Journal for Deradicalization
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Radicalization in British Columbia Secondary Schools: The Principals' Perspective
Get PDFThis essay summarizes a larger study into radicalization in secondary schools (Grades 8-12) in the Province of British Columbia, Canada, from the perspective of school principals and vice-principals (PVPs). In addition to determining the extent of radicalization, the study further explored the extent to which PVPs felt they were prepared to cope with radicalization in a school environment, and obtained their assessment of the training and resources available to help them deal with this phenomenon. Quantitative and qualitative data was acquired using a survey as well as interviews with PVPs. Research participants reported an unexpectedly low level of engagement by students in radical, extremist, or violent extremist behaviour during the 2014-2015 school year. Only 3% of PVPs surveyed believed that extremist or violent extremist behaviours had increased in their own schools during the previous three-year period, while 6.6% believed it had actually declined somewhat—or even substantially—during this timeframe. There was wide variance in the levels of confidence exhibited by PVPs in their capacity to deal with incidents of extreme or violently extreme behaviours, but most stated that they would welcome additional training on dealing with potential incidents. Only half of the interview participants claimed that the procedures and protocols in place to deal with incidents involving extremist behaviours were adequate. A consistently low level of radicalization was apparent in school environments where some factors that otherwise might trigger student radicalization were identified, explored, and resolved in a supportive and open minded manner by school staff
Radicalism Leading to Violent Extremism in Canada: A Multi-Level Analysis of Muslim Community and University Based Student Leaders’ Perceptions and Experiences
Get PDFRecently, more than 150 Canadians have joined the Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East, causing alarm among both Canadian policy makers and the general citizenry. One of the most salient questions related to this development pertains to the factors that drove these young people to extremism. Most experts posit that extremism is caused by multiple factors embedded in our social, economic, geopolitical, and cultural processes. However, evidence to support such claims is still poor as limited primary research has been done in Canada to understand, explain, and identify radicalism’s causes, its main drivers, and its global-local linkages. Due to their emphasis on policy and federal law enforcement, studies of radicalism in Canada have proven inadequate in outlining a comprehensive understanding of the psycho-social conditions that might be associated with the radicalization process. Considering the above gaps, this research draws upon three studies in order to map the perceptions of the leadership of Islamic community-based organizations and university-based student organizations with regards to issues related to social conflict, terrorism, and counter-terrorism in Canada. The objective of this study is to both document the existence of radicalism and to determine the role of critical social issues that may potentially contribute to this phenomenon. In addition, this paper will hopefully elaborate on the results of a multi-level (macro, meso, and micro) analysis of the social factors which act as key drivers of radicalism through the use of qualitative methods and the aid of social conflict and social-psychological theoretical lenses. Finally, the study concludes by exploring the Canadian national counter-terrorism (CT) strategy’s effectiveness in countering radicalization.
Der Einfluss von rechtsgerichtetem Autoritarismus und sozialer Dominanzorientierung auf homophobe Einstellungen (The influence of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on homophobic attitudes)
No full textDas Thema Homophobie geriet seit 2012 verstärkt in das Interesse der Medien. Ursachen waren u.a. die Erlassung homophober Gesetze in Russland, Outings von prominenten Persönlichkeiten wie Fußballspieler und Politiker oder die in Frankreich auftretenden Massendemonstrationen zur Verhinderung der gleichgeschlechtlichen Ehe. Durch das kürzlich stattfindende Attentat in einem beliebten Club der LGBT-Community in Orlando ist das Thema präsenter denn je. Neben Untersuchungen, die aufdecken, welchen Vorurteilen Menschen mit einer homosexuellen Ausrichtung ausgesetzt sind und wie sich diese im Alltag der Betroffenen niederschlagen, suchen vermehrt Studien nach den Gründen dieser Vorurteile. Die vorliegende Arbeit bedient sich dazu etablierter Konzepte aus der Vorurteilsforschung, um diese in einen Zusammenhang mit homophoben Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen zu bringen. Mithilfe einer Online-Befragung von 249 heterosexuellen Teilnehmern wurde der Einfluss von rechtsgerichteten Autoritarismus (RWA), sozialer Dominanzorientierung (SDO) und sozialer Identität (SI) auf homophobe Einstellungen ermittelt. Es konnte nachgewiesen werden, dass die untersuchten Variablen negativ auf die Einstellungen der Untersuchungsteilnehmer gegenüber Schwulen und Lesben wirken. Gleichzeitig wurde die Mediatorrolle der sozialen Identität als Identifikation mit der eigenen heterosexuellen Orientierung getestet und nachgewiesen, dass diese als Mediator zwischen RWA, SDO und homophoben Einstellungen fungiert. English AbstractSince 2012, the issue of homophobia has attracted increasing media interest. The causes were, among other things, the enactment of homophobic laws in Russia, outings of