Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-20-2025 
USA v. David Somerville 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. David Somerville" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 685. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/685 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-1571 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID ANTHONY SOMERVILLE, 
also known as Charles Payne 
also known as Midnite, 
                                  Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00222-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 8, 2025 
_____________ 
 
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 20, 2025) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
 
 
 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 David Somerville appeals his sentence for a pair of controlled substance offenses. 
Our review of the record reveals no nonfrivolous issues for appeal, so we will grant 
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm.1 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 
(1967).2 
First, the District Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Somerville for his “offenses 
against the laws of the United States” was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Also proper 
was the District Court’s decision to deny Somerville’s motion to withdraw his plea 
agreement because Somerville did not meet his “substantial” burden to identify a “fair 
and just” reason to withdraw the plea. See United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2003). 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review in determining whether 
there are any nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 679 F.3d 109, 114 
(3d Cir. 2012). We only consider arguments that Somerville could have raised concerning 
his controlled substance offenses because he did not appeal his separate 180-day prison 
sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. But because Somerville’s 
notice of appeal references “appeals,” we note that any appeal of his 180-day sentence 
would have been moot. See United States v. Huff, 703 F.3d 609, 611–12 (3d Cir. 2013). 
2 We reach this conclusion based on our independent review of the record, as 
assisted by the United States’ commendably thorough brief. Unfortunately, Somerville’s 
counsel has not satisfied us that he “thoroughly examined the record in search of 
appealable issues.” United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564, 569 (3d Cir. 2022). But that 
does not alter our conclusion about the nature of Somerville’s appeal because “‘in those 
cases in which frivolousness is patent,’ we will not appoint new counsel even if 
an Anders brief is insufficient to discharge current counsel’s obligations to his or her 
client and this court.” United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
3 
 Additionally, the District Court properly rejected Somerville’s request for a 
two-level reduction available in cases where “the defendant clearly demonstrates 
acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Somerville only 
changed his plea after the United States presented its case in chief and the strength of its 
evidence was readily apparent. Moreover, he tested positive for marijuana (at least three 
separate times) and cocaine while on bond, and “[c]ourts have routinely upheld the denial 
of a § 3E1.1(a) adjustment for similar or less culpable post-plea conduct.” United States 
v. Mercado, 81 F.4th 352, 361 (3d Cir. 2023). 
 Finally, the District Court correctly calculated Somerville’s advisory guidelines 
range; considered his argument for a variance; and evaluated the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
factors, making the sentence procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Merced, 603 
F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010). And the sentence is also substantively reasonable, as it 
cannot be said that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
*  *  * 
Seeing no nonfrivolous arguments that Somerville could have made, we will grant 
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm. 


USA v. David Somerville

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-22-2025 
William Webb, Jr. v. Ruth Minner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"William Webb, Jr. v. Ruth Minner" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 690. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/690 
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inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
CLD-180        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1958 
___________ 
 
WILLIAM JOSEPH WEBB, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GOVERNOR RUTH ANN MINNER; DIRECTOR JAIME H. RIVERA, D.H.S.S.; 
CHIEF MARVIN NETWON, City Plumbing Inspector; WARDEN RAFAEL 
WILLIAMS; COMM. STANLEY W. TAYLOR; SUPERVISOR PAUL PACECO; 
JANE DOE(S); JOHN DOE(S); CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES;  
SHERESE CARR, Warden 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:06-cv-00734) 
District Judge:  Honorable Colm F. Connolly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 10, 2025 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA , Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
William Webb, Jr., appeals pro se from a District Court order denying his motion 
to reinstate his case.  We will summarily affirm because the appeal presents no 
substantial question.   
Webb filed his original complaint in December 2006, and his operative amended 
complaint in May 2007.  In October 2007, the District Court dismissed five defendants 
from the case with prejudice, while allowing the case to proceed against the remaining 
defendants.  In April 2010, the District Court dismissed all but one defendant from the 
case without prejudice for failure to prosecute.  The District Court then dismissed Webb’s 
entire complaint for failure to prosecute and closed the case in May 2010.     
In January 2025—almost 15 years after the action had been dismissed—Webb 
filed a motion to reinstate his case in the District Court.  Webb alleged that he had newly 
discovered evidence that proved he had been injured by lead contaminated water while a 
state prisoner in 1998, although he did not provide such evidence.  The District Court, 
construing Webb’s motion alternatively as a motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b), a motion for reconsideration, alteration, or amendment under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and a motion for reargument pursuant to Delaware District 
Court Rule 7.1.5, denied the motion on April 29, 2025.  Webb timely appealed.     
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the denial of 
motions made under Rule 59(e) and 60(b) and motions for reargument for abuse of 
3 
 
