during the election” and “told her it was time to bear the fruits of being 
against BJP.” A.R. 63. Two of the men, who were carrying sticks, beat Ms. Patel.1  
Petitioners entered the United States on February 6, 2022. The Immigration Judge 
(IJ) denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 
 
1 Ms. Patel did not submit medical records corroborating this incident. 
 
 
 3 
CAT. While the IJ found Ms. Patel largely credible, he found it incredible that she was 
singled out for her low-level work within the Congress Party. The BIA dismissed the 
Petitioners’ appeal.2  
II. 
To qualify for asylum, an alien must establish that she is a “refugee,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(A), meaning she is “unable or unwilling to return to . . . [her] country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)(A). “Persecution ‘connotes extreme behavior, including threats to life, 
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to 
life or freedom.’” Cortez-Amador v. Att’y Gen., 66 F.4th 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting 
Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003)). But “[p]ersecution does not 
encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or 
unconstitutional.” Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Fatin v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993)).  
 
2 The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) and (9), and we 
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) over final orders of removal. “Where the 
BIA affirms the decision of the IJ and ‘set[s] forth somewhat its own rationale and 
analysis,’ we review both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions,” Herrow v. Att’y Gen., 93 
F.4th 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 
427, 433 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005)), but “[i]f the Board relies only on some of the grounds given 
for denying relief, we review only these grounds,” Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 
(3d Cir. 2017). “We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo while we review its 
factual findings for substantial evidence,” so we will “defer to the factual findings of the 
BIA as long as they are supported by evidence reasonably grounded in the record.” 
Cortez-Amador v. Att’y Gen., 66 F.4th 429, 434 n.17 (3d Cir. 2023). 
 
 
 4 
Even assuming Ms. Patel’s credibility, as the BIA did, substantial evidence 
supports the agency’s determination that the Petitioners failed to show past persecution. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). Although Ms. Patel was unfortunately attacked, her injuries 
were not severe. See Liang v. Att’y Gen., 15 F.4th 623, 625 (3d Cir. 2021); Chen v. 
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). And “[w]hile we do not mean to suggest that 
the severity of an injury should be measured in stitches, [Ms. Patel] has provided no other 
objective evidence to demonstrate that” her injuries were “severe enough to constitute 
persecution under our stringent standard.” Kibinda v. Att’y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 120 (3d 
Cir. 2007); see Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[O]ur cases suggest 
that isolated incidents that do not result in serious injury do not rise to the level of 
persecution.”).  
This conclusion is not altered by the threats Ms. Patel faced, as they were not 
“concrete and menacing.” Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 312 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(quoting Herrera-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 952 F.3d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 2020)). Even 
“considered in the context of the full record,” “the cumulative effect of the[se] threat[s] 
and [their] corroboration” did not “pose[] a ‘severe affront[] to [Ms. Patel’s] life or 
freedom.’” Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 108 (quoting Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 
F.3d 330, 341 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that the Petitioners did not 
have a well-founded fear of persecution. “An applicant does not have a well-founded fear 
of persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the 
applicant’s country of nationality.” § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). Here, there was substantial 
 
 
 5 
evidence that the Petitioners could relocate in India to escape the “highly localized 
harassment.” A.R. 5 (quoting A.R. 67). Indeed, the only reason Ms. Patel gave for not 
being able to relocate was that to receive utilities she would “have to give [her] other card 
that has [her] address,” which the BJP would somehow use to find her. A.R. 173. We 
agree it is “implausible . . . that ‘the BJP Party would hunt [Ms. Patel] down anywhere in 
India.’” A.R. 4 (quoting A.R. 65). Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s 
conclusion that the Petitioners did not suffer persecution or have a well-founded fear of 
persecution, the agency did not err in denying the Petitioners’ application for asylum.3  
Nor do we need to address the Petitioners’ applications for protection under CAT. 
The discussion of CAT in their opening brief was limited to “challeng[ing] the IJ’s 
decision denying Patel’s application” under “Article 3 of the United Nations Connection 
Against Torture,” and outlining the corresponding legal standard. Opening Br. 3. But 
“[a]n issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a 
passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.” Khan v. 
Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 495 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De 
Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 202–03 (3d Cir. 2004)). We will therefore not consider the 
denial of the Petitioners’ applications for protection under CAT. 
*  *  * 
For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
3 Because substantial evidence supported the denial of asylum, withholding of 
removal was also properly denied. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 
2003) (“If [a petitioner] is unable to satisfy the standard for asylum, he necessarily fails to 
meet the standard for withholding of removal.”). 
 
