The Trumpeter - Journal of Ecosophy (Athabasca University)

Naess, Arne

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 3 
 
History, Education,  
and Practical Applications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Trumpeter 6 
 
 
The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 21, Number 2 (2005) 
 
 
A Green History of the World 
1994R 
Arne Naess 
 
The discipline called history has, until recently, been identified more or 
less closely with the history of human societies since the time of the 
invention of written language. An important distinction is that between 
“historiography” and “historical research.” People doing historical 
research may concentrate for many years on the causes of a particular 
event or the development of an institution, for instance a university, 
through some hundred years. But the most well-known historiographers 
have tried to furnish written history of a whole society, or even a “world 
history.” As may be easily understood, the thick books pretending to cover 
the history of human societies or of humanity through thousands of years 
are not based on solid research. But they have had, and will continue to 
have, great influence.  
 
They are written from different points of view. A recent book has the title 
A Green History of the World.1 This is something new and something that 
deserves our attention. Its author, Clive Ponting, is a genuine historian, not 
an environmentalist dabbling in history writing. It is excellent that the title 
says “a history,” not “the history” because we may expect many attempts 
by professional historiographers to write human history with extensive 
reference to the environment. 
 
The collapse of civilizations has for a long time been a favourite study of 
historians, and the author of “a green history” of course emphasizes the 
environmental causes of collapse. How historians avoid the pitfall of 
pointing to one single cause of collapse is instructive. And even if we are 
convinced that bad relations with the environment must be considered one 
of the causes, a historian will show the immense complexity of the causes 
involved. The book under consideration starts with a seven-page account 
of the salient features of the human civilization on Easter Island. A few 
quotations will illustrate the complexity. He writes: 
It is not known how many settlers arrived in the fifth century but they probably 
numbered no more than twenty or thirty at most. As the population slowly increased 
Volume 21, Number 2 7
the forms of social organisation familiar in the rest of Polynesia were adopted. The 
basic social unit was the extended family, which jointly owned and cultivated the 
land. Closely related households formed lineages and clans, each of which had its 
own centre for religious and ceremonial activity. Each clan was headed by a chief 
who was able to organise and direct activities and act as focal point for the 
redistribution of food and other essentials within the clan. It was this form of 
organisation and the competition (and probably conflict) between the clans that 
produced both the major achievements of Easter Island society and ultimately its 
collapse.2
Here the author points to a certain form of organization and competition 
as a cause, but only as a preliminary remark. The islanders erected huge 
statues well known from Thor Heyerdahl's book, Aku-Aku.3  
. . . at the time of the initial settlement Eastern Island had a dense vegetation cover 
including extensive woods. As the population slowly increased, trees would have 
been cut down to provide clearings for agriculture, fuel for heating and cooking, 
construction material for household goods, pole and thatch houses and canoes for 
fishing. The most demanding requirement of all was the need to move the large 
number of enormously heavy statues to ceremonial sites around the island.4
At about 1550 the population reached its peak, about 7000, and there were 
over 600 huge stone statues. 
Then, when the society was at its peak, it suddenly collapsed leaving over half the 
statues only partially completed around Rano Raraku quarry. The cause of the 
collapse and the key to understanding the ‘mysteries’ of Easter Island was massive 
environmental degradation brought on by deforestation of the whole island.5  
Here the author points to a different cause, deforestation, but evidently he 
does not see a contradiction between this hypothesis concerning causes 
and his remark on page 3. Complementary causes! 
 
On page 3 the author mentions the causal strength of competition. It was a 
competition between the many clans to erect statues. As the number of 
clans grew, the fierceness of competition grew as well. With no such 
increased competition, the number of statues would have remained small. 
 
Increasing scarcity of timber caused an inability to erect any more statues 
and this  
must have had a devastating effect on the belief systems and social organisation and 
called into question the foundations on which that complex society had been built. 
There were increasing conflicts over diminishing resources resulting in a state of 
almost permanent warfare. Slavery became common and as the amount of protein 
available fell the population turned to cannibalism.6
The first quotation from page 6 suggests that slavery and a state of almost 
permanent warfare were results of diminishing resources, not the other 
The Trumpeter 8 
 
 
way round. The introduction of slavery marks a dreadful increase of 
hierarchy and domination by humans over humans. It is not suggested that 
that caused ruthless domination over nature and diminishing resources as a 
result. There is in the seven-page report no indication that pronounced 
hierarchy and domination between people go together with pronounced 
effort to dominate nature. 
. . . at the very time when the limitations of the island must have become starkly 
apparent the competition between the clans for the available timber seems to have 
intensified as more and more statues were carved and moved across the island in an 
attempt to secure prestige and status.7
Extraordinary cultural ambitions, and attempts to secure prestige and 
status seem to go hand in hand.  
 
Suppose historical sources were rich enough to write a 700-page account 
of the collapse of the human society on Easter Island. One may expect that 
it would be able to take into account hundreds of factors of causal 
relevance. One would get a more realistic view of the overwhelming 
complexity of causal relations. But this cannot be used to undermine the 
efforts to pick out a small number of factors, such as deforestation, 
technology, and population. In general, it pays to focus on factors that we 
believe we have a chance to influence. Perhaps population increase is 
often left unmentioned because it may be considered to be outside of 
control. 
 
I have only referred to seven pages out of the 407 pages of the text by 
Clive Ponting. But those seven pages clearly reveal the importance of 
studying the past. The disregard of our impact on the ecosystems is not a 
speciality of industrial societies. It started in the remote past, as can be 
learned from other books. Hunters and gatherers were not as innocent as 
we may want them to have been. History warns us, but it also teaches us 
how some societies did not destroy the available resources. 
Notes 
                                                 
1 Clive Ponting, A Green History of the World: The Environment and the Collapse of 
Great Civilizations. New York: Penguin Books, 1991. 
2 Ponting, 3–4. 
3 Thor Heyerdahl, Aku-Aku, the Secret of Easter Island. London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1958. Translated from the 1957 Norwegian original Aku-Aku: Paskeöyas 
Hemmelighet. 
4 Ponting, 5. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 6. 
7 Ibid., 7. 
Volume 21, Number 2 9


A Green History of the World

Morito, Bruce

 
 
The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 21, Number 2 (2005) 
 
Editorial 
Bruce Morito 
We are pleased once again to have Alan Drengson and Bill Devall edit 
the second in a series of special issues on the works of Arne Naess. This 
companion issue to the recently released Selected Works of Arne Naess 
(SWAN) follows on the heels of Volume 21 Number 1. Here, Arne’s 
‘other’ work, sometimes unpublished or published in difficult to access 
journals, magazines, and the like, can offer insights into his main works 
both for students of the deep ecology movement and its critics.  
From discussions about Easter Island and historiography/ history to 
democracy and the adequacy of political systems to address the 
environmental problems of our age, and then to a missive on boxing as 
playful violence, these pieces provide background for interpreting 
Arne’s main works and for gaining insight into the man. The piece on 
boxing is especially poignant in light of the anticipated shock most 
supporters of deep ecology will experience when reading it. It reminds 
me of other views on the role of violence in bringing peace about. 
 
Volume 21 Number 1 1 


Editorial

Devall, Bill

Drengson, Alan

Introduction to this Series

The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 21, Number 2 (2005) 
 
 
The Arctic Dimension Outside and Inside Us 
1994Q 
Arne Naess 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper was originally published in Deep Ecology in the High Arctic: 
Proceedings of the 1994 International Ecophilosophical Symposium, Svalbard, 
Norway, 29 August–2 September, edited by Elisabeth Stoltz Larsen and Robin 
Buzza. Longyerbyen: Norwegian Polar Institute, pages 13–16. 
The future of Arctic and Antarctic nature depends, to a certain degree, 
on the strengthening and spreading of the feeling and the view that it is 
a self-contained world with meaning in itself: it has its kind of 
perfection as it is; and that it should not be seen as a potential material 
resource for humankind; that we are intruders; that our contamination 
of the Arctic and Antarctic atmosphere is shameful, and the same 
applies to the interference with the composition of the stratosphere. The 
feeling of shame probably originates with the feeling that we have 
nothing to do in those far away areas: there is no good reason of 
interference. 
  
