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The Balance of Power in Professional Sports
Get PDFThis note examines the problems of the professional athlete in dealing with the establishment in the sports world. The basic framework for analysis lies in the operation of our free enterprise ideas in the practical context of professional sports. The professional athlete suffers from a severe lack of bargaining power in his relationship with management. This bargaining imbalance is inconsistent with the premises of our free enterprise system and must be eliminated if the professional sports world is to avoid a total breakdown in labor-management relations
Editorial - Edward Settle Godfrey III
Get PDFThe old University of Maine College of Law, founded in 1898, was one of the better law schools in the United States in its time. Several very able and distinguished men served on the school\u27s faculty. Many graduates became renowned as judges and lawyers and the students published a law review of considerable merit. In the final issue (1920) of the old Maine Law Review an editorial expressed grave shock and disappointment at the decision to close the College of Law. Throughout the editorial, nonetheless, ran a note of optimism, an expression of hope that the school might soon thereafter be reinstated in even a better condition than before. The hope of early reinstatement was not fulfilled. The school was not resurrected, as the new University of Maine School of Law, until 1961 and the task of turning a physical building into an institution was not undertaken in earnest until 1962. We are fortunate, however, that this task was entrusted to Edward Godfrey. Now, with Dean Godfrey\u27s decision to resign his administrative duties and return to full-time teaching and research at the end of the school year, the first administration of the new school will come to an end. Looking at the achievements of this administration, it is clear that the hope for a better condition expressed by the 1920 editors has already been more than fulfilled
The Administrative Discharge: Changes Needed?
Get PDFAt its annual convention in 1968 the American Bar Association adopted a resolution authorizing its Special Committee on Military Justice to urge congressional action with respect to the military administrative discharge and military due process of law. In response to this urging two bills were introduced in the 91st Congress dealing with the administrative discharge of members of the Armed Forces. One was sponsored by Congressman Charles E. Bennett, (D. Fla.). Another was introduced by Senator Sam J. Ervin, (D. N.C.). The Bennett bill proposes amendments to title 10 of the United States Code to limit the separation of members from the Armed Forces under conditions other than honorable, and the Ervin bill proposes extensive amendments to the same title of the United States Code to further insure due process in the administrative discharge procedure followed by the Armed Forces. The purpose of this article is to present a survey of the existing provisions of the various branches of the Armed Forces pertaining to the administrative discharge of military personnel, and to compare and evaluate the proposed legislation
Free Speech And Synthetic Lies: Deepfakes, Synthetic Media, and the First Amendment
Get PDFThe rapid evolution of deepfakes and synthetic media presents unique and pressing challenges to the scope and resilience of First Amendment protections. While these technologies can be used creatively or comedically, they are increasingly weaponized in ways that can cause substantial harm: from non-consensual pornography and fraud to manipulated political content and reputational sabotage. As the production of synthetic media becomes more accessible and convincing, courts and lawmakers are being called upon to resolve the tension between free expression and individual dignity, autonomy, and privacy. This Article examines whether existing exceptions to First Amendment free speech—such as obscenity, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, copyright, and the right to publicity—are sufficient to support broad legislation regulating synthetic media. It concludes that they are not, primarily due to the narrowness of these doctrines and defenses such as parody, satire, and fair use. Instead, this Article argues for the expansion of the right to privacy as a compelling government interest capable of justifying narrowly tailored restrictions on synthetic media. Drawing from U.S. tort law, constitutional privacy guarantees, and comparative constitutional frameworks, the Article demonstrates how privacy—while underrecognized in American constitutional jurisprudence—has historical, moral, and policy-based foundations robust enough to support such legislation. This Article also revisits the tort of false light, which has long been recognized in American privacy law, as a historically grounded and constitutionally viable framework for addressing the emotional and reputational harms caused by deepfakes. Further, this Article proposes a three-tiered model for a federal legislative response. Tier One criminalizes the creation and dissemination of non-consensual synthetic pornography. Tier Two enhances penalties where synthetic media is used to facilitate or amplify criminal conduct such as harassment, fraud, or extortion. Tier Three avoids criminalization for deepfakes generally but allows for takedown requirements and civil remedies, preserving space for satire and artistic expression.Ultimately, this Article calls for a recalibration of free speech doctrine in the age of synthetic media. While safeguarding expression remains a bedrock principle of democratic society, unchecked deepfake proliferation risks undermining truth, consent, and the autonomy of the individual. The law must evolve to protect citizens from being co-opted by machines—and others—into saying or doing things they never said or did, without silencing legitimate expression in the process