1 
 
FREEMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. 
Because Patel did not develop a CAT argument in her opening brief, I join the 
majority opinion’s resolution of that claim.  However, I would grant Patel’s petition with 
regard to her asylum and withholding-of-removal claims.  In my view, the BIA 
committed the same errors here as it did in Blanco v. Attorney General, 967 F.3d 304 (3d 
Cir. 2020) and Herrera-Reyes v. Attorney General, 952 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2020).  That is, 
it required Patel to show severe physical harm to establish past persecution; it ignored the 
violent context of the death threats against Patel; and it considered Patel’s beatings and 
death threats separately.  Blanco, 967 F.3d at 311; Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 108. 
In its first error, the BIA said Patel did not suffer harm amounting to persecution 
because her physical injuries from the beatings were “minor.”  App. 14.  The majority 
opinion also imposes a severe-physical-injury requirement for past persecution.  Maj. Op. 
at 4.  But we have stated again and again that we do not “condition a finding of past 
persecution on whether the victim required medical attention or even on whether the 
victim was physically harmed at all.”  Blanco, 967 F.3d at 311 (quoting Doe v. Att’y Gen., 
956 F.3d 135, 145 (3d Cir. 2020)) (cleaned up); Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 110 (“We 
have never reduced our persecution analysis to a checklist or suggested that physical 
violence—or any other single type of mistreatment—is a required element of the past 
persecution determination.”).  Rather, “outrageous conduct, even if limited to a single 
event without physical harm,” can (and has) risen to the level of past persecution.  
 
2 
 
Blanco, 967 F.3d at 312 (citation omitted).1  So the BIA errs when it requires a petitioner 
to show “physical harm, much less severe physical harm,” to establish past persecution.  
Id.  
Erring a second time, the BIA agreed with the IJ that the threats to Patel were not 
“concrete and menacing” because Patel did not present evidence that other Congress 
Party members were “targeted and killed or seriously injured as a result of their 
participation in . . . similar political activities.”  App. 14.  But Patel received threats 
related to her political activities three times: in 2017, 2019, and 2021.  The 2017 incident 
involved an oblique threat: Four BJP members told Patel that her refusal to leave the 
Congress Party would lead to a bad result.  But when Patel again refused to leave the 
Congress Party in 2019, several BJP members pushed, kicked, and punched her and 
threatened to kill her and her family.  And in 2021, after the BJP won an election, five 
men punched, kicked, and beat Patel with wooden sticks because of her work for the 
Congress Party.  A crowd of onlookers spooked the attackers, who fled while telling Patel 
she would not survive their next encounter. 
In the context of the beatings, the threats were clearly concrete and menacing.  
Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 107 (observing that a threat is concrete and menacing “when 
substantiated by both contemporaneous physical violence and by the petitioner’s previous 
encounters with her persecutors”); see also Liang v. Att’y Gen., 15 F.4th 623, 626 (3d Cir. 
 
1 In Blanco, we cited the example of Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 520 (3d Cir. 
2006).  There, “even though there was no evidence of physical harm, Chavarria’s death 
threat, in light of his experience of being forced from his car and robbed at gunpoint, rose 
to the level of persecution.”  Blanco, 967 F.3d at 312.   
 