The view that the polar areas are inhospitable and hostile is likely to 
disappear because of the development of proper equipment. There are 
“wonderful” possibilities of large scale tourism. Economic pressures 
may consequently be expected to increase. Resistance must be 
significantly increased. This implies wider recognition of the perils. 
How can we all contribute to that? The privilege simply to be here has a 
cost: we, who had never been here before, should in the years to come 
be willing to help those who already are trying to protect this part of the 
world.  
  
Since the time of the European Renaissance, about 500 years ago, 
academic philosophy has shown waves of conformity or fashion. In my 
time we had an internationally felt wave of logical empiricism (also 
called logical positivism); the wave caused by the “early” Wittgenstein 
and that of the “late” Wittgenstein—one personally overwhelming; the 
so-called “philosophical world”; hermeneutics; and now the less 
reputable and sometimes squarely silly (self-proclaimed) 
The Trumpeter 42 
 
 
postmodernism. It is amusing to inspect this last fashion a little because 
it is so convenient to make some conventional philosophical point in 
contrast to what is said, or seems to be meant, in the literature called 
postmodern philosophical literature.  
  
In that literature, authors use earnest expressions like “the social 
construction of reality” and “the social construction of nature,” so  
everything is social and interpretational. Texts are real, and especially 
texts about texts are taken seriously, but the way seems infinitely long 
before we reach what you and I naively worship as grand, majestic 
nature! In short, we have to do with a literary, and occasionally 
academic sophisticated “absolutizing” (Absolutierung) of social 
relations; every relation is a social relation, and we never get to a 
relation between a human being or a society and nature. Ecology seems, 
in the postmodern texts, to have only to do with human social systems 
and not ecosystems. In one word: “sociologism.” We have had in this 
century “psychologism” and “ecologism” (every science is part of 
ecology). 
  
To meet here at Svalbard can, as already suggested, only be justified as 
an expression of resolve to contribute to the dissemination of views 
favourable to the preservation of a largely intact Arctic and Antarctic. 
  
Concepts of wilderness play a prominent role in industrial states where 
there are still great areas with limited impact by humans: the United 
States, Canada, and Australia. From the point of view of conservation, 
four levels of abstention from intervention may be distinguished. At the 
first level, a limiting case, all sorts of interference by humans are to be 
avoided. This includes flying over the area. In second level, areas of 
wilderness, scientific exploration is permitted, as are attempts to 
counteract the influence of pollution and other phenomena due to non-
human and human influence. Third level wilderness permits tourism, 
but limited and only during parts of the year. Fourth level areas are 
managed roughly as the great natural parks of the United States. 
  
At the moment, one of the most noteworthy undertakings is to try to let 
there be corridors between areas of wilderness of such sort that 
inbreeding is avoided and there is free access for protected animals to 
move from one area to another. 
  
The Arctic and Antarctic are by far the greatest wilderness areas left. 
Thanks to the enormity of the areas, and relative scarcity of intrusions, 
little has been done to seriously restrict interference with the 
Volume 21, Number 2 43
ecosystems. The accelerated rate of interference, if continued, will 
result in a totally unacceptable state of affairs in the next century. 
  
As a philosopher I am expected to talk from a point of view of 
principles. This means for me, among other things, to contemplate a 
future much wider than in practical life, say, the development of life 
since Cambrian, 600 million years ago. It is quite natural to move from 
thousands years ago to thousands years from now into the future. The 
relevance of such a frame of reference along the time axis is evident 
when considering the growth of the human population. 
  
There is a discussion going on as to what extent technological advance 
is a causal factor for the high rate of population growth, and to what 
extent the increasing population pressure in the last 500 years caused or 
motivated the technological advance. At any rate, the present 
technological knowledge is such that with one-tenth of the global 
population, the “Gaia Gift” per capita would be very much greater. By 
yearly Gaia Gift per capita, I mean the amount of interference in the 
ecosystems a person may cause without resulting in ecological 
unsustainability. Roughly, the Gaia Gift is inversely proportional to the 
world population. Assuming, say, that one among ten thousand people 
feel a persistent urge to visit or stay in the high Arctic or Antarctic once 
in a lifetime, with a population of a billion that means an urge among 
100,000 to realize the dream, whereas with a population of 10 billion, it 
means that such an urge makes itself felt among one million.  
    
Now, education plays a role, and with higher education one may expect 
that a higher fraction of the population will feel an urge to stay for a 
while in the Arctic or Antarctic. In any case, it is clear that the problem 
of protecting those regions increases with population and also with 
increases in the level of education. This makes it natural for us to 
support ethically acceptable plans to contribute to a decrease of the 
human population. These plans are rejected when people make the 
sharp distinction between plans to reduce the population of a non-
human species and that of humans. The indignation when we talk about 
reduction of the human population stems, in part, from the habit of not 
thinking in terms of long time periods.  
  
Ethically acceptable efforts to reduce the population, must, so far as I 
can see, envisage a process over many hundreds of years. Even if there 
is only a quarter of a per cent yearly reduction, a very substantial 
reduction will be realized in the long run. A problem is, however, that 
education favours both increasing possibilities of reduction and 
increasing urge to experience the high Arctic areas. Nevertheless, I find 
The Trumpeter 44 
 
 
it inevitable to dream of a future state of the planet with a much smaller 
human population and a corresponding satisfactory percentage of this 
population being acceptable as visitors to well-preserved Arctic and 
Antarctic regions. As it is now, it is evident that only a tiny percentage 
of those who have an urge to make such a visit can do so with 
unacceptable interference in the ecosystems and the life of the animals 
who live there. 
  
What rules of ecotourism should be implemented? As far as I can judge 
they must be very strong rules and, considering the great difficulties in 
assessing conformity with the rules, a substantial percentage of the 
people in the regions will have to be supervisors of what is going on. 
  
The qualification of a supervisor will require competence of various 
kinds, and their mentality, fundamental attitudes, and views are also 
relevant. 
  
We shall evidently have to deal with the life philosophy of the 
supervisors or guides. The experience from other areas, for instance 
Africa, is that people can practically always bribe guides and then 
disturb and harass animals, collect rare plants, disturb the vegetation, 
and interfere in completely unacceptable ways. It seems to be necessary 
that guides or supervisors have a strong life philosophy that protects 
them from temptation. They must accept personal responsibility and 
integrate views in their personalities that make transgression of severe 
rules impossible. Such life philosophy is not very uncommon, but it is 
rarely formulated. 
  
One symptom of such a life philosophy is the serious acceptance of the 
views characteristic of supporters of the deep ecology movement. 
Perhaps we may say that the attitudes of the supporters essentially feel 
and show deep respect for any life forms, whether seen as useful or not, 
beautiful or not, dangerous or not. The grounds or causes of this respect 
may differ, but seem to have to do with some kind of identification, 
finding that we have something in common, whether we are humans or 
not. What is also characteristic is that this respect is extended to cover 
landscapes, as if they were alive and having interests. The way they 
perceive the natural world is such that it spontaneously elicits an urge, 
in appropriate situations, to care.  
  
Such a conviction leads naturally to instinctive displeasure, sometimes 
distress, and even horror at seeing a breach of respect. And they are 
able to act in favour of what they stand for, act within the limits their 
Volume 21, Number 2 45
positions permit, seeing that policies today in no country are fully 
compatible with the attitudes they have. 
  