discretion.  See Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 
673 (3d Cir. 1999); Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008); Jilin 
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 199 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006).  We may summarily 
affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4. 
 We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s order.  Motions for relief 
from judgment under Rule 60(b) “must be made within a reasonable time.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 60(c)(1).  Webb’s motion was not.  As the District Court noted, Webb’s motion to 
reinstate his case came almost fifteen years after the dismissal and presented no facts or 
legal arguments justifying the delay.  See Moolenaar v. Gov’t of V.I., 822 F.2d 1342, 
1348 (3d Cir. 1987).  Moreover, the few facts and allegations Webb did assert failed to 
satisfy any of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b).  See id. at 1345-46.   
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion when it declined to reconsider or 
alter or amend its judgment in response to Webb’s motion.  Such a motion must be filed 
within 28 days of the underlying order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and, in any event, 
reconsideration is only available in limited circumstances, see Quinteros, 176 F.3d at 677.  
As the District Court noted, Webb’s motion failed to present any grounds that warranted 
reconsideration, alteration, or amendment of the District Court’s 2010 dismissal order.  
See id.; Lazaridis v. Whemer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).   
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying reargument on 
the case in response to Webb’s motion.  A grant of reargument under District of 
4 
 
Delaware Local Rule 7.1.5 is also only available in limited circumstances, see Brambles 
USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp. 1239, 1241 (D. Del. Apr. 23, 1990), and as the District 
Court noted, Webb failed to establish any of those circumstances existed in regard to the 
2010 order of dismissal, see id.   
 Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Webb’s 
motion, and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
 


William Webb, Jr. v. Ruth Minner

Bette Eakin v. Adams County Board of Elections

In Re: Eileen Adams

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-9-2025 
In Re: BlockFi Inc. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: BlockFi Inc." (2025). 2025 Decisions. 741. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/741 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of 
Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-2637 
 
____________ 
 
In Re: BLOCKFI INC., et al., 
          Debtors 
 
George J. Gerro, 
          Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3:23-cv-18740) 
District Judge: Honorable Zahid N. Quraishi 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 9, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  September 9, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
George Gerro appeals the District Court’s judgment dismissing his appeal from 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
the Bankruptcy Court’s disallowance of his claim against BlockFi, Inc. We will affirm. 
I 
In 2019, Gerro borrowed $2.275 million from BlockFi. The loan was secured by 
Bitcoin then worth $4.55 million. When the price of Bitcoin fell in March 2020, BlockFi 
liquidated Gerro’s collateral pursuant to its rights under the loan agreement. BlockFi 
suggested that it could repurchase the Bitcoin it had sold if Gerro posted more collateral 
to secure the loan or if he paid down some of the outstanding principal. Gerro replied 
about one month later, purporting to accept BlockFi’s offer to reinstate his loan. But 
BlockFi refused to do so on the terms proposed by Gerro because the price of Bitcoin had 
rebounded and repurchasing Gerro’s collateral in the open market would have caused 
BlockFi a loss of around $1 million.  
 BlockFi filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in 2022, prompting Gerro to file a 
proof of claim against the debtor’s estate. He argued that BlockFi violated California law 
by possessing and using his collateral, asserting a claim for 426 Bitcoin or the value 
thereof at the time BlockFi filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court disallowed the 
claim and Gerro appealed to the District Court. After the District Court dismissed Gerro’s 
appeal, he filed this appeal.  
II1 
 Gerro contends that BlockFi violated Section 22009 of the California Financial 
 
