University of Maine School of Law
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The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine\u27s Submerged Lands: Public Rights, State Obligation and the Role of the Courts
Get PDFThe State of Maine has within its borders over three thousand miles of coastline and numerous navigable rivers and lakes. The productive use of these waterways and the lands which lie beneath them historically has been linked to the quality of life within Maine and continues to be essential to the social and economic development of the state. Both the state\u27s control over its thousands of acres of submerged lands and the public\u27s right to use these lands derive from what has come to be known as the public trust doctrine. The basic tenet of the doctrine is that the state holds its submerged lands in trust for the benefit of the general public. The public trust doctrine comprises the rights of the public to use a state\u27s waterways and the obligations of the state to preserve and protect those rights. The doctrine has developed into a framework through which the courts may play a significant role in protecting the public against unnecessary infringement upon its rights in submerged lands. Although the precursors of the public trust date back to Roman law and the doctrine itself has been a part of our common law heritage for hundreds of years, its precise nature and ramifications remain unclear. Maine\u27s Legislature and the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court recently had an opportunity to consider the nature of the public trust obligation and any resulting limitations upon legislative activity. In 1981, the Legislature enacted a controversial bill which relinquished all state interest in submerged lands that had been filled prior to 1975. Later that year in the Opinion of the Justices, the Justices upheld the validity of the legislation. Both the Legislature and the Justices unequivocally acknowledged the public trust in Maine law. This series of events has stimulated a renewed interest in the meaning of the public trust doctrine in Maine and has raised questions as to the role of the courts in enforcing state trust obligations
The Parent-Child Privilege and the Parent-Child Crime: Observations on State v. DeLong and In Re Agosto
Get PDFShould a child be compelled to testify against his parent under threat of criminal punishment? Ignoring for a moment the applicable legal doctrines, there are several reasons why one might answer no. First, if we value the idea of family loyalty, and believe that loyalty of a child to his parent is particularly important for traditional, moral, and practical reasons, then measures taken by a state to undermine such loyalty must be viewed critically. Second, children tend to accumulate tremendous amounts of information about their parents\u27 activities and are party or witness to many communications made by their parents with an expectation of confidentiality. Obviously, children can provide an excellent source of evidence about and against their parents, particularly if they are too young to appreciate the implications of disclosing such information; those societies which have made extensive use of the practice of collecting information about people through their children are generally indifferent to what members of our own society call civil rights. Finally, when the question involves minor children, as the preceding comment suggests, the child\u27s capacity to evaluate the implications of testifying about or against a parent is limited. The minor child\u27s limited capacity suggests not only that he may lack the requisite intent to justify punishment for contempt of court, but also that he lacks an option available to the adult. The very notion that evaluation of the implications of testifying is involved suggests that an adult faced with a court order to inform against his parent would view himself as having an option, if he felt an overriding moral obligation to his parent, to choose civil disobedience and risk punishment for contempt of court rather than inform. But a minor child faced with the same moral dilemma would obviously be less well equipped to make that choice. If he cooperates and the parent suffers, the child may well blame himself for his parent\u27s fate. If he refuses to cooperate and is punished, it is doubtful that the punishment will leave the child unscarred, even if it were knowingly incurred for reasons of conscience. The child who feels overriding loyalty to a parent, once punished, may form the conclusion that parents do not deserve loyalty and that conscience is a poor guide. Anyone who takes the foregoing concerns seriously, cannot help but be disturbed that the legal doctrines applicable to a child asked to testify against a parent take none of them into account. In general, no evidentiary privilege or immunity applies. The divergent assumptions behind two judicial decisions of early 1983 suggest, however, that these concerns should be receiving serious attention. In State v. DeLong, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, upheld the seven day jail sentence of a fifteen year old girl for criminal contempt for refusing to testify against her adoptive father. In In re Agosto, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada recognized a parent-child privilege barring interrogation of the adult son of the target of a grand jury investigation
Boucher v. Maine Employment Security Commission: The Role of Acceptance in Employment Security Law
Get PDFThe Maine Employment Security Law was enacted in an attempt to limit the serious social consequences of unemployment and to insure individual workers against the distress of involuntary unemployment. Under the law, employees who leave work voluntarily without good cause are ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Until recently the Maine Supreme Judicial Court had not determined whether a substantial reduction in wages by an employer would constitute good cause to leave work under the voluntary quit provision of the law. In Boucher v. Maine Employment Security Commission, however, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, determined that under the voluntary quit” provision of the law, a substantial reduction in wages did constitute good cause to leave work voluntarily. A review of the pertinent case law and policy considerations suggests that although the court would have been correct in establishing this precedent under other circumstances, the court misapplied the law to the facts in Boucher
