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Cyr v. Michaud: Correction of Clerical Errors with Juror Affidavits
Get PDFCyr v. Michaud, a civil suit to recover for personal injuries, was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict which included specific answers to five interrogatories. After a unanimous verdict for the plaintiff was entered and the jury was discharged, the defendant obtained affidavits from all of the jurors which indicated that the jury had made a mistake. The trial court rejected a motion to correct the error and the defendant appealed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, ruled that juror affidavits are not admissible to correct errors in the recording of verdicts. The Law Court reached the proper result, but the language of the opinion is excessively broad. In an attempt to reaffirm the rule accepted since Lord Mansfield\u27s time that a juror may not impeach his own verdict, the court ignored a well-established exception to that rule—juror affidavits may be admitted to correct a clerical error made in recording a verdict. The Law Court in Cyr v. Michaud failed to recognize the distinction between a case in which a clerical error is made and one in which the jurors simply misunderstand the law or the facts as presented to them. In the latter case juror evidence is not admissible to correct mistakes. Applicable case law suggests, however, that juror affidavits should be admitted to correct clerical errors. If certain safeguards are employed, there is no reason to overrule the case law allowing this exception. The Michaud ruling should therefore be limited to its facts. As a result trial courts should be free to follow earlier Law Court decisions allowing trial courts to determine whether clerical errors exist by reviewing juror affidavits and allowing such courts to order new trials rather than force the parties to accept an unintended result
Baybutt Construction Corp. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.: A Question of Ambiguity in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies
Get PDFA critical issue pervading the realm of commercial insurance contract law concerns the clarity of provisions contained in policy agreements. Insurance policies containing unclear or complicated language may give rise to situations in which the actual intentions of the contracting parties are not reflected in the technical terms of the policy. The parties\u27 conflicting expectations often lead to costly litigation. In such cases, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has made it clear that it will ordinarily rule against the party who wrote the policy (the insurer) and in favor of the party whose expectations were unfulfilled (the insured). The Law Court most recently confronted the issue of readability and ambiguity in insurance policies in Baybutt Construction Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., in which the court found ambiguity in the subject policy and held in favor of the insured. The Baybutt court, however, may have mistaken complexity for ambiguity in the policy\u27s comprehensive general liability insurance provisions, and may thus have extended coverage beyond the original intentions of the parties. The effect of the Law Court\u27s interpretation thus seems to have been to create a new contract, a function exceeding the court\u27s jurisdiction. An examination of the relevant case law and policy considerations suggests that the Law Court should have followed the example of the majority of jurisdictions deciding this same issue, and held in favor of the insurer
Deductibility of Investigatory Expenses Incurred in Business Expansion: North Carolina National Bank v. United States
Get PDFSection 162 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the current deduction of all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business . . . .” Exactly which business expenditures meet the requirements of section 162, however, has not been easy for courts to determine. In an attempt to enunciate a standard that is easily applicable to complex business transactions, courts have refused to allow current deduction of business expenditures which result in a benefit or advantage with a useful life which continues beyond the taxable year. In North Carolina National Bank v. United States, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that bank expansion expenditures will be allowed as current deductions, even if the life of the benefit exceeds the taxable year, unless the expenditures result in the acquisition of a separate and distinct additional asset. North Carolina National Bank is a national banking association with its principal office and place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina. In addition to its main office, the bank maintains branch banking services statewide. During the tax periods involved, the years 1965 through 1968, North Carolina National Bank expended large sums investigating new branch office locations. These expenditures were mainly for two types of planning activities: metro planning and feasibility studies. Metro planning studies sought to identify regions of North Carolina that would require banking services in the future and to determine how the bank might meet those needs. When metro planning studies indicated that a new branch should be established in a particular location, feasibility studies were then undertaken for each proposed new branch location in order to provide the bank\u27s expansion planners with more closely focused economic information. Expenditures were also made in applying to the Comptroller of the Currency for permission to expand
The Vitality of the Doctrine of Punitive Damages in Maine
