Black Metropolis Research Consortium
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UNHRC Resolution 26/9: Is a New International “Red Card” Enough to Keep FIFA and Others Accountable?
Get PDFThe lead-up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar has generated significant controversy due to the host country’s exploitative labor system and sub-standard human rights record. While FIFA has not remained completely insulated from criticism for its involvement, the sport’s principal governing body has avoided all serious threats of liability for its connection to human rights violations associated with the 2022 World Cup. This immunity largely stems from limitations on domestic courts in adjudicating domestic corporations’ foreign business activities. Yet, the ongoing development of a new treaty under the U.N. offers a different approach to liability for transnational business activities. Using U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9 and its proposed legally binding instrument as a new avenue for transnational corporate accountability, this Comment examines FIFA’s liability for human rights violations in Qatar connected to the World Cup. Further, this Comment concludes that FIFA can be held liable in its domicile for its transnational business activities in Qatar. The organization’s business relationship with Qatar, through the tournament, establishes a sufficient link to attach liability for the related human rights violations. Although questions persist as to exactly how this treaty will operate, it is apparent that FIFA’s absolute immunity is fading. Finally, this Comment shifts away from the 2022 World Cup as a case study for liability and explores the practical implications of expanding corporate liability for FIFA and other transnational corporations’ future business activities. The expansion of a hard law regime in this area raises issues surrounding the chilling of foreign investment by increasing compliance costs. While the appropriate balancing of these considerations is contentious, this Comment argues that, in FIFA’s case, the expansion of transnational corporate liability likely will not produce significant adverse effects on its investment in developing countries through “the beautiful game.
Franchise Contract Regulations and Local Market Structure
No full textMany US states have regulations that restrict the ability of franchisors to terminate franchise contracts. We estimate the economic effects of these regulations with a focus on how they impact market structure. Using data from the quick-service restaurant industry, we find that implementing franchise regulations results in 4–5 percent fewer establishments in the average county. Our results imply that franchise regulation leads to increased concentration in a large number of markets, as the number of counties in the bottom quartile of concentration would increase by between 12 percent and 15 percent with regulation
Price Benchmark Regulation of Multiproduct Firms: An Application to the Rail Industry
No full textBuilding on Harold Demsetz’s argument that market forces can be more effective in disciplining the pricing behavior of firms relative to explicit output price regulation, this paper proposes and analyzes the performance of a price benchmark approach to identify unreasonable prices in multiproduct industries subject to residual reasonable price regulation. An empirical application to the freight rail sector demonstrates that this mechanism has the potential to provide economically meaningful relief to shippers at lower cost, with less administrative burden, and without significant adverse financial consequences for the railroads
The Effects of Government Licensing on E-commerce: Evidence from Alibaba
No full textInspired by the call in Demsetz’s “Barriers to Entry” for assessing the implications of occupational licensing, we examine how the 2015 Food Safety Law (FSL) affects e-commerce in China. The FSL requires most food sellers on e-commerce platforms to obtain off-line licenses. On the basis of its gradual rollout on Alibaba, we find that larger and more-reputable sellers display an FSL license earlier, and buyers are more willing to transact with a licensed seller, especially if the seller is younger and unestablished. This suggests that the license is informative. Market-wide, the average quality of surviving sellers has improved and seller concentration has increased since the FSL. The platform’s gross merchandise value for food did not decline, nor did the average sales price increase 1 year into full enforcement. This suggests that the FSL does not hamper long-term market performance, probably because it enhances seller quality and market transparency
The Roberts Court and the Transformation of Constitutional Protections for Religion: A Statistical Portrait
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Retooling Sanctions: China’s Challenge to the Liberal International Order
Get PDFProfessor Tom Ginsburg has produced yet another classic of transnational law, political science, and international relations. Democracies and International Law yields important insights into the democratic nature of international law but cautions that authoritarian states can apply these very legal technologies for repressive or antidemocratic purposes. Building on Ginsburg’s theories of mimicry and repurposing, this contribution highlights the role of both techniques in the creation of China’s economic sanctions program. On the one hand, China has developed a basic set of tools to impose economic sanctions—a key instrument in the liberal international toolkit—on foreign entities and persons. In so doing, China has adopted elements of American economic sanctions, as well as European directives, to blunt the force of foreign sanctions. On the other hand, China has deployed sanctions for anti-democratic purposes, including squelching free speech, freedom of thought, and academic inquiry. While a full discussion of China’s sanctions regime (itself a project under construction) is still premature, the initial imposition of sanctions suggests China is trying to accomplish very different aims than the liberal states that pioneered economic sanctions in the twentieth century
Horizontal Collusion and Parallel Wage-Setting in Labor Markets
Get PDFHorizontal collusion among employers to suppress wages has received almost no attention in the academic literature, in contrast with its more familiar cousin, product market collusion. The similar economic analysis of labor and product markets might suggest that antitrust should regulate labor and product markets in the same way. But product markets and labor markets do not operate identically: people behave differently as employees and as consumers. Unlike consumers who can switch products relatively easily, employees face significant frictions in changing jobs. Other labor market frictions are created by the pay equity norm and downward nominal wage rigidity. These factors and related factors stabilize collusive arrangements and facilitate tacit coordination in labor markets. Antitrust law should therefore more aggressively regulate labor market collusion, including tacit coordination, than product market collusion