3 
 
2021) (noting that the petitioner “had good reason to take the threat[s] seriously, as he 
had just been . . . beaten”).  And the additional requirement the BIA imposed—that Patel 
prove other Congress Party members had been killed or seriously injured for their 
political opinions—has no basis in our caselaw.  Where a petitioner may demonstrate past 
persecution without having suffered physical injury herself, she plainly need not establish 
physical injury to others. 
Rounding out its errors, the BIA failed to consider the cumulative effect of Patel’s 
mistreatment.  See Blanco, 967 F.3d at 313; Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 109; Liang, 15 
F.4th at 626; Fei Mei Cheng v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 2010).  Despite 
nodding to a cumulative analysis, neither the BIA nor the IJ “consider[ed] how the 
surrounding acts of mistreatment”—particularly, the contemporaneous beatings—
“corroborated the death threats that [Patel] received.”  Blanco, 967 F.3d at 314 (cleaned 
up) (noting that the BIA erred when it merely “paid lip service to the notion of 
cumulative analysis”). 
Applying our precedent, I would hold that Patel suffered past persecution and thus 
was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.  See 
id. at 315.  And it was the government’s burden to rebut that presumption.  Id.  “[I]t can 
do so by showing that there has been a ‘fundamental change in circumstances’ or that the 
noncitizen ‘could avoid future persecution by relocating’ to another part of his or her 
home country and ‘it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.’”  Id. (quoting 
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), (B), (ii)).  But, rather than holding the government to its 
burden, the BIA faulted Patel for failing to prove that she would be unable to relocate 
 
4 
 
within India.  Due to this confluence of errors, I would remand for the agency to 
determine in the first instance whether the government can rebut the presumption of 
future persecution.  See Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 112.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent in part from the judgment in this case. 


Diptiben Patel v. Attorney General United States of America

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-25-2025 
Rashar Williams v. Attorney General United States of America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Rashar Williams v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 595. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/595 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3103 
__________ 
 
RASHAR BRANDON WILLIAMS, 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A207-667-018) 
Immigration Judge Tamar H. Wilson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 21, 2025 
Before:  HARDIMAN, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Rashar Brandon Williams, a Jamaican citizen, married a United States citizen and, 
in 2015, was granted permanent-resident status on a conditional basis pursuant to 8 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1).  His permanent resident status was terminated two years later 
because Williams and his spouse did not file the requisite joint petition to remove the 
conditions on his residence under § 1186a(c)(1)(A).  As a result, Williams was charged 
with removability.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i).  Williams then requested that the 
requirement for the filing of a joint petition be waived under § 1186a(c)(4)(B), which 
permits the Attorney General to waive the requirement as a matter of discretion if the 
marriage was entered into in good faith but subsequently terminated through divorce or 
annulment.  United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the 
petition.  In Immigration Court, Williams renewed his request for a good-faith marriage 
waiver.  Following a hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the request solely in the 
exercise of discretion.1  Upon de novo review, the BIA likewise concluded that Williams 
did not merit a good-faith marriage waiver and dismissed the appeal.  Williams petitioned 
for review. 
Williams raises two issues in his brief, both of which relate to drug-trafficking and 
firearms charges that were pending against him in Massachusetts at the time of the 
agency hearings.  First, he contends that the agency erred by initiating removal 
proceedings against him before his criminal charges were resolved.  Williams cites no 
 
1 Williams also applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention 
against Torture (CAT).  The IJ denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) dismissed the appeal.  Williams does not challenge these rulings in his opening 
brief.  Therefore, they are forfeited.  See M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. 
Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020).   
3 
 
authority for this contention, and we generally lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s 
decision to commence removal proceedings.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).   
Second, Williams contends that the agency erred by considering the non-final 
criminal charges in weighing the equities as to his waiver request.  To the extent that 
Williams is challenging the weight the agency attached to the police report, we lack 
jurisdiction to review its exercise of discretion.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Urena–
Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2004).  To the extent that Williams’s 
argument can be construed as raising a question of law, we have jurisdiction to consider 
it, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), but we conclude that it is meritless.  Consistent with 
agency precedent, the BIA gave “little weight” to the uncorroborated, non-final criminal 
charges.  See In re Arreguin De Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38, 42 (BIA 1995) (holding 
that that arrest reports are entitled to “little weight” “absent a conviction or corroborating 
evidence of the allegations contained therein”). 
For these reasons, we will dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.    
 


