Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-15-2025 
Jemma Hussey v. Pennington School 
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Recommended Citation 
"Jemma Hussey v. Pennington School" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 406. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 24-1862 
______________ 
 
JEMMA BREANNA HUSSEY; 
JEANNA ELIZABETH HUSSEY, 
      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
THE PENNINGTON SCHOOL; HEADMASTER WILLIAM S. HAWKEY; 
DEAN OF STUDENTS CHAD A. BRIDGES; BOARD CHAIRMAN PETER TUCCI; 
ASSISTANT DEAN CAROLINE HALL; DEAN OF ACADEMIC AFF SCOTT 
PEELER; DIRECTOR OF CERVONE JO PROCKOP; 
JOHN TOURANGEAU; PARENT OF MINOR MARTHA TOURANGEAU 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3:20-cv-14673) 
U.S. District Judge: Honorable Zahid N. Quraishi 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 13, 2025 
______________                                                              
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  May 15, 2025) 
 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
2 
 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Jemma and Jeanna Hussey appeal the District Court’s order denying them relief 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) from the order dismissing their complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).  Because the Husseys are time-barred from 
seeking Rule 60 relief, we will affirm.  
I 
The Husseys allege that on October 20, 2018, one of Jemma’s Pennington School 
classmates pushed her, causing her to fall and hit her head, and assaulted her again eight 
days later.  On October 21, 2020, Jemma and her mother, Jeanna, filed a complaint 
alleging that (1) Jemma’s classmate1 assaulted her twice; (2) the Pennington School and 
several of its administrators failed to (a) accommodate Jemma’s disabilities caused by the 
incident in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 et seq.; 
and (b) respond to the bullying she experienced in violation of the New Jersey Anti-
Bullying Bill of Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:37-15 et seq.; and (3) all defendants 
inflicted emotional distress upon Jeanna under New Jersey common law, see Portee v. 
Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526-28 (N.J. 1980).   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 The Husseys allege that the classmate’s parents are vicariously liable for their 
then-minor child’s actions.  
3 
 
Because the Husseys never filed proof of service of their complaint, the Clerk of 
the District Court issued a notice of call for dismissal under Rule 4(m) for failing to prove 
service.  The Husseys did not respond, and on February 23, 2021, the District Court 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice.    
More than two years later, the Husseys moved to “reinstate [the] complaint under 
Rule 4(m),” JA33, which the District Court construed as a motion for relief from the 
dismissal order under Rule 60(b).  The Court denied the motion, reasoning that the 
Husseys’ failure to comply with applicable deadlines was not due to “excusable neglect,” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), because (1) the Husseys did not promptly seek relief; (2) 
litigating their claims after such a long delay would prejudice the defendants; (3) 
although the Husseys’ counsel faced personal and health challenges, he communicated 
with Defendants in January 2021, demonstrating his ability to litigate the case during the 
time he claimed to have suffered setbacks; and (4) counsel’s proffered excuses, including 
that he learned of the case’s dismissal in September 2021, but took no action until May 
2023, while litigating another case in the interim—belied his claim of acting in good 
faith, JA3-5 (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 394 
(1993)).  The Court further explained that the Husseys were time-barred under Rule 
60(c)(1) from seeking Rule 60(b)(1) relief because they filed their motion more than one 
year after the dismissal of the complaint and they had not demonstrated “extraordinary 
circumstances” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  JA5 (citing inter alia Liljeberg v. 
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 n.11 (1988)). 
4 
 
The Husseys appeal.   
II2  
The District Court properly analyzed the Husseys’ motion under Rule 60(b) rather 
than Rule 4(m).  Rule 60(b) allows parties to seek relief from final orders under certain 
circumstances.  Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533 (2022).  Although the 
Husseys’ complaint was dismissed without prejudice, the dismissal order became final 
upon the running of their claims’ statutes of limitations.3  Green v. Humphrey Elevator & 
Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 878 n.4 (3d Cir. 1987).  Accordingly, the District Court 
correctly analyzed the Husseys’ motion as seeking relief from a final order under Rule 
60(b) rather than Rule 4(m).  See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(construing a motion to “reopen” a case dismissed for failure to effect service as a motion 
under Rule 60(b)). 
Under Rule 60(b), courts may relieve a party from a final order based on one of 
six grounds.  Because the Husseys sought to demonstrate through their motion a 
“justifiable excuse” for their failure to effect service, JA79, the District Court properly 
 
 2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Lasky v. Cont’l Prods. Corp., 
804 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1986).  We review the District Court’s order for abuse of 
discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (Rule 
60(b) motions). 
3 The Husseys concede that the statutes of limitations had run before the motion 
was filed.   
5 
 
construed their motion as one seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1),4 which permits courts to 
grant relief in the event of a party’s “excusable neglect.”5  However, because a Rule 
60(b)(1) motion must be filed “no more than a year after the entry of the [relevant final] 
order,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), and the Husseys did not seek relief until well-past the 
one-year deadline, the District Court properly denied the Husseys’ request for relief as 
time-barred.  See Bainbridge v. Governor of Fla., 75 F.4th 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 2023) 
(affirming denial of Rule 60(b)(1) relief sought years after final order as untimely).  
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
 
4 The Husseys do not argue for, and the record does not support, relief based on 
the grounds identified in Rule 60(b)(2) through (5).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) (newly 
discovered evidence), (b)(3) (fraud), (b)(4) (void judgment), (b)(5) (satisfied, vacated, or 
no-longer-equitable judgment).  As to Rule 60(b)(6)’s catch-all provision, “a party may 
not avail himself of the broad ‘any other reason’ clause of 60(b) if his motion is based on 
grounds specified in clause (1)—[including] excusable neglect.”  Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 
863 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the Husseys’ arguments for relief 
rested entirely on explanations for their failure to timely address service of the complaint, 
the District Court properly interpreted the Husseys’ motion under Rule 60(b)(1) and the 
Husseys therefore cannot avail themselves to the catch-all provision in Rule 60(b)(6).   
5 “[F]or purposes of Rule 60(b), ‘excusable neglect’ is understood to encompass 
situations in which the failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to 
negligence.”  Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 394. 


English

Jemma Hussey v. Pennington School

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-20-2025 
Robert Cason v. Middlesex County Prosecutors Office 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Robert Cason v. Middlesex County Prosecutors Office" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 421. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/421 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1969 
__________ 
 
ROBERT G. CASON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE; OLD BRIDGE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT; OFFICER G. BRACHT; ANTONIO J. TOTO; PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
OFFICE NEWARK NJ; SAYREVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT; C. TEATOR 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-05503) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert Kirsch 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 9, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 20, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 Robert G. Cason appeals pro se from the District Court order which dismissed his 
amended complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
I 
In September 2022, Cason filed a short complaint against the Middlesex County 
Prosecutors’ Office (MCPO) and other state and private Defendants alleging that they 
had committed fraud and perjury in a court proceeding. After the District Court dismissed 
the complaint without prejudice for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8, Cason filed an amended complaint, adding a few Defendants. Cason’s 
amended complaint is centered upon two documents that the MCPO filed in a civil rights 
action Cason pursued in D.N.J. Civ. No. 18-cv-2101.1 The first document was MCPO’s 
June 15, 2021 affidavit and certificate of service at the end of its motion to dismiss, 
which, according to Cason, falsely asserted that MCPO had served Cason and falsified 
Cason’s signature. The second document was a July 20, 2021 letter from the MCPO 
asking the District Court relist its motion to dismiss the complaint because Cason had not 
been properly served. According to Cason, the inconsistency between these two 
documents is proof of fraud and forgery. He seeks damages based on Defendants alleged 
violation of (1) 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making false statements); (2) 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail 
 
1 This Court affirmed the dismissal of Cason’s amended complaint in D.N.J. Civ. No. 18-
cv-2101. See Cason v. Middlesex Cty. Prosecutors Office, C.A. No. 23-1545, 2024 WL 
4455675 (3d Cir. Oct. 10, 2024) (per curiam) (not precedential).                            
 