prominent personalities such as soccer players and politicians or mass demonstrations in France to prevent same-sex marriage. The recent terror attack on a night club popular with the LGBT community in Orlando has made the issue more present than ever. In addition to studies that reveal the prejudices people with a homosexual orientation are exposed to and how these prejudices are reflected in the everyday lives of those affected, studies are increasingly looking for the reasons for these prejudices. The present work uses established concepts from prejudice research in order to connect them with homophobic attitudes and behavioural patterns. An online survey of 249 heterosexual participants was used to determine the influence of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO) and social identity (SI) on homophobic attitudes. It was shown that the variables studied have a negative effect on the attitudes of the participants to gays and lesbians. At the same time, the mediator role of social identity as an identification with one's own heterosexual orientation was tested and proved that it indeed functions as a mediator between RWA, SDO and homophobic attitudes. The article was written in German
The Forms and Ecologies of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh
Get PDFIslamist militancy and terrorism, a major sociopolitical issue of Bangladesh today, has largely remained under-researched. This paper mainly explores the forms and ecologies of Islamist militancy and terrorism based on the content analysis of media reports and interviews with some experts in Bangladesh. Ecologies, in this paper, refer to the multiple interrelated and interdependent environments: social, political, and religious, that foster, germinate and nurture the growth of militancy and terrorism. Despite Bangladesh being globally identified as a moderate Muslim country located in South Asia, Islamist radicalization, extremism and militancy have become a major concern since the incidence of nationwide serial bomb blasts in 2005. Although an estimation of the group operatives may not be possible because these groups change names or members change groups from time to time, the presence of seventy Islamist militant outfits with thousands of militant members was identified during 1999-2010. Islamist militants carried out over 203 attacks killing 164 innocent people and injuring more than 2,658 people in this period. Using bomb explosions, these attacks targeted political parties, cultural groups, intellectuals, diplomats, movie theatres, NGO offices, and minority religious institutions. In response to these attacks, the government has adopted mostly a law-enforcement centric approach, but this study suggests a comprehensive strategy balancing enforcement, intervention and prevention urgently needed for de-radicalization and counterterrorism in Bangladesh --- the 8th most populous country and the 3rd largest Muslim country of the world. Although foreign journalistic and intelligence-based reports have argued that Islamist militants have links with madrassas (Islamic seminary institutions), this system has actually been in vogue for many years in the country. Research suggests that unemployment problems, poverty, illiteracy, and ignorance about religious matters among the youths are the common drivers for Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. An unfocused national educational policy on madrassas, the narrow and dated madrassa curriculum, and frustrations felt by madrassa graduates who cannot find jobs are likely to instigate the madrassa students to get involved in militancy. Political, educational, and religious interventions are must for countering radicalization effectively. Improving education policy and creating employment opportunities for the unemployed youth can begin to address the problem of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh
What’s in a name? Asymmetries in the evaluation of religiously motivated terrorism and right-wing motivated violence in the context of the “refugee crisis”
Get PDFIn the course of 2015, Germany was confronted with ever increasing immigration flows which resulted in the so-called “refugee crisis”. This sudden political and societal challenge brought about feelings of fear, anxiety and insecurity in many people. As a result, the right-wing Populist Party AFD and the populist movement PEGIDA steadily gained more support. Furthermore, the number of right-wing motivated crimes reached a total of 13 846 by the end of December 2015, of which 4183 were declared as motivated by “anti-migrant” or xenophobic sentiments. However, it appears as if the German government has difficulties reacting appropriately to those developments. This paper argues that the asymmetry between the moral and political evaluation of transnational religiously motivated terrorist violence and domestic right-wing extremist violence is untenable. Consequently, the emphasis on safeguarding national security against the risk of this kind of terrorist violence denies the importance of dealing with the right-wing risk “from within”. It is argued, that the increasing right-wing motivated violence shares certain dynamics with religiously motivated terrorism, even though both phenomena differ in fatality. The choice to call one form of violence terrorism and another form, in this case right-wing extremist violence, is not considered as terrorism, is not as neutral as is often presumed and is certainly not exclusively attributable to the differing character or fatality of the violence. It will be shown that instead, it reveals a lot about certain prejudices, a priori assumptions about the nature of terrorism, prevailing resentment and political interest.