Rashar Williams v. Attorney General United States of America

Roger Real v. Attorney General United States of America

San Diego County Employees Retirement Association v. Johnson & Johnson

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-12-2025 
USA v. Tylee Brown 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Tylee Brown" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 641. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/641 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1762 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TYLEE BROWN, 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 3:20-cr-00262-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 16, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MONTGOMERY-REEVES and McKEE, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Filed:  August 12, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
CHAGARES, Chief Judge. 
 Tylee Brown moved to suppress evidence found during the search of a vehicle in 
which he was a passenger.  Brown argues that the police violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights not only when officers detained him outside the vehicle, but also when they later 
stopped the car, prolonged the stop, and searched the car.  For the reasons below, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
I. 
 We write primarily for the parties and so recite only those facts pertinent to our 
decision.  Police officers were investigating a rural lot in Susquehanna County, 
Pennsylvania after receiving a report for stolen property allegedly located at the lot.  As 
the officers entered the lot, where it was raining heavily, a Volkswagen sedan pulled up 
to the driveway.  The driver of the vehicle, Edwin Blaisure, exited and spoke to the 
officers.  They discovered that Blaisure had an active arrest warrant out of New York, 
prompting the officers to take him into custody. 
 As the officers arrested Blaisure, another vehicle arrived on the scene.  A Chrysler 
sedan with heavily tinted windows approached the driveway, but then abruptly stopped, 
backed up, and became stuck in the mud along the roadway.  The front-seat passenger, 
Brown, then exited the vehicle and began pushing it from behind.  After this unsuccessful 
attempt to dislodge the car, Brown ran into the wooded area surrounding the lot, 
unbeknownst to the officers as they approached the Chrysler.  When the officers 
eventually realized Brown’s flight, they pursued and apprehended him.  Brown explained 
that he ran because he was on parole and had marijuana in his possession, which he said 
3 
he discarded into the woods.  The officers did not locate any marijuana and began 
escorting Brown back to the lot in handcuffs. 
 Other officers, meanwhile, were questioning the remaining occupants of the 
Chrysler.  The driver and owner of the vehicle, Heriberto Delmoral, stated that he came 
from Philadelphia to the lot to have his car mirrors repaired.  Delmoral also explained 
that Brown paid him $200 to drive him to the lot, where one of Brown’s vehicles was 
being painted.  Neither Delmoral nor the other occupants of the vehicle, Alisha Blye and 
her young child, had physical identification in their possession.  The questioning officer 
observed that the journey from Philadelphia to the rural lot would have taken five hours 
round-trip.  The officer also noticed that Delmoral was winking and nodding at him as 
they were speaking, which the officer found “extremely” unusual.  Appendix (“App.”) 
132.   
 Brown and the officers then returned to the lot.  The officers conducted a pat-
down of Brown, noting to him that he “ran for no reason.”  App. 19.  The pat-down 
uncovered two cellphones in Brown’s possession, which the officers associated with 
trafficking of contraband.  During the pat-down, the officers also asked Brown about the 
rather long route for customary car repairs.  Brown responded that he knew the lot owner 
and had left another car, a Range Rover, to be repaired as well, but officers could not 
locate any Range Rover on the premises.  Brown also clarified that his travel originated 
in Norristown (a suburb of Philadelphia) and included a stop in Scranton before their 
arrival to the lot. 
4 
  The officers, suspecting that the Chrysler contained contraband, asked Delmoral 
for consent to search the car, which he refused.  The police then called for a canine unit to 
inspect the vehicle, which arrived forty minutes later.  The drug-sniffing dog, Khan, 
alerted the handler twice as they inspected the car, indicating the presence of controlled 
substances.  The officers searched the car, finding a tote bag containing crystal 
methamphetamine in the trunk.  Brown, Delmoral, and Blye were arrested.   
 A federal grand jury indicted Brown for conspiring to distribute and to possess 
with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, as well as possessing 
with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine.  Brown moved to 
suppress the evidence obtained from the Chrysler, arguing that the police lacked 
reasonable suspicion to detain him or the vehicle, improperly prolonged the stop to 
investigate other crimes, and had no probable cause to search the car.  Brown also sought 
to suppress his statements from the day of his arrest, which he said contravened Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
The District Court granted in part and denied in part his motion.  It first held that 
Brown lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the vehicle’s detention and 
search and that reasonable suspicion supported Brown’s detention.  The only police 
action that implicated Brown’s privacy interests was his detention in the woods, 
according to the District Court, but reasonable suspicion supported his detention.  The 
District Court also held that even if Brown had standing as to the stop and search of the 
vehicle, those investigatory actions would not have violated the Fourth Amendment 
either.  The District Court lastly held that because Brown was subject to custodial 
5 
interrogation during his initial detention, his un-Mirandized statements about his 
marijuana possession and parole status were inadmissible.  But the District Court noted 
that this conclusion did not affect the admissibility of any physical evidence recovered at 
the scene. 
 Brown then entered into a conditional plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to suppress.  The District Court sentenced him to 228 months of 
imprisonment.  Brown timely appealed. 
II.1 
A. 
The District Court concluded that reasonable suspicion justified the initial 
detention of the Chrysler, and probable cause supported the ensuing search.  We agree.   
Assessing reasonable suspicion requires considering the “totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether ‘the detaining officers . . . [had] a particularized and objective basis 
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’”  United States v. 
Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2006)).  And “a dog’s positive alert while 
sniffing the exterior of the car provides an officer with the probable cause necessary to 
search the car without a warrant.”  United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction to 
review Brown’s conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a).  This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to a 
district court’s factual findings but exercises plenary review over its legal determinations.  
See United States v. Stewart, 92 F.4th 461, 466 (3d Cir. 2024).   
6 
The investigatory actions here complied with the Fourth Amendment, as the 
District Court concluded.  The vehicle’s presence in a “haven for illegal activity,” App. 
176 — a remote lot where “drugs and stolen property” were suspected, id., someone had 
recently been arrested, and another had just run into the woods — combined with its 
evasive maneuvering and likely violation of Pennsylvania law on tinted windows, 
allowed the police to temporarily detain the Chrysler and its occupants.  That stop was 
also not unreasonably delayed, given the time required to procure a drug-sniffing dog in 
the area.2  See United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 272 (3d Cir. 2020).  And as the 
District Court noted, the dog positively alerted to the presence of drugs, the handler 
testified to the dog’s certification and experience, and Brown offers nothing to rebut the 
credibility of those alerts.  See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013).  Brown’s 
challenge to the stop and search of the Chrysler is therefore unavailing.3   
B.  
  We likewise agree with the District Court that the circumstances here support the 
officers’ reasonable suspicion that Brown was engaged in criminal activity.  First, the 
remote lot where Brown was driven to was well known for criminal activity, with one 
officer testifying that it was “an area involved in high crime” and “a haven for illegal 
 