3 
 
fraud); (3) 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (perjury); and (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (making false 
declarations). He sought monetary damages as relief.  
 The District Court sua sponte dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court explained that, inter alia, the federal criminal 
statutes relied upon by Cason did not provide him with a private right of action, and, in 
any event, that the two documents relied upon by Cason did not show any wrongdoing.  
 Cason appealed. He also filed in our Court a motion requesting relief from 
“Circuit Court Judgments and Orders Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).”  
II 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Cason’s amended 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d 
Cir. 2020).  
III 
 The District Court correctly dismissed Cason’s amended complaint. The criminal 
statutes on which he relies do not create a private right of action. See Bauer v. Elrich, 8 
F.4th 291, 295 (4th Cir. 2021) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1621); Lee v. 
United Stages Agency for Int’l Dev., 859 F.3d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (no private right of 
action under 18 U.S.C. § 1001); Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1623); Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, 167 
 
4 
 
F.3d 402, 407-08 (8th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases and finding no private right of action 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341). To the extent Cason complains that the District Court was 
biased, nothing in the record supports that assertion.     
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2  
 
2 We have considered all of the arguments Cason made on appeal in Dkt. # 10, 11, 15, 
and 18 and they do not warrant further discussion. Cason’s Rule 60(b) motion is denied.    


Robert Cason v. Middlesex County Prosecutors Office

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-20-2025 
USA v. Steven Wilson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Steven Wilson" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 423. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/423 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
 
No. 24-1507 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN WILSON, 
                           Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 3:22-cr-00250-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on April 17, 2025 
 
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 20, 2025) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
 
2 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
Steven Wilson was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment on federal drug-related 
charges in March 2024.  He appeals his sentence, contending the court improperly 
considered dismissed state charges against him at his sentencing.  We disagree and will 
affirm. 
Wilson pled guilty to drug-related charges in August 2023.  Before his sentencing, 
state law enforcement officers found him with a stolen, fraudulently registered truck.  The 
state charged Wilson in connection with that encounter.  His presentence report in this case 
included these charges.  At sentencing, the court stated in relevant part, 
Your convictions, [Assistant U.S. Attorney] Ms. Roberts has detailed with 
considerable effect here. I won’t repeat them again. Your own lawyer in his 
presentencing memorandum on your behalf where he did advocate for you, 
but he acknowledges a significant criminal history and you do. I can’t sit here 
and say anything different. I won’t repeat all of the offenses for which you 
were convicted and for which you spent time in incarceration, but they begin 
in 2007, and Ms. Roberts, as I said, detailed all of them, and they continued 
right up to the present time, and what’s notable about these -- again, for some 
reason today, Ms. Roberts is two steps ahead of me -- what she pointed out 
is true, every time you were incarcerated, you were paroled and you violated 
parole. I can go through these convictions item by item by item here, 
conviction by conviction, but it seems to be unnecessary because Ms. Roberts 
pointed out already to significant effect. 
App. 86.  Wilson was ultimately sentenced to 180 months in prison and six years of 
supervised release, below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range of 188 to 235 
months.  After his sentencing, the state dismissed its pending charges. 
 
 
 
3 
 
We ordinarily review the imposition of a sentence for abuse of discretion.1  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  Here, our review is for plain error because Wilson 
failed to object at his sentencing, which he does not contest in his reply brief.  United States 
v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014).  Under plain error review, we reverse 
when (1) “there [is] an error or defect” that has not been “affirmatively waived;” (2) “the 
legal error [is] clear or obvious,” not “subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) “the error . . . 
affected the appellant’s substantial rights,” i.e., “affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings”; and (4) the error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Wilson contends the court’s statement shows it “considered a pending state charge 
as a conviction at the time of [his] sentencing.”  Appellant’s Br. 7.  A court may not impose 
a sentence based on a “bare arrest record—without more.”  United States v. Berry, 553 
F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2009).  A mere arrest “does not justify an assumption that a 
defendant has committed other crimes and . . . therefore [does] not support increasing 
his/her sentence in the absence of adequate proof of criminal activity.”  Id.  The same logic, 
Wilson argues, bars the consideration at sentencing of charges that are later dropped.  
But we cannot say the court committed a “clear or obvious” error here because the 
sentencing colloquy does not unambiguously show the court considered those dismissed 
 
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
 
 
 
4 
 
state charges.  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.  Wilson points to the following portion of the 
statement: “I won’t repeat all of the offenses for which you were convicted and for which 
you spent time in incarceration, but they begin in 2007 . . . and they continued right up to 
the present time.”  App. 86.  He contends this “shows that the district court included [his] 
pending state prosecution as a conviction because the district court mentions that [his] 
convictions ‘continued right up to the present time,’” and the temporally closest criminal 
proceeding against Wilson other than this case was the pending state prosecution.  
Appellant’s Br. 11.  But the most natural reading of the court’s statement is that it excludes 
his pending state prosecution from consideration, since it is limited to “offenses for which 
[Wilson] w[as] convicted and for which [he] spent time in incarceration.”  Appellant’s Br. 
11 (emphasis added).  And Wilson was neither convicted nor incarcerated on those charges.  
By “present time,” the court most likely referred, perhaps imprecisely, to the instant offense 
for which Wilson was convicted and being sentenced.  Appellant’s Br. 11. 
Even if the statement is at best unclear as to whether the court considered the 
dropped charges, that is enough to survive plain error review because the error is “subject 
to reasonable dispute,” i.e., not “clear or obvious.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; see United 
States v. Holman, 840 F.3d 347, 355 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Moreover, any ambiguity with 
respect to the district court’s statements [at sentencing] is debatable at most and thus does 
not rise to . . . plain error.” (citations omitted)).  Accordingly, we need not reach the 
government’s argument that the state charges against Wilson were a proper basis for the 
court’s sentence. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  


USA v. Steven Wilson

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-28-2025 
USA v. Abdul Outlaw 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Abdul Outlaw" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 433. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/433 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-2114 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
ABDUL OUTLAW 
_____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.: 2:21-cr-00382-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
_____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2025 
 
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and 
RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 28, 2025) 
 
 
Sabrina G. Comizzoli 
Mark E. Coyne 
2 
 
Alina Habba 
Office of United States Attorney 
970 Broad Street 
Room 700 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Michael J. Pappa 
Rudnick Addonizio Pappa & Comer 
25 Village Court 
Park Village 
Hazlet, NJ 07730 
Counsel for Appellee 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Though they are often discussed in tandem, probable 
cause to search is not the same as probable cause to arrest. The 
facts in this case could have plausibly supported a search of 
Appellee Abdul Outlaw’s vehicle. But they did not support his 
arrest, and therefore did not support a search incident to his 
arrest. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order 
suppressing the fruits of the officer’s unlawful search.  
I. 
On the evening of December 31, 2020, four plainclothes 
police officers in unmarked cars patrolled a high-crime area in 
Newark. One of the officers, Detective Marc Castro, testified 
that on this patrol, he spotted a parked, running Audi that had 
its sunroof open and “heavy aftermarket tints.” App. 60. As 
3 
 
Castro’s vehicle approached the Audi, he testified that he 
smelled burning marijuana,1 and decided to conduct a vehicle 
stop. At the time, it was a crime in New Jersey to operate a 
vehicle while in possession of marijuana. 
Castro then stepped out of his vehicle, illuminated the 
Audi’s windshield with his flashlight, and saw that there were 
two occupants in the vehicle. One of those occupants—the 
driver—was Appellee Abdul Outlaw. When he shined his 
flashlight into the windshield, Castro did not see Outlaw or the 
passenger smoking marijuana, exhibiting signs of being under 
the influence of marijuana, discarding anything, or making 
furtive movements. Castro approached the driver’s side of the 
Audi, Outlaw rolled down his window, and Castro saw smoke 
emanating from the window and noticed that “the smell of 
burning marijuana became more pungent.” Id. at 64. Upon 
request, Outlaw provided his license, registration, and 
insurance documents without making sudden or furtive 
movements, and while keeping his hands in plain view. 
Castro then asked Outlaw to step out of the vehicle, 
“[d]ue to the belief there’s criminal activity afoot in the vehicle 
due to the smell of burning marijuana, along with physically 
seeing the smoke emanating from the vehicle.” Id. at 65. He 
did not, however, see Outlaw or the passenger smoking 
 
