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No full textGiven the national reckoning around structural inequity, racism, and intractable health inequalities, there is an unrequited demand among faculty and scholars who teach and write about health equity and social justice for texts that go beyond a discussion of the social determinants of health and access to care to provide analysis that offers a structural and legal lens for understanding entrenched health inequity in the U.S. The COVID-19 pandemic has only made the need for this approach more compelling and urgent.
Addressing that need, authors Elizabeth Tobin-Tyler and Joel Teitelbaum have built upon and expanded their first edition with Essentials of Health Justice: Law, Policy, and Structural Change, Second Edition. This unparalleled new edition explores the historical, structural, and legal underpinnings of racial, ethnic, gender-based, and ableist inequities in health, and provides a framework for students to consider how and why health inequity is tied to the ways that laws are structured and enforced. Additionally, it offers analysis of potential solutions and posits how law may be used as a tool to remedy health injustice.
Written for a wide, interdisciplinary audience of students and scholars in public health, medicine, and law, as well as other health professions, this accessible text discusses both the systems and policies that influence health and explores opportunities to advocate for legal and policy change by public health practitioners and policymakers, physicians, health care professionals, lawyers, and lay people.https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-chapters/1046/thumbnail.jp
Reasonable in Time, Unreasonable in Scope: Maximizing Fourth Amendment Protections Under Rodriguez v. United States
Get PDFIn Rodriguez v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer may not conduct a drug dog sniff after the completion of a routine traffic stop because doing so extends the stop without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures. Tracing the background of Rodriguez from the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, this Comment argues that Rodriguez is best understood as a reaction to the continued erosion of Fourth Amendment protections in the investigative stop context. Based on that understanding, this Comment argues for a strict reading of Rodriguez, under which any detour from a traffic stop’s “mission” that extends the stop for any amount of time renders the stop an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
While many courts have read Rodriguez in a similarly rigorous way, they differ on the question of whether every detour from a traffic stop’s mission is unlawful, or if something more akin to a reasonableness approach is more appropriate. Additionally, even among those courts that have taken the approach this Comment advocates for, there has been significant difficulty formulating a workable framework for applying Rodriguez’s rule. To address those difficulties, this Comment draws on Idaho and Kentucky case law to construct a straightforward method for applying Rodriguez in the context of a motion to suppress evidence—the primary remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation
Surprises in the Skies: Resolving the Circuit Split on How Courts Should Determine Whether an Accident is Unexpected or Unusual Under the Montreal Convention
Get PDFArticle 17 of both the Montreal Convention and its predecessor, the Warsaw Convention, imposes liability onto air carriers for certain injuries and damages from “accidents” incurred by passengers during international air carriage. However, neither Convention defines the term “accident.” While the United States Supreme Court opined that, for the purposes of Article 17, an air carrier’s liability “arises only if a passenger’s injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger,” it did not explain what standards lower courts should employ to discern whether an event is “unexpected or unusual.” In 2004, the Fifth Circuit looked to industry standards; in 2022, the First Circuit looked to the perspectives of a reasonable passenger. As a result, courts are now split on which methods they should adopt to determine whether an event constitutes an Article 17 “accident.”
This Comment looks at the history of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions and how courts have traditionally interpreted the language of Article 17 to define “accidents.” It highlights the recent circuit split on the standards courts should adopt to determine if an event can properly be described as “unexpected and unusual” to constitute an Article 17 “accident.” Taking into consideration unique aspects of the commercial aviation industry, this Comment introduces a solution based on the existing “block time” model and proposes that courts should adopt separate standards depending on when the event takes place to determine whether an event can be classified as “unexpected or unusual” and thereby recoverable as an Article 17 “accident.
