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On Relating Social Sciences to International Law: Three Perspectives
Get PDFThis Essay offers a critical yet constructive reading of the social science approach to international law. In seeking to frame international legal studies alongside the positivistic social sciences, the social science approach has suffered from important methodological deficiencies. Though appearing to be an objective science, the social science approach requires a scholar to make subjective decisions throughout the research process. A reductionistic social science approach to international law risks consolidating existing inequalities and imperialistic institutions in the name of objective science. A healthy interaction between international law and the social sciences requires enriched conceptions of both international law and the social sciences, as well as a proper perspective on their working relationship. This dynamic perspective recognizes the constitutive role of international law in carrying out the social science approach. It further emphasizes the importance of internalizing interdisciplinarity within international legal scholarship itsel
Geoffrey Stone, Informal 8
No full textGeoffrey Stone, the Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor in the University of Chicago Law School. Mr. Stone served as dean of the Law School (1987-1993), and as university provost (1993-2002).
University of Chicago Photographic Archive, [apf7-05816-004], Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.
View information about rights and permissions.https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/geoffrey_stone_images/1006/thumbnail.jp
Gerhard Casper, Informal 2
No full textGerhard Casper, professor of Law and Political Science, dean of the University of Chicago Law School (1979-1987) and university provost (1989-1992).
University of Chicago Photographic Archive, [apf7-00152], Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.
View information about rights and permissions.https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/gerhard_casper_images/1009/thumbnail.jp
Superstars and the Law
No full textA feature of the entertainment industry is the concentration of earnings in a handful of performers—the superstars. Sherwin Rosen, a famed economist at the University of Chicago, developed a theory of superstars. This episode of Chicago’s Best Ideas (a series aimed to expose students, and especially 1Ls, to great ideas that are associated with our Law School and University, but then also to tell us what if anything they contribute to our modern understanding of law and society) revisits Rosen’s ideas about superstars and consider their extension to other types of “performers,” such as lawyers and other professional service providers, CEOs, and even corporations. Will superstars characterize more occupations and activities in the future? Does the growth of superstars contribute to economic inequality, and what, if anything, should the law do about it
Rethinking Nudge: an Information-Costs Theory of Default Rules
Get PDFPolicy makers and scholars—both lawyers and economists—have long pon-dered the optimal design of default rules. From the classic works on “mimicking”defaults for contracts and corporations to the modern rush to set “sticky” defaultrules to promote policies as diverse as organ donation, retirement savings, consumerprotection, and data privacy, the optimal design of default rules has featured as acentral regulatory challenge. The key element driving the design is opt-out costs—how to minimize them, or, alternatively, how to raise them to make the default sticky.Much of the literature has focused on “mechanical” opt-out costs—the effort peopleincur to select a nondefault alternative. This focus is too narrow. A more importantfactor affecting opt-out is information—the knowledge people must acquire to makeinformed opt-out decisions. But, unlike high mechanical costs, high informationcosts need not make defaults stickier; they may instead make the defaults “slippery.”This counterintuitive claim is due to the phenomenon of uninformed opt-out, whichwe identify and characterize. Indeed, the importance of uninformed opt-out requiresa reassessment of the conventional wisdom about Nudge and asymmetric or liber-tarian paternalism. We also show that different defaults provide different incentivesto acquire the information necessary for informed opt-out. With the ballooning useof default rules as a policy tool, our information-costs theory provides valuable guid-ance to policy makers
