Wittenberg University Journals

Bodin, John

The Japanese Success and its Roots in the Meiji Restoration * 23
The Japanese Success
and its Roots in the Meiji Restoration
By John Bodin
Wittenberg Class of 2000
Hartje Award Finalist
The country of Japan has achieved a level of
economic and political success that is
unparalleled throughout the non-western world.
Along with Germany, it is the United States
only real economic competitor. To many
developing countries, Japan serves as a role
model on how to succeed through western-style
modernization yet at the same time be able to
retain its own unique cultural heritage. The
Japanese have shown that being European does
not have to be a prerequisite for success in the
modem world. Although the causes behind
Japan's success is are too complex and varied to
be examined by this paper, a major component
of that success would undoubtedly be the Meiji
Restoration of 1868. The Meiji Restoration made
Japan the first and most successful self-
modernized non-Western country.
Rutherford Alcock, a British diplomat
writing in 1863 after spending three years in
Japan, described Japan in terms of Europe's
medieval ages. Feudalism, he said, was found in
Japan "with sufficient identity and analogy in all
its leading features to make the coincidence
striking."1 Indeed, members of the Japanese
ruling class, the samurai, remained bound to
each other by ties of vassalage and extracted
from the landed peasantry a portion of their
crop as feudal dues. This all radically changed,
when in 1868 a group of samurai reformers
seized control of the country from the unstable
Tokugawa shogunate. They wanted their
regime to be known as the "Meiji Restoration,"
which purportedly "restored" the imperial
family to its proper role after years of de facto
rule by shoguns.
The political and economic changes that
were instituted in the 21 years between 1868
and the acceptance of the Meiji Constitution in
1889, were truly revolutionary in scope and
magnitude. These changes needed to be of such
a dramatic nature, considering the purpose for
which the Meiji Restoration was undertaken.
This purpose, was the importation of western
institutions, finance, and technology necessary
for the establishment of a strong industrialized
economy capable of keeping foreigners at bay.
This was achieved first through political
centralization, which resulted in the abolition of
feudal domains and the end of administrative
iocalism. It was believed by the reformers that
only through the establishment of an absolutist
and centralized state could they avoid the social
upheaval that such rapid modernization might
bring. Probably the most significant reform was
the establishment of a centrally commanded
conscript army and the subsequent abolition of
the samurai as a class.2 With the end of the
samurai's monopoly on warfare came the
destruction of the samurai's basis for power
which removed the threat of opposition from
the old feudal order. The ultimate Meiji goals
were reached when the Meiji leaders managed
to begin the industrialization process by a series
of government initiatives. Just as the present
Japanese government, the Meiji leaders saw
economic development in nationalist terms.
Japan pursued a policy of state capitalism, by
which the government served as the principal
manager and financier of modern industry. The
government took on a number of plant
operations, buying whole factories overseas,
assembling them in Japan, and bringing in
foreign technicians and workers to get them
started.3
As an island nation, Japan's fundamental
predicament is that it is vulnerable to foreigners
who might ovel±ly or subtly force their ways on
24 ° The Wittenberg History Journal
Japan. In this predicament Japan had two
choices. Either to wall itself off from the
outside world as it did during the isolationist
period of the Tokugawa era, or to attempt to
control the surrounding environment so it will
not be able to spring any surprises on the
Japanese. Thus, Meiji Japan underwent a radical
transformation not only from handicrafts to
modern industry but also from reclusive
feudalism to expansionism. This new
expansionism is seen through Japan's opening of
Korea through the Treaty of Kangha, the Sino-
Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war. The
victory over Russia was especially significant
since it was the first time an Asian country
triumphed over a major European power. Japan
had established itself as a peer of the other
Western powers.
Japan stands today as the world's only non-
white first world country. It has done this, not
just through vigorous western adaptation, but
also by the use of its unique cultural strengths
such as its enormous drive and emphasis on
community. As any visitor to Japan can easily
testify, it has remained true to its own cultural
identity. It has shown us that in this highly
polarized world of poverty and power, there is
alternatives to the white, western model of
success.
Notes
1PaulAkamatsu, Meiji 1868 (London: Ruskin House,
1972) 142.
2 W.G. Beasley, The Rise o[ Modern lapan (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1998) 61.
Beasley, 66.


English

The Japanese Success and its Roots in the Meiji Restoration

Lydy, Kevin

James Burke: A Historian?