2 We do not decide whether unreasonable delays to investigatory stops under Rodriguez 
v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), apply to non-traffic stops as here.  
 
3 Brown’s argument that he has standing to challenge the search is unpersuasive.  
Brown fled from the vehicle, effectively abandoning any privacy interest he had in the 
items searched therein.  See United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 127, 132 (3d Cir. 
2014) (holding that a former passenger of a car — who did not own the car and 
voluntarily left the car — did not have standing to challenge the search of the car).   
7 
activity, especially, regarding drugs and stolen property.”  App. 171, 176.  Second, the 
officers were already at the scene to investigate stolen property.  Third, the officers had 
already arrested another individual who had an active warrant out for his arrest.  Fourth, 
Brown, unprovoked, ran into a wooded area despite the cool temperatures and rainfall so 
heavy that the vehicle became stuck in the mud.   
Unlike Brown suggests, these circumstances are not akin to United States v. 
Navedo, 694 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2012).  That case involved testimony that the officers did 
not “observe[] any conduct that would have suggested that Navedo was doing anything 
illegal,” but rather observed Navedo standing on his apartment building’s porch and 
running up the stairs into his apartment building where he was tackled.  Id. at 465–66.  
By contrast, Brown drove a long distance to a remote location; the officers were already 
on the scene investigating illegal activity at that address; the officers had already arrested 
on individual on the scene; and Brown, unprovoked and without the police announcing 
themselves, ran into a heavily wooded area during what he describes as “pouring rain.”  
Brown Br. 10.  In light of the totality of the circumstances, the police had reasonable 
suspicion to detain Brown to continue their investigation. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  


