Journal for Deradicalization
Not a member yet
320 research outputs found
Sort by
Terrorism, the Internet and the Social Media Advantage: Exploring how terrorist organizations exploit aspects of the internet, social media and how these same platforms could be used to counter-violent extremism.
Get PDFThe deeply engrained nature of social media in modern life have provided ease of access to information and speed of use within almost every aspect of a person’s life. These same benefit are also available to terrorists and their organizations. The same technology that allows for a globalized world to interact without regard for distance or physical location is also utilized, exploited and adapted to by terrorist organizations to conduct operations, reach candidates and ensure organizational longevity. This article takes the position of observer of these advancements with the end goal of informing counter-violent extremism strategists of the advances that terrorist groups have already made in digital technology; and where the priority of intervention strategies should be aimed. Further, this is intended to guide policy makers to embrace and utilize digital technologies as a mechanism to carry counter-radicalization and counter-violent extremism interventions through the same digital potential and reach the same audiences as terrorist organizations. What appears strongly apparent is that social media will not abate from its intrinsic position graphed into daily life. This means that counter-terrorism, counter-radicalization and counter-violent extremism strategies must take up the same technology in order to effectively discredit and nullify extremist groups – a digital problem needs a digital solution.
Book Review: Alina Polyakova – The Dark Side of European Integration. Social Foundation and Cultural Determinants of the Rise of Radical Right Movements in Contemporary Europe
Get PDFIn her book “the Dark Side of European Integration”, Alina Polyakova establishes the assumption that social integration has not followed economic integration in the European project. Her research interest is, to find out whether and in which ways nationalism in its ethnic form constitutes a countermovement to the European project, an assessment which she bases on the increasing successes of radical right parties and movements all over Europe. Within the increasing success of radical right parties and movements she chooses 3 main contexts for closer analysis, examining different aspects of her broader research topic. The contexts she chooses are the factors for the electoral support of radical right parties, the individual motivations of people to join these parties or movements and in the last chapter a theoretical discussion of social movement research and the interconnections of social movements and political parties. In the 3 main parts of the book the author uses different methodological approaches; while the first part is a quantitative analysis with a Tobit regression, the second part is a qualitative research of interviews with activists and the last chapter is a discussion on a theoretical level. Also, Polyakova first refers to a set of countries, while turning to a single country in her second analysis and staying on a theoretical level in the third part of the book
Islamic State, Identity, and the Global Jihadist Movement: How is Islamic State successful at recruiting “ordinary” people?
Get PDFWhat conditions breed radicalization? How does Islamic State capitalize on those conditions to maximize their recruitment numbers? The foreign fighter phenomenon has puzzled academics, particularly as the crisis in Iraq and Syria has seen an influx of foreign fighters from “ordinary” backgrounds. This analysis attempts encapsulate why Islamic State is successful at recruiting foreign fighters by looking at their recruitment strategies in practice in conjunction with secondary analysis of identity theories and sociological processes of recruitment. The analysis finds that identity crises are key factor in the process, and IS recruiters are methodical in their approach of how they interject their ideology on the hearts and minds of the vulnerable
Conflict Management, Transitional Justice and De-radicalization – Different, but common goals
Get PDFThe aim of this working paper is to explore common issues between the process of reconciliation in post-conflict societies, negotiations and the renouncement of violent means. This paper brings forward the argument that reconciliation, negotiations as well as disengagement or de-radicalization processes are important for a non-violent communication between extremists and the society they should re-integrate. Re-opening communication channels after terrorist violence can help to build trust and chance former conflict party’s mindsets. Comparing the principles of victim-oriented instruments of transitional justice to the disengagement process of perpetrators demonstrates some reasons for successful collective disengagement. Furthermore, especially amnesties, ore milder punishment are important incentives for negotiations and disengagement. This is often evaluated as unjust by victims and may suppress a further truth-finding process. Choosing completive restorative justice instruments like public apologies and public discussions in truth-finding processes can increase justice for victims and makes de-radicalization processes more lasting
Counter-Productive Counter-Terrorism. How is the dysfunctional discourse of Prevent failing to restrain radicalisation?
Get PDFThis paper explores why the Prevent strand of the UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, is failing to achieve success in reducing radicalisation of young Muslims. By refusing to engage with extremists, and denying ‘extreme’ ideas a platform for expression, this paper will explain how the importance of cultural-linguistic epistemologies, and their role in extremism, has been overlooked. Rather than striving to understand how socio-political factors influence one’s reading of religious doctrines or interpretation of ideology, Prevent understands ideology to be the core radicalising agent, used by influential figures who can exploit the grievances of the vulnerable. The problematic repercussions of this will be addressed throughout, highlighting the various, and extensive, criticisms that Prevent has faced from academics, practitioners and commentators – primarily that it is counter-productive. The importance of the post-9/11 neoconservative paradigm in underpinning Prevent will be explained, but a Neo-Weberian approach, as a better lens through which to understand radicalisation, will be proposed, to ultimately trump the simplistic, yet currently dominant, ‘Conveyor Belt’ theory. Based on this, recommendations are made for an improved Prevent, rooted in the notion that radicalisation, extremism, or terrorism cannot be prevented, without knowing the motives, the views, and the assumptions of the radicals, the extremists, and those vulnerable to engaging with them.
