Wittenberg University Journals

Mazur, Kelsey

English

The Holy Fool and Folly in the Late Antique World: A Historiographical Examination

Wright, Kristin

Societal Transformations in Iceland Through Christian Conversion

Walp, Amy

Toil and Trouble: Reproductive Health and Accusations of Witchcraft During the European Witch Craze

Harvey, Gregory

Vol. XXXIV, Spring 2010 ° 3
Hartje Paper:
The Gordian I mot and Alexander the Great
Gregory Harvey
A knot sits, tangled and unsolved for many
years in the temple of Zeus in the ancient city of
Gordium. It shrunken fibrous laces are entwined
together around a piece of dogwood bark, connected
to a wooden wagon with a strong mythological
story just as complex and disheveled as the tethered
knot itself. A born leader approaches the knot's city
from the east, not yet knowing about the knot's
foretold secret. Hearing about the mythology and
clandestine tale surrounding the Gordium puzzle,
the Macedonian warlord tries his own hand to
the intricate and multipart task of untying this
strategically bound binding. After fiddling and much
struggling ensues, as the knot remains unaffected,
the dominating demi-god of Macedon starts to feel
a very human sensation slither into his hands and
soul, could he possibly not untie the Gordian Knot...
Alexander of Macedon, or as history knows
him, Alexander the Great, was a warlord of all Asia
during the early parts of the fourth century B.C.
Some primary sources portray Alexander lII as a
great militant leader that conquered all of the Persian
Empire in thirteen short years, while others see him
as insane, psychotic, and lonely. Regardless of the
opinions of ancient and contemporary authors and
historians, Alexander was the leader among leaders,
hosting thousands upon thousands of men that
made up his immense army, "never in all the world
was there another like him." Nothing stood in his
way, not people, not kings, not armies, not cities, or
tasks of any sort. While Alexander was living and
breathing, no earthly creature was bigger or smarter
than him.
The Gordian Knot story arises from an ancient
tale. A poor man named Gordius, who only had
two oxen to hid name, and a wooden wagon for
thern to pull, plough, and transport, made his way
through his daily activities.2 An eagle perched
itself on top of the wagon until the day's work was
finished, and Gordius took this as a sign or omen
from the gods.a He consulted an oracle and was told
that the next man who entered the city on a wagon
would become the king of the Phrygians.4 This
poor man ended up marrying the oracle and had a
son named Midas. Eventually Midas came through
the city gates on a wagon, and after debate, "Midas
was put on the throne...made and end to their
trouble and strife and laid up his father's wagon on
the acropolis as a thanks-offering to Zeus King for
sending the eagle.'
When attaching the yoke to the actual wagon,
a "great number of thongs, closely tangled with one
another and concealing their interlacings," were
placed between the two. Afterwards, the oracles
and seers stated that whoever untangles the knot
would be, "destined to be king of the whole world."7
Hearing about this knot made Alexander even more
eager to take and conquer the town. To him, he
could possibly achieve two objectives: conquer the
city and expand his rule, and untie the Gordian Knot
solidifying yet another reason for why Alexander
should be the ruler of the known world.
Alexander stared at the knot, not seeing
any ends protruding, or a possible way or path to
solve the puzzle. At this point in time, the young
king was at odds with how to proceed. He was
simply and utterly confused. Alexander wanted to
unfasten the knot so badly, and the desire, the same
stubborn desire to remain faithful to his father's
unfinished work and go against the biggest army
in Persia, "entered Alexander's mind of fulfilling
the prophecy."* The tension surrounding the
sovereign king was so immense. Around him stood
the natives of the land, the Phrygians, and also
many members of Alexander's personal army, the
Macedonians? Some questioned the outcome of the
next few short and quick minutes that lay ahead of
them. Alexander would not back down from the job
that lies in his war-tom hands, "as his failure might
possibly lead to public disturbances." ° While the
great competitor contemplated his next move, his
mixed audience, who stood circled around hin as
if they were the audience in the Roman Coliseum,
was literally on their tiptoes waiting in anxiety,
4 ° The Wittenberg History Journal
uncertainty, and most of all suspense. Alexander
then made his next and final move in this game of
fame and power.
The ldng shouted, "it makes no difference how
they are loosened," pulled out his sword and with
a quick and speedy slash, cut straight through the
lacings that held the knot ever so tight?1 Instead of
manually undoing the knot, as every other person
figured was the correct way to solve the puzzle
and become king of the world, Alexander used his
creativity and cleverness and made, not found, a
second route to greatness. "I have undone it!''2
Bibliography
Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander. Trans. A. De
Selincourt. London: Penguin, 2003.
M. Junianus Justh us, Epitome Historiarum Philippicarum,
Trans. John S. Watson. Chicago, Illinois: Ares
Publishers, Inc., 1992.
Babbitt, Frank Cole. "PfutarchY Moralia IV. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Justin, Eptiome of the Philippe History of Pompeius Trogus,
Trans. J.C. Yardley, NewYork: Clarendon Press, 1997.
Quintus Curtius Rufus, tIistoly of Atexander, Trans. J.C.
Rolfe. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Hal zard University
Press, 1956.
Endnotes
1 "The Campaigns of Alexander" by Arrian, Aubrey De S8lmcourt,
trans., (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), Book Vii, 30.
2 Ibid., Book II, 3.
"Epitome of the Phillippic History of Pompeius Trogus" by Justin, ].C.
Yardley, trans., (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997), Book XI, 7.5.
4 Ibid., Book XI, 7.6.
s The Campaigns of AIexander, Book II, 3.
s "Quintus Curtius Rufus, History of Alexander, mars. J. C. Rolfe
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), 69.
7 Plutarch, MoralialV trans. FralkColeBabbitt(Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), 273. It should be stated
that the oracles and seers knew that the knot was extremely hard
to untie, hence stating that the person who succeeded in untangling it
would become king o[ the entire wozld. This person would have to
be extremeIy smart and clever. Also, the world at that point
in time was Asia or the Persian Empire.
* History of Alexa,lder, 69.
9 Ibid.
lo The Campaigns ofAlexandet3 Bookli, 3.
n History of AlexandeI; 71.
12 The Campaigns of Alexander, Book II, 3.