USA v. Tylee Brown

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-18-2025 
Stephanie Ricketts v. Titusville Area School District 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Stephanie Ricketts v. Titusville Area School District" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 672. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/672 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 24-2569 
_______________ 
 
STEPHANIE RICKETTS, as parent of L.G., a minor, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TITUSVILLE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT; ROCHELLE CRESSMAN 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1:21-cv-00129) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
_______________ 
 
Submitted April 28, 2025 
 
 
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 18, 2025) 
__________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
One way in which courts protect the right of public access to judicial proceedings is 
by requiring, as a general rule, that cases proceed using the real names of the parties.  In 
 
2 
 
cases involving minor children, however, a child’s privacy interests outweigh the public’s 
interest in knowing their real name.  For this reason, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and our Local Rules mandate that the names of 
all minor children be redacted or replaced by initials in all documents filed with the court, 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(5); Third Circuit L.A.R. 113.12(a)(2), and 
failure to comply with such rules may be grounds for sanctions.  Fed. R. App. P. 46(c).  
Litigation, however, can be a lengthy ordeal, so it is not uncommon for a minor 
child to reach adulthood before a case has fully resolved.  That occurred here when L.G.—
a minor victim of sexual abuse—turned eighteen in between the filing of the complaint and 
the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  Counsel, uncertain as to their 
obligations in this scenario, included L.G.’s unredacted name in certain filings before the 
District Court and before us on appeal.  Because we had not spoken clearly on this issue 
before, we will not impose sanctions, though we will take this opportunity to clarify the 
relevant rules. 
I. 
 In 2021, Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Ricketts brought claims on behalf of her 
child, L.G., arising out of sexual abuse he suffered at the hands of a teacher while he was 
a minor.  Pursuant to the applicable rules, Ms. Ricketts’ counsel used the initials “L.G.” in 
the complaint and both sides’ counsel understood their duty to redact or initialize L.G.’s 
name and those of any other minor children in all documents filed with the Court.  But by 
the time the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, 
the Titusville Area School District, L.G. had turned eighteen.   That meant that L.G. was 
 
3 
 
no longer a minor when Ms. Ricketts appealed the District Court’s decision and the parties 
filed merits briefs and appendices in the matter now before us.   
Upon review of those materials, we discovered that the appendices included L.G.’s 
unredacted name, as well as the unredacted names of other individuals who were minors 
at the time of the events described.  We therefore sua sponte placed these unredacted 
appendices under seal and ordered the parties to submit new redacted versions and to show 
cause why sanctions were not warranted.  Both parties responded by apologizing for their 
error, with the School District further explaining that it had understood the Federal Rules 
and our rules to require redaction only of the names of persons who were minor children 
at the time of filing. 
II. 
We begin with counsel’s obligations before the District Court.  Because L.G. was a 
minor at the time the complaint was filed, Rule 5.2 required counsel to redact his name in 
all court filings.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3).  When L.G. turned 18 during the course of 
litigation, however, that rule no longer applied on a prospective basis.  At that point, 
counsel could have moved to continue to allow L.G. to proceed anonymously by 
demonstrating that doing so would be necessary to prevent serious harm.  See In re Avandia 
Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662, 672 (3d Cir. 2019).  Depending on 
the nature and circumstances of the case, minors who reach adulthood during the course of 
litigation may be able to justify such treatment as a result of their continuing interests in 
avoiding the embarrassment, stigma, and potential for retaliation that can attend public 
disclosure.  See, e.g., Katie M. and A.M. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 2025 WL 934458, at *1-2 
 
