SelectedWorks @ Rutgers School of Law-Newark
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The 10-Month School Year: Are We Ignoring Educational Reseach in Order to Preserve Summer Vacation? Finding a Compromise Between Educational Advancement and Overschooling.
No full textThe optimal structure and length of the school year has been debated for years. While it is widely acknowledged that students lose academic knowledge over the traditionally long summer break, society and many states have been resistant to implement year-round schooling due to concerns about funding, economic impact on tourism, the decrease in a student’s ability to engage in non-formalized summer learning, and the negative impact on family life. Yet, concerns regarding the United States’ ability to compete globally, the ever growing achievement gap between wealthy and poor students, the changing family dynamic, and the need to combat child labor exemplify why some sort of academic summer program should be made available to all students, but particularly to under-achieving and under- privileged children.
Part I of this paper looks at the history of the traditional school year, outlining the rationales behind creating a “summers-off” system of education. Part II assesses and discusses why the traditional rationales behind the 9 or 10-month school year are outdated, unpersuasive, and no longer relevant. Part III looks at the national and global prevalence of year-round schooling. Part IV argues in favor of year-round schooling, outlining many benefits that would result from its implementation. Part V discusses the obstacles and restrictions that prevent the implementation of year-round schooling. Lastly, Part VI proposes educational recommendations and attempts to find compromises between much needed educational advancements/reforms with the economic and social concerns that are in opposition to year-round schooling
Home is Where The Art Is: The Impact that Housing Laws and Gentrification Policies have had on the Availability and Affordability of Artist Live/Work Spaces
No full textArtists have long been praised as creative innovators, respected and admired for their unique perspectives and ability to portray life in a new light. Federal and State Governments have long recognized the cultural value that art and artists provide, and thus, legislatures have passed protective housing laws that provide artists with affordable live/work spaces. Today, though artists have often been portrayed as “starving,” studies on urban policy/planning have shown that where artists live, money and capital growth will follow. Artists are pioneers of gentrification. Thus, urban planners and many communities have sought to provide incentives that promote artist relocation in order to facilitate the revitalization of cities, neighborhoods, and towns.
This paper will discuss the history of artist housing laws, the prevalent use of artists to promote gentrification, and the future of artist live/work spaces. Though this paper will focus largely upon artists who reside in New York City, it will also survey and discuss notable cases and artist incentive programs throughout the country. Part I of this paper will discuss artist housing laws, specifically focusing on (1) the history of rent control and its impact on the artist community, (2) New York City’s artist zoned housing, and (3) New York City’s “Loft Laws.” Part II of this paper will discuss gentrification, specifically focusing on (1) the effect artists have on gentrification, (2) communities where artists have contributed to gentrification, and (3) current initiatives aimed at increasing artist populations. Lastly, Part III of this paper will discuss the future of artist housing, and will outline (1) the difficulties artists face post-gentrification, (2) prevalent arguments against rent stabilization, and (3) concerns regarding the longevity and permanency of “artist communities.
A Paradox in Employment: The Contradiction that Exists between Immigration Laws and Outsourcing Practices, and its Impact on the Legal and Illegal Minority Working Classes
No full textoai:works.bepress.com:mary_osullivan-1002The drastic distinctions between the United States’ immigration and outsourcing policies have created a system where American companies are able to send unlimited jobs overseas, yet, have very restricted ability to bring workers to domestic offices and factories. Restrictive immigration policies seek to protect American jobs, while liberal outsourcing regulations permit, and encourage, employers to send jobs outside of the United States. As a result, the United States’ outsourcing policy sabotages the purpose of American immigration laws. The uncertainty of the contradiction between immigration and outsourcing policy may be the cause of unusually high unemployment numbers, particularly in the minority working class.