Building Businesses and Portfolios for Tomorrow
No full textThe world of business and finance has seen rapid change in the last few years, including soaring inflation, massive stock price swings, huge shifts in monetary policy, a volatile global recovery and tensions between major economic powers. As the world looks for a way forward, where is the “smart money” going? What types of new businesses are poised for success? What careers should you be building skills for now? What business and investment trends, challenges and opportunities can we expect to navigate in the days and years ahead
An Integrated Approach to Citation Literacy
Get PDFThis presentation explored how integrating citation literacy instruction into the fundamentals could lead to more durable learning for students and identify five quick methods to make it happen
PARADIGMS FOR FOREIGN TECH-PLATFORMS REGULATION: U.S. OPTIONS AFTER THE TIKTOK SAGA
Get PDFThe heated discussion stirred up by the U.S. regulatory actions against TikTok continues to this day. The nearly predatory popularity of this Chinese application has raised people’s awareness that the country is in urgent need of a fully developed policy in order to deal with the surge of robust foreign digital platforms.
This article gives the contour of the latest development of theories regarding the foreign tech-platforms regulation. Three contemporary frameworks are reviewed. The first laissez faire paradigm inherits the values of early neoliberalism to prevent a “Splinternet,” but its inaction fails to deal with novel security threats ranging from data privacy to economic competitiveness nowadays. The second case-by-case restrictions paradigm is presently the most mainstream and frequently-discussed scheme. It recognizes the blurriness of the existing non-systemic actions and has been flourished with risk assessment methods proposed by scholars. However, the inconsistency, unpredictability and the complexity of rules constitute its inborn deficiency. The last platform-utilities paradigm is a newly-developed innovative approach, which identifies the similarity between the tech-platforms and traditional utilities platforms of political-economy features, and thus provides legitimacy and viability of the sectoral regulation. Nonetheless, the differences between the internet platforms and the traditional utilities platforms, the shift from the U.S. long standing open attitude, and the risk of second order effects, all require further reflection.
All of the proposals are an inspiration for policymakers to rethink the tension between internet freedom and national security. The article concludes by briefly reviewing the TikTok saga chronologically and analyzing the latest regulation attempt of Executive Orders of different States
No Sense of Decency
Get PDFFor nearly seventy years, the Court has assessed Eighth Amendment claims by evaluating “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” In this Article, I examine the evolving standards of decency test, which has long been a punching bag for critics on both the right and the left. Criticism of the doctrine has been fierce but largely academic until recent years. Some fault the test for being too majoritarian, while others argue that it provides few constraints on the Justices’ discretion, permitting their personal predilections to rule the day. For many, the test is seen as a lightning rod over constitutional interpretation, as its very language embodies living constitutionalism and seems to reject originalism.
Now an evaluation of the possible replacements for the “evolving standards of decency” test takes on greater urgency. Appellate court judges have begun to press the Court to replace or reconsider the test. Three Justices have signaled their willingness to overrule the test, and at least two more are likely to join them. Given that stare decisis does not appear to be a formidable constraint on the current Court, the time has come to grapple with a new reality for the Eighth Amendment.
This Article begins with a comprehensive evaluation of the tests that both originalist and non-originalist scholars have proposed as replacements. It contends that none of the proposed tests eliminate the shortcomings of the evolving standards of decency test, then concludes that originalism is an unsuitable methodology for interpreting the Eighth Amendment. The Article then proposes a new test—grounded in the structural harms of the modern criminal punishment system—that constrains judicial discretion in line with the constitutional values of antisubordination and human dignity. This new test addresses the flaws of the evolving standards of decency test without rendering Eighth Amendment jurisprudence a dead letter
Toward Mutual Recognition: An Investigation of Oral Tradition Evidence in the United States and Canada
Get PDFUnited States (“U.S.”) courts have long failed to recognize the value of oral traditional evidence (“OTE”) in the law. Yet, for Indigenous peoples, OTE forms the basis of many of their claims to place, property, and political power. In Canada, courts must examine Indigenous OTE on “equal footing” with other forms of admissible evidence. While legal scholars have suggested applying Canadian precedent to U.S. law regarding OTE, scholarship has generally failed to critically examine the underlying ethos of settler courts as a barrier to OTE admission and usefulness. This essay uses the work of political philosopher, James Tully, to examine OTE not just as evidence, but as an exercise of Indigenous self-determination. By recognizing the inherent political nature of OTE, U.S. courts may expand on Canadian law to build a “just relationship” with Indigenous peoples