1 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), and the District Court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and 1334. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291. 
3 
Code by possessing and using his collateral. The California Financial Code defines a 
“finance lender” to: 
include[] any person who is engaged in the business of making consumer 
loans or making commercial loans. The business of making consumer loans 
or commercial loans may include lending money and taking, in the name of 
the lender, or in any other name, in whole or in part, as security for a loan, 
any contract or obligation involving the forfeiture of rights in or to personal 
property, the use and possession of which property is retained by other than 
the mortgagee or lender, or any lien on, assignment of, or power of attorney 
relative to wages, salary, earnings, income, or commission. 
Cal. Fin. Code § 22009 (emphasis added). A “finance lender” also “include[s] a personal 
property broker.” Id. 
 Pointing to this definition, Gerro asserts that BlockFi violated its Finance Lender 
License and § 22009 by using and possessing his collateral. To support his argument, he 
cites letters sent by the California Department of Business Oversight (Department) to 
BlockFi in connection with its California Financing Law (CFL) license application, 
which stated that BlockFi could not hold borrowers’ digital assets as collateral due to 
§ 22009.  
 But the Department’s interpretation in those letters was inconsistent with the 
statute. See Kim v. Reins Int’l Cal., Inc., 459 P.3d 1123, 1128 (Cal. 2020) (“If the 
statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls.” (citation omitted)). 
Indeed, a few months later, the Department reversed course and awarded BlockFi a 
license, knowing that it would possess and use borrowers’ collateral.  
It did so because a finance lender “includes any person who is engaged in the 
business of making consumer loans or making commercial loans.” Cal. Fin. Code 
4 
§ 22009 (emphasis added). Section 22009 then explains that those activities “may 
include” secured lending in which the lender does not use or possess the collateral. Id. 
That inclusive language ensures that certain lending activity is captured by the definition 
of finance lender, but it does not mark any outer limits. Put simply, BlockFi was a 
finance lender because it was engaged in the business of making consumer loans. And 
nothing in the definition itself—as opposed to the statute’s extensive regulatory 
provisions—imposes any obligations on finance lenders.2 See id. §§ 22150–22172 
(general regulations); id. §§ 22300–22347 (consumer loan regulations); id. §§ 22600–
22604 (commercial loan regulations).  
III 
For the stated reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment as modified.3 
 
2 Because BlockFi did not violate the California Financial Code, we need not address 
Gerro’s willfulness argument. See Cal. Fin. Code § 22750(b) (providing a remedy for 
willful violations of the CFL). 
 
3 The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order and dismissed Gerro’s appeal. 
But because it had jurisdiction, we will modify its order to simply affirm the Bankruptcy 
Court’s order. 


In Re: BlockFi Inc.

Ronald Koons v. Attorney General New Jersey

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-12-2025 
Gregory Bingham, Jr. v. Philadelphia School District 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Gregory Bingham, Jr. v. Philadelphia School District" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 754. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/754 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of 
Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 24-2998 
_______________ 
 
GREGORY BINGHAM, JR., 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PHILADELPHIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:23-cv-02249) 
District Judge: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 12, 2025) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Gregory Bingham, Jr. challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his 
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting that the Philadelphia 
School District engaged in religious discrimination by failing to accommodate his 
sincerely held religious beliefs after he objected to the School District’s COVID-19 
vaccine mandate and quarantine protocol.1  Discerning no error, we will affirm. 
I. DISCUSSION2 
 We follow a two-step test in assessing Bingham’s Title VII religious 
discrimination claim.  Smith v. City of Atl. City, 138 F.4th 759, 774 (3d Cir. 2025).  First, 
Bingham must establish that “(1) he held a sincere religious belief that conflicted with a 
job requirement, (2) he informed his employer of the conflict, and (3) he was disciplined 
for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.”  Fallon v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 
877 F.3d 487, 490 (3d Cir. 2017).  If he makes this showing, we proceed to the second 
step where the School District can prevail by demonstrating that it offered Bingham a 
reasonable accommodation or that doing so would have imposed an undue hardship.  
 