This paper will argue that through application, the United States’ immigration and outsourcing policies are contradictory in their goals and application. Furthermore, this paper will assert that the United States’ outsourcing policy undermines employment immigration policy, and indirectly facilitates unemployment and economic despair. Lastly, this paper asserts that an illegal immigration working class is present in the United States because of the interplay of immigration and outsourcing policies
Early Childhood Education: An Ignored Solution to the Achievment Gap in the United States
No full textThis paper will attempt to analyze the conundrum of how the United States, with its educational goal of decreasing the achievement gap, fails to implement early childhood education, an undisputed determent factor of academic achievement. Through looking at the undisputed contentions in educational policy and the current state of U.S. public school education, this paper will attempt to highlight the disconnect between educational research and implementation, and will outline possible remedies
A FAIR PUNISHMENT FOR HUMBERT HUMBERT: STRICT LIABILITY AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
No full textIn this article, I focused on the intersection of strict liability offenses and affirmative defenses. I sought to explore and evaluate a peculiar discrepancy: all states, as well as the Model Penal Code, deny to a defendant charged with a strict liability offense the defense of mistake, yet at the same time, allow most other affirmative defenses. Is this discrepancy warranted? Consider the following scenarios inwhich Humbert Humbert is charged with the statutory rape of Lolita: If Humbert Humbert tried to argue that he had acted under a mistaken belief that Lolita was above the age of consent, he most likely would not prevail. He would not prevail even if he made all possible efforts to find out Lolita’s true age (e.g., checked Lolita’s birth certificate and received a signed sworn affidavit from Lolita’s mother) or if he fell prey to Lolita’s own deception.
The outcome, however, would be different if Humbert Humbert could prove that his misperception of Lolita’s age was a result of insanity. In that case, Humbert Humbert would have a valid defense. He would also have a defense if he could show that he had had sex with Lolita under duress. Say, Clare Quilty, engrossed in the production of his pornographic movie, threatened to beat up Humbert Humbert unless he and Lolita performed a sexual act in front of his camera.
Obviously, the defenses of mistake, insanity, and duress, albeit belonging to the same family of excuses, differ in many important respects. To see whether certain formative differences may account for the different treatment of these defenses, I examine various excuses on the scales of cognitive-volitional, external-internal, and permanent-temporary. In the end, I conclude that, from the moral perspective, there is: (i) no difference between a permanent and temporary impairment; (ii) a marginal difference in favor of external limitation compared to internal; (iii) a meaningful difference in favor of cognitive impairment compared to volitional. Effectively, this conclusion means that a person who commits a strict liability offense pursuant to a reasonable mistake deserves punishment even less than a person who commits the same crime under duress.
I further explore the discrepancy between the treatment of the defense of mistake and other excuses in cases of strict liability from the perspectives of efficiency and other public policies. I conclude that this discrepancy is unwarranted, unfair, and arguably, unconstitutional. Accordingly, I advocate for a revision of the current law and adoption of an across-the-board rule that would make the defense of a reasonable mistake available in any criminal prosecution
Hard Times, Hard Time: Retributive Justice for Unjustly Disadvantaged Offenders
No full textCriminological studies consistently indicate that a disproportionate percentage of crimes in our society, both violent and non-violent, are committed by those who are impoverished. If we assume that at least some of the poor who commit crimes are poor because they fail to get from society what they “deserve” in terms of economic or political or social rights, the question arises whether this fact should affect the determination of what such people “deserve” from society in terms of punishment. The question is all the more pressing given recent Census Bureau figures indicating that the economic recession that began in 2008 has resulted in a higher percentage of Americans living below the poverty line than at any point since 1997, with figures for 2009 certain to be even worse given rising unemployment rates.
Most scholars who have been concerned with this issue have assumed that there is one set of principles that will explain the proper relationship between distributive and retributive justice: The fact that an offender has been denied the basic entitlements of a just society, however defined, is taken to have implications for criminal liability across the board, regardless of the offense charged. The argument that I develop here suggests that a proper analysis of the relationship between distributive and retributive justice should proceed on a case-by-case basis. Such an analysis would take account of three distinct factors: First, it would look to the specific kind of offense with which the offender is charged. The fact that an offender is deeply and unjustly disadvantaged might be relevant to determining his blameworthiness for committing one kind of criminal offense (say, an offense against the person) but not another kind of offense (say, an offense against property or an offense against the administration of justice). Under this approach, we need to consider what it is that makes an offender blameworthy for committing a particular kind of offense in the first place, and then ask whether and how such blameworthiness is affected by his disadvantage. Second, we need to look at the precise form that the offender’s disadvantage takes. The fact that an offender has been denied any reasonable opportunity to obtain property, for example, might be relevant to determining his blameworthiness for committing a particular kind of offense in a way that his being denied the opportunity to participate in the political process or the right to certain kinds of basic police protection by the state might not. Third, we need to consider the economic and social circumstances of the crime victim, if any. For example, a criminal act directed by a disadvantaged offender at a similarly disadvantaged victim might be blameworthy in a way that the same crime directed at a privileged member of the political or economic elite would not
Review Essay: Golden Rule Ethics and the Death of the Criminal Law\u27s Special Part
No full textThis brief review of Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law, by Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, with Stephen Morse, focuses on the authors’ proposal that the Special Part of the criminal law, the part that identifies and defines specific offenses, be radically stripped down in a manner that is reminiscent of the Golden Rule of Ethics, which, they say, offers a “clear” and “concise” guide to living ethically. Rather than a long list of specific prohibited forms of conduct (“don’t murder,” “don’t rape,” “don’t commit theft,” and the like), they argue, the criminal law should rely on a single “general rule,” to the effect that “[i]t is criminal for an actor to take an unjustified risk of causing harm to a legally protected interest or to take an unjustified risk that his conduct constitutes prohibited behavior.”