4 
 
(D. Utah, Mar. 27, 2025); M.V. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 2025 WL 463308, at *2 (D. 
Utah, Feb. 11, 2025); N.E. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 2023 WL 2696834, at *15 
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2023); Doe v. USD No. 237, 2017 WL 3839416, *11 (D. Kan. Sept. 1, 
2017).  Those criteria would seem to weigh heavily on the side of redaction in the case of 
a minor victim of sexual assault, but no such motion was filed, so counsel was not required 
by Rule 5.2 or by order to anonymize submissions after L.G. turned 18. 
Before L.G. turned 18, however, his counsel filed at least three documents that did 
not redact his name, including one document that was also filed with the appendix on 
appeal.  These filings clearly violated Rule 5.2, but because they originated in the District 
Court we have no occasion to impose sanctions for these failures to redact.1 
Turning to counsel’s obligations on appeal, we identified several unredacted 
documents filed publicly as part of the parties’ supplemental appendix on appeal.  These 
documents had originally been filed under seal in the District Court, meaning there was no 
Rule 5.2 violation with respect to them.  But the District Court never ordered those 
documents unsealed, and under our rules, any “records sealed in the district court and not 
unsealed by order of [this] court must not be included in the paper appendix.”  See Third 
Cir. L.A.R. 30.3(b).  Thus, it appears the parties violated our Local Rules by filing 
previously sealed information on the public docket.  Nonetheless, because both parties have 
 
1 We note that the unredacted documents on the District Court’s docket have since been 
sealed. 
 
5 
 
expressed sincere regret and explained their good-faith efforts to comply with the rules, we 
do not believe that violation warrants sanctions.   
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will not impose sanctions on either party. 


Stephanie Ricketts v. Titusville Area School District

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

USA v. Raphael Ross

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-20-2025 
USA v. David Somerville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. David Somerville" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 685. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/685 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-1571 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID ANTHONY SOMERVILLE, 
also known as Charles Payne 
also known as Midnite, 
                                  Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00222-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 8, 2025 
_____________ 
 
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 20, 2025) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
 
 
 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 David Somerville appeals his sentence for a pair of controlled substance offenses. 
Our review of the record reveals no nonfrivolous issues for appeal, so we will grant 
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm.1 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 
(1967).2 
First, the District Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Somerville for his “offenses 
against the laws of the United States” was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Also proper 
was the District Court’s decision to deny Somerville’s motion to withdraw his plea 
agreement because Somerville did not meet his “substantial” burden to identify a “fair 
and just” reason to withdraw the plea. See United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2003). 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review in determining whether 
there are any nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 679 F.3d 109, 114 
(3d Cir. 2012). We only consider arguments that Somerville could have raised concerning 
his controlled substance offenses because he did not appeal his separate 180-day prison 
sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. But because Somerville’s 
notice of appeal references “appeals,” we note that any appeal of his 180-day sentence 
would have been moot. See United States v. Huff, 703 F.3d 609, 611–12 (3d Cir. 2013). 
2 We reach this conclusion based on our independent review of the record, as 
assisted by the United States’ commendably thorough brief. Unfortunately, Somerville’s 
counsel has not satisfied us that he “thoroughly examined the record in search of 
appealable issues.” United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564, 569 (3d Cir. 2022). But that 
does not alter our conclusion about the nature of Somerville’s appeal because “‘in those 
cases in which frivolousness is patent,’ we will not appoint new counsel even if 
an Anders brief is insufficient to discharge current counsel’s obligations to his or her 
client and this court.” United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
3 
 Additionally, the District Court properly rejected Somerville’s request for a 
two-level reduction available in cases where “the defendant clearly demonstrates 
acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Somerville only 
changed his plea after the United States presented its case in chief and the strength of its 
evidence was readily apparent. Moreover, he tested positive for marijuana (at least three 
separate times) and cocaine while on bond, and “[c]ourts have routinely upheld the denial 
of a § 3E1.1(a) adjustment for similar or less culpable post-plea conduct.” United States 
v. Mercado, 81 F.4th 352, 361 (3d Cir. 2023). 
 Finally, the District Court correctly calculated Somerville’s advisory guidelines 
range; considered his argument for a variance; and evaluated the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
factors, making the sentence procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Merced, 603 
F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010). And the sentence is also substantively reasonable, as it 
cannot be said that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
*  *  * 
Seeing no nonfrivolous arguments that Somerville could have made, we will grant 
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm. 