1 Though it was a cold day, Castro kept his window rolled 
down “to be aware of sounds, odors, [and] smells.” App. 59. 
He testified that he knew the smell was burning marijuana from 
his training and experience as a detective in the Newark Police 
Department’s criminal intelligence unit, which included 
“hundreds” of encounters with marijuana or other controlled 
substances. Id. at 62. He also testified that there were no 
pedestrians in the Audi’s vicinity. 
4 
 
marijuana, ask them if they had been smoking marijuana, smell 
marijuana on their breath or clothing, or observe that they 
appeared to be under the influence of marijuana. Castro 
decided to pat down Outlaw “[d]ue to the burning marijuana 
inside the vehicle” and his “belie[f] there may be more 
contraband or weapons, and due to officers’ safety.” Id. at 66. 
Castro found a firearm with a scratched-off serial number and 
a prescription bottle with 3.6 grams of raw marijuana on 
Outlaw’s person, and (after the pat-down) placed him under 
arrest. Castro testified that the raw marijuana he uncovered was 
not the burning marijuana he smelled. 
Officers also searched the passenger. They did not find 
anything illicit and did not arrest her. They also did not find 
any weapons or drugs in the car, nor did they find marijuana 
residue or paraphernalia that could confirm Castro’s testimony 
that he smelled burning marijuana. 
The officers issued two motor vehicle summonses to 
Outlaw for his illegally tinted windows and possession of 
marijuana (the raw marijuana in the bottle) in a motor vehicle 
in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 39:3-75, 4-49.1. Outlaw was 
also charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and 
unlawful possession of marijuana in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 2C:39-7B(1), 39-5B, 39-3D, 35-10A(4). Later, after the 
Government adopted the case for federal prosecution, a grand 
jury charged Outlaw in a one-count indictment with unlawful 
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
Outlaw moved to suppress the evidence obtained from Castro’s 
search (i.e., the firearm and prescription bottle with marijuana), 
and, after an evidentiary hearing and supplemental briefing, the 
District Court granted Outlaw’s motion. The court reasoned 
that, while the vehicle stop was lawful given the tinted 
windows and burning marijuana smell, Castro did not have 
5 
 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search Outlaw’s 
person. This appeal followed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. This Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, as 
the United States Attorney has certified that it complies with 
§ 3731’s requirements. 
We review “the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings 
and exercise[] plenary review of the District Court’s 
application of the law to those facts.” United States v. 
Alexander, 54 F.4th 162, 170 n.10 (3d Cir. 2022) (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 
(3d Cir. 2002)).  
III. 
The sole issue before us is whether Detective Castro had 
probable cause to arrest Outlaw. If there was probable cause to 
arrest Outlaw, it was permissible to search his person. See 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (“When 
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that 
the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his 
escape.”). The fact that Castro searched Outlaw before the 
formal arrest is of no moment—if there was probable cause to 
arrest Outlaw prior to the pat-down, there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 
111 (1980); United States v. Paige, 870 F.3d 693, 700–01 (7th 
Cir. 2017) (no Fourth Amendment violation where officer 
conducted pat-down shortly before arresting defendant, where 
6 
 
officer smelled marijuana on defendant prior to search); United 
States v. Wright, 844 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 2016) (same).2 
The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to arrest a 
suspect without a warrant where there are “facts and 
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are 
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable 
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the 
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an 
offense,” that is, where the arrest is supported by probable 
cause. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). 
Probable cause is determined “with reference to the facts and 
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge at the time of the 
investigative stop or arrest.” United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 
187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007). “[W]e do not evaluate probable cause 
in hindsight, based on what a search does or does not turn up.” 
Fla. v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 249 (2013). So here, we cannot 
consider the fact that the officers did not uncover any 
marijuana paraphernalia, residue, or other evidence of 
marijuana use in Outlaw’s car. We can only consider the facts 
within Castro’s knowledge when he decided to search 
Outlaw’s person.  
The Government urges that the marijuana odor and 
smoke emanating from the driver’s side window created 
probable cause to arrest Outlaw. In support of this argument, 
the Government points to United States v. Ramos, where we 
said that “the smell of marijuana alone, if articulable and 
 
2 As Outlaw rightly points out, the fruits of the search 
themselves (the firearm and marijuana) cannot provide 
probable cause for the arrest. See Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 
543 (1990). But the Government does not advance that dead-
end argument here. 
7 
 
particularized, may establish not merely reasonable suspicion, 
but probable cause.” 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006).  
The Government reads Ramos to say that marijuana 
odor alone creates probable cause to arrest. But that ignores the 
phrase “if articulable and particularized.” Id. We now clarify 
the import of that phrase and join our Sister Circuits in 
concluding that, while the smell of marijuana alone can create 
probable cause to search a vehicle,3 there must be facts that 
connect the smell to an individual passenger for there to be 
probable cause to arrest that passenger. See Paige, 870 F.3d at 
700; United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659–60 (4th 
Cir. 2004).4 In other words, for a search of a vehicle (or other 
 
3 United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 186 (3d Cir. 2018); 
United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Johnson, 707 F.3d 655, 658 (6th Cir. 2013); 
Long v. United States, 847 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Beard, 708 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Snyder, 793 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2015); 
United States v. Stancil, 4 F.4th 1193, 1199 (11th Cir. 2021); 
cf. United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296, 305 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (probable cause to search vehicle where officer “smelled 
the ‘faint’ scent of ‘fresh marijuana,’ and saw an abnormally 
large number of air fresheners throughout the car”). 
4 Of course, in both circumstances, the smell of marijuana can 
only establish probable cause when an officer has training and 
experience relevant to identifying such a smell. See Green, 897 
F.3d at 183, 186. Here, it is undisputed that Castro was “aware 
of the smell of marijuana” “[d]ue to [his] training and 
experience” in “hundreds” of “narcotics arrests[ and] 
investigations[.]” App. 62. 
8 
 
confined space), the odor must be particularized to that space, 
and for an arrest or search of a person, the odor must be 
particularized to that person. See Ramos, 443 F.3d at 308; cf. 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“Where the standard 
is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be 
supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that 
person.”). When the odor is particularized to a vehicle, and an 
individual is alone in that vehicle, this distinction is immaterial. 
But where, as here, there are multiple individuals within the 
vicinity of the smell, there is not probable cause of marijuana 
possession particularized to any one person absent additional 
facts.5 See Humphries, 372 F.3d at 659. 
 