Pay-to-Play: Maine’s Unconstitutional Requirement for Indigent Defendants to Pay to Appeal Eviction Judgments
Get PDFMaine’s eviction appeal process imposes financial barriers that effectively condition appellate review on a tenant’s ability to pay. Under Maine law, tenants must pay rent or arrears—often in dispute—before filing an appeal. This “pay-to-play” requirement disproportionately harms low-income tenants, particularly those receiving public assistance, and violates constitutional due process and equal protection guarantees. Despite federal and state precedent rejecting financial barriers to appeals, Maine’s eviction appeal system continues to restrict access to justice for indigent tenants. This Article examines the legal and constitutional implications of these requirements, comparing Maine’s approach to eviction appeals with those of other states. It explores the disparate impact of these financial barriers on protected classes, particularly tenants of color and women, who face disproportionately high eviction rates. This Article finds that Maine’s eviction appeal process unlawfully denies indigent tenants meaningful access to the courts. It argues that requiring tenants to pay in order to challenge an eviction judgment exacerbates housing instability and reinforces systemic inequities. The Article further highlights alternative state models that balance due process protections with landlord interests, offering a comparative framework for reform. To address constitutional deficiencies imposed by the appeal bond, this Article recommends legislative changes to eliminate financial prerequisites for filing eviction appeals. It proposes a bifurcated approach that distinguishes between tenants seeking to remain in possession and those appealing solely to challenge an eviction judgment. Additionally, it calls for fee waivers and escrow procedures that allow tenants to contest wrongful evictions without facing insurmountable financial hurdles. By reforming its eviction appeal process, Maine can align its housing policies with constitutional protections and ensure that all tenants, regardless of income, have meaningful access to appellate review
Breaking Up with the Anti-hero: How 303(B)(3) Can Help Law Schools Mitigate Their Perennial Devices, Prices, Vices, and Crises
Get PDFThe American Bar Association’s issuance of Standard 303(b)(3) represents a pivotal shift compelling law schools to adapt their approach to the evolving needs of law students, lawyers, and the profession. The Standard serves as an invitation to re-evaluate the relationship between the primary curriculum and student support frameworks. This Article proposes a comprehensive approach to infuse professional identity development throughout the first year of law school. While professional identity development requires ongoing efforts, sometimes tailored to particular practice interests, this Article contends that all students benefit from early explicit instruction on foundational professional identity competencies. This Article first outlines the current challenges facing law schools, including the strains on students and the evolving landscape of legal education. Next, it provides a short overview of the history and evolution of professional identity mandates. Then, it examines the intersection between student success theories and professional identity development and the qualities shared by both. Finally, it offers practical strategies for integrating early-stage professional identity development into the first-year experience, emphasizing the importance of a holistic and integrated approach. By embracing the mandates of ABA Standard 303(b)(3) and integrating professional identity development into the core curriculum, law schools can foster the growth of well-rounded, ethical practitioners, ultimately contributing to a stronger legal profession and civil society
A Rule 54(b) Dilemma: Divorces Lacking Finality Due to Undismissed Counterclaims
Get PDFRecent decisions of the Maine Law Court bring into sharp focus certain difficulties inherent in applying rules of civil procedure developed in the context of federal practice to a state law setting. In such instances, the rules must operate on certain types of litigation peculiar to state law, notably the entire field of domestic relations. In a field bearing the unique features and demands of domestic relations, it is not surprising that federally patterned rules raised problems not anticipated by their drafters. In the 1981 case of Parent v. Parent, the Maine Law Court, in customary observance of Rule 54(b) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed an appeal from the Superior Court because of a pending counterclaim. Under that rule, patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the court has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals from orders in multiple-party or multiple-claim litigation until the lower court enters judgment on all claims by and against all parties, absent special certification by the trial judge. In the meantime, any order by the trial court is subject to revision. Rule 54(b) dismissals have become commonplace in federal courts and in Maine, as well as in the many state courts that have adopted the federal rules in substantial part. The Parent decision gave this procedure a new twist. Because the action in