Hartje Paper: The Gordian Knot and Alexander the Great

"Who\u27s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?": The Story Behind the Story of Little Red Riding Hood

Papic, John

The Cult of the Ace: The Airman and His Role in the First World War

Hoover, James

Blaine Hoover and the Restructuring of the Japanese Civil Service During the Allied Occupation

Bochicchio, Ethan

6  •  The Wittenberg History Journal
U.S. foreign policy in Latin America became 
defined by unilateral intervention during the Cold War. 
This first manifested with the 1954, CIA-organized 
coup ousting the democratically-elected president of 
Guatemala, Jacobo Árbenz, which radicalized many 
Latin Americans. Deeply affected was Salvador Allende, 
a leftist Chilean senator who began to place opposition 
to U.S. foreign policy at the center of his politics. 
Allende never strayed from the democratic process in 
pursuing his leftist ideals, but like Árbenz, he would be 
faced with U.S. interventionism.
In 1964, when Allende, head of a leftist, four-
party coalition, ran for president of Chile, the U.S. 
sent 100 advisors to support his opponent, Eduardo 
Frei, while the CIA underwrote more than half of 
Frei’s campaign costs. Frei won, but six years later, 
Allende ran again, with the Unidad Popular coalition, 
prompting Henry Kissinger to quip to a meeting 
of the National Security Council (NSC), “I don’t 
see why we need to stand by and watch a country 
go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own 
people.” At this meeting, $300,000 was allocated to an 
anti-Allende campaign. Still, Allende won a plurality 
in an election internationally deemed legitimate. Per 
Chilean electoral rules, Chile’s Congress would meet 
weeks later and vote to either confirm Allende or the 
runner up, Jorge Alessandri. The NSC then authorized 
funds to bribe Chilean congresspeople to vote for 
Alessandri. Meanwhile, discussions detailing possible 
assassination scenarios against Allende were held in the 
White House. Nonetheless, Allende was confirmed and 
on November 3, took the presidency.
In true Marxist fashion, Allende gave primacy 
to the role of workers in Chilean society:
Allende Against Empire
 
Ethan Bochicchio
The building of the new social regime is   
based on the people, who are its protagonist 
and its judge. It is up to the State to guide, 
organise, and direct, but never to replace the 
will of the workers. In the economic as well as 
in the political field, the workers must retain 
the right to decide. To attain this means the 
triumph of the Revolution.
 
