Journal for Deradicalization
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Die Pluralität der Radikalisierung - Eine systematische Analyse der Theorieansätze zur Radikalisierungsforschung (The Plurality of Radicalization – A Systematic Analysis of Theories Within Radicalization Research)
No full textProcesses of radicalization are assessed to be dynamic processes of change and in particular transformative learning processes of attitudes and behaviours. Based on ideological foundations, they include diverse initiative motivators and triggers, different accelerators as well as various drivers and catalysts. Individuals and groups can be radicalized to the use of violence due to these multiple components, which are interacting in various ways in a complex mechanism. But it is hardly possible to make generalizations on specific factors, sequences and combinations setting up the process of radicalization. However, this does not mean, that processes of radicalization can't be understood and that research on radicalization is useless. Future analysis should decrease their focus on a desired radical profile and increase their exploration on the plurality of radicalization; the different paths and diverse ways leading people through various levels to the use of violence. Article in Germa
How much Takfir is too much Takfir? The Evolution of Boko Haram’s Factionalization
Get PDFThis article explores the ways in which the doctrine of takfir has been a central component in causing the Boko Haram movement to factionalize. The paper considers the historical origins of the concept of takfir and then turns to looking at how this concept has been (re)interpreted in the contemporary period among jihadist groups such as Boko Haram. Contemporary usage of takfirism as an ideology has often led to lethal consequences for civilians on the ground who are labeled “Kafir”, and devastating consequences for the internal cohesion of groups who use takfir as disagreements arise over who is or is not “Kafir”. The concept is highly controversial, and has torn jihadist movements apart. The priority given to this concept in Boko Haram factions provides an illustrative case study of takfirism in contemporary jihadist movements. In the conclusion, the article provides recommendations on how this concept can be incorporated into CVE programs and especially de-radicalization of both leaders and foot soldiers of Boko Haram
Countering ISIS Call for Hijra (Emigration): A Review through the Lens of Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah
Get PDFFrom Al-Qaeda to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and now the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the so-called Islamic State (IS), hijra (Arabic for emigration), has been exploited by these groups to justify their call for Muslims all over the world to emigrate to Dār al-Islām or abode of Islam. Historically and in the Islamic context, hijra refers to the earlier generation of Muslims who left Mecca for Abyssinia as well as Prophet Muhammad’s emigration to Medina. This paper focuses on the notion of hijra as interpreted by ISIS to draw Muslims to Iraq and Syria to strengthen its rank and file. It argues that the modern jihadists’ interpretation of hijra is a misrepresentation of the two earlier emigrations. More importantly, it fails to satisfy the Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah or the objectives of Sharīʿah law. This paper will make a critical analysis of the concept of hijra from the perspective of Maqāṣid Ash-Sharīʿah, and offer an ideological rebuttal strategy to counter ISIS’s call for hijra. It will also attempt to address the ideological flaws in the call which foreign terrorist fighters (or FTF) are unaware of
Rethinking ‘Radicalisation’: Microradicalisations and Reciprocal Radicalisation as an Intertwined Process
Get PDFThis paper proposes a rethinking of ‘radicalisation’ as a process with no definite beginning or inevitable end-point. Reflecting on empirical research which engaged with radical Islamist and far-right activists and supporters, it argues that we should not focus the concept of radicalisation on the moment in which an individual or group moves from legal to illegal activity, or from non-violent to violent, as this is only one part of a longer journey. Thus, the term radicalisation should encompass any movements towards greater conflict, both commonplace and rare, small and large, driven by a potentially infinite range of motives, encompassing all political outlooks, and made by individuals, groups, societies and states. Using this conceptualisation instead allows us to examine how small conflicts escalate through ‘reciprocal radicalisation’, and how big radicalisations arise from microradicalisations. This, we argue, provides a more equitable basis for policy and practice that aims to avoid, prevent or combat the most problematic radicalisations, or otherwise resolve political conflict. To achieve this, however, also means not hyping everyday radicalisations into a threat to the existence of the nation state
Radikalisierungsprozesse westlicher Dschihadisten. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel Denis Cuspert (Radicalization processes of Western Jihadists. An examination using the example of Denis Cuspert)