5 To be clear, this scenario is distinct from that in Maryland v. 
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003). There, the officers found $763 
in cash and five plastic baggies containing cocaine in a vehicle 
and arrested all three of the vehicle’s occupants despite not 
knowing to whom the cash and drugs belonged. Id. at 368. The 
Court concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest 
the three men, as it was “reasonable . . . to infer a common 
enterprise” because “[t]he quantity of drugs and cash in the car 
indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to which 
a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with 
the potential to furnish evidence against him.” Id. at 373; see 
also United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, 871 (8th Cir. 
2005) (inferring common criminal enterprise among vehicle’s 
passengers based on odor and observation of “seeds, stems, and 
sandwich bags on the floor of the van, and a scale inside a 
grocery bag hooked to the passenger seat”); United States v. 
Myers, 986 F.3d 453, 454–55 (4th Cir. 2021) (inferring 
common criminal enterprise among vehicle’s passengers 
where officers found over 300 grams—a “distributable 
amount”—of fentanyl in a vacuum-sealed plastic bag in the 
9 
 
While it is a close question, we agree with the District 
Court that Castro’s testimony does not establish probable 
cause.6 Before he approached the car, Castro did not observe 
or detect any evidence of marijuana ingestion (other than the 
odor), nor did he see Outlaw or the passenger move furtively 
or attempt to discard any evidence. True, when he walked 
towards the car, Castro saw smoke come from the driver’s side 
window and noticed that the odor became more pungent. But 
who’s to say that it was necessarily Outlaw’s smoke, rather 
than that of the passenger? Moreover, after Outlaw got out of 
the car, Castro did not smell marijuana on his person, clothing, 
or breath, and did not see evidence indicating that Outlaw was 
 
vehicle and previous surveillance raised suspicion of drug 
dealing). Differently, here, smoke and marijuana odor alone do 
not evince a common criminal enterprise. While a drug dealer 
would be unlikely to expose an innocent person to evidence of 
their criminal activities, we cannot say the same of a casual 
marijuana user. 
6 We reject Outlaw’s argument that the District Court did not 
find Castro’s testimony credible. True, the District Court noted 
that Castro’s testimony was “somewhat contradictory” and 
“seemingly conflicting.” App. 24 & n.16. But it also stated that 
it “found no indicia, in Detective Castro’s body language, tone, 
or otherwise, that he was being anything but forthright and 
honest at the Hearing when providing his testimony;” and 
“therefore . . . f[ound] Detective Castro’s testimony credible.” 
Id. at 23 n.14. It then reiterated that it “found Detective Castro 
to be credible,” id. at 24 n.15. In light of these statements, we 
cannot read the District Court’s opinion as Outlaw does. In the 
absence of clear error, we too accept Castro’s testimony as 
credible.  
10 
 
under the influence of marijuana. If the smoke from the 
driver’s side window heightened Castro’s suspicion that 
Outlaw (not the passenger) was smoking marijuana, the lack of 
a smell on Outlaw’s person or other signs of recent ingestion 
should have dispelled such suspicions. 
In cases where courts have concluded that marijuana 
odor was sufficiently localized to the arrestee, the connection 
to the arrestee was not in doubt. And, in those cases, events 
leading up to the arrest increased or confirmed the officer’s 
individualized suspicion, whereas here, they undermined it. In 
Humphries, which we relied on in Ramos, 443 F.3d at 308, the 
officers smelled “a strong odor of marijuana” when they were 
about 20 feet from Humphries. 372 F.3d at 659. There was not 
probable cause to arrest Humphries at that point, however, as 
he “was not alone on the street, . . . so the odor could not 
initially be tied to [him] alone.” Id. But there was probable 
cause to arrest him once the officer followed him and, from 5 
to 10 feet away, smelled “the same strong odor of marijuana . 
. . coming off his person.” Id. Likewise, in United States v. 
Paige, there was probable cause to arrest Paige where the 
officer smelled marijuana coming from his person and no other 
people were around. 870 F.3d at 700–01. And in United States 
v. Perdoma, there was probable cause to arrest Perdoma where 
the officer smelled marijuana emanating from his person 
during a brief one-on-one conversation. 621 F.3d at 747–49. In 
each of those cases, the officer could reasonably discount the 
possibility that the odor came from someone other than the 
arrestee. This case would be analogous if Outlaw had been 
alone in his car. But he was not. There was a very real 
possibility that the passenger’s actions, not Outlaw’s, created 
the marijuana odor and smoke. We therefore conclude that 
probable cause was lacking, and the search violated Outlaw’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court was right to 
11 
 
suppress the fruits of Castro’s unlawful search. See United 
States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 730 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s 
order granting Outlaw’s motion to suppress. 


USA v. Abdul Outlaw

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-4-2025 
Roseanna Sias v. Secretary New Jersey Department of State 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Roseanna Sias v. Secretary New Jersey Department of State" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 450. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/450 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3125 
__________ 
 
ROSEANNA A. SIAS; EILEEN L. MCMENAMIN; BASILIA  
TSIKENTZOGLOU; PAUL TESTA; JOHN C. WONG, 
          Appellants 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF STATE, in her official capacity as 
Lt. Governor and Secretary of State the State of New Jersey; NEW JERSEY DIVISION 
OF ELECTIONS, Donna Barber, in her official capacity as Acting Director for the New 
Jersey Division of Elections 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-08747) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 27, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 4, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellants, Roseanna A. Sias, Eileen L. McMenamin, Basilia Tskikentzoglou, 
Paul Testa, and John C. Wong, were New Jersey presidential elector candidates who had 
pledged their votes to aspiring presidential candidate Shiva Ayyadurai.  On July 11, 2024, 
Ayyadurai filed a petition with the New Jersey Secretary of State nominating Appellants 
as electors for himself as an independent candidate on the November 5, 2024 general 
election ballot.  Following an objection to the petition, an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) found that Ayyadurai was ineligible to hold the office of the President because he 
is not a natural-born citizen of the United States.1  The New Jersey Secretary of State 
adopted the ALJ’s decision and rejected Ayyadurai’s petition.  Ayyadurai filed 
applications for emergent relief in the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, 
and the New Jersey Supreme Court, but both applications were denied.    
On August 26, 2024, Appellants filed a complaint in the District Court against the 
New Jersey Secretary of State and the New Jersey Division of Elections.  They sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that Appellees had violated their First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding them from the New Jersey ballot for the 
 
1 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen 
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to 
the Office of President. . . .”).  
 
 
3 
 
November 5, 2024 general election.  Along with their complaint, Appellants filed a 
motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Appellees from removing them 
from the ballot.  The District Court denied the motion.  Appellants appealed.   
 The appeal is moot.  “[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions that 
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.”  North Carolina v. Rice, 404 
U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam).  In their motion for a preliminary injunction, 
Appellants sought only to enjoin Appellees from removing them from the November 5, 
2024 general election ballot.  Because that election is now over, no live controversy 
remains.  While we recognize that there is an exception to the mootness doctrine for 
challenges to actions that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” see Spencer v. 
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998), the action Appellants challenge does not evade review; 
rather, Appellants’ underlying suit is ongoing in the District Court.  They may continue to 
litigate their legal challenges there.   
For these reasons, we will dismiss the appeal.   


Roseanna Sias v. Secretary New Jersey Department of State

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-6-2025 
Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of v. Anthonee 
Patterson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of v. Anthonee Patterson" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 467. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/467 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1306 
__________ 
 
THE TRUSTEES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CHURCH OF THE 
LORD JESUS CHRIST OF THE APOSTOLIC FAITH, INC.; CHURCH OF THE 
LORD JESUS CHRIST OF THE APOSTOLIC FAITH 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONEE PATTERSON; ROCHELLE BILAL, in her  
official capacity as Sheriff of Philadelphia County 
 
ANTHONEE PATTERSON, 
    Third Party Plaintiff 
v. 
 
