Biolinguistics (E-Journal)
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Analysis by Synthesis: A (Re-)Emerging Program of Research for Language and Vision
This contribution reviews (some of) the history of analysis by synthesis, an approach to perception and comprehension articulated in the 1950s. Whereas much research has focused on bottom-up, feed-forward, inductive mechanisms, analysis by synthesis as a heuristic model emphasizes a balance of bottom-up and knowledge-driven, top-down, predictive steps in speech perception and language comprehension. This idea aligns well with contemporary Bayesian approaches to perception (in language and other domains), which are illustrated with examples from different aspects of perception and comprehension. Results from psycholinguistics, the cognitive neuroscience of language, and visual object recognition suggest that analysis by synthesis can provide a productive way of structuring biolinguistic research. Current evidence suggests that such a model is theoretically well motivated, biologically sensible, and becomes computationally tractable borrowing from Bayesian formalizations
A Naturalist Reconstruction of Minimalist and Evolutionary Biolinguistics
Kinsella & Marcus (2009; K&M) argue that considerations of biological evolution invalidate the picture of optimal language design put forward under the rubric of the minimalist program (Chomsky 1993 et seq.), but in this article it will be pointed out that K&M’s objection is undermined by (i) their misunderstanding of minimalism as imposing an aprioristic presumption of optimality and (ii) their failure to discuss the third factor of language design. It is proposed that the essence of K&M’s suggestion be reconstructed as the sound warning that one should refrain from any preconceptions about the object of inquiry, to which K&M commit themselves based on their biased view of evolution. A different reflection will be cast on the current minimalist literature, arguably along the lines K&M envisaged but never completed, converging on a recommendation of methodological (and, in a somewhat unconventional sense, metaphysical) naturalism
Recursion as a Human Universal and as a Primitive
This contribution asks, in an empirical rather than formal perspective, whether a range of descriptive phenomena in grammar usually characterized in terms of ‘recursion’ actually exhibit recursion. It is concluded that empirical evidence does not support this customary assumption. Language, while formally recursive, need not be recursive in the underlying generative mechanisms of its grammar. Hence, while recursion may well be one of the hallmarks of human nature, grammar may not be the cognitive domain where it is found. Arguments for this claim are briefly exposed and then discussed with respect to a selection of talks from the DGfS workshop on Foundations of Language Comparison: Human Universals as Constraints on Language Diversity that led to this special issue