The firm basis of conviction is combined with a general principle of 
non-violence but persistence in communication with opponents, with 
people and institutions in favour of developments that are incompatible 
with more severe measures to preserve, or with people who proclaim 
indifference. 
  
One cannot expect that people with an urge to experience the Arctic or 
Antarctic also have an urge to contribute to the change of policies. It is 
unfortunately more common that they tend to avoid publicity and 
exposure in social conflicts. It would be cruel to insist that they should 
participate in the “ugly” and complicated political conflicts that are 
inevitable in the years to come. But they should try to express clearly 
their sincere appreciation when people engaged in politics courageously 
favour radical kinds of protection of the Arctic and Antarctic. “Go on, 
we are right behind you. Come to dinner if you need food!” The 
institutions responsible for telling the public about what is going on, but 
should not go on, in the Arctic and Antarctic, do not perhaps have a 
sense of the importance of being “sellers.” They try to “sell” a message, 
but do not study seriously enough the means used by corporations 
trying to increase their sales. We need to increase the minority who are 
aware of the dangers ahead and who will gladly give a little of their 
time and energy to help. 
  
I propose we discuss “ways and means” very seriously. What can we do 
this year? At our places of work? In our dealings with people and 
institutions? In our daily lives? What are the not too costly books and 
periodicals we need to disseminate? What is going on in schools? At 
universities? 
  
But before leaving the philosophical arena, I shall try to make clearer 
why non-interference, leaving something completely alone, keeping 
away, may not mean to abandon. In the darkness in a cabin at night, in a 
small ship on a vast ocean, the ocean is not seen but is present in the 
mind, colouring its contents, adding a dimension, sometimes like an 
impressive background, sometimes like a reminder of our own 
limitations. 
  
Man's history in the high Arctic is primarily a history of unlimited 
greed, brutality, and vandalism. When this is said three times over, we 
may add: a story of courage and perseverance. 
  
The Trumpeter 46 
 
 
Hunting lacked ethical rules, the pleasures of greed and taste of 
wallowing in resources resulted in mass slaughter completely beyond 
what possibly could have any meaning or function. 
  
What I say here does not express a judgement by urbanized people who 
have never hunted and never lived under harsh climatic conditions. It is 
a judgement by people today who have lived for a long time in the high 
Arctic and who very well know the strain and hardships. On the 
contrary, the term “glaring” or “screaming” arrogance is used on page 
142 in the important book Hvit Villmark by Robin Buzza.1 But he adds 
that this kind of arrogance “flourishing in the great area of whaling and 
hunting” was not considered unbecoming in “the centuries of European 
expansion.” What is less understandable to me is the following 
grotesque phenomenon: Long articles about the great area of whaling 
find their way to newspapers describing every aspect except the slow 
death of whales being tortured by irons in their flesh, dragging boats 
along until they had no more strength but still with intact nerves for 
pain. The vandals were able more or less to destroy many habitats of 
mussels and fish.2 It is something of an irony; we are right in being 
afraid of exponential or explosive population growth. Under certain 
circumstances, a few hundred humans degrade living conditions more 
than a hundred thousand would do under what we today call normal 
conditions.
 
Notes 
                                                 
1Robin Buzza, Hvit villmark: om en ferd i Svalbards natur og menneskets sinn. Oslo: 
Grøndahl Dreyer (1994). 
2 Buzza, 143. 
Volume 21, Number 2 47


The Arctic Dimension Outside and Inside Us

The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 21, Number 2 (2005) 
 
 
Deep Ecology and the Potters in Our Planet 
1992 
Arne Naess 
 
 
 
 
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2This paper was originally published in Studio Potter, June 1992, Vol. 20, No. 2,
pp. 38–39. es, I mean “in.” The atmosphere is over us and also part of the Earth. 
o we are inside, rather than on, the Earth. We are mobile, too mobile, 
ragments and units of life, busy using and misusing whatever we find 
t hand for our many, sometimes admittedly queer, purposes. 
 
otters, as so many others, contribute to the fight against the resulting 
egradation of life conditions on Earth. If an example is needed, you 
ave North River Pottery, situated in one of the ecological deserts 
practically no biodiversity) teeming with humans: Brooklyn, New 
ork. The term “desert” is not quite appropriate, though. It is a centre 
f human activity that, in a not-too-distant future, may be an area with 
ustainably rich and diverse life forms. (Let us say, in the twenty-
econd century.) In a pottery, in one city, one may now listen to more 
ounds and music literally “in the Earth” than ever before. 
 
sked to tell something about deep ecology for the periodical Studio 
otter, I can only say what I would say to a hundred other occupational 
roups in our—from the point of view of history, of humans—
stronomically rich in the material and technological sense societies. (I 
m reminded of the saying of Mother Teresa: “We are poor in Calcutta? 
o, you are poor!”) 
 
rom the 1960s until today there are, roughly, two main kinds of 
eaction to the ecological crisis. First, there are some people who admit 
hat a new set of global problems are at hand that requires a less 
olluting industry, recycling, a less steep population curve, preferably a 
tabilization, and more respect for nature. But in the main: business as 
sual. This group considers those who ask for deep changes in the rich 
ountries to be alarmists who underestimate the chances and effects of 
The Trumpeter 4 
 
 
technological revolutions—if the crisis turns out to be more severe than 
scientific research today estimates it to be. They regard those who 
introduce philosophical or religious issues as soft-headed, and 
“ecosabotage” as a form of terrorism with no good effects in 
democracy. 
  
A minority reacts very differently. The way of life in the rich countries 
is devastating the conditions of life on Earth if it continues in the 
present direction, they say. And that way of life is not conducive to the 
fulfillment of the basic goals and ideals of a good human life. So 
nothing essential is lost if societies change their main aspect: not only 
economically and technologically, but also the social texture. Nothing 
less is required in order to significantly change ecologically relevant 
policies and general political priorities. 
  
In the long run, life quality will not decrease, but rather increase. 
Humans will use a little more wisdom and will be able to realize a rich 
life with simple means. The point of view of this minority is based on 
diverse philosophical or religious premises, even if these are articulated 
only rather fragmentarily or not at all. They may be said to have or 
manifest, however vaguely, a philosophy of life or even a view of the 
whole, a total view. 
  
Within both groups there are many who use some of their energy to 
overcome the crisis, even if they clearly see that their personal 
contribution has to be small. The former I call supporters of the 
“shallow” or the “reform” ecology movement; the latter, the supporters 
of the “deep” ecology movement. 
  
I italicize the two words because they are often neglected where they 
are important. Thus, there is a widely used term “deep ecologist,” in my 
view an unfortunate designation. It makes it natural to add a somewhat 
ridiculous term “shallow ecologist.” Most supporters of the shallow 
movement do necessary and excellent jobs. It is only a waste of time 
when they oppose the deep movement in general. Instead of the term 
“deep ecologist,” one may use “deep ecology theorists.” There are 
hundreds of articles and books by authors, philosophers and others, who 
discuss important questions of principles, and who sometimes add 
complicated, sometimes unclear discussions. The rank and file 
supporters, the backbone, need not bother to read the theorists. They 
need not know the terminology. 
  
Volume 21, Number 2 25
It is of importance that groups who otherwise have different opinions 
and belong to different cultures find each other and encourage each 
other. To help, however modestly, to reach this situation is the main 
function of the common terminology. It is important to feel that 
thousands and thousands are working for the same goals. It is also good 
to feel that it is not only people from the rich countries, but also people 
in materially poor areas who eagerly and under adverse circumstances 
work along the lines of the deep ecology movement. My presentation 
here is one adapted to people in the rich countries with high formal 
education relative to the global average. 
  
