The Trumpeter - Journal of Ecosophy (Athabasca University)

Morito, Bruce

Welcome to issue 22.1. The Naess Festshrift

Naess, Arne

Possibilism and Reflections on Total Systems

The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Festschrift Section 
Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 
 
 
Pluralism in Cultural Anthropology:  
Comments on an Article by Hans Skjervheim 
1990H 
Arne Naess 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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8This article was written in 1990 and is published here for the first time. As the
title implies, it is in response to an article written by Norwegian philosopher 
Hans  Skjervheim. That article, “Ad Skjervheim,” is in Norwegian only; it 
appeared first in a journal and was reprinted in 1997 in a collection of 
Skjervheim’s work edited by Hermund Slaattelid.  hat can I do except join Skjervheim1 in his efforts to clarify and reject 
he absolutistic ‘scientism’ of Lévi-Strauss? But I can do it only with 
ome trepidation because of the difference between the methodological 
argon of Lévi-Strauss and that of myself. An example: the former says 
hat “the model should be so constituted as to make immediately 
ntelligible all the observed facts.”2 Either Lévi-Strauss uses the word 
model’ so differently from myself that no ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is relevant in 
he discussion, or I must say NO with the feeling of desperation. The 
unction of models is such that if it covers, and even makes intelligible, 
all’ pertinent observations, then it is not a model. Models are highly 
elective. And how can he use the word ‘fact’ in this connection? An 
nthropologist notes down that two members of such and such culture 
lay (fight, make an axe, blame each other . . .). His conceptual 
ramework is his own, however talented he is in putting “himself in the 
lace of the people living there”3 and, also, however clever his 
heoretical models. 
 
n my favourite terminology of the ’30s and later, the anthropologist 
itnesses things rather than observes. With his witness reports 
unctioning as a sort of raw material, he successively eliminates or 
hanges those sentences which manifestly reveal the provinciality of his 
riginal concepts. Thus, if he stated “then the friends shook hands,” he 
ay be correct because of increasing evidence that ‘friendship’ as “we” 
The Trumpeter 0 
 
 
understand it is not their concept, and because the reaction sequence 
named ‘shaking hands’ does not have that significance. 
  
So, where are the ‘facts’? 
  
Suppose anthropologists from cultures A, B, and C compare each 
others’ reports as witnesses and their laboriously constructed accounts 
of the social relations of the Balinese. Why should we believe in a kind 
of true scientific account of those relations? The greater the differences 
between A, B, and C, the greater, on the whole, will be the differences 
in their accounts. If very great, the classification of all three as 
‘anthropologists’ gets to be rather shaky. Which are the maximum 
methodological divergencies possible with the conceptualization 
‘anthropologist’? 
  
We may assume that by means of scientific methods of some sort we 
are able to reduce the differences between the three accounts of the 
social relations of the Balinese. But even if against all odds, the number 
of differences could be reduced to zero, the appearance of a fourth 
anthropologist, D, belonging to a young generation is likely to shatter 
the artificial joint account constructed by A, B, and C. 
  
The problems faced are essentially the same as those facing us when we 
try to formulate a definition of a term, e.g., ‘democracy,’ on the basis of 
a set of use occurrences of the term. Or, the construction of a 
characterization of a Verhaltensweise corresponding to the cognitive 
content of ‘the distance between Sun and Earth is 149.5 million km.’ 
based on a set of descriptions of behaviours (verbal and non-verbal) of 
scientists. 
  
Pluralism is inescapable, and nothing to lament. Reality is one, but if 
accounts of it are identical, this only reveals cultural poverty. Excessive 
belief in ‘science’ favours acceptance of poverty as a sign of truth. 
  
According to Lévi-Strauss, good models will save us from pluralism 
because of their intimate relation to what he calls ‘reality,’ sometimes 
even ‘deep reality.’ 
  
Strauss’s references to Freud are important in this connection.  
  
The concepts used by Freud in order to describe the function of the 
unconscious are socially understandable. “I intended to kill my father” 
may be unacceptable to the patient at a certain stage of the 
psychoanalysis, but patricide is part of a set of understandable social 
Festschrift Section, Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 81
concepts. Physicists may introduce completely new concepts like 
“quarks” in fundamental explanation (i.e., on the top level of hypo-
deductive systems). But social scientists must, I presume, narrow down 
the areas basic concepts in his models to that of socially amused 
acceptance, such as that we really are mere appendages of selfish 
genes,4 but this conceptualization is useless in social science. The 
‘realness’ Dawkins asserts is only one in relation to certain biological 
models. 
  