No full textDiese Arbeit setzt sich mit der Frage auseinander, wie sich westliche Dschihadisten radikalisieren und welche konkreten Faktoren dazu beitragen können. Anhand theoretisch ausgearbeiteter Modelle, soll der Frage am konkreten Beispiel Denis Cuspert nachgegangen werden. Aufgrund der Brisanz des Themas, allein in der Bundesrepublik sind in den letzten Jahren über 850 Personen nach Syrien oder in den Irak ausgereist, liegt die Notwendigkeit einer Auseinandersetzung mit dessen Hintergründen nahe. Gerade hinsichtlich Cuspert, dem die Sicherheitsbehörden ein erhebliches Mobilisierungs- und Gefahrenpotential zusprechen, wurden bisher vor allem nicht-akademische Beiträge gewidmet, weshalb diese Arbeit den Anspruch erhebt, diese zu sammeln und den Radikalisierungsprozess Cusperts in einer theoriegeleiteten, empirischen Untersuchung darzulegen. Die Ergebnisse spiegeln, wie in der Forschung zur Radikalisierung vielfach ersichtlich wird, die Vielschichtigkeit des Prozesses wieder. So sind es, wie so oft, persönliche Krisen und Diskriminierungserfahrungen, Identitätsprobleme, Einflüsse extremistischer Bewegungen sowie Narrative dass der Westen einen Krieg gegen den Islam führt, die letztlich dazu führen, dass er in den Dschihad zieht. Was der Fall Cuspert aber auch lehrt ist, dass sich vor allem aufgrund von individueller Charakteristika erklären lässt, warum in fundamentalistischen Kreisen manch einer zur Waffe greift und ein anderer nicht.English AbstractThis study deals with the question of how western jihadists radicalize and which concrete factors might contribute to this, using theoretically elaborated models and the case study of Denis Cuspert. Due to the pressing nature of the issue, in recent years more than 850 people have left Germany for Syria or Iraq, the necessity of dealing with the background of radicalization is obvious. Particularly with regard to Cuspert, to whom the security authorities ascribe a considerable mobilization and risk potential, so far primarily non-academic contributions have been devoted to, which is why this work aims to collect these and present Cusperts' radicalization process in a theoretical and empirically based investigation. The results reflect the complexity of the process, as is often evident in radicalization research. Thus, as is so often the case, it is personal crises and experiences of discrimination, identity problems, the influence of extremist movements and narratives that “the West is waging a war against Islam”, which ultimately lead to him being dragged into jihad. What the Cuspert case also teaches us, however, is that individual characteristics above all explain why in fundamentalist circles some people resort to taking up weapons and others do not. The article is written in German
Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization. Counterterrorism and Homeland Security in France and Germany
Get PDFThe article analyzes the commonalities and differences of counterterrorism (CT) practices applied by governments in France and Germany and their effects on the local ground. Altogether, there has been a qualitative difference of CT responses. Paris has launched more extensive measures than Berlin. Regardless of the differences, the policies of both governments lack attention towards the unintended effects of these specific measures. For instance, the concern raised by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) about the prolongation of the state of emergency in France is one starting point of analysis. AI accused the French authorities of abetting home-grown radicalization as a result of the discriminate repression in marginalized suburbs of Paris. The paper’s argument is twofold: First, decision-makers in Paris and Berlin respond to terrorist threats in a one-sided and linear way. Second, they disregard that the very CT measures are likely to fuel radicalization. In this light, polarization and stigmatization breed radicalization. Based on this discussion, policy recommendations will be presented. Amongst other things, these recommendations include a more symmetric integration of local actors in the overall de-radicalization effort. This refers to the content and tone of public debates as well as to the equal treatment of prison imams
De-radicalization and Counter-radicalization: Valuable Tools Combating Violent Extremism, or Harmful Methods of Subjugation?
Get PDFThis article debates the justifications behind the practice of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization. It emphasizes the concepts as shrouded in confusion, and highlights that the practices continue to develop and expand despite claims of counter-productiveness, wholly subjective evaluation, and significant doubt around their premises. The aim of this article is to encourage a greater awareness of the potential costs to society of promoting policy with no rigorous basis of evidence. Focussing on both (rehabilitative) prison counter-radicalization schemes and (preventative) non-prison based de-radicalization, the discussion explores the evaluative methods that remain chaotic despite a growing need for ‘evidence-based’ public policy-making, examines the tenuous link between terrorism and ideology which upholds the principles behind attempts to combat radicalization, and then analyses the possible outcomes for society of relying on these schemes to minimize extremist violence. It concludes that taking the link between terrorism and ideology as causal is deeply flawed, and that by persisting with no systematic method of evaluation combating radicalization in these ways will continue to fail. Indeed, in prisons, they have been found to be distrusted, ineffective and even detrimental. Outside of prisons, where preventative counter-radicalization programmes exist, these will continue to divide societies among the lines where suspect communities are drawn. It takes the view that whilst we continue to elevate de-radicalization as a ‘useful tool’ in combating terrorism, we will also continue to associate certain people groups with terrorism and only add to grievances that exist in our societies
Dutch Suspects of Terrorist Activity: A Study of Their Biographical Backgrounds Based on Primary Sources.