Contrary to the authors’ contention, the proper formulation, meaning, and function of Golden Rule of Ethics are anything but “clear.” There are substantial controversies about both the Rule\u27s substance (its proper formulation, its meaning, and whether it leads to the right result), and its procedure (e.g. about whether the rule is meant to be relied on by ordinary people on a case-by-case basis in their daily lives; applied only when there exists no more specific rule on point, or where specific rules conflict; or used, primarily by theorists, as a general justifying principle that explains or justifies more specific ethical rules). Relying on a single, general rule of conduct in the criminal law sphere would create similar interpretive and practical uncertainties and difficulties. Rather than doing away with centuries of common law and legislative developments, and essentially starting over, we should instead endeavor to refine the criminal codes we already have so that they are more carefully formulated and more respectful of the harm principle
The Case of Weak Will and Wayward Desire.
No full textIn this article, I confront Garvey¡¯s argument that a weak-willed individual deserves partial excuse for trying to resist a strong desire that pushes him toward commission of a criminal act even though in the end he unreasonably abandons his resistance and commits the crime. I attempt to refute Garvey¡¯s argument on two counts: one, I question whether the law should indeed provide mitigation to such an offender; and two, I argue that, even if it should, this mitigation may not come in the form of a partial defense. Defenses, even partial, are desert based, and there is nothing in Garvey¡¯s offender¡¯s circumstances that makes him less blameworthy for the crime he committed. A court may choose to treat such an offender more leniently but it should not be mandated to do so
Rights, Wrongs, and Comparative Justifications
No full textThe goal of this article is to rethink the relationship between the concepts of justification and wrongdoing, which play vital roles in the theory of criminal law. Reading George P. Fletcher’s new book, The Grammar of Criminal Law, in the context of his earlier scholarship has led me to one major disagreement with Fletcher as well as with the traditional criminal law doctrine: for Fletcher and many others, wrongdoing and justification mutually exclude each other; for me, they do not. Consider a hypothetical: a group of people are captured by criminals. The criminals are about to kill everyone but then they have a change of heart and offer their victims a deal: if Jack rapes Jill, the criminals will let everyone go. If not, no one’s life will be spared. Realizing that this is the only way to save several lives, including Jill’s own, Jack reluctantly agrees. Jill, on the other hand, vehemently protests that she would rather die than be violated. When Jack attempts to overpower her, Jill fights back and seriously injures Jack. At that moment, the police arrive and take everyone into custody. It appears that both Jack and Jill have valid defenses of justification – Jack can successfully claim necessity, and Jill can successfully claim self-defense. But is it fair to say that the two are equally right or that neither of them has committed any wrongdoing? Focusing on the problem of incompatible justifications, I suggest that we should revise our understanding of justifications in general. Specifically, I argue that, in certain circumstances, justifiable conduct may be wrongful; that in a conflict between two incompatible justifications, one side may be more right than the other; and that justifications should be viewed not as a homogenous group in which each defense has equal importance but as a hierarchical structure in which the place afforded to a defense is determined by its rationale and effect on the rights of others. The top priority belongs to justifications that do not violate rights of others and, in addition, compel others to behave in a cooperative way (the public duty defenses). The intermediate priority belongs to justifications that neither violate rights of others nor create in others a duty to cooperate (the “special relationship” and autonomy defenses). Finally, the lowest priority belongs to the defense of necessity, which, by design, may involve violation of rights of innocent, unoffending individuals