One general way of explaining how deep ecology movement has come 
to being is to note the expansion of care. More than ever, it is seen that 
non-human living beings also need care, whether they are considered 
useful or not from a narrow human point of view. People who always 
have found it meaningful to do things for their own sake, whatever the 
beauty or ugliness of these beings, find that there is a frightful lack of 
care, locally, regionally, and globally. Therefore, most supporters tend 
to agree that every living being has intrinsic or inherent value or worth. 
And that there is a right, if rights exist at all, that belongs to every living 
being.  
  
Considering the consequences of the population explosion in the last 
centuries, the opinion exists that it would be good for the fulfilment of 
human basic goals in life to be fewer, and very good for other living 
beings if there were fewer humans. The fulfilment is more likely if 
there are significantly different human cultures, but that requires space. 
Perhaps, in the twenty-second century, a slow decrease of the 
population will take place. But ethical consideration suggests that this is 
a process that requires many centuries of wise policy. 
  
It is plain that respect for non-industrial cultures must prevail among 
the supporters as part of their concern for future richness and diversity 
of life forms on Earth. What is called ecological sustainability requires 
sustainability of human life forms, but the importance of the peace 
movement derives largely from the tendency within some cultures to 
coerce or even destroy others. A good sign of increasing awareness of 
past destruction is furnished by the mixed feelings about the 
“discovery” of America in 1492. The resulting destruction both of 
human cultures and life conditions in general have been of gigantic 
proportions. But we can only smile at the idea that it might have been 
postponed until the appearance of greater human maturity, say in the 
twenty-second century? 
The Trumpeter 26 
 
 
  
How would future societies look? How would the requirement of not 
violating deep ecology principles affect the structure of human 
societies? Interestingly enough, it seems that a wide variety of cultures, 
including their social aspects, may fully take care of those principles. 
But some should be disregarded because of inadequate satisfaction of 
two additional sets of requirements, those laid down by two mighty old 
movements: the peace movement and the social justice movement. The 
basic emphasis on increasing care within the deep ecology movement 
largely insures a broad co-operation with the two other movements. The 
unecological aspects of armaments and wars are too obvious to dwell 
on. But clearly some long range ecological goals must be ignored today 
in order to be of material help to very poor countries starting 
development toward economic progress, but this, of course, does not 
imply support for a development in the same direction as the so-called 
“developed” countries. That must be avoided at all costs, even if it will 
elicit serious hostility on the part of the power elites in so many poor 
countries. 
  
My vision: a manifold of green, or better, colourful, societies, and few 
or no power pyramids like the USA or EEC. It cannot, of course, be 
part of the function of deep ecology theorists to work out blueprints of 
ecologically fully responsible societies, but to use both their creative 
imagination and full power in criticism. The green movement at its best 
learns from all the three movements requiring grassroots support and 
activism. 
  
Ecological sustainability requires full richness and diversity of life 
forms on Earth. The term “richness” is meant to convey the idea of 
local, regional, and global abundance, not only absence of extinctions. 
The scary diminishing of biodiversity practically everywhere in the 
suburbs has only recently been investigated thoroughly. A change 
towards richness and diversity requires profound change of city and 
regional planning. It is difficult to see how this will happen if the 
“business as usual” attitude prevails. The supporters of the deep 
ecology movement have a formidable task to accomplish, and the 
frontier is long. Don’t press people active in one sector to move to a 
different one. Victory means an immense contribution to life quality of 
humans, and relief to countless other beings. 
 
 
 
 
Volume 21, Number 2 27
References 
Devall, Bill, and George Sessions. 1985. Deep Ecology. Salt Lake City: Gibbs 
Smith. 
Naess, Arne. 1989. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Translated by David 
Rothenberg: London and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Pearce, D., A. Markandya, and E. Barbier. 1989. Blueprint for a Green 
Economy. London: Earthscan. 
 
 
The Trumpeter 28 


Deep Ecology and the Potters in Our Planet

Reflections on Gestalt Ontology

The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 21, Number 2 (2005) 
 
 
What Kind of Democracy? 
1996AK 
Arne Naess 
 
There is substantial agreement within the environmental movement that 
there is no better kind of government and society than a democracy. 
Authoritarian and dictatorial kinds of government are ruled out. To be 
sure, conditions in some democracies might deteriorate to such an extent 
that there is a real threat that the authoritarian forms of government and 
society will come to be. I think that such a possibility is remote. There are 
presently many kinds of democracy and, with minor changes, they can 
adapt as necessary to meet demands to lower environmental impacts. 
However, there are “doomsday prophets” who think that uninhibited 
economic expansion could require drastic laws to be imposed, whatever 
the contrary opinion of the majority of people. In all democracies, 
regardless of kind, there has to be access to accurate information. This 
becomes more difficult in so-called advanced nations, since, in many, the 
control of mass media tends to be in the hands of large private firms 
whose interests might not be consistent with the basic requirements and 
principles of democracy. 
 
I use the phrase “kind of democracy” in a wide sense, so that I can talk 
about various kinds and subkinds of democracy. There are many forms of 
government. We could call democracy, in the most general sense, a form 
of government by the people that protects individual rights and community 
well being. But at a more specific, concrete level, given demands and 
differences in ecosystem and so on, we have the gift of many varieties of 
democracy to discuss. Theorists of democracy who are concerned about 
the ecological crisis are questioning whether the present subkinds of 
democracy are the best suited for the immense tasks ahead that are 
required to cope with this crisis. 
 
Many seem to think that democracy is the best way to govern ourselves; 
but how can popular democracies cope with crises that might not be 
acknowledged by their leaders and mainstream media? And when a crisis 
becomes severe, how can leaders react without centralizing control? This 
The Trumpeter 10 
 
 
process happens, as we have seen recently, with nations that go on a war 
footing. Civil rights and other liberties can be compromised, local control 
lost. What kinds of democracies are necessary, and more specifically for 
me, what about the kind of democracy we have in Norway? Is our kind of 
democracy fit to meet the challenges ahead? 
 
Some pessimism about the outlook for significant change of ecological 
policies may, in part, be due to the tacit assumption that nothing can or 
will change in the way that democracies work today. For many of us, it is 
profitable to study changes contemplated by authors specializing in this 
topic. In what follows, I will concentrate on the work by John S. Dryzek 
as it is presented in his book, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and 
Political Science.1  He writes: 
Discursive democracy is woven here from threads supplied by the classical 
(Aristotelian) model of politics, participatory democracy, communicative action, 
practical reason, and critical theory. The product, or so I shall argue, is a coherent, 
integrative, and attractive program for politics, public policy, and political science.2
Dryzek maintains that, over the first centuries, rationality has come to 
demand two things:  
The first is effective instrumental action; instrumental rationality may be defined in 
terms of the capacity to devise, select, and effect good means to clarified ends. The 
second is the idea that [there are] rational choices concerning theories and beliefs 
about matters of fact, and even about values and morals . . . 3  
This is characteristic of a subkind of democracy that can be overcome by 
inability to cope with deep change. But there is another characteristic that 
goes together with the dominance of instrumental rationality, namely what 
Dryzek calls “objectivism.” The representatives of the instrumental 
rationality “conjure up a clean and orderly world where modern science, 
technology, and economics flourish. However, I shall argue that modernity 
also allows some very different possibilities in polity, economy, and 
society.”4 Dryzek doesn’t doubt that there are important subkinds of 
democracy that will save what is valuable in rationality as opposed to 
irrationality. There are subkinds of democracy that can help nurture care 
for nature and that can encourage change to sustainable social practices 
and economies and that can gauge their progress by shifting from standard 
of living to quality of life and all this implies.  
 
The least radical escape from a democracy where instrumental rationality 
and objectivism dominate is, according to Dryzek, the Popperian open 
society in which instrumental rationalists can freely criticize one another’s 
designs, and in which objectivists freely criticize one another’s theories. 
But that is not enough. 
 
