Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics
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Technology as the God-Command
A book Review of Giorgio Agamben\u27s Creation and Anarchy: The Work of Art and the Religion of Capitalism. Stanford, California: 2019
Philosophische Übersetzung zwischen "sprachlicher Gewaltanwendung" und translativer Hermeneutik. Translatorische Überlegungen aus der Sicht der Übersetzung(en) von Jean-Paul Sartres \u27L\u27être et le néant\u27
Philosophical translation between "linguistic violence" and translative hermeneutics. Translational considerations from the perspective of the translation(s) of Jean-Paul Sartre\u27s L\u27être et le néant The establishment of translatology as a scientific discipline is a late phenomenon to which not only linguistics but also the philosophy of language has contributed significantly. Although the considerations of Schleiermacher, Ricoeur, Derrida, Balibar, Cassin and other philosophers are very stimulating for the examination of the translation problematics, they do not offer a particular translation theory of philosophical texts. Most of their works are of little help in practice when it comes to translating a complicated philosophical text. That is why I will take in this paper the opposite path and start from my own experience as a translator of philosophical literature into Bulgarian and, more concretely, from my translation of Jean-Paul Sartre\u27s L\u27être et le néant. On the base of this key work of contemporary philosophy and its translations into different languages, I will address the difficulties and the specifics of philosophical translation, discuss various translation methods, and argue several theses, which could serve as impulses for a further development of translation theory and translation practice in the field of philosophy.
On the Ethical and Cultural Perspectives of Translation
Editorial to Vol. 21, No. 2 of Labyrinth 2019, which is dedicated to the general theme "Translating Philosophy and the Humanities: Contemporary Problems and Debates." 
Human Rights without Objective Intrinsic Value
The current predominant conception of human rights implies that human beings have objective intrinsic value. In this paper, we defend that there is no satisfactory justification of this claim. In spite of the great variety of theories aimed at explaining objective intrinsic value, all of them share one common problematic feature: they pass from a non-evaluative proposition to an evaluative proposition by asserting that a certain entity has intrinsic value in virtue of having certain non-evaluative features. This is a step that cannot be justified. In light of this negative result, we offer a radically different approach to intrinsic value. Our proposal reinterprets the claim that human beings have intrinsic value in terms of a commitment to value human beings intrinsically. This commitment provides both objective practical reasons for, and a rational explanation of, efforts aimed at defending and promoting human rights, without need to appeal to the existence of objective intrinsic value.
Pour une étude généalogique de la valeur des droits de l\u27homme : une opposition à l’historicisme et au racisme
For a genealogical study of the value of human rights: an opposition to historicism and racism The purpose of this article is to focus on human rights as a value in itself that has to fight against other values. We would like to show that human rights have become an intrinsic value only by following a path in human history that distinguish them from historicism. Because human rights became a value through history, it is important to be able to show the lay out of this history. We will illustrate it by means of diverse philosophical theories. We will begin with Leo Strauss\u27 philosophy of natural rights which considers human rights in their opposition to historicism. Then, with the help of Michel Foucault\u27s genealogy we will show how human rights develop themselves against the racist theory elaborated by a fraction of the French aristocracy in the 17th century. Consequently, a tension emerges inside those rights between their natural value and their historical one, which leads to the fundamental question: what is the essence of humankind involved in human rights?
Figurative art in Bulgaria from the 1920s and 1930s: The School of Kyustendil, Kiril Tsonev and Boris Elisayeff
The aim of this paper is to present those realistic tendencies in Bulgarian painting from the 1920s and 1930s, that echoe contemporary West European ones, like the New Objectivity in Germany. Among others, it will be shown how Bulgarian artist’s paintings are inspired by the folklore primitive from the past and reflect the assiduity of cultural administration to renew the idea of a modern artistic school of art with a defined national character.
Bridging the Gap between Rationality, Normativity and Emotions
This paper argues that emotions play a key role in intentional explanation, because they can be conceived as rational. Furthermore, their rationality is specific as they make agents act and react with respect to values and norms. Indeed, emotions have cognitive bases and are reactions to the presence of values and are regimented by epistemic norms that can be constrained by social norms. Additionally, thanks to their action and cognitive tendencies emotions ground rational actions by providing, among other features of rationality, intentions to promote values through norms of action that can also be constrained by social norms. In that sense, emotions seem to bridge the gap between rationality and normativity by articulating the rational detection and production of values related to epistemic and action norms that can be both regimented by social norms.
Philosophy between Power and Powerlessness: A Homage to Karl Jaspers
The aim of the following paper is to discuss Jaspers\u27 disappointement of politics and his confession about the powerlessness of the (philosophical) Spirit, expressed at the end of his life. This confession may seem to contradict some of his earlier statements and positions. Yet, by analizing the evolution of his views about the complex relation between philosophy and politics, the autor claims that Jaspers\u27 philosophy is an emblematic illustration of a tension, inherent in contemporary philosophy, namely that between the faith in Reason and the scepticism about its potentialities to achieve a substantial changement of human nature and society.
Aletheia : la vérité des traductions philosophiques en tant que traduction de la vérité. À la rencontre de Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricœur et Antoine Berman: À la rencontre de Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricœur et Antoine Berman
Aletheia: The Truth of Philosophical Translation as a Translation of Thruth.An Encounter of Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricœur and Antoine BermanThe article analyzes the specificity of philosophical translations insofar as they generate a new meaning and present themselves as originals that must be retranslated. This goes against Ricœur’s conception of translation as a creation of comparable terms. We will show that philosophical translation consists in the creation of an incomparable term, which cannot be measured in terms of equivalence, adequacy or fidelity. All these terms correspond to a notion of truth understood as adequacy, therefore we operate a deconstruction of aletheia, the Greek concept for “truth”, in order to show that what we hold today to be the truth of translation has been the result of a translation. Through Heidegger’s reading of aletheia and through Berman’s account of the terms that name translation in Europe, we reinterpret the Roman philosophical translations as examples of traductio and we show, in the end, that by retranslating aletheia, the rules for the practice of translation change, allowing the latter to be guided by an ethical approach towards the otherness rather than by righteous fidelity and adequacy.
Understanding Aristotle\u27s Notion of the Mean: A Case Study in Anger
In this paper, I argue that purely quantitative understandings of Aristotle\u27s concept of "the mean" (as presented in Nicomachean Ethics) are oversimplified, and I make this argument by analyzing the particular emotion of anger. Anger, I contend, helps to complicate the purely quantitative understanding of the mean, insofar as, I argue, the amount of anger experienced is not the morally salient feature in determining whether or not the anger is virtuous. Rather, anger is one example of an emotion or trait for which other, non-quantitative parameters of the mean are more salient, giving us a more nuanced understanding of what the mean is. Anger is virtuous not when it is in the right measurable degree, but rather when it is directed at the proper target. In this way, the virtue-making property of anger is distinctly qualitative. Examining anger provides insight into the concept of the mean and its role in Aristotle\u27s ethics, and also helps to shed light on contemporary debates about political anger.