USA v. David Somerville

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-22-2025 
William Webb, Jr. v. Ruth Minner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"William Webb, Jr. v. Ruth Minner" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 690. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/690 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
CLD-180        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1958 
___________ 
 
WILLIAM JOSEPH WEBB, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GOVERNOR RUTH ANN MINNER; DIRECTOR JAIME H. RIVERA, D.H.S.S.; 
CHIEF MARVIN NETWON, City Plumbing Inspector; WARDEN RAFAEL 
WILLIAMS; COMM. STANLEY W. TAYLOR; SUPERVISOR PAUL PACECO; 
JANE DOE(S); JOHN DOE(S); CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES;  
SHERESE CARR, Warden 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:06-cv-00734) 
District Judge:  Honorable Colm F. Connolly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 10, 2025 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA , Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
William Webb, Jr., appeals pro se from a District Court order denying his motion 
to reinstate his case.  We will summarily affirm because the appeal presents no 
substantial question.   
Webb filed his original complaint in December 2006, and his operative amended 
complaint in May 2007.  In October 2007, the District Court dismissed five defendants 
from the case with prejudice, while allowing the case to proceed against the remaining 
defendants.  In April 2010, the District Court dismissed all but one defendant from the 
case without prejudice for failure to prosecute.  The District Court then dismissed Webb’s 
entire complaint for failure to prosecute and closed the case in May 2010.     
In January 2025—almost 15 years after the action had been dismissed—Webb 
filed a motion to reinstate his case in the District Court.  Webb alleged that he had newly 
discovered evidence that proved he had been injured by lead contaminated water while a 
state prisoner in 1998, although he did not provide such evidence.  The District Court, 
construing Webb’s motion alternatively as a motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b), a motion for reconsideration, alteration, or amendment under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and a motion for reargument pursuant to Delaware District 
Court Rule 7.1.5, denied the motion on April 29, 2025.  Webb timely appealed.     
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the denial of 
motions made under Rule 59(e) and 60(b) and motions for reargument for abuse of 
3 
 
discretion.  See Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 
673 (3d Cir. 1999); Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008); Jilin 
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 199 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006).  We may summarily 
affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4. 
 We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s order.  Motions for relief 
from judgment under Rule 60(b) “must be made within a reasonable time.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 60(c)(1).  Webb’s motion was not.  As the District Court noted, Webb’s motion to 
reinstate his case came almost fifteen years after the dismissal and presented no facts or 
legal arguments justifying the delay.  See Moolenaar v. Gov’t of V.I., 822 F.2d 1342, 
1348 (3d Cir. 1987).  Moreover, the few facts and allegations Webb did assert failed to 
satisfy any of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b).  See id. at 1345-46.   
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion when it declined to reconsider or 
alter or amend its judgment in response to Webb’s motion.  Such a motion must be filed 
within 28 days of the underlying order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and, in any event, 
reconsideration is only available in limited circumstances, see Quinteros, 176 F.3d at 677.  
As the District Court noted, Webb’s motion failed to present any grounds that warranted 
reconsideration, alteration, or amendment of the District Court’s 2010 dismissal order.  
See id.; Lazaridis v. Whemer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).   
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying reargument on 
the case in response to Webb’s motion.  A grant of reargument under District of 
4 
 
Delaware Local Rule 7.1.5 is also only available in limited circumstances, see Brambles 
USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp. 1239, 1241 (D. Del. Apr. 23, 1990), and as the District 
Court noted, Webb failed to establish any of those circumstances existed in regard to the 
2010 order of dismissal, see id.   
 Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Webb’s 
motion, and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
 


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Diptiben Patel v. Attorney General United States of America

Rashar Williams v. Attorney General United States of America

Roger Real v. Attorney General United States of America

San Diego County Employees Retirement Association v. Johnson & Johnson

USA v. Tylee Brown

Stephanie Ricketts v. Titusville Area School District

USA v. Raphael Ross

USA v. David Somerville

William Webb, Jr. v. Ruth Minner

Bette Eakin v. Adams County Board of Elections

40,620

41,076