The Status of Jury Trial Waivers in Maine\u27s District Court
Get PDFThe power of a defendant to waive jury trial in state and federal criminal prosecutions has long been recognized. At the same time, when the offense charged is serious, i.e., one which invokes a federal constitutional right to jury trial, the United States Supreme Court has required a careful examination of the validity of such a waiver. The waiver rule applicable in Maine\u27s superior court fully appreciates this strict waiver standard. Exercising its rulemaking authority, however, Maine\u27s Supreme Judicial Court adopted a rule (effective in 1982) for waiver of jury trial in the state\u27s district court which seemingly obscured the criminal defendant\u27s unequivocal right to jury trial. But two years later in State v. Rowell, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has interpreted that district court waiver provision in a manner which assures the continued vitality of the Maine criminal defendant\u27s jury trial right
State v. Curlew: Assessing the Sufficiency of Evidence Under the Corpus Delicti Rule
Get PDFIn State v. Curlew, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, reversed a conviction for unlawful sexual contact. The court predicated reversal upon a reaffirmation of both the substantive aspect and the evidentiary aspect of the corpus delicti rule. The substantive aspect of the corpus delicti rule requires the state to produce, exclusive of any confession or admission by the defendant, such credible evidence as will create a substantial belief that the crime charged has been committed by some person. The evidentiary aspect of the corpus delicti rule requires proof of the corpus delicti prior to the introduction of the defendant\u27s statements into evidence, thereby insuring that a defendant\u27s statements are not introduced prior to independent proof of the corpus delicti. Based on these requirements, the court concluded that the state had failed to establish a touching of the genitals through evidence independent of the defendant\u27s admission and therefore reversed the conviction. The corpus delicti rule has been in force in Maine since 1951. Curlew, however, highlights the adverse impact that a highly technical application of the corpus delicti rule may have on the state\u27s ability to prosecute a case based upon all the otherwise admissible evidence. Instead of reviewing all the evidence adduced at trial under a sufficiency of the evidence approach, the reviewing court under a corpus delicti analysis is precluded from examining statements made by the accused. Thus, the practical effect of Maine\u27s corpus delicti rule, as interpreted by Curlew, is to eliminate the probative value of such statements
Hanover Insurance Co. v. Hayward: Imposition of Punitive Damages in Addition to Criminal Sanctions
Get PDFIn Hanover Insurance Co. v. Hayward, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, addressed the issue whether punitive damages may be awarded against a defendant who has been criminally convicted for the conduct giving rise to the punitive damages claim. Although it affirmed the superior court\u27s decision not to allow the award of punitive damages, the Law Court concluded that the imposition of criminal sanctions did not by itself bar punitive damages. Instead, the court indicated that criminal punishment is merely one factor to consider in determining whether an award of punitive damages would serve a meaningful deterrent function. The Hayward court thus avoided an opportunity to resolve the long standing question whether punitive damage awards are proper under Maine law. Further, in addressing the narrower question whether civil punitive damages are available in spite of a defendant\u27s prior criminal conviction, the court failed to explain why two successive proceedings should be allowed to accomplish one purpose: to punish a wrongdoer in order to deter similar conduct by the wrongdoer and by other members of the community. An examination of the relevant case law relied upon by the court reveals that the justifications offered in prior Maine cases for allowing punitive damages when criminal punishment could be imposed may no longer be valid. Furthermore, the justification for punitive damage awards in Maine may no longer be differentiated from the justification for criminal punishment as expressed in Maine\u27s new Criminal Code. Finally, there are significant procedural safeguard problems in allowing punitive damage awards in civil actions
Common Law Sovereign Immunity and the Maine Tort Claims Act: A Rose by Another Name
Get PDFOn October 12, 1976, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court allowed a Bath homeowner to sue the city for damage to her property resulting from the city\u27s negligence. The case was Davies v. City of Bath and its significance was twofold. First, for decades before the Davies decision the Maine Supreme Judicial Court had routinely refused to consider such suits because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Fifteen years before Davies the court had expressed dissatisfaction with the doctrine, but until 1976 had repeatedly refused to abrogate it. Second, the Davies decision was significant because the Maine Legislature, under the guiding hand of the Maine Municipal Association, reacted swiftly to the decision by passing the Maine Tort Claims Act. The Act became effective January 31, 1977, about three months after the court\u27s decision in Davies. In many ways the Act codifies common law sovereign immunity. Immunity remains the rule and liability the exception. Liability provisions are specific, however, unlike the common law, where liability had been couched in rather general terms open to liberal interpretation. For instance, a major area of common law liability involved municipal activity which could be called proprietary in nature. The term is not subject to precise definition, but for present purposes it is sufficient to say that it was broad enough to make a town liable when acting for gain or remuneration and not solely because of a duty imposed by law . . . . Similarly, other potentially broad exceptions to municipal immunity were not retained in the Tort Claims Act. Moreover, the Act places new and unique notice requirements on the individual injured by municipal negligence, imposes a two-year statute of limitations, and imposes a $300,000 cap on recovery from any municipality