It is amusing to imagine that we are only appendages of certain kinds, 
just as it is entertaining to think of ourselves as swarms of atoms, or as 
many-dimensional oceans of probability waves. If we live long enough 
we can look forward to a series of new wonderful models superbly 
popularized by eminent natural scientists. 
  
In short, if Lévi-Strauss relies on models from the most modern natural 
science, logic, and mathematics, the pluralism is not only inescapable, 
but very clearly stated in modern general methodology. The models are 
mutually inconsistent; otherwise, change of models would be only 
moderately interesting. If we think of reality as one, and I do not see 
how we can avoid that, the relation of the models to reality cannot be 
but indirect. They cannot put us in touch with deeper layers of reality in 
the way Freud tried to do. His conceptualizations served the aim to 
make our feelings and actions more understandable. 
  
The astonishing success of physical models since Galileo justifies the 
belief that they somehow picture something real and independent of 
cultural differences among scientists. The equations seem ‘themselves’ 
to be independent, but their use and interpretations are always 
dependent. 
  
Against what I have said so far, it may be argued that it is absolutistic: 
the pluralist conclusion is asserted ‘monistically’ at a higher meta-level. 
The pluralism is part of a total view which is not mentioned. If Lévi-
Strauss has a different total view, my arguments for pluralism may be 
misconceived, irrelevant, or simply not understandable from his point 
of view. 
  
It would lead too far to go into the problems of total views. Suffice it to 
say that some of my formulations are purposely made absolutist in 
order to remind the reader of those problems. This holds, e.g., for the 
bombastic sentence “Pluralism is inescapable . . .” When I work toward 
a total view, pluralism gets increasingly ‘obvious,’ or gets to be 
The Trumpeter 82 
 
 
derivable with increased rigour from fundamental norms and 
hypotheses. 
  
With Skjervheim I agree that Lévi-Strauss seems to favour a kind of 
scientific absolutism. I would add “with an atomist flavour” considering 
his ideal of “reintegrating culture and nature and finally of life within 
the whole of its physico-chemical conditions.”5 Atomism I understand 
as the opposite of gestalt thinking, that is, thinking in terms of ever 
more comprehensive wholes, and stressing the non-reducibility of 
higher order wholes to lower order wholes. Classical examples: 
melodies to sequences of noises or even tones, propositions or units of 
intended meaning to sentences or formulations, Verhaltensweisen or 
operations to reactions. 
  
Mathematics, chemistry, socio-biology, and other branches of science 
are of heuristic help to social scientists as ‘auxiliary sciences.’ But they 
do not help to dissolve sciences of man. They do not dissolve any thing 
or process. ‘Reduction’ as a part of the scientific enterprise must be 
understood in a different way.6
  
Skjervheim’s way of saying essentially the same or similar things to 
what I have so far said in this article is often not my way. The 
difference is instructive, but not easy to pin down in clear words. In 
what follows I shall try to clarify disagreements about how to interpret 
some points in my Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten (“E”). 
  
The biologist and philosopher von Üexküll worked out clearer than 
others that each species has a set of different reactions applied in 
different kinds of situations (defined by the biologists!). The world each 
lives in as an experienced world has the number of discriminable 
features which manifest in a number of kinds of reactions. This is all 
very inspiring except that every reaction and situation is of course 
described in terms of the human observer, as features of his world. 
  
Now, if we as cultural anthropologists try to “study men as if they were 
ants,”7 the reactions and situation we describe in our witness reports on 
culture B is in terms of our own particular culture A. The culture B 
cannot be described except as something completely within the 
cognitive framework of A. The world of B is either naively pictured as 
a part of the world of A or else said only to have an abstract structure 
corresponding (isomorphically) to a non-abstract structure within the 
world of A. 
  
Festschrift Section, Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 83
When it is said that a person, N. N., within a culture, B, thinks he or she 
is actually identical with a particular animal, the terms person, identical 
and animal (etc.) possess the connotations they have in A. We, 
members of A, get an exciting picture of B, but we should not pretend 
we can experience the world of B through the connotations of words 
belonging to A. If we do, we succumb to the mistake of ‘maze-
epistemology.’ (We describe the movement of an animal in a maze 
without clearly recognizing that the maze is a feature of our 
experienced world rather than of that of the animal.) 
  
