University of Maine School of Law
University of Maine, School of Law: Digital CommonsNot a member yet
1960 research outputs found
Sort by
The Precedential Weight of Summary Dispositions of Appeals
Get PDFThe extent to which the Supreme Court\u27s summary dispositions of appeals are entitled to precedential weight presents a serious problem for lower courts confronted with cases involving issues similar to those previously disposed of in a summarily decided appeal. A recent source of confusion in this area was the Supreme Court\u27s 1975 opinion in Hicks v. Miranda. In Hicks, the lower court held a California statute unconstitutional despite the fact that one year earlier the Supreme Court had summarily dismissed an appeal from a decision upholding the constitutionality of the same statute., The Supreme Court reversed, pointing out that its summary dispositions of appeals are decisions on the merits that lower courts must respect as binding precedents. Accordingly, last year in Mandel v. Bradley the Court significantly limited its Hicks dictum by emphasizing that summary dispositions, as precedents, are to be narrowly confined to their specific facts. Following a description of the Supreme Court\u27s summary review procedures, this Comment will attempt to define the relationship between the doctrine of stare decisis and summary dispositions of appeals in light of Hicks v. Miranda. The problem is first considered in the context of a summary disposition that is obviously applicable to a later case. Next, the problem of overbroad interpretation of more ambiguous summary dispositions is identified and illustrated with examples from lower court decisions. Finally, Mandel v. Bradley is analyzed for its future significance for the use of summary dispositions of appeals as precedents
Graduated Responsibility as an Alternative to Current Tests of Determining Criminal Capacity
Get PDFWhen a person breaks the law, inquiry may be made into why he acted in an illegal manner and, if he satisfies the relevant test of criminal exculpation, he will be held blameless under the law. Although a range of explanations of behavior is possible, when examining criminal responsibility, the law is concerned only with those excuses which bear on moral culpability. This comment suggests an alternative to the absolutist notion that the defendant is either completely responsible or completely irresponsible for his unlawful act. It is contended that cognitive and volitive capacities exist by degrees and that a fairer, more socially useful legal test of responsibility would make punishment more nearly proportional to the defendant\u27s capacity at the time of the unlawful behavior
Argersinger and the Right to Counsel in the Military
Get PDFThe dramatic advances made since 1965 in recognizing the right to counsel for accused indigents have steadily, albeit unevenly, extended to military courts-martial. Despite this progress, many questions remain unresolved regarding right to counsel both generally and in the military. While the right to counsel is solidified in general courts-martial, it remains precarious in special and summary courts-martial, for the right to lawyer counsel is defeasible where a military exigency is shown in the former and lawyer counsel is not yet required service-wide in the latter. The military exigency exception to full sixth amendment rights to easily degenerates into a catchall which allows officials to deny lawyer counsel for a multitude of reasons which sound more like inconvenience than true exigency. A recent United States district court opinion cleared away some of the confusion by holding that lawyer counsel must be made available to all defendants in summary courts-martial. Of equal importance was the same court\u27s restrictive view of the military exigency exception. By holding that only the most extreme military operative reasons may be offered for use of nonlawyers at summary trials, the court showed a new willingness to police the unfettered discretion of commanders in deciding whether or not law-trained counsel are available
Federal Evaluation of Riparian Property: Section 111 of The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1970
Get PDFCertain of our citizenry persist in their belief that the water resources of this nation are essentially a free good which necessitates very little, if any, governmental interference in the development or beneficial exploitation of these resources. Theirs is obviously a dream world which dangerously ignores evidence from much of our history as well as the obvious conditions of the present. The nation is confronted with too many people, and the promise of many more, making too many demands upon our existing and foreseeable supply of water to allow the perpetuation of a myth of rugged individualism. This attitude has created an over demand for water which in turn has led to the tragedies of flood, drought, and chronic pollution, a crisis of national magnitude that requires solutions. The federal government does in fact have a history of involving itself in the protection and development of our national waterways. Until fairly recently, however, such federal activity was justified largely on the basis of assuring navigability and was confined primarily to that purpose. But, this narrow genesis of federal involvement has proved to be the key to the federal multiple purpose waterway regulation and development