Lucas, Dawn

A Hero in the Night
By Dawn Lucas
Bay Village, Ohio
(1997 Hartje Award Winner)
I shan't forgit the night
When I dropped be'ind the fight
With a bullet where my belt-plate should 'a'
been.
I was chokin' mad with thirst,
An' a man spied me first
Was our good old grinnin', gruntin' Gunga Din.
'E lifted up my 'ead,
An' he plugged me where I bled,
An' 'e guy me 'aft-a-pint o' water green.
It was crawlin' and it stunk,
But of all the drinks I've drunk,
I'm gratefullest to the one from Gunga Din.1
Rudyard Kipling
When writing histories about war, most
historians focus on the battles fought between the
opposing sides; few give account of what happened
after the gunfire ended. The Battle of Fredericksburg
exhibits one of the cruelest days of warfare that
Americans have ever seen. If one studied only the
actual engagement of Fredericksburg, he would miss
a great act of heroism by a Confederate soldier.
Commander of the Army of the Potomac,
General Ambrose Burnside and his officers, General
Edwin Sumner and General Joseph Hooker, stood on
the balcony of the Phillips House and surveyed the
town of Fredericksburg, Virginia2 In the two mile
region in front of the Phillips House, ran the
Rappahannock River.a On the other side of the river
was the urban center of Fredericksburg whose
population of five thousand had been replaced by
one hundred and fifty thousand Union soldiers.4
Circling the southern half of the town was a field.
This barren ground rose gradually rose about fifty
feet.s At the top of the rise was an old road worn
from its many years of wagons traversing upon it. In
order to prevent further erosion, citizens of
Fredericksburg reinforced the sides of the sunken
road with stone. Within this sunken stone road,
Confederate soldiers held their position,s
After surveying the theater of operation Burnside
discussed with Sumner and Hooker the best plan of
attack. By eight o'clock, the morning of 13
December 1862, the Generals had sent the battle plan
to Union officers; the officers were to lead their
troops in.a frontal attack against Rebel lines.7
General William A. French's division was to lead the
attack on the sunken road supported by Generals
Winfield Hancock and Oliver Howard.s
As French's division emerged from the town
onto the barren plain they knew that they were
doomed2 The eight hundred yard stretch between
the edge of the town and the Rebel front at the
sunkenroad was impenetrable. The Confederate
infantrymen barricaded behind the sunken road had
an unobstructed view of the approaching Union
soldiers. As the Union soldiers emerged from the
town, their brothers from the South rested their guns
on the wall, aimed the barrels at the enemy and
began to fire2°
Undaunted by their hopeless position, Union
soldiers gallantly proceeded with the attack. French's
division formed into three lines and began their
march to the sunken road. As the Union soldiers
charged up the hill toward the sunken rode, the
Confederates continually pummeled them with
gunfire. Large gaps formed in the lines and within a
few minutes French's division was reduced from six
thousand to fifteen hundred,n
The Irish Brigade under the direction of General
Hancock was sent to support French's dwindling
position. These men who had survived the Siege of
Yorktown, the Battle of Seven Pines, the Second
Battle of Bull Run, and "Bloody Lane" at Antietam,
would find their demise on the field at
Fredericksburg. 2 The hail storm of Confederate
bullets from behind the stone wall was too strong for
these Union veterans. 3 For six long hours the
Confederate soldiers successfully defended their land
from the invading enemy.
As nightfall set upon the battlefield, the fighting
stopped. Union dead and wounded were left where
they fell. Moaning and crying of the wounded
42 • The Wittenberg History Journal
replaced the sounds of gunfire on the hill. The