The cultural provinciality of anthropologists can be reduced through 
successive (endless) modifications of their accounts. In the example 
given above, the member of culture A will try to find out how people in 
B experience what we call animals, persons, and identities. Another 
example: how can Sherpas seem to say (in their language) that the 
mountain Tseringma is a mountain and a princess? How can we 
translate, if at all, their verbal utterances in such a way that we 
approximate their experience of Tseringma? The attempts to do so 
result in a plurality of versions. 
  
Strangely enough, the successive approximations—if such are at all 
forthcoming—are reached by successive steps of methodological 
alienation: We start treating the members of B as colleagues: the 
Sherpas assert ‘mistakenly’ that Tseringma also is a princess. Then we 
retreat from them, allowing for the possibility that their concept of a 
mountain is not the same as ours, nor is that of a person, nor their use of 
language. We may even start looking for evidence that identification 
somehow is differently conceived. 
  
If very successful we may be able roughly to experience the world as a 
member of culture B, still retaining the ability somehow to describe the 
experience in the language of A. But with further approximations this 
ability gradually vanishes: it is a basic feature of the experience within 
culture B, that it does not somehow contain the consciousness of being 
different from A. As long as the cultural anthropologist walks round 
with his notebook in mind, his experience is in one fundamental way 
different from that of B. 
  
The eminent cultural anthropologist Fredrik Barth sometimes writes as 
if humans are capable of going in and out of many different cultures, 
participating in each word they define. I presume he does not pretend to 
grasp more than fragments.8 If he went in deep I presume it would be 
next to impossible to get out. 
  
The Trumpeter 84 
 
 
Literally speaking, everything is affected by a culture—including the 
primary sense qualities like length and breadth. The size of coins 
perceived by members of the culture in which the coin is used is 
perceived differently according to its value.9 An axe is full of cultural 
traits, and in at least one culture it is perceived as a status symbol in a 
way so complicated that it would take years to adjust one’s behaviour to 
its cultural ontology. The repugnance toward lack of intelligence is so 
pervasive in our competitive civilization that rats classed as dull are 
treated worse than those classed as bright—with the effect that the 
former perform even worse than necessary.10 Cultural priorities 
determine behaviour in ways completely unknown to the participants. 
  
The terms behavioural and behaviourism are usually associated with 
the doctrines of J. B. Watson and other ‘molecular’ behaviourists, not 
with the ‘molar’ behaviourism of E. C. Tolman. The difference is 
philosophically essential because the molar view is an intentional 
view.11 In E, I use the Tolmanian conception of behaviour as action, not 
reaction. The term Verhaltensweise, way of behaviour, is not 
observable as a succession of movements or reactions. 
  
Skjervheim suggests that in my earlier work (E) “behaviour” did not yet 
have intentional import. I disagree. Perhaps I did not make it clear 
enough that the ‘stranger from another planet’ whom I introduce for 
certain purposes, is not a Tolmanian behaviourist? My Verhaltenswise 
was meant to offer a synthesis of Erkenntnisinhal (cognitive content) 
and Erkenntnistätigkeit (cognition as act). Only inherently purposeful 
ways of behaviour could represent cognitions as acts and content—in 
the kind of science of science envisaged. 
  
When operationists like Bridgman insisted that in science of science 
one should not listen to scientists but see what they do, I stressed that in 
that case one should not even listen to how scientists define their 
various operations, but must take up the attitude of the anthropologists 
or even the rat psychologist in observing the scientist. An illustration: 
 
A: What do those two scientists do? 
B: They each perform an x-ray measurement. 
A: But they move very differently. Look at their arms. 
B: Nonsense: The one is left-handed, the other right-handed. You must 
understand that those differences in reactions are totally irrelevant. 
A: But what do they do now? They behave very differently.  
Festschrift Section, Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 85
B: Nonsense. They still perform an x-ray measurement. One of them 
smokes a cigarette, the other sings. You must understand that it is a 
completely irrelevant difference. 
 