LUTHER WEAVER Esq., individually, in his role as attorney; FOX ROTHSCHILD 
LLP; L.E. WEAVER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.; JOHN/JANE DOES 1-30; MICHAEL 
TWERSKY ESQ., individually and in his role as attorney for The Trustees of the General 
Assembly; STRADLEY RONON STEVEN & YOUNG; DANIELLE BANKS ESQ., 
individually and in her role as attorney for Kenneth Shelton, individually and as General 
Overseer and President of the board of Trustees, Stradley Ronon Steven & Young; 
ROBERT A. BURKE; ANTHONY LAMB, individually and in his role as Trustee of the 
Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith; JOHN CARLTON THOMAS, 
individually and in his role as Trustee of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the 
Apostolic Faith; JAMES BROWN, individually and in his role as Trustee of the Church 
of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith; LEON BLIGEN, individually and in his 
role as Trustee of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith; JOHNNY 
BROWN ESQ., individually, in his role as attorney, and in his role as Trustee of the 
Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith,  
     Third Party Defendants 
 
Anthonee Patterson, 
  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
     
 
2 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-00634) 
District Judge:  Honorable Karen S. Marston 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 10, 2025 
 
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 6, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
The Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith (the “Church”) is a 
religious society located in Philadelphia.  The Trustees of the General Assembly of the 
Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith (the “Corporation”) hold in trust 
and manage real and personal property for the Church’s use.  In 1991, a succession 
dispute arose within the Church between Kenneth Shelton (“Shelton”) and Roddy Nelson 
Shelton, both of whom claimed that they were the new General Overseer.  Some 
congregants followed Roddy Nelson and the appellant, Anthonée Patterson, to a new 
church located in Darby, Pennsylvania, while other congregants remained with Shelton in 
Philadelphia.   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
In 1995, Patterson attempted to take control of the Church by suing Shelton in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for violations of Pennsylvania’s 
Nonprofit Corporations Law (the “Patterson Action”).  Patterson and Shelton eventually 
agreed to resolve the dispute via arbitration.  In 2006, an arbitrator found that Shelton had 
diverted Church funds and ordered all Church property held by the Corporation to be 
transferred to Patterson’s control.  The parties continued to litigate issues surrounding the 
succession dispute for another decade.  Ultimately, in 2017, a state court held that the 
order confirming the arbitration award and the arbitration award itself represented the last 
valid judgments in the Patterson Action.  Patterson then obtained a writ of possession, 
and the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Office posted an eviction notice on the Church’s 
headquarters.   
In response, the Church and Corporation initiated this action in the District Court. 
They asserted that because they were not parties to the Patterson Action, execution of the 
writ of possession against them would violate their rights under the First, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as the Church would be forced to accept Patterson’s leadership 
and control.  They requested a preliminary injunction preventing Patterson from 
executing on the arbitration judgment, as well as a declaratory judgment that enforcement 
of the arbitration judgment against them would be unconstitutional.  
Following a hearing, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction precluding 
Patterson from attempting to take control of the Church or Corporation.  In issuing the 
injunction, the District Court concluded that (1) the Church and Corporation had 
4 
 
demonstrated a likelihood of succeeding on their claim that the arbitration award could 
not be enforced against them because they were not parties to the Patterson action; (2) the 
Church and Corporation would be irreparably injured by the denial of injunctive relief 
because Patterson intended to take control of the Church; (3) Patterson would not suffer 
greater harm than they would if an injunction were granted, as an injunction would 
merely preserve the status quo; and (4) an injunction would be in the public’s interest 
insofar as the public has an interest in ensuring that judgments are enforced only against 
those who are parties or privies to prior actions; the public has an interest in allowing 
individuals to have their day in court; and the public has an interest in ensuring that 
religious groups can choose who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out 
their mission.   
Patterson appealed, arguing that the District Court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that collateral estoppel barred the 
Church and Corporation from relitigating issues decided by the state courts.  We rejected 
both arguments and affirmed.  Trustees of Gen. Assembly of Church of Lord Jesus Christ 
of Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Patterson, No. 21-1662, 2021 WL 6101254, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec. 
21, 2021).   
Patterson then filed numerous motions in the District Court challenging the 
preliminary injunction, all of which were denied.  He also filed an answer asserting 
several counterclaims, including, as relevant here, a counterclaim requesting a 
declaratory judgment that the arbitration award was immediately enforceable against the 
5 
 
Church and Corporation.  When Patterson demanded a jury trial on that claim, the 
District Court denied the request because it was both untimely and sought only equitable 
relief. 
Meanwhile, the Church and Corporation moved the District Court to convert the 
preliminary injunction against Patterson into a permanent injunction.  The District Court, 
emphasizing that Patterson had not presented any new evidence since the preliminary-
injunction proceedings, gave preclusive effect to its findings in those proceedings and 
granted the motion.  The District Court also issued a declaratory judgment that 
enforcement of the arbitration award against the Church and Corporation was 
unconstitutional and denied Patterson’s counterclaim for declaratory judgment.  The 
District Court denied Patterson’s appeal.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s order granting the Appellees’ motion for a permanent injunction and its rulings 
on the parties’ opposing requests for declaratory judgment for an abuse of discretion.  See 
NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011); Kelly v. 
Maxum Specialty Ins. Grp., 868 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 2017).  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s application of issue preclusion.  Jean Alexander Cosms., 
Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2006).   
“In deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction, the district court must 
consider whether: (1) the moving party has shown actual success on the merits; (2) the 
moving party will be irreparably injured by the denial of injunctive relief; (3) the granting 
6 
 
of the permanent injunction will result in even greater harm to the defendant; and (4) the 
injunction would be in the public interest.”  Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 
(3d Cir. 2001).   
Findings made during a preliminary-injunction proceeding can have preclusive 
effect in litigation on the merits in the same proceeding “if the circumstances make it 
likely that the findings are ‘sufficiently firm’ to persuade the court that there is no 
compelling reason for permitting them to be litigated again.”  Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. 
Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 474 n.11 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Dyndul 
v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 409, 411–12 (3d Cir. 1980)).  “Whether the resolution in the first 
proceeding is sufficiently firm to merit preclusive effect turns on a variety of factors, 
including ‘whether the parties were fully heard, whether the court filed a reasoned 
opinion, and whether that decision could have been, or actually was appealed.’”  Id. 
(quoting In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991). 
We see no error here.  As the District Court explained, its findings in the first 
proceeding were sufficiently firm to merit preclusive effect.  The District Court held a 
three-day-long hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction and heard extensive 
testimony from multiple witnesses—including Patterson himself.  After the parties were 
heard, they submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The District Court then 
issued an exhaustive eighty-five-page opinion concluding that the arbitration award could 
not be enforced against the Church and Corporation because they were not parties to the 
Patterson Action nor in privity with Shelton.  And, finally, we saw no error in the District 
7 
 
Court’s findings on appeal.  In light of these considerations, the District Court was 
permitted to give the findings preclusive effect.  See Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 126 F.3d at 
474 n.11. 
With these findings, the District Court acted within its discretion in converting the 
preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction.  In doing so, the District Court 
emphasized that Patterson had not presented any new evidence that would call its 
previous findings into question.  The District Court then properly determined that the 
Church and Corporation had succeeded on the merits by showing that the arbitration 
award could not be enforced against them.  The District Court also reasonably determined 
that the balance of the equities favored them.  See Shields, 254 F.3d at 482.   
Patterson now argues, as he did in his prior appeal, that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction over this case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits a district 
court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction when a state-court loser essentially seeks 
federal-court review of the state-court judgment, see Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010).  We previously rejected this 
argument, explaining that since the Church and Corporation were not parties to the 
Patterson Action, they could not be considered losers in that action.  While Patterson 
contends that he presented new evidence in the District Court demonstrating that the 
Church and Corporation were, in fact, parties to the Patterson Action, he does not identify 
any evidence that sufficiently supports his position.  We have considered Patterson’s 
8 
 
remaining arguments on the Rooker-Feldman question and conclude that they are 
meritless.   
We also previously rejected Patterson’s contention that collateral estoppel bars the 
Church and Corporation from relitigating issues decided by the state courts.  Collateral 
estoppel prevents parties from litigating the same issue again when a “court of competent 
jurisdiction has already adjudicated the issue on its merits.”  Witkowski v. Welch, 
173 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 1999).  As we explained, that doctrine does not bar this suit 
because the Church and Corporation were neither parties to the Patterson Action nor in 
privity with Shelton.   
Patterson next contends that the District Court erred by entering the permanent 
injunction and denying his request for a declaratory judgment without affording him “the 
trial to which he was entitled.”  Br. 40, ECF No. 22.  As explained above, however, the 
District Court was permitted to give its rulings from the preceding hearing preclusive 
effect without holding a second hearing.  In any event, there is no right to trial by jury 
when a party seeks equitable relief in a declaratory judgment action.  See AstenJohnson, 
Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 562 F.3d 213, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2009).  
We have considered Patterson’s remaining challenges to the District Court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction in this case and conclude that they are meritless.  These 
arguments, like his others, fail because the Church and Corporation were not parties to 
the Patterson Action.  Patterson’s motion to certify questions to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court is denied. 


Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of v. Anthonee Patterson

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-9-2025 
USA v. Leevander Wade 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Leevander Wade" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 470. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/470 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 24-2461 
_______________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
LEEVANDER WADE, 
    Appellant  
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00703-002) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael E. Farbiarz 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on June 6, 2025 
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: June 9, 2025) 
_______________ 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
LeeVander Wade was charged with racketeering conspiracy for his role in helping the 
Bloods gang deal drugs and kill three people. He was also charged with a dozen related 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
2 
crimes, but those charges were dismissed by the Government when he pleaded guilty to 
racketeering conspiracy. Though his Guidelines sentencing range was life in prison, the 
plea agreement called for 33 to 38 years. The District Court sentenced him to about 36 and 
a half years. Wade appealed. Now, his lawyer has asked to withdraw because there are no 
non-frivolous issues for appeal. We agree and affirm. 
In ruling on an Anders motion, we ask two questions. First, we decide whether Wade’s 
attorney “thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues” and explained 
“why the issues are frivolous.” United States v. Brookins, 132 F.4th 659, 666 (3d Cir. 
2025). He has. His facially adequate brief reflects a thorough review of the record, identi-
fies several issues, and explains that they would be frivolous on appeal. See United States 
v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564, 569 (3d Cir. 2022). The government points out that the District 
Court erred because it “did not personally discuss the appellate waiver” with Wade, instead 
delegating that task to the prosecutor. United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 929 (3d Cir. 
2008) (discussing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N)). In a supplemental brief, Wade’s lawyer 
explains that this issue would be reviewed only for plain error and thus would fail on ap-
peal.  
Second, we ask whether there are any non-frivolous issues on our review of the record. 
Langley, 52 F.4th at 569. We agree with counsel that there are none. For one, the Rule 11 
mistake did not affect Wade’s substantial rights. See Corso, 549 F.3d at 929–30. In open 
court, at the District Court’s instruction, Wade discussed the waiver extensively with the 
prosecutor and confirmed that he understood the consequences of his plea. For another, we 
are sure that the plea hearing was fair. Id. at 931–32. Plus, Wade’s sentence fell within the 
3 
stipulated range and below the Guidelines range, and we perceive no sentencing errors. So 
he has no legitimate arguments to attack the plea, the appellate waiver, or his sentence. 
Even if the appellate waiver is invalid, his appeal would be frivolous.  
For these reasons, we will grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  


USA v. Leevander Wade

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-9-2025 
Lansana Mansaray v. Robert Wenner 
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"Lansana Mansaray v. Robert Wenner" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 472. 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1591 
__________ 
 
LANSANA MANSARAY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT WENNER; KEVIN DALY; OIL CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY OF 
OIL CITY, CITY COUNCIL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00081) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 6, 2025 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 9, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
 Pro se Appellant Lansana Mansaray appeals from the District Court’s grant of 
Appellees’ motion to dismiss his amended complaint for failure to state a claim based on 
res judicata. For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I 
 Mansaray filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania asserting that his civil rights were violated when local municipal police 
officers purportedly sent a biased police report to the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS). The report stated that Mansaray posed a danger to the 
community. Because of this report, Mansaray claimed, immigration authorities denied his 
I-360 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) petition, which led to his deportation. 
Mansaray named four Defendants in his amended federal complaint; they were: (1) 
Robert Wenner; (2) Kevin Daly; (3) the Oil City Police Department; and (4) the Oil City 
Council. In his amended complaint, Mansaray noted a prior separate state court case in 
the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Venango County, that had been decided 
against him.  
Ultimately, the District Court granted the Appellees’ motion to dismiss 
Mansaray’s amended complaint pursuant to res judicata. The District Court specifically 
relied on a December 5, 2022 order from the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, 
Venango County. In that case, like his federal case, Mansaray sued Henner and Daly for 
sending the purportedly biased report to USCIS that caused him to be deported. The 
Court of Common Pleas dismissed Mansaray’s state complaint with prejudice for failure 
 
 
3 
to state a claim. Mansaray did not appeal that order to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 
The District Court determined that the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas’ judgment 
precluded this federal action. 
Mansaray appealed the District Court’s judgment. After the matter was fully 
briefed by the parties in this Court, Mansaray filed a motion to strike Appellees’ brief and 
requested punitive damages.  
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s dismissal order. See Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 
120 (3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although res judicata is an affirmative defense, a party can assert 
it in a motion to dismiss when, as here, the defense is apparent on the face of the 
complaint. See Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 870 n.14 (3d Cir. 1984); see also 
Hoffman v. Nordic Nats., Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2016).  
III 
The District Court, as detailed above, dismissed Mansaray’s federal amended 
complaint as barred by res judicata.1 “In determining the applicability of principles of res 
 
1 The District Court stated that Mansaray’s claims were also likely barred by the statute 
of limitations. However, given our conclusion that the District Court’s res judicata 
 
 
4 
judicata, we must give the same preclusive effect to the judgment in the common pleas 
court case that the courts in Pennsylvania, the state in which the judgment was entered, 
would give.” Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citations omitted). Under Pennsylvania law, “[a]ny final, valid judgment on the 
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties 
or their privies on the same cause of action.” Balent v. City of Wilkes–Barre, 669 A.2d 
309, 313 (Pa. 1995) (citation omitted). The doctrine “applies not only to claims actually 
litigated, but also to claims which could have been litigated during the first proceeding if 
they were part of the same cause of action.” Id.  
Mansaray’s state case resulted in a final judgment on the merits as his state case 
was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. See Brown v. Cooney, 442 A.2d 
324, 326 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (“Dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim is a 
final judgment on the merits.”). The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas determined 
that Mansaray failed to allege facts showing that the transmission of the report 
constituted a breach of any duty owed to him and that Mansaray failed to show he was 
deprived of any constitutional or statutory right.  
Mansaray also asserted the same cause of action in both his state and federal 
cases—that his civil rights were violated when officers purportedly sent a biased police 
report to immigration officials which led to his deportation. Indeed, in both cases, 
 
analysis was sound, we need not consider that potential alternative rationale given by the 
District Court.  
 
 
5 
Mansaray sued Wenner and Daly. While Mansaray also sued the Oil City Police 
Department and the Oil City Council in his amended federal complaint, that does not 
change the result that the District Court properly applied res judicata to bar Mansaray’s 
federal suit. See Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1972) (“[R]es 
judicata may be invoked against a plaintiff who has previously asserted essentially the 
same claim against different defendants where there is a close or significant relationship 
between successive defendants.”); Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 131 A.2d 622, 627 (Pa. 
1957) (stating that res judicata “should not be defeated by minor differences of form, 
parties or allegations” and that a shuffling of defendants on the record should not be 
permitted to nullify the res judicata rule). 
Accordingly, for these reasons, the District Court properly applied res judicata in 
granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss. Thus, we will affirm. Mansaray’s pending 
motions before this Court are denied. 