Confederate soldiers tried to ignore the anguished
cries of the Union soldiers they had shot down a few
hours earlier.
Whether he felt guilt from slaying his fellow man
or had sympathy for the dying souls a few feet away,
a young Confederate infantryman scaled the stone
wall in order to relieve the suffering of those
attacking his country. Nineteen-year-old, Richard
Kirkland received permission from his commanding
officer to relieve the fallen Union soldiers off their
agony. Kirkland knew that once he emerged from
behind the stone wall he would be exposing himself
to Union and Rebel fire, but the cries for help were
too great. Kirk]and climbed the wall and gave water
to the Union soldiers who laid dying on the
battlefield. When the Rebel and Union
sharpshooters guarding the battlefield saw that
Kirk]and was comforting the fallen soldiers they
ceased their fire, allowing the young man to provide
relief to the wounded.14 Most historians do not
account for the actions of Richard Kirldand in their
writings; they rather focus on the movements of the
troops and the horrors of the day. From this awful
December day, one should not overlook the bravest
man in the Battle of Fredericksburg. Richard
Kirk]and risked his own life in order to provide
comfort to his wounded enemies.
Bibliography
*The Battle of Fredericksburg. The New York Times. 17 December
1862, 1.
Couch, Darius N. Report of Major General Darius N. Couch,
U.S. Army, commanding Second ArmyP in Wax of the
Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1888, 221-
223.
Kipling, Rudyard. "Gunga Din." Rudyard Kipling's Verse: Definitive
Edition. Garden City, FrY: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1940, 404 486.
Rice Thomas. "Desperate Courage." Civil War Times, November/
December 1990, 58-70.
Stackpole, Edwin J. Drama on the Rappahannock: The Fredericksburg
Campaign. Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1962.
Hancock, Winfield S. Report of Brigadier General Winfield S.
Hancock, U.S. Army, commanding First Division," in War of
the Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1888, 226-
232.
Lowe, Ian. SunkenRoad. (information-on-line) Fredericksburg
. and Spotsylvania National Military Park, accessed on
2121197; available from http://www.nps.gov/frsp/
sunken.htm; internet.
Sumner, Edwin V. Report of Major General Edwin V. Summer,
U.S. Army, commanding Right Grand Division" War of the
Rebellion O[fiicial Records of Union and Confederate Armies.
Washington D.C.: Goverrmaent Printing Office, 1888, 218-
220.
Endnotes
I Rudyard Kipling, Gunga Din," Rudyard Kipling's Verse:
Definitive Edition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company,
Inc., 1940) 404-406.
2 "The Battle of Fredericksburg," New York Times, 17
December 1862, p.1.
8 Edwin V. Sumner, Repott of Major General Edwin V
Sumner, U.s. Army, commanding Right Grand Division," in War
of the Rebellion O Tdal Records of Union and Confederate Armies
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1888), 219.
4 Nero York Times 1; Stackpole, Fredericksburg Campaign,
266.
s New York Times, 1,
6 Ian Lowe, Sunken Road (information on line)
(Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park, accessed
2/21/97); available from http://222.nps.gov/frsp/
sunken.htm;internet.
7 New York Times, 1.
Edward J. Stackpole, Drama on the Rappahannock: the
Fredericksburg Campaign (Harrisburg, PmmsyDania: The Stackpole
Company, 1962), 188.
9 Darius N. Couch, Report of Major General Darius N.
Couch., U.S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps," in War of
the Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
(Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1888), 222.
Io New York Times 1.
n Ibid., 1.
I Thomas E. Rice, Desperate Courage," Civil War Times,
November/December 1990, 58, 62.
13 Ibid., 66.
14 Lowe, Sunhen Road, http://www.nps.gov/frsp/sunken.htm.