Volume 21, Number 2 11
The most radical escape “repudiates human reason, minimally in some 
specified domain, but sometimes more universally.”5 It is natural here to 
think of Paul Feyerabend and his joyful escape from the tyranny of 
viewing Western science as the only source of knowledge. But Dryzek 
promotes a third escape route. “. . . discursive and democratic rationality 
may regulate the remnants of instrumental rationality and replace 
objectivism.”6 The route goes through participatory democracy to 
discursive democracy. The first implies substantial strengthening of 
political communities that govern themselves and downscaling the 
intervention of representatives. The requirement is to participate also in 
sustained debates concerning conflicting programs of non-local character. 
As Dryzek sees it, this goes against the idea of liberal democracy where 
there is no public interest other than the sum of the interests of individuals. 
Public communal reasoning toward policy positions via consensus on 
normative positions moves the quality of decisions to the centre of the 
debate. The consensus is “on what is to be done while differing about 
why.”7  
 
It is now necessary to introduce another of Dryzek’s terms, “discursive 
design.” It is “a social institution around which the expectations of a 
number of actors converge. . . . a site for recurrent communicative 
interaction.” 8Participants should be reflectively and discursively free to 
override any rules of procedure. 
 
A concrete issue may make clearer what Dryzek proposes: Take for 
example the whaling issue: “Actors with a stake in the whaling issue 
include national governments (both whalers and nonwhalers), 
environmental groups . . ., aboriginal whalers . . ., commercial whalers, 
commercial whale watchers, consumers of whale products, scientists . . ., 
and international organizations such as the IWC and the United Nations.” 
9As I understand it, all these actors should come together regularly and on 
equal footing. 
 
Having been active in the whaling issue for ten years, I can confidently 
say that a meeting of representatives of all the actor groups would be a 
good thing. The location of a willing, competent, and credible third party, 
a requirement mentioned by Dryzek, would not pose any problem. 
Sweden, although opposed to whaling, is nevertheless friendly towards 
Norway, and would be willing to assist. As to compensation to whalers, 
the only realistic solution is to guarantee them work in the seas. 
 
I asked Norwegian whalers whether they would accept jobs as inspectors 
to prevent illegal fishing. There is a great need for enforcement here. It is 
probable that such an arrangement would have been acceptable to the 
The Trumpeter 12 
 
 
whalers in the 1980s, when the plan was aired. However, in political 
circles it was said to be “politically impossible” to invite whalers to be 
trained as inspectors. Such special arrangements for particular groups have 
no precedents. My conclusion: Discursive design and recurrent 
communicative interaction would increase the chances of constructive 
solutions in moderately sharp conflicts, such as that of whaling. Among 
the practical obstacles, I should mention, are the costs for all actors to 
come together to meet in person. In many cases, it would be sufficient to 
use certain modern non-personal means of close interaction. More 
generally, my conclusion is that Dryzek points to a largely neglected issue: 
creative thinking about changing the main features of contemporary kinds 
of democracy. 
 
What is the chance that present democracies might change and what is the 
chance that green values will benefit from these changes? In some 
countries, changes are not improbable. There is a lot of dissatisfaction 
with existing conditions. But in Norway, as in many other countries, 
politicians tend to agree that the population is unprepared for significantly 
more responsible and demanding ecological policies. A great upsurge of 
participatory democratic activism today might or might not strengthen the 
urge for such policies. This is not predictable. 
 
Dryzek concludes his book by expressing his conviction that discursive 
democracy and its development depends upon “critical theory,”10 and 
“multifaceted and relentless critique.”11 Here he certainly finds support 
from people in the deep ecology movement, but less in the environmental 
movement as a whole. Fortunately, able Green political theorists are 
gradually making themselves better known. It is my feeling that, as a plain 
environmental activist, it is important to keep up the interest, to introduce 
various issues in discussions, to talk about what is gained and what is lost, 
to encourage people to make use of the opportunities they have to enjoy 
free nature, and to avoid making still more propaganda for what may be 
called overwhelmingly exciting nature, that is, places you only reach as 
tourists. Most people do not have much time to visit such places. They 
might desire to see them. However, the most firm basis for persistent 
activism may be a deep need for living in nature that is not dominated by 
man, however modest its reputation. And if not living there, at least being 
able to be there sometimes.  
 
I remember when being driven through Tokyo once, that there were 
endless queues of vehicles, with cement everywhere. But on a nearby 
vacant lot there was lush vegetation: Dandelions and other flowering 
plants that are mostly despised. But that characterization is a kind of 
conventional classification. What was really there was practically an 
Volume 21, Number 2 13
infinite variety of living beings with the capacity to flourish in an 
environment of exceptional difficulty, surrounded by square miles of big 
buildings. Speaking of species and subspecies, there were, of course, many 
plants there that are unknown to me as a Norwegian. I had a delightful 
time looking for plants. People seeing me through the windows of their 
cars could see my delight. In the internationally admired botanical garden 
in Tokyo, I could not help concentrating on plants looking like my 
“friends” from childhood in Norway. And yet, I was probably looking at 
least at subvarieties never seen by me before. There was a hidden 
otherness: to concentrate on this resulted in sometimes ignoring the 
extremely rare and strange looking celebrities for which the botanical 
garden is famous. 
 
What I am driving at here is only to remind us that a fondness for free 
nature can be fostered in children even in our imperfect democracies. 
Education should be in awareness and feeling as much as in intellectual 
smartness. In a natural setting some people see hundreds of things more 
than the average person. If they are used as teachers in natural settings, 
their very body language reveals their positive emotions for the world. 
Unfortunately, the selection of teachers is mainly dependent on the higher 
levels of school administration in a country. I have talked to assemblies of 
Norwegian teachers and I have insisted that if they decide that education 
must proceed differently, no upper level administration, not even the 
government itself, could block their efforts. They would succeed! There 
are not 10,000 teachers available to take over their jobs. 
 
Unfortunately, the motivation for significant changes is not strong enough 
among the majority of teachers. They complain, but seem to have too 
much to do within the present regime to organize effective resistance. 
Resistance! And the government goes primarily for continued economic 
growth. This in itself could be of value, if it were not understood to imply 
continued consumerism. The idea is still new or little known that the 
measure of economic growth is independent of level of domestic material 
and energy consumption. If the growth is three percent, it is compatible 
with a six percent increase or decrease in domestic consumption. A 
decrease could be caused by large scale co-operation with Third World 
efforts to overcome the world ecological crisis. For instance, producing a 
sufficient number of small hydroelectric installations to secure energy 
supply in Nepal; next, financing the stay of a sufficient number of 
Norwegians to partake in the proper use of the equipment for the first 
years; and finally, to instruct the Nepalese on how to start production, 
using this continuing energy supply, with a higher ecological quality than 
is now found in Norway. Other nations could do other things that they are 
good at. 
The Trumpeter 14 
 
 
 
A similar misunderstanding may be present as to level of unemployment. 
A basic variable is level of labour intensity in the units of work, as 
opposed to capital intensity. The employment of one more worker in the 
production of something might require a capital investment of ten 
thousand or even ten million Norwegian Crowns. The production of 
aluminum is highly capital intensive in this sense. Whereas hiring a person 
to look after very old people, who manage imperfectly to live by 
themselves, may only be the cost of transport and food. Both are examples 
of economic production, that is, production of goods and services. 
 