Religious Beliefs, Unemployment Benefits, and Constitutional Choices: Flynn v. Maine Employment Security Commission
Get PDFThe last decade has seen a growing number of individuals adopt fundamentalist, born-again Christianity. For these people, religion requires more than observance of a sabbath, weekly services, or financial commitment. Fundamentalist religion often requires its adherents to spread their religious beliefs with missionary zeal. Religion may be a constant preoccupation and as such, is brought into the work place. Thus, there is potential for conflict between the needs and demands of employers and the exercise of one\u27s religion. While the free exercise clause of the first amendment may not always provide protection for employees against employers\u27 requirements, it nevertheless serves to protect unpopular religions and religious beliefs against government action. Consequently, when religious beliefs interfere with finding or keeping employment, unemployment benefits cannot be denied to the claimant. What happens, though, when an employee is fired for following his or her fundamentalist beliefs? Can this conduct rightfully be called misconduct, and is the state justified in denying unemployment benefits? In Flynn v. Maine Employment Security Commission, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed the question whether the Maine Employment Security Commission\u27s application of a statutory provision barring unemployment benefits for misconduct impermissibly burdened the claimant\u27s right to the free exercise of religion under the first amendment
Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Retarded in Maine: The Inevitable Face-Off with Zoning
Get PDFIn July 1978, agencies and officials of the State of Maine entered into a federal consent judgment which terminated a class action lawsuit that had dragged on for three years. The consent judgment in Wuori v. Zitnay detailed a comprehensive plan designed to bring about speedy and meaningful relief to the plaintiff class: mentally retarded citizens of Maine involuntarily confined to Pineland Center, Maine\u27s principal institution for the mentally retarded, and certain others who were conditionally released from Pineland and in community placements. The relief granted was a right to be provided the least restrictive and most normal living conditions appropriate for each member of the class. The decree required that mentally retarded persons be moved from the centralized Pineland institution to small facilities integrated in the communities of Maine. In August 1981, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld a lower court determination that a proposed group home for the mentally retarded is not a single-family use permitted in a residential zone. As a result of the Law Court\u27s decision in Penobscot Area Housing Development Corp. v. City of Brewer, the Wuori defendants\u27 ability to implement the federal court mandate is made to depend upon the local municipality\u27s receptivity to group homes as reflected in the municipality\u27s definition of family in its zoning ordinance. The tremendous power and promise of a decree of the federal judiciary, redressing violations of constitutional rights, thus can be rendered dysfunctional by a state court applying a local zoning ordinance. This Comment explores the evolution of the deinstitutionalization movement in Maine, the effect of Wuori and Penobscot on that movement, and, finally, posits that federal-state judicial comity should have compelled a different result in Penobscot
Supplements to Environmental Impact Statements: Implementation of the Standards Set by the Council on Environmental Quality
Get PDFEnvironmental impact statements (EISs) are prepared before any major federal project is undertaken, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). An original EIS may become obsolete if a Project\u27s operation later changes in any significant way, or if previously unsuspected environmental impacts are later discovered. When either of these two events occurs, compliance with NEPA demands that a supplemental EIS be prepared to focus on the changes. The decision whether a supplement is required in any particular situation is guided by standards set by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). In addition, some federal agencies have promulgated their own internal regulations to guide these supplementation decisions. A substantial controversy presently exists as to whether the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company\u27s plan to increase spent fuel storage at its Wiscasset, Maine nuclear reactor site is the type of change in a project for which a supplemental EIS is required. The State of Maine, as an intervenor in the case, is arguing before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the potential increase in spent fuel storage is exactly the kind of variation from an original plan that a supplemental EIS is designed to bring to the public\u27s attention. In the context of three recent judicial decisions applying agency standards for supplemental EISs, this Comment examines ways in which a uniform application of the CEQ\u27s now-binding standard will affect the decisionmaker\u27s role in all cases in which review of an agency\u27s supplementation decision becomes necessary, and points out ways in which individual agency requirements may be ineffective to implement NEPA\u27s demands. The Comment then reviews Maine Yankee\u27s proposed changes in its spent fuel storage operation and predicts that some of those changes will trigger the need for a supplemental EIS in light of the CEQ Guidelines