Lansana Mansaray v. Robert Wenner

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-10-2025 
In re: NFL Players Concussion Injury Litigation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"In re: NFL Players Concussion Injury Litigation" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 481. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-1910 
_____________ 
 
IN RE: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS CONCUSSION INJURY 
LITIGATION 
 
Byron Cuthbert & Associates, LLC; SPID 100004410; SPID 100004597; SPID 
100007249; SPID 100007913; SPID 260001260; SPID 100002921; SPID 100005756; 
SPID 100005198; SPID 100000435; SPID 100002185; SPID 100007068; SPID 
100008484; SPID 100013989; SPID 100002465, 
Appellants 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2:12-md-02323) 
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2025 
_____________ 
 
Before: MATEY, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 10, 2025) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
 
 
 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 More than a decade ago, a class of retired professional football players settled 
claims against the National Football League concerning chronic head injuries. In re Nat’l 
Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 421–22 (3d Cir. 2016). 
The settlement agreement established a program to distribute funds to class members who 
receive a qualifying diagnosis of one or more concussion-related conditions. It also 
empowered a Claims Administrator to verify claims and investigate potential fraud or 
wrongdoing. If “the Claims Administrator determines that there has been a 
misrepresentation, omission, or concealment of a material fact” in connection with one or 
more claims, it refers the claim(s) to the Special Masters. Supp. App. 60. The Special 
Masters’ decisions are subject to review by the District Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f). 
Byron Cuthbert & Associates, LLC (BCA) has represented hundreds of class 
members seeking settlement awards. After several allegations of wrongdoing, the Claims 
Administrator initiated an audit and found that BCA’s Byron Cuthbert 1) “pressured 
physicians” to use “Amyloid PET scans that he knew were unreliable”; 2) “attempted to 
influence” physicians to obtain Alzheimer’s diagnoses for his clients; 3) improperly 
“drafted medical records” and third-party affidavits; and 4) was not truthful with the 
Claims Administrator. App. 3. Accordingly, the Claims Administrator determined that 
Mr. Cuthbert’s actions constituted “material misrepresentations and omissions related to 
Claim filings.” App. 3. 
The Claims Administrator referred the matter to the Special Masters, who adopted 
the Claims Administrator’s factual findings and denied twelve claims “directly 
3 
 
implicated” by the issues identified in the audit. App. 7. The Special Masters also 
suspended processing of all claims filed by BCA clients and directed the Claims 
Administrator to 1) deny claims subject to the issues identified in the audit; 2) certify 
which claims were free of those issues; and 3) deny any claims for which it could not be 
determined whether there were issues. All denials were without prejudice, allowing 
claimants to resubmit claims after “obtaining new medical records unsullied by the 
issues” identified in the audit. App. 7. The District Court affirmed the Special Masters’ 
decision. Seeing no error, we will affirm.1  
 First, the District Court properly declined to address Appellants’ argument that the 
Claims Administrator discriminated against Mr. Cuthbert in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981, as this issue was not raised before the Special Masters. See AMA Multimedia, 
LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201, 1213 (9th Cir. 2020). Appellants point only to a single 
sentence in the Special Master briefing where BCA argued that the “Claims 
Administrator’s actions show[] bias towards Attorney Cuthbert—as claims with the same 
PET scan evidence are being approved for other Attorneys but not Attorney Cuthbert.” 
App. 132–33. That is insufficient.  
 Second, there was no modification of the settlement agreement. When evaluating 
whether the Amyloid PET scans championed by Mr. Cuthbert were reliable, the Claims 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) and we exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s interpretation of the 
settlement agreement for clear error and the exercise of its authority to administer the 
settlement for abuse of discretion. In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury 
Litig., 962 F.3d 94, 101 (3d Cir. 2020). 
4 
 
Administrator relied on the expertise of a nuclear medicine consultant. Appellants argue 
that reliance amended the settlement agreement to require claimants to use the 
consultant’s methodology. Not so. The Claims Administrator merely utilized an outside 
opinion to verify and investigate fraud claims, a process consistent with the terms of the 
settlement agreement. 
Finally, Appellants argue the Special Masters’ decision violated due process in a 
variety of ways. But many of their arguments amount to attacks on the Special Masters’ 
factual findings, which are final and binding under the terms of the settlement agreement. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(3)(B). The settlement agreement also precludes Appellants from 
obtaining an evidentiary hearing on their challenge to the audit proceeding. In sum, 
Appellants obtained the process available to them under the settlement agreement, which 
they previously had the opportunity to challenge. See In re Nat’l Football League, 821 
F.3d at 422–26, 447–48. There is no due process violation. 
* * * 
 For these reasons we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 


In re: NFL Players Concussion Injury Litigation

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-13-2025 
Michael Gorrio v. Francis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Michael Gorrio v. Francis" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 488. 
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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1711 
__________ 
 
MICHAEL GORRIO, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER FRANCIS; CORRECTIONAL 
OFFICER CARASELLY; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 
FETCHCO; SERGEANT WALSHAN; LIEUTENANT 
ROBERT RHODES; LIEUTENANT PARKER; 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER EMMINGER; 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER POLAND; CORRECTIONAL 
OFFICER SCOLES; SUPERINTENDENT MARK V. 
CAPOZZA; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER EVANS; 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER TERRAVECHIA; 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER DICKS; CORRECTIONAL 
OFFICER ROCKRIDGE; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 
HAILEY; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BURRIE; 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MINOR; SERGEANT 
MCKILEEN; LIEUTENANT ALBERT WOOD; 
LIEUTENANT DAILEY; LIEUTENANT RUSNAK; 
EDWARD BOHNA; BRITTANY KIMMEL; 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER REGINA; CORRECTIONAL 
OFFICER COX; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER OHRMAN; 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER TWARDZIK; 
2 
 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SAXION; CORRECTIONAL 
OFFICER HENRY; SERGEANT HAINES; SERGEANT 
WILES; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JOHN DOE, 
Other Unknown Officers; JANE DOE, Other Unknown 
Medical Personnel; JOHN DOE, Other Unknown Sergeants; 
JOHN DOE, Other Unknown Lieutenants; RHONDA 
HOUSE, Superintendent Assistant; LUIS ALLEN; BETH 
RUDZINSKI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-01297) 
District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 22, 2025 
 
Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed ) 
 
Michael Gorrio 
Indiana, PA 
 
 Pro se Appellant 
 
Daniel B. Mullen 
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
Appellate Litigation Section 
1251 Waterfront Place 
3 
 
Mezzanine Level 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
 
Hannah Kogan 
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
1600 Arch Street 
Suite 300 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
 Counsel for Appellees 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Michael Gorrio appeals from the 
District Court’s order denying his motion for a new trial after 
the jury verdict and final judgment.  He also appeals from 
various pre-trial orders entered by the District Court 
concerning the scope of discovery and amendment of Gorrio’s 
complaint.   
 
The limitations that the District Court placed on 
discovery impermissibly conflict with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  However, to obtain relief, Gorrio must 
demonstrate prejudice from the improper limitations.  He has 
not done so.  Seeing no other errors in the challenged orders, 
we will affirm the judgment.   
 
I. 
 
4 
 
Michael Gorrio is a Pennsylvania state prisoner.  In 
2019, he filed a complaint against numerous Correctional 
Defendants alleging a variety of constitutional and statutory 
violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the RICO Act, the 
Hobbs Act, the Clayton Act, and Pennsylvania law.1  Pursuant 
to the District Court’s standing practice order for all civil rights 
cases filed by pro se incarcerated plaintiffs, a Magistrate Judge 
was assigned to perform certain tasks.  Among other things, the 
Magistrate Judge was responsible for deciding non-dispositive 
motions and managing discovery.   
 
After several claims in Gorrio’s complaint withstood a 
motion to dismiss, the Magistrate Judge issued a case-
management order.  That order stated that “no formal 
discovery, such as depositions, interrogatories, requests for 
production or requests for admission will be allowed in this 
case without leave of court.”  Dist. Ct. ECF No. 117 at 1.  
However, the order instructed the Defendants to provide all 
reports, documents, and records relating to Gorrio’s claims and 
any information in Defendants’ possession that would help 
Gorrio identify the John and Jane Doe Defendants.  It also 
provided Gorrio a month after receipt of those materials to 
“advise the court of any further discovery” he required, and to 
submit formal requests to the court for review so that the court 
could determine if the discovery would be permitted.  Id. at 2.   
Gorrio filed multiple motions seeking depositions, 
interrogatories, and documents beyond what Defendants had 
 
1  Gorrio’s list of Defendants included John Doe correctional 
officers who were later dismissed because Gorrio had failed to 
identify them.  Gorrio later attempted to reinstate them and 
appeals the District Court’s denial of those attempts.   
5 
 
provided him, as well as extensions of the discovery period.  
The Magistrate Judge permitted Gorrio additional time to 
explain the discovery he sought, but she denied each motion 
for discovery.   
 