A democracy with an increased budget devoted to consumption outside its 
own country, and increased labour intensity, requires some changes in 
value priorities on the part of a significant percentage of its population. It 
requires a minority who agree with these goals and are willing to use some 
of their time to “stand up” and work for their realization. Recent 
developments have seen an increase of social activism by women. They 
“stand up” in social conflicts and are on the average less charmed with 
power gained through directing material production. I am not going into 
the questions of how to proceed in detail, but point to the likelihood that 
the kinds of means we use will not generally change our kind of 
democracy in Norway. We will first change the value priorities within the 
democracy we have. This will probably be true in many other democracies 
as well. Even if this is unlikely, the changes, as convincingly described by 
Dryzek, offer possibilities for major changes in how democracies might 
work more effectively, especially in relation to ecological responsibility 
and social justice. 
Notes 
                                                 
1 John S. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
2 Dryzek, p. ix. 
3 Ibid.,  3–4. 
4 Ibid.,  4. 
5 Ibid.,  7. 
6 Ibid.,  9. 
7 Ibid.,  43. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 104. 
10 Ibid., 220. 
11 Ibid., 221. 
Volume 21, Number 2 15


What Kind of Democracy?

The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 21, Number 1 (2005) 
 
 
Norway: A Developing Country with Good 
Prospects? 
1988H 
Arne Naess 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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9This paper was originally published in From One Earth – One World, p 47–49, 
and was presented to the organizers: The Joint Committee of the Norwegian 
Research Councils and The Ministry of Cultural and Scientific Affairs. The 
Report was from a research policy conference on environment and 
development held in Fornebu, Oslo, Norway, March 22–23, 1988. ow was a philosopher to react to the birth of a strong, international 
nvironmental movement in the 1960s? To me, the issue was perfectly 
lear: people would be forced to seriously contemplate their philosophy 
f life. I know of no philosophy of life that assumes that high quality of 
ife can be achieved by damaging interference in the natural 
nvironment. Philosophers have always reacted when people build up a 
igantic external apparatus in order to achieve basic goals in life, 
hether these are regarded as pleasure, happiness, or some kind of 
erfection. They have always reacted when a whole ocean of external 
easures are demanded to satisfy people’s vital needs, an ocean in 
hich people are now slowly but surely drowning. But Diogenes of 
inope clearly exaggerated in his teachings that virtue requires 
voidance of physical pleasure. We must compromise between him and 
urselves. 
t is now recognized that the mad economic, and more general, growth 
n the richest countries ever known in the history of the world cannot 
ontinue. Therefore, as a philosopher, I believe that the path is open for 
hange in the way people conduct their lives. This change must consist 
f placing a higher value on the quality of life than on material 
tandards of living. [This is deep ecology movement platform principle 
. Ed.] But this demands profound differences in all kinds of politics 
nd policies. We must “give priority” to resolving the problems.  
he problems will be felt in the interim period. Old habits die hard. The 
ath toward wise policies and a wise way of life is bound to be long.  
The Trumpeter 2 
 
 
 
In the future, when we interfere in nature, we shall ask: are these 
interventions necessary for the quality of our lives as humans? Perhaps 
we can simplify life in our society in a way that would be beneficial? 
This concerns our personal freedom, our freedom of movement, our 
freedom from economic worries. 
  
The Earth’s fabulous resources are bountiful enough for a sustainable 
human population, of perhaps at least 1000 million (1 billion), to live in 
paradise as far as external conditions are concerned, without destroying 
either the conditions of life for other living creatures, or the diversity of 
the landscapes. (I believe that it is an inescapable goal to maintain the 
richness and diversity of life on Earth, at least for people who have had 
an opportunity to thoroughly contemplate the development of life on 
Earth.) 
  
Until 1945, the rallying slogan of the dominant political long-term 
perspective in rich countries was progress. When, in the period 1945 – 
1965, the emphasis was placed on a global perspective, and it included 
the materially poor countries, the central maxim became development! 
The poor countries were called developing countries and the rich 
countries developed countries. And the dreadful thing was that the rich 
were used as a model for the poor. However, in the 1960s, something 
radically new occurred. The international ecology movement received a 
flying start with Rachel Carson’s book, Silent Spring, and the fight 
began against the marriage between agriculture and the chemical 
industry. It became clear that pollution of the natural environment was 
almost proportional to economic growth. “Gross National Product,” 
GNP, was rechristened “Gross National Pollution.” This was not 
mentioned in the [Brundtland] Commission’s Report. In circles 
concerned about the degradation of the environment the maxim 
“development” was replaced by “sustainable development.” Persons 
concerned with the global perspective have tacitly understood that the 
term “conditions of life” refers to the richness and diversity of life on 
Earth and more generally to the ecosphere, not just the biosphere. It is a 
significant advance when the Commission’s Report, approved by 
politicians, uses the term “sustainable development” as its slogan. An 
initial conclusion from the above is that the rich nations must now 
admit clearly and explicitly that, at best, they are developing countries, 
that is to say, countries that are seriously planning a process of 
development in the direction of what is sustainable in the long term. 
The rich countries’ economic growth, as growth is understood today, is 
clearly not sustainable. Compared with certain poor countries, 
Volume 21, Number 1 93
Norway’s share, per inhabitant, of serious pollution and other activities 
threatening to life is overwhelming. 
  
Philosophically speaking, it is obvious that the wise thing is to attain 
high quality of life by the simplest possible means. Today, simplicity is 
of primary importance. This implies that we must learn to place the 
highest possible value on things of which there are enough for all. The 
more lasting and intense pleasure we get out of these things, the less 
time and energy we spend on striving to obtain things of which there is 
not enough, and which therefore have a market price. And the quality of 
life in a country as a whole must be measured in terms of those who are 
most poorly situated, and not in terms of the average.  
  
This shows the limitations of the current market economy which 
encourages consumption of material and energy. There is little 
connection between lifestyle and the satisfaction of fundamental needs 
and goals, such as self-realization, including freedom from economic 
worries. Sales people want us to buy. 
  
Today, it is a blessing that the goal of sustainable development in the 
long term naturally leads to political clarification of the relation 
between the fundamental goals of life and the means used to achieve 
them. Rationalization implies proper use of means to achieve 
fundamental goals. We sorely need such rationalization on a global 
scale. 
  
In political terms this implies a strong, but gradual reduction of public 
and private consumption, a decrease in real wages, reduced imports. It 
is worth noting that I have used three words with emotionally negative 
overtones in the preceding sentence – reduction, decrease, reduced. 
Therefore, tactically speaking, our present terminology is very 
unfortunate. This is because outdated goals force us to answer basically 
unimportant questions: “Can we really no longer expect increased gross 
or net national product?” (But that’s dreadful!). “Must we really tighten 
our belts any more, i.e., reduce consumption?” (But that’s awful!), etc. 
Life quality is important and can be high with low material 
consumption. 
  
As yet, no terminology has been developed for rational goals, those 
which refer directly to the quality of life and sustainable development in 
the long term. The difference must be incorporated into private and 
public communication. If we examine this more closely, the change, 
provided we show a certain minimum of wisdom and common sense, 
will consist of higher quality of life. The transition from a scale of 
The Trumpeter 94 
 
 
measurement based on material living standards to one based on the 
quality of life will take time, but it is also well under way [in 2005]. 
  
Finally, I will sum up the most important points briefly: 
1. Considering that it is politicians and not ecologists who 
coach for the World Commission’s Report, it represents a 
marked advance in the view of the future of the human race 
and conditions of life on Earth. 
2. By choosing the term “sustainable development” as a central 
slogan, the Commission has given the green light for a very 
radical interpretation of what lies ahead, both in poor and in 
rich countries. The term “economic growth” is still used, but 
the rich countries’ models of growth are sufficiently 
criticized to make these countries qualify as developing 
countries, ones which must now try to achieve a course of 
development that is sustainable in the long term. Then, GNP 
will lose its importance. [See the websites focusing on 
General Progress Indicator, or GPI, as a broader, deeper way 
of defining and measuring progress.] 
3. As a consequence of this, a large share of the research 
considered meaningful in terms of the Commission’s Report 
must consist of planning and implementing the transition to 
a sustainable process of development in rich countries. 
4. Use of simple means to satisfy fundamental needs is one 
prescription for change. The goal in the long run is to 
implement such change without reducing the quality of life 
in spite of lower material standards of living as defined in 
the richest societies. The research tasks will stem largely 
from such goals. 
5. If the basic goal is achieved, another goal will also be 
achieved that has hitherto been considered unachievable: To 
have a standard of living in the rich countries that the 
citizens of these countries can honestly want all others to 
share. 
 