A Hero in the Night

Fornari, Erica

Irish Romantic Nationalism and the German Motive

Baughman, Kristen

The Battle of Blair Mountain: Remembering the Story That Got "Left Out"

Doucher, Stephen

A Plight Forgotten: An Argument for Viewing Indentured Servitude as White Slavery

Kutz, Amanda

Munster as the New Jerusalem

Brunsvold, Andrea

Defining the Peasantry in the Conflicts of 1857: Collective Identity or Collective Action?

NazirSoviet Pact: The Better of Two Deals * 25
The Nazi-Soviet Pact: The Better of Two Deals
by Andrea Brunsvold
Wittenberg Class of SO00
Hartje Award Finalist
On 11 August 1939 an Anglo-French
delegation arrived in Moscow to discuss a
possible tripartite agreement. It was hoped an
agreement with the Soviet's would deter Nazi
Germany from invading Poland. Twelve days
later, however, on 23 August, a Nazi-Soviet
non-aggression pact was signed between
Joachim yon Ribbentrop, Germany's Foreign
Minister, and Jozef Stalin's regime. The Soviet
Union had guaranteed Germany she would not
get involved if Poland was invaded. The parties
then dispersed and returned home to prepare
for war.
A tempting question to ask is, quite simply,
why? Why did the Soviet Union agree to
Ribbentrop's offer of noninvolvement when her
support could conceivably have stopped Hitler
in the early stages of World War II--if not
prevented him from invading Poland? A clue to
the answer is evident in a question Marshal
Voroshilov, the Soviet Commissar of Defense,
asked the Anglo-French delegation on i4 August
1939: "Do the French and British General Staffs
think that the Soviet land forces will be
admitted to Polish territory in order to make
direct contact with the enemy in case Poland is
attacked?"1 The delegation had no adequate
reply. Poland, when consulted, informed the
beseeching French that Soviet troops were
absolutely not allowed on Polish territory.
They resisted French pressure, according to P.
H. M. Bell by "explaining simply that if the Red
Army entered Polish territory it would stay
there."2 Despite their fears, the British and
French respected Poland's autonomous decision,
and assured them they would fight Germany
without Soviet assistance. Meanwhile, the
delegation had nothing to offer the Soviets that
would make their participation worthwhile--
not even the assurance of Polish complicity,s
Legitimately, the Soviets were reluctant to
accept a deal requiring them to enter Polish
territory if Germany invaded. The Red Army
would have to face Polish hostility while trying
to defend them from the Germans. D.C. Watt
asks a crucial question: "How could the Soviet
Union, lacking a common frontier with
Germany, make any serious plans for action
virthout knowing whether they were allowed to
operate in Poland[.]"4 Another deterrent was
simple geography. Britain and France were able
to sustain a war from behind defenses, using
blockade and air warfare. The Soviets, however,
would not be in a position to utilize a navy, nor
had Soviet airmen any experience with carrying
war to the enemy's industrial strongholds. The
Red Army would need to enter Polish territory--
where they were not welcome--and engage in
the bulk of the fighting with no reimbursement
for their efforts.5 One can hardly blame Marshal
Voroshilov and Stalin for their half-hearted,
dawdling interest in the delegation's offer.
The arrival of Joachim von Ribbentrop,
however, re-ignited Soviet interest in the affairs
of Western Europe. Bell points out that
"[i]nstead of risk a war, [Germany] could offer
certain neutrality. In terms of territory and
spheres of influence, they came bearing gifts,
• ready to carve up Poland and to yield at once
when Stalin asked for the whole of Latvia."
The Anglo-French delegation was severely
restricted in what they could offer the Soviets, as
they respected Poland's autonomy in her
decision not to admit Soviet troops if Germany
attacked. Ribbentrop, however, had no qualms
about dismissing Poland's apprehension. Hitler
was intent on destroying her, and the Soviet's
were welcome to help. In fact, as far as
26 ° The Wittenberg History Journal
Germany was concerned, the Soviets could share
in the spoils when Poland was conquered.7
James L. Stokesbury also suggests that "[Stalin]
could make a deal with Hitler, they could divide
Poland between them, Hitler would (probably)
turn west, and Germany, France, and Britain
would fight it out, after which Stalin would
move in and pick up the pieces."s
It is difficult to blame Stalin for accepting
Ribbentrop's offer. He offered what the Anglo-
French delegation could not: Poland and non-
involvement. The answer to the question, "Why
did the Soviets accept Ribbentrop's offer of
Poland and noninvolvement?" is simply: "It was
better." The Anglo-French delegation could not
even guarantee Poland's cooperation with the
Red Army. If Stalin had any hopes of remaining
in Poland after assisting her, they were not
sufficient enough to form an alliance with France
and Britain. The drawbacks far outweighed any
beneficial outcome for the Soviets.
Consequently, Ribbentrop's offer appeared the
better of the two, and the Soviet's seized the
Pact while Ribbentrop seized the day.
Notes
i Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The Making o[the Second
World War (London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1992),
218.
2 P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in
Europe, 2nd ed. Origins of Modern Wars (London: Addison
Wesley Longman Limited, 1997), 292.
3 Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate
Origins of the Second World War, 4938-t939 (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1989), 463
4 Watt, 456.
: Watt, 451 2.
Bel!, 296.
7 Watt, 457
8 James L. Stokesbury, A Shorl History of World War II
(New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980), 65.
Works Cited
Adamthwaite, Anthony P. The Making of the Second World War.
London: Routledge, Chapman and Hail, Inc., 1992.
StokesbuIy, James L. A Short History of Wodd War II. New York:
Wi!liam Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980.
Bell, P. M.H. The Origins of the Second World War in Europe,
2nded. Origins o[ ModernWars. London:Addison
Wesley Longman, 1997.
Watt, Donald Cameron. How War Came: The Immediate Origins of
lhe Second World War, f938-t939. New York: Pantheon
Books, 1989.


The Nazi-Soviet Pact: The Better of Two Deals

Vanlier, Elizabeth

Extremist Protest or Patriotic Acts: The League of Blood Incidents

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