Political de-radicalization: why it is no longer possible in the wilāyāt system of the Islamic State
Get PDFThe emergence of the Islamic State as a regional and ideological player deeply affected the mechanisms of radicalization witnessed worldwide. The article will compare a former instance of jihadism, the Egyptian al-Gamā’a al-Islāmiya (Islamic Group, IG), with the phenomenon of the Islamic State and its wilāyāt system. The Islamic Group, which has been active during the last three decades of the Twentieth century, constitutes an ideal case study because it performed a process of political de-radicalization and disengagement that led its members to abandon violence. The hypothesis underlying the paper is that a similar process could no longer take place in the case of the Islamic State. Indeed, the transnational project of the Caliphate is likely to exclude every chance of undertaking a de-radicalization and/or disengagement process in which a group effectively negotiates with a nation-state, and this difference is likely to represent one of the major counter-terrorism challenges arising from the Syrian-Iraqi scenario. In order to complete its de-radicalization process, the IG issued four books of murāğa’āt, “recantations”, in January 2002, under the general title of The Correcting Conceptions Series. The major one was titled The Initiative for Ceasing Violence: a Realistic View and a Legitimate Perspective. It was authored by two Shura Council members and it generally addressed the practical and the ideological reasons behind the initiative. Unquestionably, this gradual process has been possible not only thanks to the new attitudes towards violence endorsed by al-Gamā’a al-Islāmiya, but also to the perceptive reaction of the State. By contrast, the a-national nature of the Islamic State obstructs this process. Indeed, after the local-oriented attitude of the first gam’iyāt and the emergence of al-Qa’ida as the premium brand of global terror, aims, push factors and geographical horizons of jihadism deeply changed. It is therefore not a question whether jihad is a binding religious prescription: it unquestionably is. The fundamental issue is whether and how one is to conduct it by lawful and prudent means and it is precisely this question that profoundly and irremediably divides the national jihadi movements from the Islamic State. As an internal Islamist critique - one that relies on a common Salafi substratum - the gam’iyāt refutation of global jihad may shed a light over the role of Da’ish in the contemporary jihadi panorama.
Belastungen von Angehörigen im Kontext psychischer Traumatisierungen (Stress for Relatives in the Context of Psychological Traumatizations)
No full textPsychische Erkrankungen haben in der bundesdeutschen Bevölkerung einen hohen Stellenwert und erreichen eine 12-Monatsprävalenz von ca. 30%. Dazu gehören auch posttraumatische Störungsbilder, die durch Einwirkung von Extrembelastungen aus dem beruflichen (wie beispielsweise bei Einsatzkräften) oder privaten Kontext (Raubüberfälle, Vergewaltigung etc.) entstehen können (Wittchen & Jacobi, 2012). In der Bundeswehr ergab eine kürzlich zum Abschluss gebrachte epidemiologische Studie eine 12-Monatsprävalenz psychischer Erkrankungen für Einsatzsoldaten von 21,4% und für Nicht-Einsatzkräfte von 22,5%. Die Posttraumatische Belastungsstörung war mit 2,9% vertreten, Angststörungen mit 10,8%, ebenso wie affektive Störungen, von einer Alkoholerkrankung waren 3,4% betroffen (Wittchen u.a., 2012). Die zunächst überraschend höhere Prävalenzrate in der Gruppe ohne Einsatz ist dabei durch Gesundheitsuntersuchungen der Bundeswehr vor dem Einsatz erklärbar, wodurch in einigen Fällen ein Einsatz zumindest vorübergehend unterbleiben muss, beispielsweise bei laufender Psychotherapie (Wittchen u.a. ,2012). „Das Leben mit einem psychisch erkrankten Menschen kann für die Angehörigen eine starke emotionale Belastung hervorrufen (Manguno-Mire u.a., 2007). Jede psychische Erkrankung greift nicht nur in die gewohnten Abläufe sondern auch in die ungeschriebenen Gesetze einer Partnerschaft ein und löst häufig ein Schwanken zwischen Hoffnung und Enttäuschung, Zuversicht und Resignation aus (Bischkopf, 2010). Auf der anderen Seite scheint familiäre Unterstützung ein protektiver Faktor gegen Langzeitstress zu sein (Stevens u.a. 2013) und den Verlauf posttraumatischer psychischer Erkrankungen positiv zu beeinflussen (Price u.a. 2013)“ ( Wesemann u.a.,2015, S. 3) Die supportive therapeutische Arbeit mit Angehörigen lässt daher positive Effekte sowohl für diese selbst als auch für die originär Erkrankten erwarten. English AbstractMental illnesses are very important in the German population and reach a 12-months prevalence of about 30%. This also includes post-traumatic disorders, which can be caused by the effects of extreme stress from professional (such as in the case of emergency services) or private contexts (robbery, rape, etc.). A recent epidemiological study in the German Army (Bundeswehr) revealed a 12-months prevalence of mental illness among soldiers in the armed forces who have been deployed of 21.4% and 22.5% for non-deployed personnel. Post-traumatic stress disorder was