 
Volume 21, Number 1 95


Norway: A Developing Country with Good Prospects?

 
 
The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 21, Number 2 (2005) 
 
 
Climbing and the Deep Ecology Movement 
1994V 
Arne Naess 
 
Reality as we know it has an abstract structure and an unsurveyable 
richness of content. Modern physics and cosmology study its abstract 
structure with extreme success. The “soft” sciences, poetry, literature, 
and the arts, reveal concrete contents. 
  
A mountain may be defined in terms of structures such as geographical 
coordinates and physical properties. As to contents, we may acquaint 
ourselves with its beauty or ugliness, its threats or its support, its 
mysteriousness or clarity, its hugeness or its insignificance, its 
fecundity or barrenness. So far as I can judge, all these properties 
belong to reality known to humankind. It is a blind alley to say that it 
really is a swarm of atoms, or simply a void. This way of thinking 
confuses abstract structure with concrete content. 
  
As supporters of the deep ecology movement, we try to emphasize the 
positive contents as part of the general fight for preserving what is left 
of the planet Earth in its unsurpassable splendour. 
  
Let us mention avalanches. They are more often conceived as threats 
than as splendid, awe-inspiring natural phenomena. In part, this is due 
to population pressure, pressing people too high up the valleys against 
their own common sense; in part, it is due to overestimation of our own 
strength and insights, as when peasants with great élan have pushed far 
up the valleys, and have brought their wives and children to tragic 
deaths. Our sympathy is with these people, and we are apt to think of 
avalanches with horror and even with anger and moral censure. But for 
a mountaineer, not overpowered by competitive urges but in love with 
all the life processes of the mountain, the observation and meditation of 
avalanches are positive encounters, every time different and never 
adequately describable to outsiders. Consequently, if the avalanche 
does not hit somebody, or at least nearly hit somebody, it is of slight 
interest to the media. 
Volume 21, Number 2 57
  
Avalanches are only one kind of mountain phenomena, and of course a 
very special kind. We have narratives and works of art, some going 
back at least 3000 years, and testimonies from the most diverse 
cultures—Chinese, Japanese, Aztec, Indian, Greek—showing positive 
acquaintance with mountains. There is a far-reaching similarity of 
descriptions: testimonies of the majestic, awe-inspiring, 
unreachableness, their serenity and purity, of their protective function, 
their job to make us see far, to let us survey, to make us free, strong in a 
good sense, concentrated on the essentials in life.  
  
Using the somewhat misleading term symbols, the mountain has 
symbolized the upward, the lofty and the high in a positive sense, and 
therefore, of course, what is nearest to heaven. 
  
On the other hand, the symbol of what goes downwards is associated 
with what is low, flat, hollow, and evil. The devil never has been 
located very high. The evil spirits in nature are mostly in caves, 
hollows, or, if in rocky landscapes, not in the really great mountains. 
  
Perhaps the surge upwards rather than downwards is millions of years 
old. In any case, from early infancy, climbing up is a positive 
experience: up stairs, up on chairs and tables, and with age, up on 
windows, roofs, trees, rocks. It is difficult to explain why some children 
dislike these activities unless it is through certain bad experiences or 
depressed moods. For me, it is difficult to understand why grown ups 
let such experiences go, and thus, with increasing routine, do not go on 
from trees to mountains. The question: “Why do you still climb?” 
should be countered by the question: “Why did you stop?” 
  
But in cultures like ours, where people do not, like certain tribes, live in 
caves on vertical cliffs, the climbing of mountains by adults is taken to 
be something extraordinary, hard to explain. Some time ago in Norway, 
it was seen as something foolhardy and even on the verge of insanity, or 
as something admirable as an expression of great courage, toughness, 
masculinity or whatever. As if climbing were more dangerous than 
skiing! 
  
Consider the following scenario. A little girl, perhaps 10 years old, 
rows out into the Arctic Ocean in big waves to meet the local steamer 
and gets a big, heavy sack of potatoes that is lowered down from the 
ship. The little boat moves up and down and so does the sack above the 
head of the girl. I am amazed. Not so the other people lazily looking at 
what is happening. Why? Because it is part of a culture, a tradition, and 
The Trumpeter 58 
 
 
it is more or less trivial. But a lot of training, years of training, and 
some unruffledness (uforferdethet) is required. Later some of the 
bystanders discover our climbing outfit, ropes etc. Amazement. What 
folly! Dare-devils! Admiration mixed with outrage. What we do is part 
of the Arctic Norwegian culture. A mountain with some 70 to 80 degree 
precipices looks vertical. No place to put hands and feet are seen at a 
distance. We may explain that some training and much experience on 
steep surfaces make climbing mountains a safe thing, as safe as skiing 
and other outdoor activities. But they are not convinced. 
  
Climbing is not more dangerous than skiing. But unlike easy skiing in 
moderate surroundings, easy climbing on moderate precipices requires 
attention, like driving a car. You cannot turn around looking for a piece 
of chocolate on the back seat. You must turn the wheel at the proper 
moment and not confuse the brake with the gas pedal. 
  
But what about the challenge, excitement, technical virtuosity of 
climbing? Is the all-round mountaineer perhaps a serious person, 
engulfed in meditation and deep experiences of mountains as they have 
developed in famous cultures? This is a misconception. There is no 
contradiction between the well-rounded mountaineer and virtuosity in 
climbing techniques.  
  
The excitement is there. And the risks to life and limb. Think of a crack 
that seems to lead to a beautiful little ledge near the summit. It seems 
that the crack stops just a couple of yards below the ledge. It takes 
hours and hours to enter the crack, and time is short. We risk a very 
unpleasant bivouac if we do not reach the ledge. Excitement, challenge, 
fear of not reaching the ledge, but a moderate fear, a fear that elicits 
smiles. 
  
To risk life or limb is stupid and, considering the consequences for 
one's nearest, often irresponsible. So, it is felt a great shame when a 
mountaineer falls or obviously does things recklessly. It is practically 
like cheating in sport. Somebody “succeeds” in reaching a summit, but 
as a climb it is unsuccessful because rules of safety were ignored. The 
party was not strong enough to carry the 30 pounds each, which is the 
minimum on that climb needed to survive safely a week in a snow cave 
in case of increased chance of avalanche at a certain spot.  
  
Many young climbers stop climbing after getting married or through 
mild pressure from their nearest, who suffers every time a climb is 
planned. They do not give up skiing or fast driving! Implicitly, a form 
Volume 21, Number 2 59
of climbing is taken for granted that reflects the image not created, but 
gladly maintained and nourished, by the media. 
 
 
The Trumpeter 60 


Climbing and the Deep Ecology Movement

 
 
The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 21, Number 1 (2005) 
 
 
Nonviolent Communication in Group Conflicts: 
An Intramural Note 
1993AC 
Arne Naess 
 
The following norms and hypotheses explicitly touch upon norms and 
hypotheses concerning verbal conflict behaviour:  
 
 H11a, H11b, H14, H16, H20 
 N7, N10, N11a, N12, N19 
 
Survey of norms of nonviolence, see my Gandhi and Group Conflict1, 
p. 60ff 
 
 Norm 
N1c Take part in ethically significant group conflicts and 
communication in a nonviolent way, etc. 
 
N2c Make a constructive program, part of which is dealing with 
nonviolent communication, part of your campaigns 
 
H3c Short-time violent verbal communication counteracts 
 
N3c Never resort to violent verbal communication 
 
H4c As H4 adding: This implies never to use argumentatum ad 
hominem, never touch the dignity of the antagonist as a human 
being. 
 