In so far as ‘x-ray measurement’ is a kind of Verhaltensweise, it is a 
complicated task to describe it in terms of relevant and only relevant 
traits. But if that could be done, the intentional aspect would be 
included, simply in terms of relevance. Intentionality does not manifest 
itself in pure consciousness, but in units of verbal and non-verbal 
behaviours. 
  
This is the point of view of E, and I accept it. But just as a cultural 
anthropologist starts out using uncritically the conceptual framework of 
his own culture, the science of science specialist starts out as a 
colleague of the scientists, that is, methodologically as a ‘witness.’ The 
kind of scientist of science envisaged in E tries step by step to get rid of 
the prejudices due to cultural affiliation. But where does this end? I 
agree with Skjervheim that there is a limit beyond which the scientist of 
the science B cannot any longer be said to understand B, or more 
precisely, does not produce an account of B that makes B 
understandable. I think the molar behavioural (objektiv psychologische) 
account envisional in E is inside the limits, whereas that of the 
“researcher from a strange planet” is outside. He establishes a science 
of science of sorts, and according to the stated assumptions, one in a 
strange, but perfect way, explains the difference in cognitive content 
between various human hypotheses about the distance of the sun. He is 
in one way completely inside (and perhaps very proud of this), but at 
the same time hopelessly outside in another way. Call it the 
hermeneutical way, if you insist. 
Notes 
                                                 
1 Hans Skjervheim, “Ad Skjervheim,” in Regime under Kritikk: Om Hans Skjervheim 
I Norsk Filosofi Og Samfunnsdebatt, edited by Hermund Slaattelid, Oslo: Aschehoug, 
1997. pp. 49–53. Skjervheim addressed the same topics in “Objectivism and the Study 
of Man,” in Positivism, Dialectikk, Materialisme. Den Norske Debatten om 
SamfunnsuitenKapenes Teori, edited by R. Sladstad, Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 1976. 
2 Quoted on p. 6 in Skjervheim’s article. 
3  See quotation on p. 8. 
4  For example, Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 1976, New York and Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
5 Cp.p.13. 
6 Cp. Bonner, J. T., The Evolution of Culture in Animals, Princeton 1980, about 
culture in animals and man. 
7 Lévi-Strauss, cp. p. 13. 
8  F. Barth, Andres Liv - og vårt eget, Oslo: Gyldendal, 1980, p. 32. 
The Trumpeter 86 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
9  E. Brunswik. 
10  R. Rosenthal & K. Frode. 
 11After the War when E. Brunswik and myself were going to write the psychology 
volume for the Encyclopedia of Unified Science, even the mellow and sophisticated 
behaviourism of E. C. Tolman and Brunswik was too rigorous and antimentalististic for 
me. Our ways parted. Brunswik wrote a highly competent volume alone. 
Festschrift Section, Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 87


Pluralism in Cultural Anthropology: Comments on an Article by Hans Skjervheim

 
 
The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Festschrift Section 
Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 
 
 
Is It a Plus to Have a Definite  
Metaphysics in Common? 
Arne Naess 1991 S 
The monumental work of Max Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness,1 
ends on pages 352–354 with a kind of postscript that seems to envisage 
an unnecessary limitation of future cultural diversity. He writes: 
 
Is salvation possible? Or have we so fouled this earth, so covered the green 
world beneath our second world, that no light can penetrate the world’s 
midnight? Is there hope for the plant and animal people? Is there hope for us 
all? These are questions that must be answered by the postmodern mind, for 
only through that exercise of consciousness can our modern dilemma be 
transcended.2
 
Fortunately, as there is no definite “modern mind,” there will be no 
definite “postmodern mind.” Or, to be more explicit, I join the reaction 
against Western arrogant historical generalizations, speaking about the 
period of enlightenment, romanticism, modernity, and so on. The kind 
of philosophy of history I join is influenced by cultural anthropology. 
There are even today deep cultural differences and from that point of 
view there are different “minds” operating, opening many avenues for 
future development.  
 
Jerry Mander’s book In the Absence of the Sacred3 has as a subtitle 
“The failure of technology and the survival of the Indian Nations.” He 
tells how some American Indian people continue with their old cultural 
traditions. These and many other examples from around the world 
should tell us that history is broad. What some of us hope for is a future 
with deep cultural and ecologically sustainable diversity, with only 
moderate areas dominated by humans and absence of wars and of cruel 
poverty. But these requirements hopefully do not prevent diversity. 
Peaceful coexistence of radically different green societies! All this to 
my mind does not necessitate common ultimate premises in human 
metaphysical or religious views. No definite sort of ‘mind’! 
 