represented with 2.9%, anxiety disorder with 10.8%, as well as affective disorders, 3.4% were affected by alcohol disorder. The initially surprisingly higher prevalence rate in the group without deployment can be explained by health examinations of the Bundeswehr prior to deployment, which in some cases means that at least temporarily deployment was cancelled, for example during ongoing psychotherapy. Living with a mentally ill person can cause a strong emotional burden for the relatives. Every mental illness interferes not only with the usual processes but also with the unwritten laws of a partnership and often triggers a fluctuation between hope and disappointment, confidence and resignation. On the other hand, family support seems to be a protective factor against long-term stress and to have a positive influence on the course of post-traumatic mental illnesses. The supportive therapeutic work with relatives can therefore be expected to have positive effects both for them and for the original patients. The article was written in German
Radicalization and Mass Violence from a Beckerian Perspective: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations
Get PDFThis paper considers the conceptual and empirical merits of Ernest Becker’s analysis of radicalization and mass violence. Starting with several cases showing a clear link between exposure to traumatic events and violence, Ernest Becker’s idea that mass violence should be understood as an attempt to overcome the fear of death is examined in the light of recent experimental social psychological research, field research on the attitudinal effects of threatening situations, clinical modeling of the relation between fear and anger, and insights from neuroscience. Becker’s ideas, in conjunction with empirical research, may contribute to an understanding of how humans can behave under extreme circumstances
Re-enforcing Radicalisation with bad PR? The Nigerian Army's Handling of Boko Haram
Get PDFThe organisation formerly known as Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād' and currently known as Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah, better known as Boko Haram, rose to international prominence in April 2014, when it kidnapped over 250 school girls from the Nigerian village of Chibok. Although the organisation is active since 2002 and began its violent insurgency in 2009, the mass kidnapping of the “Chibok Girls” attracted worldwide attention to the conflict, in large part due to the #BringBackOurGirls campaign, which was actively supported by U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama. The attention however also focused on the Nigerian government and raised questions about its fight against Boko Haram, why the kidnapping occurred, what could be done to save the girls and how the terrorists could be defeated. This focus put pressure on Goodluck Jonathan's presidency and the Nigerian army to react to the kidnappings and produce results, turning the Boko Haram insurgency into a full fledged propaganda war. While there have been many military and political changes in the eighteen months since, it could be argued that the propaganda war has turned into the main front, thereby raising numerous questions about its impact on the battlefield
Funktionslogik terroristischer Propaganda im bewegten Bild (The Functioning Logic of Terrorist Propaganda in Moving Images)
No full textDie Medienfront ist heute ein wichtiger Kriegsschauplatz, den viele neben Land, Wasser und Luft für gleich wichtig halten. Terroristen fühlen sich in sozialen Medien wohler als man denken könnte. Im Netz können sie die asymmetrische Kräfteverteilung überwinden, die sie in der offenen Feldschlacht unterlegen sein ließe.Terroristen machen sich das Bild zur Waffe und produzieren erst durch die Positionierung an der Medienfront Sinn in ihren Taten. Ohne ein Bekennerschreiben, ein Abschiedsvideo des Attentäters oder ein letztes Posting im sozialen Netzwerk wäre ein Bombenanschlag nichts als ein Kapitalverbrechen. Durch die terroristische Kommunikationsstrategie wird das Verbrechen erst zum terroristischen Akt. Das ist die theoretische Grundannahme dieses Aufsatzes. Ohne Medienberichterstattung könnten terroristische Organisationen nicht existieren. Durch die Entwicklung des Web 2.0 und insbesondere sozialer Medien kommen terroristische Organisationen heutzutage aber ganz ohne das Verschicken von Videotapes an Fernsehsender aus. Durch YouTube und andere Kanäle, können sie die Adressaten ihrer Botschaften direkt und ohne zwischengeschaltete Journalistinnen und Journalisten erreichen.So ist es nicht erstaunlich, dass terroristische Organisationen sich eine gewisse Expertise im Umgang mit sozialen Medien zugelegt haben. Al-Qaida hat seine eigene Medienabteilung, auch die kolumbianischen FARC arbeiten sehr professionell und welchen Einfluss der Islamische Staat im Internet ausübt ist inzwischen bereits Gegenstand einiger Reportagen und Untersuchungen geworden.Die diesem Aufsatz zugrundeliegende Arbeit hat sich mit neun verschiedenen Videos aus dem Umfeld von al-Qaida, der IRA und der FARC beschäftigt und versucht, aus dem analytischen Vergleich dieser Videos Rückschlüsse