Gorrio also filed motions to amend his complaint by 
reinstating previously unidentified defendants.  The District 
Court denied each of those motions.   
 
Eventually, the case proceeded to a jury trial on Gorrio’s 
state law claims of assault, battery, and negligence and his § 
1983 claims of excessive use of force, deliberate indifference 
to safety and medical needs, and sexual harassment.  After a 
multi-day trial in February 2024, the jury rendered a verdict in 
favor of the Defendants on each claim.  The District Court 
entered final judgment on the same date. 
 
Gorrio filed a motion for a new trial, arguing for the first 
time that two of the jurors knew him from interactions they had 
a decade prior, and alleging that they had been prejudiced 
against him.  The District Court denied his motion, ruling that 
Gorrio had waived the argument by not raising it before jury 
deliberations and that he did not meet the standard for a new 
trial based on juror bias.  Gorrio appealed.2   
 
2  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review the denial of a motion for a new trial generally for abuse 
of discretion; however, if the district court “bases its denial of 
the motion on an application of law,” we apply de novo review.  
McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citation omitted).  The District Court’s orders denying further 
discovery and leave to amend are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 778 (3d 
6 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, Gorrio argues that the District Court abused 
its discretion by denying his pre-trial motions for additional 
discovery and by denying him leave to amend his complaint to 
reinstate now-identified John and Jane Doe defendants a month 
before trial.  Gorrio further contends that the District Court 
abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial, 
particularly without having held an evidentiary hearing 
regarding his allegations of juror bias.  We address each of his 
arguments in turn.   
 
A.  
 
On its face, the case-management order disallowing 
discovery without leave of court conflicts with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1) (“A 
party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a 
party, without leave of court except as provided in Rule 
30(a)(2).”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(1) (“A party may, by written 
questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave 
of court except as provided in Rule 31(a)(2).”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 
34(a) (“A party may serve on any other party a request . . . to 
produce . . . any designated documents or electronically stored 
information.”).   
 
The Supreme Court and Congress approve the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribe the procedures to be 
followed by parties and the courts.  Sempier v. Johnson & 
Higgens, 45 F.3d 724, 736 (3d Cir. 1995).  Although district 
 
Cir. 2000); Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 
2019).   
7 
 
courts have discretion to manage discovery, In re Fine Paper 
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982), they may not 
circumvent or deviate from the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as a matter of course, see Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 
F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The conflict between the local 
rule, which requires leave of court before filing a request for 
production of documents, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b), which 
permits such requests without leave of court, is clear.  
Accordingly, Local Rule 23(VIII)(B)(6) is invalid, and we so 
hold.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
Here, the Magistrate Judge provided no case-specific 
basis for requiring leave of court to conduct discovery, let 
alone one consistent with the exceptions provided by the 
federal rules.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 
31(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a).  And no basis is apparent from 
the record.  To the extent that the Magistrate Judge issued the 
case-management order as a matter of course, that was 
improper. 
 
Nonetheless, to obtain relief on a claim concerning 
discovery issues, an appellant must make “the clearest showing 
that the procedures have resulted in actual and substantial 
prejudice” to him.  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 
at 817 (cleaned up).  Specifically, an appellant must “show that 
the district court’s denial of discovery made it impossible to 
obtain crucial evidence.”  Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. 
v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997) (cleaned 
up). 
 
Gorrio has failed to make this showing.  Specifically, 
Gorrio has not identified what crucial evidence he was 
prevented from obtaining—particularly given the Defendants’ 
8 
 
compliance with turning over records3—that would have aided 
his case.  See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc., 107 F.3d at 
1032.  The closest Gorrio comes is arguing that it disallowed 
him “the fundamental opportunity to discover affirmative 
evidence negating a material and essential element of a party’s 
claim.”  Gorrio Supp. Br. at 18.  That vague assertion is not 
sufficient to establish that he was deprived of “crucial 
evidence,” Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc., 107 F.3d at 
1032, and is “speculative and lack[s] any support in the 
record,” Cyberworld Enter. Tech. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 
200 (3d Cir. 2010).  See generally Martel v. Cnty. of L.A., 56 
F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).  Gorrio therefore is not 
entitled to relief. 
 
B.  
 
We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s 
denial of Gorrio’s motions to reinstate previously unidentified 
John and Jane Doe defendants.  District Courts “may deny 
leave to amend a complaint if a plaintiff’s delay in seeking 
amendment is undue, motivated by bad faith, or prejudicial to 
the opposing party.”  Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001).  By itself, delay is not 
 
3  The Defendants’ production was addressed at the pretrial 
conference, and “[t]he Court [found] Defendants’ statements 
that they properly disclosed the relevant documents credible.”  
Dist. Ct. ECF No. 326 at 1.  Gorrio has provided no grounds 
for us to set aside that determination.  See Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 215 F.3d 407, 417 
n.11 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We apply a deferential standard of review 
to the District Court’s credibility determinations . . . .”).   
9 
 
a sufficient reason to deny leave to amend, but it may become 
undue delay “when a movant has had previous opportunities to 
amend a complaint.”  Id. at 273 (citations omitted).  Finding 
prejudice to the opposing party requires “consider[ing] 
whether allowing an amendment would result in additional 
discovery, cost, and preparation to defend against new facts or 
new theories.”  Id.  
 
Here, the District Court denied Gorrio’s motions to 
reinstate the previously unidentified Doe defendants, deeming 
amendment untimely and prejudicial given his receipt of the 
relevant unredacted documents almost two years prior.  On 
appeal, Gorrio asserts that the Defendants had failed to comply 
with the discovery case-management order and had withheld 
the relevant reports until the last minute.  As noted earlier, the 
District Court found credible Defendants’ statements that they 
had provided all relevant documents to Gorrio in early 2022.  
Gorrio has provided no basis for us to conclude otherwise.   
 
C.  
 
Finally, by waiting until after trial to raise his concern 
of juror bias, Gorrio arguably forfeited his right to raise this 
challenge.  See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 105 F.3d 117, 
126-27 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Gootee, 34 F.3d 475, 
479 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).  Gorrio has not shown 
that he realized the misconduct only after trial, and that his 
failure to discover it during trial was not “the result of lack of 
diligence.”  Pelullo, 105 F.3d at 126 (cleaned up).  Regardless, 
we agree with the District Court that Gorrio’s claims of juror 
bias have no merit.  The District Court evaluated Gorrio’s 
claims under the test articulated in McDonough Power Equip., 
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984).  McDonough 
10 
 
requires a party to show that “a juror failed to answer honestly 
a material question on voir dire,” and that “a correct response 
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”  
Id.  
 
As the District Court correctly determined, Gorrio has 
failed to meet either requirement.  Gorrio’s alleged isolated 
interactions with the two jurors occurred over a decade prior to 
the trial, and his affidavit alleging that the jurors had failed to 
answer the voir dire honestly did not present “clear, strong, 
substantial . . . evidence that a specific, nonspeculative 
impropriety ha[d] occurred” such that a hearing was required.  
United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 301 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(cleaned up); see also United States v. Noel, 905 F.3d 258, 274-
75 (3d Cir. 2018).  Further, as the District Court correctly 
noted, even if actually established, a juror’s mere acquaintance 
with a party does not render a potential jury member unfit to 
serve on the jury.  See United States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 
218, 224 (3d Cir. 1991).  We therefore discern no abuse of 
discretion or error in the District Court’s denial of Gorrio’s 
motion for a new trial.  
 
* * * 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.4 
 
4  We deny Gorrio’s motions for sanctions, as he has not shown 
that Appellees acted in bad faith related to his delayed receipt 
of their response brief.  Gorrio was granted extensions to file 
his reply brief, which we have considered.   


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