Festschrift Section, Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 75
I hope mathematical physics, cosmology and other branches of the 
‘hard’ sciences will thrive in at least one green society, together with 
the ‘soft.’ This requires the use of energy on a large scale and may 
necessitate energy austerity in other ways in that society. The 
appropriate global institution will have to decide how to maintain some 
measure of ecological justice. All of this can be done with cultural 
diversity. 
 
Unfortunately, Oelschlaeger can be interpreted to be looking for 
something rather uniform. He writes: 
 
And there is an old-new way of being, beckoning on the horizon. Turtle 
Island is its name. Snyder’s vision seems to make even the deep ecologist a 
vulgar pragmatist, and yet that primordial green world beckons with subtle 
gestures. Tao says no words; deep and obscure is its meaning.4  
 
Gary Snyder’s Buddhist-inspired vision belongs to his personal total 
view. If we roughly define an ecosophy as a total view in part inspired 
by the ecological crisis, his vision is an ecosophy, of course only 
fragmentarily articulated in words. And he belongs to the small group 
of highly articulate, explicit supporters of the deep ecology movement. 
Good, but some supporters find the gestures too uniform.  
 
The strength of the movement depends on bringing together of people 
of deeply different articulations of ultimate views: often, I am glad to 
say, using artistic means, and similarity of views and attitudes relating 
to the ecological crisis. This includes the similar way they personally 
try to live, mirroring a sort of “ecological consciousness.” But they also 
recognize that social and political action is needed, which may or may 
not be articulated in terms of the “exercise of consciousness.” 
Differences in terminology make themselves felt here as elsewhere. 
 
I am sorry if I talk as if Oelschlaeger disagreed with the ‘plurality’ I 
stand for. It is, among other things, his use of the term deep ecologist in 
the above quotation that might lead some readers to misconstrue what 
he means. Does he refer to some writers? I acknowledge an 
international deep ecology movement. 
 
“Turtle Island” is a name for “an old-new way of being,” and the 
fundamental views involved in a description of that way belong to the 
ecosophy of many supporters of the deep ecology movement. But 
others do not quite feel at home with those articulations. “Tao says no 
words.” How excellent! It is encouraging to see a line from ancient 
Chinese views of deep ecology. It is also encouraging to see how well 
process philosophy, Heidegger and other sophisticated Western views 
The Trumpeter 76 
 
 
are applicable. The doctoral thesis of Shahed A. Power, Gandhi and 
Deep Ecology,5 shows convincingly how Hindu ultimate premises can 
furnish some ultimate premises for deep ecology movement attitudes. A 
manifold of ultimates is necessary for the global impact of the deep 
ecology movement. 
 
It is strange to me to find that my expressions of enthusiasm for a 
Spinozist approach, including a Spinozist interpretations of hard 
science, sometimes is conceived as an effort to make others look at such 
an approach as the ‘best.’ I don’t know what the ‘best’ implies here. 
Anyhow, the majority of supporters of the deep ecology movement 
have never thought about Tao, Whitehead, or Heidegger. They simply 
do not have the formal education implied, nor does their important 
contribution necessitate any elaborate, verbal expression of their 
ultimate views. But they have such views, and it is a pleasure to listen 
to their informal talk, sometimes at gatherings, demonstrations, or other 
great or small direct actions. 
 
My remarks do not challenge any views clearly expressed by 
Oelschlaeger, but I wish to forestall some misinterpretations related to 
my understanding of the deep ecology movement. 
 
                                                 
1 Max Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1991. 
2 Ibid., 353. 
3 Jerry Mander,  In the Absence of the Sacred: The failure of technology and the 
survival of the Indian Nations. San Francisco: Sierra Books, 1991 
4 Oelschlaeger, 352. 
5 Shahed A. Power, Gandhi and Deep Ecology, Doctoral thesis, University of Salford, 
1991. 
Festschrift Section, Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 77


Is It a Plus to Have a Definite Metaphysics in Common?