Get PDFOn four separate occasions between December 1981 and February 1982, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court called into question the continued vitality of the common law doctrine of punitive damages. The substantive propriety of punitive damages was not challenged by any of the defendants in those four cases. As a result, the Law Court assumed for the purposes of each opinion that punitive damages could be awarded by a court in some instances without explicit statutory authorization. Nevertheless, in a footnote to Braley v. Berkshire Mutual Insurance Co., the court challenged this assumption. Noting that the doctrine of punitive damages initially was implemented by a divided court in 1861, the Braley court asserted that the judicially created rule . . . is open to reconsideration in light of modern considerations and authorities [and because] it may not have been thoroughly examined since then. An examination of the rationale and effectiveness of the doctrine of punitive damages, however, reveals that the doctrine is as vital today as it was when it was implemented. Indeed, in some circumstances, modifications in the application of the doctrine have provided adaptation to the needs of modern society, making the use of punitive damages even more important than a century ago. This does not mean necessarily that the doctrine is faultless. Nevertheless, the problems which are associated with the doctrine warrant its modification, not wholesale renunciation. When the conduct of a defendant evidences malice or wanton and reckless disregard of [a] plaintiff\u27s rights, more than merely compensatory damages generally ought to be awarded
What the Cluck? Backyard Chickens and Maine\u27s Mysterious Right to Food
Get PDFWhen Maine voters approved the nation’s first “right to food” constitutional amendment, many were concerned about the amendment’s potential to conflict with animal welfare, food safety, and other regulations currently in place at the state and local level. Born from a decade of advocacy, the amendment represents a new era for Maine’s food sovereignty movement. However, the boundaries of the amendment remain unclear, and Maine’s municipalities lack sufficient guidance as they attempt to navigate how this amendment applies to them. This Comment explores one example of the many challenges that may arise from the enactment of the right to food amendment. Zoning regulations and local ordinances regulating health and safety, long under municipal control through the right of home rule, may be upended if they unreasonably restrict residents’ ability to procure their own food. Specifically, this Comment examines backyard chicken ordinances in light of the new amendment and structures a model ordinance that attempts to appropriately balance individuals’ right to food with municipalities’ right to regulate public health and safety. This Comment shows that it is possible, with some flexibility on both sides, for these rights to coexist. As Maine and other states look to their constitutions as a mechanism for creating individual rights where the U.S. Constitution has left gaps, it is critical to show that these rights are not just nice in theory, but workable in practice
Shoreline Access in Rhode Island: A Case Study of Black Point
Get PDFAccess to the shoreline in Rhode Island has been a strong tradition since the colonial era. However, with increasing development pressures on the formerly rural shore areas, especially in the region of the state commonly called South County, it was only a matter of time before public and private interests collided over the diminishing resource. That inevitable collision occurred at a particular piece of shorefront property known as Black Point, in the Town of Narragansett, when a developer purchased this large tract of ocean-front property and proposed the construction of luxury condominiums. The project would entail the closing of an extensive network of paths to and along the shore that had been used by members of the public for over 100 years. Negative public reaction to the project was swift and dramatic. This Article will examine the course of the controversy and its ultimate outcome. At the heart of the matter was the ability of the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) to evaluate an enormous volume of evidence pointing to the existence of a dedicated path to and along the shore. The controversy emerged as a statewide political issue pitting Rhode Island\u27s largest developer against the state\u27s largest environmental organization and the Environmental Advocate of the Rhode Island Attorney General\u27s office. Although the CRMC\u27s decision and various aspects of the Black Point case will be under appeal for years, the political heat generated by the case resulted in the condemnation of the entire parcel by the Governor for open-space recreation and incorporation into the state\u27s park system. As a prelude to discussion of this controversy, the history of shoreline access law in Rhode Island will be reviewed. Finally, the Article will review the case\u27s impact on shoreline access throughout the state
Maine Refuses to Recognize a Cause of Action for Loss of Parental Consortium: Durepo v. Fishman
Get PDFIn Durepo v. Fishman, two minor children filed suit to recover for the loss of parental consortium resulting from injuries allegedly suffered by their mother when she was negligently treated by a physician. The defendant moved to dismiss the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court. The case invited the Law Court to declare for the first time in Maine whether a minor child should possess an independent right of action for loss of parental consortium against a third person who negligently causes physical injury to a parent. The Law Court declined that invitation and deferred to the Legislature for consideration of the public policy issues involved in this proposed extension of tort liability. The question now becomes: what should the Legislature do? This Note considers whether the Legislature should statutorily adopt a right of action for loss of parental consortium. The Note reviews the development of the claim for loss of consortium, tracing it from its origin in the property rights of men to the modern view which stresses relational interests in care, comfort, society, and companionship. Analysis of contemporary rulings and approaches with respect to parental consortium demonstrates the growth of a small but significant minority viewpoint recognizing the cause of action denied by the Law Court in Durepo. After weighing the variety of considerations on each side of the issue, this Note concludes that the Maine Legislature should indeed exercise its lawmaking power in order to create a right of action for loss of parental consortium