that has become commonplace since at least the 1930\u27s. Endeavors to cope publicly with the water resources crisis have involved considerable expense over the past forty years and even greater public outlays undoubtedly will be necessary in the future. Some portion of such past outlays can be attributed to the necessary purchase of compensable, preexisting, private property rights which proved to be too inconsistent with federal water plans to allow for the continued and effective existence of such rights. To the extent that even greater federal involvement with our water resources is to be expected and encouraged in the future, the occasions necessitating the taking of compensable property rights will also increase. The word to be emphasized, however, is compensable. For, in the instance of many such waterway acquisitions, the federal government, and thus the general taxpayer, has been judicially blessed with a money saving attribute of national sovereignty that is commonly referred to as the navigation servitude. As a result of that doctrine, in many instances no federal compensation is due anyone for the taking of otherwise legitimate property interests. However, the 91st Congress chose to forfeit one very valuable aspect of the navigation servitude and, in so doing, legislatively overruled at least one Supreme Court decision. This article is concerned with examining the occurrence of this congressional forfeiture and overrule
Maine\u27s Judicial Machinery at the Crossroads
Get PDFThere is really no such thing as a court ; in modem society, at least, there is only something which may be called a court system. Even that designation, however, may be a misnomer; a court system is really no more than a group of people, judges, clerks, lawyers, bailiffs, and so forth, tied together by certain functional arrangements. Even the finest institutional organization for a court system will produce delay and injustice if it is not staffed by competent people. Conversely, the most competent and dedicated people cannot produce satisfactory results from an institutional arrangement which does not permit them to operate up to their full capacities. A judicial system is, therefore, somewhat like the proverbial chain, only as strong as its weakest link. Like the chain, the system may appear to be operating satisfactorily until stress is placed upon that one weak link. There are clear signs that just such a situation exists today in the State of Maine; the critical overload has not yet been reached, but the weakness is there, and the question before us is whether we will act now, or only when crisis is upon us. President Nixon recently noted that Justice delayed is not only Justice denied, it is also Justice circumvented, Justice mocked, and the system of Justice undermined. Neither lawyer nor layman can take issue with this appraisal. In civil cases, justice delayed means, for successful plaintiffs, excessive delay in receiving rightful compensation, and for defendants, an excessive period of uncertainty as to their liability. On the criminal side, delay means that society may be leaving at large and unsupervised those who have committed crimes or, in the case of those defendants unable to raise bail, that it may be detaining those who will be ultimately set free, either because they are innocent or because they are safe probation risks. Delay, therefore, means a repudiation of the two basic purposes for which the judicial system stands; the prompt resolution of civil disputes, and the prompt disposition of criminal charges. For the benefit of both society in general and the parties immediately concerned, such delays must be minimized and hopefully eliminated. A positive step toward that elusive goal would be administrative regionalization of Maine\u27s court system
Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc.: Defective Products, Expanded Liability, and the Demise of the Impact Rule
Get PDFDuring the last decade there has been a rapid change in the theories of recovery in cases involving defective products. A majority of jurisdictions has adopted strict products liability as a tort. Others still employ implied warranty, a device, apparently tort, borrowed from contract law. A minority still holds that a plaintiff must prove his claim in negligence. In a recent decision, Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., the Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed the question of the extent of a manufacturer\u27s liability for a defective product and the nature of the proof necessary to show a compensable injury. This bipartite decision represents a considerable departure from precedent, and the court has indicated that further change in the field of products liability may be imminent. Malcolm Wallace removed a bottle of Coca-Cola from a grocery store cooler and opened it. Upon taking a drink, he felt a foreign object touch his lips. Investigation disclosed that an unpackaged prophylactic was immersed in the liquid. After returning home and thinking about his experience, he became ill. His illness was manifested by vomiting, which persisted for some time and caused him to be absent from work. Plaintiff brought suit against the bottler alleging a breach of warranty and negligence. On defendant\u27s motion, the judge dismissed the breach of warranty allegation and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of negligence. The