The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Festschrift Section 
Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 
 
Total Views, Personal or Not? 
Arne Naess 1993U 
Total views are personal in the sense that a person A, may feel at home 
with the set of articulations T, but B may not feel that way, but feels at 
home with U, and C with V. They may agree that they do not quite 
understand each other in spite of serious and honest efforts. That mutual 
understanding is limited in spite of all the efforts is, I hope, an 
indication of deep cultural differences. Differences studied by cultural 
and social anthropologists, by historians of ideas, historians of 
economics, by linguists, semanticists, even by social biologists and a 
host of others engaged in finding the specific roots of a total view, 
taking roots in a rather general sense.  
  
The people feeling at home with T or U or V may profit significantly by 
listening to the tales of the researchers. They may, as a consequence, 
change their terminology and even some of their cherished views under 
influences by chance meetings with certain authors, traditions, and 
people. ‘Chance meetings’ in the sense of some arbitrariness involved, 
resulting in acceptance of views that are slightly inconsistent with the 
deeper views they hold. That is, the information of the students of the 
roots of a total view may furnish, for instance, the ecosophers with 
additional relevant material. 
  
By saying that an ecosophy is something personal, one runs the risk of 
being interpreted as overestimating the personal roots of the views 
expressed. Or, in other words, underestimate the social, cultural, 
traditional, etc. roots of those roots. What the ecosopher has contributed 
personally should not be overestimated: yes, but not underestimated 
either. 
  
There are students of roots who talk as if they believe in total cultural, 
social, (and so on) determinism: that ‘the individual’ contributes 
nothing, that the individuals are just puppets, moving and talking and 
deciding, determined by strings operated by cultures, societies, etc. Less 
dogmatic, there are researchers insisting that the range of personal, 
‘free,’ decision is very limited, perhaps extremely limited. But even if 
The Trumpeter 78 
 
 
extremely limited, each person cannot but try to decide on the basis of 
personal views. "What does my religion ask me to do in this situation?" 
"What does Great Britain expect of me: attack the enemy or run away?" 
"What does my conscience tell me to do now?" The answers are in my 
opinion personal answers. And they normally differ. An ecosopher may 
perhaps ask "What is the best to do now from the point of view of 
contributing to the decrease of the rate of increasing eco-logical 
unsustainability?" I doubt that such a long sentence will form ‘in the 
mind’ of an ecosopher, but the main point is that whatever the non-
personal roots of a decision, an ecosophy furnishes a personal aspect of 
decisive importance. When deciding, we humans decide, not cultures. 
Whatever we think of ourselves as enthusiastic traditionalists or 
individualists, does not in principle make a difference. In short, saying 
that an ecosophy is a personal thing does not imply any answer to the 
question which cultural, social, etc. determinants influence the views 
and decisions articulated, and the question to which extent there are 
specific personal traits revealed, traits mirroring individual traits of the 
ecosopher. 
  
When I ‘personally’ attach some weight to emphasize the personal 
aspect of an ecosophy, it is due to the opinion that we all need to make 
clear to ourselves ‘where we stand,’ and never take for granted that 
somebody else can show us adequately where that is. We can learn 
from others, and learn about ourselves, but with widely different 
backgrounds we should expect differences in ecosophies, even 
differences that limit mutual adequate understanding. If I, for instance, 
choose some Spinozistic articulations, why should anybody else do 
exactly that? Why should they use a lot of time trying to understand 
Spinoza? If they do, it makes me glad, but it also makes me glad to see 
how an ecosophy may be worked out on a theoretical basis that is very 
different from mine. Cultural diversity is in danger! We need diversity! 
 
Festschrift Section, Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 79


Total Views, Personal or Not?

Gullvåg, Ingemund Gullvåg

Vagueness and Ambiguity

Self-Realization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep, and Wolves

Quick, Tim

Holons or Gestalts? A Response to Wilber and Zimmerman

The Trumpeter 
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 22, Number 2 (2006) 
Editorial 
Bruce Morito 
Welcome to issue 22.2. This second issue of 2006 is the fourth and last 
in the series celebrating the just released Selected Works of Arne Naess 
(SWAN). The continuing efforts of Alan Drengson and Bill Devall have 
produced yet another special and unique issue. We again express our 
gratitude for the great work and dedication that Alan and Bill have 
applied to this important series. 
Volume 22 Number 2 1 


Editorial

Drengson, Alan

Emotions, Judgments and Life Quality

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