1 Bingham’s Amended Complaint asserted claims for racial and religious discrimination 
and retaliation under Title VII and for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In response to the School District moving for summary 
judgment on all claims, Bingham’s opposition focused only on his Title VII religious 
discrimination claim.  This appeal is likewise limited to that claim. 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the grant of summary judgment de novo.  Pitsilides v. 
Barr, 128 F.4th 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2025).  Summary judgment is appropriate only where 
there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 
3 
 
United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882, 886–87 (3d Cir. 
1990).   
Bingham’s claim falters at step one.  By his own admission, Bingham was not 
subject to any disciplinary actions.  At first, Bingham pleaded that the School District 
“terminated [his] employment because of his sincerely-held religious beliefs.”  App. 16.  
But he later admitted that he interviewed for and accepted a position at a nearby charter 
school and willingly resigned from his position with the School District, and a voluntary 
resignation is not a disciplinary action taken by the employer, see, e.g., Savel v. 
MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th 932, 940–41 (6th Cir. 2024); Honor v. Booz-Allen & 
Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 180, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2004); cf. Leheny v. City of Pittsburgh, 
183 F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 1999).  Because there is no evidence in the record showing 
that Bingham was disciplined for failing to comply with an employment demand that 
conflicted with his sincerely held religious beliefs, he has failed to establish a prima facie 
case of religious discrimination under Title VII.  The District Court thus correctly ruled 
in favor of the School District at step one. 
In addition, the School District satisfied its burden at step two by showing that it 
provided Bingham with a reasonable accommodation.  Bingham objected to getting 
vaccinated on religious grounds.  The School District responded by exempting him from 
the vaccine policy but requiring him to quarantine when he was exposed to someone who 
had tested positive for COVID-19.  This accommodation was reasonable because it 
eliminated the conflict between the School District’s employment requirement and 
Bingham’s religious beliefs.  Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986).  
 
4 
 
And conditioning the accommodation on compliance with the quarantine protocol 
recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Philadelphia 
Department of Public Health does not transform it into an unreasonable one.  See Jackson 
v. Methodist Health Servs. Corp., 121 F.4th 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 2024). 
As Bingham accurately points out, he had to expend his earned sick or personal 
leave while quarantining.  But “a sufficient religious accommodation need not be the 
‘most’ reasonable one (in the employee’s view), it need not be the one the employee 
suggests or prefers, and it need not be the one that least burdens the employee.”  Shelton 
v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000).  Rather, an 
“employer satisfies its Title VII religious accommodation obligation when it offers any 
reasonable accommodation,” id., which includes anything that “eliminates the conflict 
between employment requirements and religious practices,” Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70.  
The School District offered such an accommodation here.  
Finally, Bingham argues that the School District violated Title VII by denying his 
request to work from home.  Not so.  Nothing in the record suggests Bingham’s religious 
beliefs required him to work from home.  Even if they did, a duty to accommodate under 
Title VII is triggered once the employee gives the employer fair notice “that a particular 
employment practice will interfere with that employee’s religious beliefs.”  Wilkerson v. 
New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 2008).  Bingham’s 
unilateral pronouncement that he “will be working from home via zoom” until he was 
allowed back in person so that he does “not lose sick time or pay,” App. 313—without 
any mention of his religious beliefs—fell well short of providing the School District with 
 
5 
 
the requisite fair warning.  What is more, Bingham never formally requested a religious 
accommodation to work from home despite receiving instructions on how to do so.  The 
District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the School District. 
II. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 


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USA v. David Somerville

William Webb, Jr. v. Ruth Minner

Bette Eakin v. Adams County Board of Elections

In Re: Eileen Adams

In Re: BlockFi Inc.

Ronald Koons v. Attorney General New Jersey

Gregory Bingham, Jr. v. Philadelphia School District

Bradley Livingston v. Borough of Elmwood Park

USA v. Sean Jelen

Novo Nordisk Inc v. Secretary US Dept & Health and Human Services

40,620

41,076