dismissal of the warranty claim was not appealed. Essentially, plaintiff\u27s evidence was: (1) The bottle reacted normally when he opened it; (2) he was in the process of drinking the beverage when he discovered a foreign object in it; and, (3) he became ill as a result of drinking the contaminated beverage. The jury drew an inference of negligence from this evidence and awarded damages to the plaintiff. The issues addressed by the court on appeal were: (1) Whether negative evidence of tampering by third parties should be an essential element of plaintiff\u27s case; and (2) whether recovery should be allowed for mental injury not accompanied by a physical impact. The court affirmed the jury\u27s verdict by holding on the first issue that in situations of this type plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that: 1. The bottle he purchased was processed by the Defendant; [and] 2. There was nothing unusual about it when it was opened. On the damages issue the court overruled a 1921 Maine case and held that, subject to certain limitations, physical impact is no longer necessary to recover for mental suffering
The Civilianization of Military Law
Get PDFMilitary law in the United States has always functioned as a system of jurisprudence independent of the civilian judiciary. It has its own body of substantive laws and procedures which has a different historical derivation than the civilian criminal law. The federal courts have always been reluctant to interfere with the court-martial system, as explained by the Supreme Court in 1953 in Burns v. Wilson: Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment. This Court has played no role in its development; we have exerted no supervisory power over the courts which enforce it . . . .” As a result, the court-martial system still differs from the civilian court system in such aspects as terminology and structure, as well as procedural and substantive law. Throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th, the court-martial system was still an autonomous legal system with its own distinct procedures and laws relatively unaffected by civilian notions of criminal law and judicial due process. Court-martial abuses and outrageously severe sentences led to the first public movement for the civilianization of military law. For the first time the question was asked why members of the military had to be subjected to a system which failed to afford them the constitutional and due process rights to which they would be entitled in civilian courts. This article will consider the growth and development of the civilianization movement from World War I to the present, and those aspects and structures which still remain as targets for reform in light of the conflicting arguments concerning further civilianization of military justice
Uniform Maine Citations, 2025-2027 Edition
No full textUniform Maine Citations is organized so that similar types of references to Maine authorities appear together. The organization is grouped by primary or secondary research materials, including subdivisions for (1) statutory and legislative materials, including constitutions, statutes, legislative documents, and municipal ordinances; (2) court decisions, rules, and documents; (3) executive agency regulations, reports, and other documents; and (4) secondary materials that analyze and interpret the primary materials, including Maine-specific treatises, practice books, and legal periodicals. Beyond guidance for proper citation, the primary and secondary sources identified in this edition constitute a useful catalog of materials available to support research into Maine legal authority and sources that discuss them. Further, Uniform Maine Citations identifies the major law libraries and the state and federal court and state government websites that provide free access to primary sources for Maine-specific legal research materials. Maine Uniform Citations undertakes to provide annually updated guidance for the proper form for citation to and location of Maine-specific primary and secondary legal source material. As with the editions that most recently preceded it, this edition is published on the University of Maine School of Law website alongside the Maine Law Review page and is updated at least annually on the academic calendar to recognize new developments and new sources of Maine-related legal research.https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/uniform-maine-citations/1020/thumbnail.jp
A (Loper) Bright Future? Charting Federal AI Legislation With State Blueprints In a Post-Chevron World
Get PDFDespite a growing proliferation of algorithmic systems across the market, the U.S. lacks a comprehensive federal AI law to address the risks posed by this technology. The 2024 Supreme Court case Loper Bright v. Raimondo, which overturned the doctrine of Chevron deference, arguably complicates the passage of such a law by constraining Congress’ ability to use ambiguous statutory language as a means of reaching legislative consensus. Nevertheless, as Congress prepares to tackle this complex issue, it can look to state legislatures that have passed AI laws amidst similar constraints. The purpose of this article is to analyze certain state AI laws in the context of their respective deference levels, affording federal lawmakers insights into what is legislatively feasible in terms of AI in a post-Chevron world