question was an action for divorce and the pending counterclaim was an undismissed counterclaim for divorce, the court warned in a footnote that the faulty procedure may mislead unsophisticated litigants into believing that they are in fact finally divorced before the entry of a final judgment and acting in reliance thereon to their detriment. In other words, the overlooked counterclaim apparently forestalled any divorce. Shortly after rendering its opinion, the court denied a motion for rehearing, although neither party had raised, briefed, or had an opportunity to argue the Rule 54(b) issue previously. Because counterclaims for divorce have become routine and many courts have routinely neglected to enter judgment on the losing party\u27s claim and because parties make critical life decisions in reliance upon divorce decrees, the concern and fear generated by the Parent opinion have been considerable
Developments in the News Media Privilege: The Qualified Constitutional Approach Becoming Common Law
Get PDFIn late 1977 and early 1978, the Boston Globe published a series of articles about a Delaware corporation engaged in building fiberglass boats in New Hampshire. The articles reported a number of allegedly serious defects in the boats, some of which may have contributed to sinkings. Critical comments of boat owners, surveyors, Coast Guard officers, company employees and a repairman were included. The builder was given an opportunity to respond in part of one article. Provoked by this quotidien instance of investigative journalism, the boat builder brought a libel action against the Globe in federal district court. The boat builder\u27s action, Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., reached the First Circuit on an interlocutory appeal. It is easy to imagine that the climate of doubt created by the articles could and probably did have an impact upon the corporation\u27s boat sales. The boat builder chose the judicial forum to seek a vindication of the corporate reputation. In recent years the news media have frequently found themselves in an adversary relationship with defamation plaintiffs, as in Bruno & Stillman, and with other civil litigants, criminal defendants, the state and the courts. While some antagonism is undoubtedly healthy for the maintenance of an independent press, what has particularly provoked controversy in the last decade has been whether the Constitution requires protection for news gathering activities. The news media and many legal scholars maintain that such protection is a constitutional mandate. One aspect of this protection includes access to government information and legal proceedings. Related to its concern with access to information, the press has sought the establishment of a news media privilege against disclosure of confidential news sources and information in the face of a demand for disclosure in a legal proceeding. One unavoidable effect of this privilege would be to make some relevant and material evidence unavailable to the proceeding. The institutional American media are in the business of gathering, editing and disseminating newsworthy information. Frequently, some of this information is relevant to a criminal investigation or trial, or a civil suit. Although the press acquires this information from a wide spectrum of sources, most available to any member of the general public, controversial news leads for investigative journalism, particularly for stories involving the government, often develop from informants who demand confidentiality as a quid pro quo for their candor. The press claims that requiring the disclosure of confidential sources would have a deleterious effect upon its ability to gather and disseminate the news because the confidential sources would dry up. The constitutional issue posed is whether the press as news gatherer has a privilege to protect its relationships with confidential sources from the potential harm of intrusive and burdensome compliance with legal processes because of the disruptive impact such compliance would have upon news gathering and dissemination. This Comment will outline the legal history of the media privilege argument, examining common law, constitutional and statutory foundations. The Comment will then concentrate on recent developments of the media privilege in both criminal and civil contexts, with particular emphasis on defamation actions such as Bruno & Stillman. The present uncertain status of a news media privilege in the courts merits examination because of its discordant effect upon the national media
Maine\u27s Action to Try Title: A Proposal for Statutory Reform
Get PDFMaine law provides three distinct statutory proceedings to try title: the real action, an action at law to quiet title, and an action in equity to quiet title. As the preceding Comment demonstrates, the present statutory scheme preserves outmoded distinctions between law and equity that are functionally obsolete in modern civil practice. Although the statutory law governing actions to try title in most states is, like Maine\u27s, a patchwork product replete with archaic concepts, several other states have consolidated legal and equitable remedies into simple, comprehensive statutory actions. This Comment proposes a similar statute for Maine in the interest of efficient resolution of title controversies. While an exhaustive blueprint for reform of Maine\u27s present statutory scheme is not attempted, the most salient features of the reform legislation and the changes it will bring to Maine law are discussed generally, with reference to how jurisdictions with similar legislation have resolved various conflicts over property rights