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Amateur Hour Is Over: Time for College Athletes to Clock In Under the FLSA
The debate surrounding the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) amateurism principles has waged for decades. The governing body of college athletics insists that the athletes who compete on a daily basis should not—or shall not—receive any compensation in exchange for their services while NCAA executives line their pockets with billions of dollars each year. This concept of “no pay for play” has drawn national criticism since the NCAA created the term “student-athlete” in the 1950s to combat a workers’ compensation claim. The amateurism principles were concocted as an attempt to prevent college athletes from being classified as employees of their universities; put more plainly, the NCAA intentionally labeled college athletes as “amateurs” to deny the athletes the compensation they are entitled to.
Athletes have challenged the NCAA’s amateurism principles under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the past, petitioning courts to recognize athletes as “employees” of their universities, but to no avail. Courts traditionally rely on an “economic reality” test to determine whether an employer–employee relationship exists, entitling the petitioning party to guaranteed protections under federal labor laws. In the context of college athletics, however, the economic reality of the relationship between the athletes, their universities, and the NCAA is traditionally defined by the NCAA’s concept of amateurism. But what happens when amateurism is exposed for the sham of a concept it truly is?
This Note explores how recent judicial, legislative, and societal events have eviscerated the credibility of the NCAA’s amateurism principles. Specifically, this Note argues that a district court order, though issued in the antitrust context, precludes future courts from relying on the amateurism principles to define the economic reality of college athletics. The case, In re National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation (Alston), exposes the hypocrisy behind the NCAA’s compensation rules in a way that changes the calculus of an FLSA challenge and demands a finding that college athletes qualify as employees under federal labor laws. Now, the Supreme Court is set to get involved, granting certiorari to review Alston and allow the Court to assess the amateurism principles for the first time in thirty-five years. With the pressure surrounding the NCAA’s exploitation of college athletes reaching an all-time high, this Note proposes that the NCAA proactively abandon its commitment to its antiquated concept of amateurism and afford college athletes the basic fundamental rights they are entitled to through collective bargaining and group licensing agreements.
The NCAA has stubbornly insisted on labeling college athletes as “amateurs” when reality reflects that the athletes are anything but. In fact, the only distinguishing factor that separates college athletes from their professional counterparts is the arbitrary—and frankly insulting—label that the NCAA desperately clings to. No longer can the charade continue. The NCAA’s time is up; amateur hour is over
Reluctance Or Apathy? Examining Georgia’s Continued Adherence to a Strict Mutuality Issue Preclusion Doctrine
The common law doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, prevents parties from relitigating an issue in subsequent lawsuits if a prior judgment already conclusively decided the issue. Issue preclusion traditionally required strict mutuality of parties; the first and second lawsuits had to involve the exact same litigants. Although the majority of jurisdictions now allow nonmutual issue preclusion, Georgia continues to enforce “identity of parties” as a necessary element of issue preclusion. Despite recently reaffirming this requirement, the Georgia Supreme Court has not thoroughly analyzed the merits of the rule.
This Note examines the evolution of issue preclusion and the mutuality element in federal and state courts, distinguishes offensive and defensive assertions of issue preclusion, contrasts Georgia with other jurisdictions, considers policy arguments, and explores why the Georgia Supreme Court has not addressed the nationwide trend towards allowing nonmutual issue preclusion. The Note argues for changing Georgia law to allow nonmutual issue preclusion in civil litigation and advises practitioners on practical avenues for achieving that goal
Professional Gamers are Today’s Professional Athletes
Recall the adversities faced by many in the entertainment industry. Freddie Mercury tried to join several bands before forming Queen. Judy Garland signed with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer at age thirteen after performing with her sisters throughout her childhood. Babe Ruth signed his first professional baseball contract with the minor-league Baltimore Orioles. Those same historic adversities faced by these giants of the entertainment industry are being repeated today in a closely related field—the Esports industry.
Esports, a form of competitive video gaming, attracts audiences that “rival some of the world’s great sporting events.” A thorough due diligence review of the industry-norm contract must be undertaken. Esports professionals continue to fall victim to handshake deals put to paper like so many entertainers before them. Esports organizations use heavy-handed contracts to severely limit professionals from exploring other options and strip them of most of their earnings.
Turner “Tfue” Tenney’s lawsuit against FaZe Clan brought to the forefront the lack of regulation in the Esports industry and the question of whether gamers should be entitled to similar protections as actors, artists, and athletes, and other entertainers. The Talent Agency Act (TAA) and the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act (MAA) apply different standards to the representation of artists and athletes. By dismantling the pros from the cons of these two Acts, legislatures can craft new Esports-specific legislation to protect the creative minds of these professionals.
Specifically, the proposed legislation should further define “artist” and “other entertainment enterprises” from the TAA to account for the new characters in the entertainment industry, such as professional gamers and influencers. The legislation should also define “athlete” to help guide courts in determining if professional gamers are better labeled as an athlete, artist, or a combination of the two.
This is not the first time the entertainment industry has prioritized agents’ financial gains over artists’ and athletes’ freedom to contract and livelihoods, but hopefully courts, legislatures, and lawyers can use the past lessons of Freddie, Judy, Babe, and the countless others to better protect professional gamers
\u3ci\u3eRobots are Coming for the Lawyers but Might Also be Their Rainmakers\u3c/i\u3e
Imagine what a lawyer does on a given day: researching cases, drafting briefs, advising clients. While technology has been nibbling around the edges of the legal profession for some time, it’s hard to imagine those complex tasks being done by a robot.
And it is those complicated, personalized tasks that have led technologists to include lawyers in a broader category of jobs that are considered pretty safe from a future of advanced robotics and artificial intelligence
The State Courts Don\u27t Have Time for Your Crackpot Antiquarianism: A Decade of Domestic Homicides Since \u3cem\u3eGiles v. California\u3c/em\u3e
This article presents the first comprehensive review of the 114 domestic homicide cases since Giles in which there was an intimate relationship between the victim and the accused, and the victim had made statements that were sought to be introduced against the defendant. In general, the courts were not overtly critical of Giles, although they also seemed entirely uninterested in its originalist underpinnings. Yet they managed to overturn very few convictions. Whether they were simply tuning out what they perceived to be Supreme Court posturing and getting on with business as usual, or merely following the facts and the law where these took them, the lower courts\u27 response to Giles makes for an interesting case study in what happens when the Supreme Court issues rules that the lower courts disagree with