über terroristische Medienmacher und die terroristischen Organisationen selbst zu ziehen. Wie schnell und suggestiv die Videos arbeiten, ist etwa davon abhängig, welche Ziele sie transportieren wollen und ob sie sich an Laien oder an bereits ideologisch vorgeschulte Anhänger richten. Sozialrevolutionäre Gruppen sind besonders bemüht um eine gute Außendarstellung, da sie tendenziell dazu neigen, elitär zu sein und sich von der Bevölkerung zu entfremden. Während sie eine klare Sprache nutzen, arbeiten religiös-motivierte Terroristen oft mit blumigen Bildern und Umschreibungen.Die taktischen Erwägungen von Terroristen, etwa ihre Kämpfer geheim halten zu müssen, führt oft dazu, dass sich die Vorteile des Web 2.0 nicht vollständig für sich ausnutzen können. Organisationen wie die FARC oder der Islamische Staat, die selbst über Rückzugsterritorien verfügen, können aber auch ganz ungeniert Gesicht zeigen und damit noch viel effektiver auf ihre Zielgruppen einwirken. Es hat sich auch gezeigt, dass es große Unterschiede in der Medienkompetenz terroristischer Organisationen gibt: Während die weiter oben erwähnten Gruppierungen teils eigene Medienstäbe eingerichtet haben, scheinen die Videoproduktionen anderer Organisationen eher Ausschussware zu sein. Wenn sich der terroristische Kampf wirklich auf dem Feld der Kommunikation entscheidet, so haben manche Organisationen hier die besseren Karten ausgespielt als andere. Sie schaffen es, ihre Ziele – die Dämonisierung und Einschüchterung des Feindes, die Legitimation der eigenen Gewalt und die Anwerbung neuer Kämpfer und Unterstützer – besser zu transportieren. Der Islamische Staat beschreitet auf diesem Gebiet keine grundsätzlich neuen Wege. Neu ist ihm nur die Leichtigkeit und die technische Professionalität, mit der er auf die Kommunikationsherausforderungen des digitalen Zeitalters reagiert. English AbstractThe media front is now an important theater of war, which many consider to be equally important alongside land, water and air. Terrorists feel more comfortable in social media than one might think. In the Internet, they can overcome the asymmetric distribution of forces which they would have to overcome in the open battle. Terrorists turn images into a weapon and only by positioning themselves on the media front they are able to produce meaning for their actions. Without a letter of confession, a farewell video of the assassin or a last posting on the social network, a bombing would be nothing but a capital crime. The terrorist communication strategy turns the crime into a terrorist act. This is the basic theoretical assumption of this paper. Without media coverage, terrorist organisations could not exist. With the development of the Web 2.0 and social media in particular, terrorist organisations nowadays can do without sending video tapes to television channels. Through YouTube and other channels, they can reach the recipients of their messages directly and without the need for intermediate journalists. It is therefore not surprising that terrorist organisations have acquired a certain expertise in dealing with social media. Al-Qaeda has its own media department, the Colombian FARC are also working very professionally online and the influence of the Islamic state on the Internet has already become the subject of several reports and investigations. The empirical work on which this essay is based has dealt with nine different videos from al-Qaeda, IRA and FARC communities and draws conclusions about terrorist media producers and terrorist organisations themselves from the analytical comparison of these videos. How quickly and suggestively the videos work depends on which goals they want to transport and whether they are directed at outsiders or at already ideologically trained followers. Social revolutionary groups are particularly keen to have a good public image, as they tend to be elitist and alienated from the general population. While they use a clear language, religiously motivated terrorists often work with flowery images and descriptions. The tactical considerations of terrorists, such as keeping their fighters secret, often lead to the fact that the advantages of Web 2.0 cannot be fully exploited. Organizations such as the FARC or the Islamic State, which have their own territories, can also show their face in a completely uninhibited manner and thus have an even more effective impact on their target groups. It was also shown that there are large differences in the media competence of terrorist organisations: while the above-mentioned groups have set up their own media staffs, the video productions of other organisations seem to be more of a by-product. If the terrorist struggle really is decided in the field of communication, some organisations have been more effective than others. They succeed in conveying their goals of demonising and intimidating the enemy, legitimising their own violence and recruiting new fighters and supporters. The Islamic State is not breaking new ground in this area. What is new to it is the ease and technical professionalism with which the organisation responds to the communication challenges of the digital age. The article was written in German