Disengagement from Ideologically-Based and Violent Organizations: A Systematic Review of the Literature
Get PDFResearch on disengagement from violent extremism is an emerging field of inquiry. As compared to the related field of radicalization, there have been fewer studies of disengagement. Further, little effort has been made to conduct a large scale, systematic review of what is currently known about disengagement from violent extremism. This type of meta-literature assessment can play an important role in terms of informing strategies and programs designed to facilitate exit. To help fill this gap, our project systematically examines the disengagement literature to determine the range and frequency of various exit factors identified in previous studies. We also rely on parallel literatures such as exit from street gangs, mainstream religious groups, cults, and nonviolent social movements to build a robust sample of studies that assess the extent to which group exit factors may generalize across different populations.
Rise of Radicalization in the Global Village. Online Radicalization vs. In-person Radicalization - Is There a Difference?
Get PDFIn the vicinity of open space, some authors have called the “dark web” the perfect “breeding grounds” for generating conditions for seeds of extremism to thrive and grow. The perceived anonymity and vast information databases found here present a perfect incubator for terrorist activity. Academics and policymakers alike are as well convinced that such an open space filled with recruiter masterminds is perfectly adept at embracing the unadoptable, unconventional, or socially unfit into terrorist or jihadi organizations.Nevertheless, regardless of organizations, modernization and adoption of new technological methods in which one can obtain ideas and information, many individuals are still and to a great extent, influenced by face-to-face interactions. Intimate environments of a religious institution, somewhat of a home-like feeling in community gathering center, can equally impact a person, as can the internet and its vast informational influence.For the reason of contributing to understand the radicalization in the Global Village, this article will examine differences in online and in-person radicalization and illustrate it with some examples and attempt to make a comparison between two different exposures to information and its effects on young individuals
De-Radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: developing a basic prison based de-radicalisation programme
Get PDFThe Nigerian Counter Terrorism Strategy recognised that force alone was not enough to combat violent extremist elements in Nigeria and that a multi-faceted approach was required to counter the threat of violent extremism. The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) was tasked with developing an ambitious countering violent extremism (CVE) programme consisting of three elements: community-based counter radicalisation; strategic communications; and de-radicalisation. The de-radicalisation element of the CVE programme included establishing a prison based de-radicalisation programme for sentenced and pre-trial prisoners. The challenge facing ONSA and the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS) in setting up the de-radicalisation programme was considerable. Prison conditions were basic; there were no existing offending behaviour programmes on which to build; risk assessment was rudimentary and focussed on escape risk; awareness among staff at all levels of de-radicalisation programmes, their content and how they should be managed, was minimal; specialist staff were in short supply and had no training in running interventions; and resources, both physical and financial, were limited.This paper sets out how ONSA and NPS went about establishing the de-radicalisation programme and describes key elements of that programme, including: creating a supportive operating environment; risk and needs assessment; types of intervention; and programme management and staffing. It highlights the challenges and lessons that can be drawn from the operation of the programme during its first 18 months, which will be of particular interest to low resource, post-conflict and fragile states that are seeking to establish their own basic de-radicalisation programmes.
Suburban Bliss or Disillusionment - Why Do Terrorists Quit?
Get PDFThis study explores the explanatory value of two theories of desistance – the cessation of criminal behavior – in explaining why 27 individuals left the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). The article focuses specifically on jihadists that turned away from ISIS after March 2011, asking why individuals desist from ISIS and choose to leave the caliphate. A dataset of 27 narratives of desistance was analysed to answer the question to what extent desistance from ISIS by jihadists can be explained by the Laub & Sampson’s life course theory and by Altier, Thorogughood & Horgan’s model of push and pull factors. The primary pathways for desistance are coded according to the two theories. The results show that of the 27 individuals, the majority desisted from the caliphate because of their perception of the excessive use of force by ISIS and their inability to cope with the effects. A minority desisted because of their perception of alternative options outside the terrorist group or because of important life events that happened ‘at home’. Thus, the article concludes that the push and pull factors model is valid in the explanation of desistance from the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq whereas life course theory does not hold explanatory valu
Youth Evaluations of CVE/PVE Programming in Kenya in Context
Get PDFDespite the military efforts of the Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Somali Federal governments, the collaboration of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces with US and coalition forces, and despite the enormous tactical and strategic set-backs that al-Shabaab has faced over the last five years, its insurgency in the Horn of Africa (HoA) remains resilient. The Kenyan government’s approach to stemming domestic recruitment to al-Shabaab remains fixated on law enforcement control and surveillance. As a result, many Somali communities are subject to daily crackdowns, interrogations, and discriminatory profiling practices whose negative effects are only heightened by current tribal and clan-based tensions in the country. Current scholarly evaluations of Kenya’s ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ (CVE) & ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (PVE) policies tend to adhere to three major approaches: top-down evaluations by elites repeatedly locating the protection of national security in inter-agency cooperation; bottom-up CVE/PVE evaluations placing primacy on the voices of Muslim community elders, such as imams, social workers, parents, and community leaders for interventions with at-risk youth; and social scientific evaluations of CVE/PVE policy through empirical exploration of the push and pull factors of youth recruitment into militancy. To date, there is a dearth of studies asking what Kenyan youth leaders think about CVE/PVE policies especially in light of the fact that they are often the main targets of al-Shabaab attacks. This study has one key objective: to use input from Kenyan youth to evaluate the effectiveness, suitability, and appropriateness of Kenya’s current CVE/PVE policies in order to dissect their utility, inefficiencies, and possible harms, and contribute to the academic and policy discussions on the best CVE/PVE policy mix