Disparity and the Need for Sentencing Guidelines in Maine: A Proposal for Enhanced Appellate Review
Get PDFPerhaps in no other field of judicial endeavor is diversity and variety more apparent than when a sentencing judge considers the circumstances presented by a defendant convicted of a criminal offense. In each case, the sentencing judge confronts an individual who has no exact counterpart in any defendant previously appearing before the court for sentencing. The sentence imposed is primarily a matter of judicial discretion and is based upon consideration of the nature of the offense, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense, and the circumstances of the defendant. The sentencing judge formulates a specific sentence within broad statutory authorization by balancing the competing and contradictory societal goals reflected in the statutory purposes of sentencing. Such a scheme provides significant leeway for the exercise of judicial discretion in determining the length of a criminal sentence and thus permits variations in sentences imposed for convictions of the same criminal offense. Some commentators suggest that sentencing in Maine can be compared to an extreme form of substantively irrational law described as Khadi Justice. The Khadi, for whom this concept is named, is a Moslem judge who sits in the market place and renders decisions without reference to rules or norms. He operates within a broad universe of information and he alone determines what portion of that information is relevant and should be employed in any given case. Although the comparison is far from accurate, it does point out the absence in current sentencing practice of a coherent and accepted scale of punishment within the broad sentencing range established by statute. Acting under the impetus provided by overcrowded prisons, the abolition of parole, increased sentences, and claims of disparate treatment, critics argue that there is a need to structure and to govern the exercise of discretion by the sentencing judge in order to promote uniformity in sentencing. Legislative enactment of sentencing guidelines is the means generally considered for accomplishing such a goal. Sentencing guidelines typically take into account two variables, the seriousness of the offense and the background of the offender, and provide scales with which to measure each variable. The actual sentence is determined by reference to a grid that designates a sentence corresponding to the combined measurement on both scales. For an administrative commission or a legislature, it is a monumental task to determine abstractly an appropriate sentence for every conceivable future offender. Moreover, the legislative process is too unwieldy to enact and refine sentencing guidelines, and such statutory sentencing schemes thus suffer from rigidity. Finally, there are certain risks in subjecting the sensitive subject of sentencing directly to the whims of the political process. These shortcomings suggest that the Legislature is ill-suited for creating sentencing guidelines. It is not necessary, however, to abandon all efforts at improving the current system. Thus far, little thought has been given in Maine to the alternative of expanding the grounds for direct appeal of sentences and charging the judiciary with the task of creating sentencing guidelines in the process of deciding cases. Appellate courts with common law powers share the lawmaking function with legislatures, and the case-by-case decisional process affords courts the flexibility required to establish scales of punishment. Maine is one of only twenty-six states that provide some form of appellate review of criminal sentences. This Article discloses the deficiencies in the current system of sentence review in Maine and compares it to the eighty-year-old English system of direct appeal of criminal sentences. The sentencing guidelines produced in England show that appellate review provides an effective and rational means of flexibly structuring the exercise of sentencing discretion. Maine has not yet achieved improvements in sentencing practice through channeling sentencing discretion. This Article therefore suggests that the Legislature should change Maine\u27s present system of appellate review in order to permit the development of a law of sentencing by the judiciary
Arctic Policy Considerations for Scottish Independence
Get PDFThe ongoing effects of climate change on the Arctic environment raises the geopolitical importance of the Arctic and nearby regions, such as the broader High North. With deteriorating relations between Russia and much of the international community, changes to international borders in these regions would undoubtedly be a concern for those with Arctic interests. Consequently, due to Scotland’s location in the world, the legal analysis surrounding any Scottish claim to external self-determination under international law would include Arctic considerations. Following a review of the Artic policy priorities of the U.K. and Scottish governments, and each government\u27s involvement in developing those policies, this Comment provides a broad discussion of the Arctic’s role in the analysis. On one side of the analysis, this Comment concludes that differences in Arctic policy priorities between Scotland and the U.K. adds some weight, albeit insufficient on its own, to support Scottish claims. On the other side, this Comment concludes that differences in military and security policy represent the potential disruption of the status quo, causing key nations like the U.S. and other NATO countries to view Scottish independence as a possible threat to the maintenance of international security. Given Scotland’s geostrategic importance to NATO in deterring and responding to Russian aggression, this alleged security threat could be sufficient to outweigh any factual considerations supporting a Scottish external self-determination claim under international law assuming the region will remain unstable. Therefore, in the event Scotland unilaterally secedes from the U.K., this Comment recommends that Scottish claims should diminish these security concerns and emphasize how the differences in Arctic policies between Scotland and the U.K. prevents Scotland from pursuing its political, economic, cultural and social development