Get PDFWith the impending defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, supporters of terrorist groups, among them home-grown supporters and returning foreign fighters, have become a huge security threat to their country of return. Some have committed attacks in western countries, even while under the surveillance of authorities. Counter-terrorism is confronted with enormous challenges. One of the most prominent issues is the absence of evidence based knowledge on early warning signs. Experts on radicalization and terrorism have emphasized that neither typologies of terrorists nor accurate descriptions of generalizable risks can be made. This leads to opportunities for those who are willing to prepare and commit acts of terrorism to do so, without the agencies in charge of monitoring such individuals being able to accurately identify relevant threats. An additional deficiency in counter-terrorism research, is its dependency on historic and secondary source material. One of various actors in the Netherlands tasked to evaluate and mitigate relevant risks of terrorist suspects and offenders, is the Dutch Probation Service (DPS). In response to today’s prevailing terrorist threat, a specialized section of the DPS is set up to identify and supervise potential problem behaviour of those who are suspected or convicted of terrorism. The authors have been involved in this Unit Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalization (TER) for years. As professionals of TER, the authors have had unique access to both judicial data, such as police files and prosecutor’s data, as to experts in the Dutch field of counter-terrorism. The authors have analysed the pre-sentencing advices of twenty-six clients of the DPS. These files are comprised of several socio-economic, historical, psychopathological and behavioural indicators. The goals are to learn from the analysis of the biographical backgrounds of the suspects and to stimulate the debate on management and supervision of terrorist offenders.
Who does (not) belong to the jihadis’ umma? A comparison of IS’s and al Qaida’s use of takfīr to exclude people from the Muslim community.
Get PDFSince the declaration of the caliphate in mid-2014, the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) has been preoccupying the media as well as experts and scientists. Thereby, the organisation is often described as succeeding al Qaida as the most important and most dangerous salafi jihadi terror group. Despite the two groups being commonly referred to as salafi jihadi and fighting for supremacy in the jihadi landscape, they differ in terms of ideology and creed (ʿaḳīda), as well as their way of fighting a jihad (manhadj). The purpose of my paper is to highlight the differing ideologies of the two organisations regarding their excommunication of (Sunni) Muslims (takfīr) by analysing jihadi sources. The Islamic State uses the concept of excommunication (takfīr) to legitimise violence against four categories of Sunnis: (1) Muslim rulers, who do not rule according to the sharia; (2) Islamist parties that take part in democratic elections; (3) Muslim rebels questioning the authority of a ruler; and (4) other jihadis who come to the defence of Sunnis who are declared apostates by IS. Whereas al Qaida agrees in the excommunication of the first two categories, it heavily criticises IS for excluding the third and fourth categories of people from the Islamic society (umma), accuses IS of leaning towards extremism (ghulū) and provoking a division of the society (fitna). Analysing IS’s extensive use of excommunication of Sunni opponents and al Qaida’s criticism of it, I derive the conclusion that the two organisations differ in their definition of who belongs to the Muslim society (umma) and thus is to be protected. This means that IS does not succeed al Qaida but takes an even more extremist orientation
Re-Purposing the Push-Pull Model to Describe Signature Patterns of Terrorist Disengagement by Group: A Validation Study.
Get PDFVarious researchers have developed the push-pull model (Aho, 1988; Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014; Altier, Boyle, Shortland, & Horgan, 2017; Bjorgo 2009). Others have completed research on factors of disengagement (Barrelle, 2014; Gill, Bouhana, & Morrison, 2015). The studies aggregate data from either individual testimonies or group analyses into a broad pool of factors in order to create a universal theory. This paper argues that rather than trying to view all terrorist organizations as having commonalities, the push-pull model can provide a unique perspective of how each group is dissimilar. Each organization has a distinctive pattern of disengagement that aligns with its context. Of particular interest is the positive or negative orientation of members toward their former community. The data from four studies of disengagement from different terrorist organizations also provide a meso-level view to validate the push-pull model, allowing for a comparative analysis of whether some factors occur more frequently or do not appear in specific groups as well as whether some factors are missing from the model. A future counterterrorism application of this paper would be to carry out push-pull analyses of terrorist organizations in order to create a convincing strategy tailored by organization that will encourage members to voluntarily leave