H9c “ . . . by use of violent communication  
 
H11ac Distorted description of your and your opponents' case 
reduces the chance etc. 
 
Volume 21, Number 1 129
N7 . . . which supporters and critics of the DEM and different 
shades of radical environmentalism have in common. Furthermore, 
which broader groups have in common.2
 
 
From this survey it is clear how important Gandhi considered 
nonviolent communication in conflicts. 
 
Only very few in very few conflicts completely agree with Gandhi's 
hypotheses and norms. And even among those who do, only a minority 
can be expected to try to follow them strictly and persistently. 
 
One aspect that is difficult for many to accept is the Gandhian radical 
optimism that at least seems to be implicitly implied. Example: H14. 
“There is a disposition in every opponent such that wholehearted, 
strong, and persistent appeal in favour of a good cause is able ultimately 
to convince him.” (General convincibility) 
 
Gandhi explicitly includes Hitler (p. 72). But he also imagines that the 
force of satyagraha in some persons may far exceed anything he has 
been capable of developing. He does not pretend that he could convince 
a Hitler of anything. And he presupposes a massive manifestation of 
satyagraha in wide groups of the population, “unarmed men, women 
and children” willing to face death without bitterness. 
 
India got rid of its colonial status in the first half of this century, but 
only after great conflicts. Mahatma Gandhi's supreme efforts to 
maintain a high level of verbal nonviolence within those dramatic 
conflicts, and his insistence that his followers do the same, contributed 
significantly, perhaps decisively, to the political liberation. 
 
The importance of nonviolence in communication during conflicts has 
been severely underrated. In what follows, I formulate a set of basic 
norms and hypotheses characteristic of this kind of behaviour as it 
manifested itself within Gandhi's satyagraha. The basic general norms 
and hypotheses of satyagraha I have tried to systematize in my book 
Gandhi and Group Conflict (now SWAN V). It is instructive to see how 
central the questions of communication are placed within the broad 
general question of how to behave in conflicts. 
 
My book did not intend to furnish such a complete account, but it 
furnishes relevant material. In what follows, I make ample use of its 
general account of the basic norms of group conflict behaviour, and 
The Trumpeter 130
 
 
especially the account on page 60ff. It turns out that as many as 10 of 
the hypotheses touch upon verbal behaviour in conflicts. 
 
Slightly modified, the formulations of the 9 norms and hypotheses may 
be thus expressed: 
  
H11a. Incompleteness and distortion in your description of your 
case and the plans for  your struggle reduce the chance of a non-
violent realization of the goal, and also that of future struggles. 
 
11b. Secrecy reduces the chance of a non-violent realization of the 
goal of your campaign. 
 
The intention to keep certain plans, moves, motives, and objectives 
secret influences our behaviour so that we cannot face our opponent 
openly. (Poker-face development) The intention, and its 
implementation, is also more easily revealed to the opponent than we 
are likely to believe. Our poker-face alerts the opponent. Furthermore, 
once a secret is revealed, the opponent cannot know how many other 
secrets are kept, and a general suspicion poisons the communication 
channels. 
 
On the other hand, if the opponent is in power, he may arrest all the 
leaders of a planned direct action. This stresses the need of democratic 
leadership, making it possible for a large number to take over the 
leadership. 
 
H11a. Incompleteness and distortion in your description of your 
case and the plans  for your struggle reduce the chance of non-
violent realization of the goal, and also that of future struggles. 
 
Unfortunately, Gandhi uses Hitler as an example. He writes as late as in 
1938:  
 
Hitherto he [Hitler] and his likes have built upon their invariable experience that 
men yield to force. Unarmed men, women and children offering non-violent 
resistance without any bitterness in them will be a novel experience for them. Who 
can dare say that it is not in their nature to respond to the higher and finer forces? 
They have the same soul as I have . . . 
 
Gandhi was not aware of the very, very special character of Adolf 
Hitler. Other examples are better . . . 
 
Volume 21, Number 1 131
H14. There is a disposition in every opponent such that whole-
hearted, intelligent, strong, and persistent appeal in favour of a good 
cause is able ultimately to convince him. (General convincibility) 
 
N7. Try to formulate interests which you and your opponents have 
in common and try to establish co-operation on that basis. 
  
As a premise Gandhi uses the theory that in complex social conflicts the 
participants always have interests in common, for example, kinds of 
situations they both seriously wish that will not arise. Negative feelings 
toward the “enemy” tend to make us overlook such interests or at least 
not sincerely and repeatedly express them in well-chosen words. 
 
N10. (Derived from N4 and H11a) Do your utmost in order to be in 
full accordance with the truth in your description of individuals, 
groups, institutions, and circumstances relevant to the struggle. 
(Unbiased description). 
 
Early in his life Gandhi trained himself in unbiased description in 
labour conflicts. He was on the side of the labourers but used a lot of 
time to describe the difficulties of the leaders of Indian industry. 
Examples: Germany and other industrial societies started producing 
markets because of their chemistry, in India they lost markets because 
of their traditional ways. Gandhi made the resulting difficulties crystal 
clear. How could one find work for labourers who would have to give 
up their old jobs? Broad co-operation between “enemies” was 
necessary. Trust must be cultivated. Therefore: unbiased description of 
the total situation in spite of the greater in-group solidarity and 
willingness to fight based on distorted, one-sided descriptions. 
 
N12. (Derived from N4 and H12 and H13) Announce the goal of 
your campaign explicitly and clearly, distinguishing essentials from 
non-essentials. 
 
N19. (Derived from N10 or from N20) Do not formulate your case 
and the goal of your campaign and that of your opponent in a biased 
way. 
 
Gandhi tried to split up the general movement in favour of political 
freedom in a succession of energetic campaigns. The opponent (Indian 
British Administration in most cases) was supposed to get clear inside 
information about the campaign, its strategy, and even its tactics (!!). 
No secrecy. Full communication all the time. And no overstepping of 
the goal of the campaign! No pictures of police brutality. Indignation, 
The Trumpeter 132
 
 
yes, protests, yes, but no use of means to incite hatred. No malevolent 
caricatures. Iron will and strength to reach the goal of the campaign, but 
communication at a top level of fairness and equimindedness. No silly 
words among leaders of the campaign! As a pragmatist Gandhi only 
tried to clear up a misinterpretation when it was necessary:  
 
I am used to misrepresentation all my life. It is the lot of every public worker. He 
has to have a tough hide. Life would be burdensome if every misrepresentation 
had to be answered and cleared. It is a rule of life with me never to explain 
misrepresentations except when the cause requires correction. This rule has saved 
much time and worry. 
 
The worry he speaks about probably has to do with protracted, 
unfruitful discussion. The opponent may insist that they do not 
misinterpret you, “should I answer or not?” 
 
N21. (Derived from N14 and H21) Keep in mind and admit your 
own factual and normative mistakes, and look for opportunities to 
correct your judgments. 
 
This makes it more understandable that Gandhi often offered a 
compromise: “I am essentially a man of compromise, because I am 
never sure that I am right.” 
 
Nevertheless the British often found him stubborn. Perhaps they found 
it peculiar that he always was ready to communicate in a most warm 
and friendly way, but rarely changed his practical decisions. 
 
We may imagine meetings proceedings like this. Gandhi says “Yes, 
yes—I understand, yes of course, yes . . .” But when the British 
conclude with a “So we agree. You will postpone the planned 
campaign?” But Gandhi: “No, no, no! Sorry!” 
 
So much about hypotheses and norms. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1974. 
2Gandhi goes very far in his harmony beliefs. How far depends on how he conceives the 
time factor. A thousand year struggle? A hundred years? Or even less? 
Volume 21, Number 1 133


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