 In line with this, Allende nationalized banks, 
implemented land reform, provided free milk for 
mothers and children, and engaged working people 
politically at a municipal level.
A memorandum from Kissinger to Richard Nixon 
on November 5, 1970, warned, “US investments 
(totaling some one billion dollars) may be lost.” These 
fears were not unfounded. Chile was the third-largest 
copper exporter in the world, though U.S. corporations 
controlled eighty percent of the industry.  On July 
11, 1971, Allende passed a constitutional amendment 
through Chilean Congress, empowering him to 
nationalize the copper industry. Rather than offering 
the U.S corporations compensation, Allende declared 
that they owed Chile money for years of exploitation. 
Next, Allende nationalized the Chile Telephone 
Company, in which IT&T had invested $153 million. 
He was playing with fire.
 On September 11, 1973, which Chileans 
refer to as the “first 9/11,” the Chilean Army, led by 
Augusto Pinochet, launched a coup. U.S. Navy ships 
patrolled Chilean waters and U.S. aircraft monitored 
events. Visiting American filmmaker, Charles Horman, 
reported to friends that at the time of the coup, he was 
told by an American naval engineer, “We came to do 
a job and it’s done.” Days later, Horman was arrested 
  Vol. XLVIII, Spring 2022  •  7
and never seen again. Within hours, the Chilean Army 
and Navy had control, except for the Capitol and the 
Presidential Palace where Allende remained. When 
Allende would not surrender, Pinochet bombed the 
palace. In his last message, Allende identified, “Foreign 
capital and imperialism, united with reactionary 
elements,” as the perpetrators of the “fascism” being 
imposed on Chile. He assured his countrymen, “It is 
possible they will smash us, but tomorrow belongs to 
the people, the workers. Humanity advances toward 
the conquest of a better life.” He then took his own life 
with a rifle gifted him by Fidel Castro, engraved with, 
“To my comrade in arms.”
 Under Pinochet, U.S. military aid to Chile 
increased extensively, and the economy was reopened 
to the U.S., while  3,000 people were killed, and 
over 40,000 people became victims of human rights 
violations. When questioned about Pinochet’s brutality, 
Kissinger said, “I think we should understand our 
policy— that however unpleasant they act, [this] 
government is better for us than Allende.” Days after 
the coup, in a speech at a rally in solidarity with the 
Chilean struggle, Allende’s daughter Beatriz, who 
had fled to Cuba, relayed that while holding the rifle 
Castro gave him, Allende had ordered the unarmed 
men and women to leave, “because he didn’t want 
useless sacrifices when the important thing would 
be the organization and leadership of the working 
class.” Even his last hours, faced with the Goliath of 
U.S. intervention, Allende never gave up faith in the 
triumph of the Revolution.
Bibliography 
Allende, Beatriz. “We Never Saw Him Hesitate.” Chile: 
The Other September 11. ed. Pilar Aguilera and 
Ricardo Fredes, New York: Ocean Press, 2006.
Allende, Salvador. “First speech to the Chilean parliament 
after his election.” Marxists Internet Archive. 
1970.
Allende, Salvador. “Last Words Transmitted by Radio 
Magallanes, September 11, 1973.” Chile: The 
Other September 11, ed. Pilar Aguilera and 
Ricardo Fredes. New York: Ocean Press, 2006.
Blum, William. Killing Hope: US Military & CIA 
Interventions since World War II. London: Zed 
Books, 2003.
Dietrich, Christopher. “‘Our Hand Doesn’t Show’: The 
United States and the Consolidation of the 
Pinochet Regime in Chile (1973-1977).” Dirty 
Hands and Vicious Deeds: The US Government’s 
Complicity in Crimes Against Humanity and 
Genocide. ed. Samuel Totten, Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2018.
Elliott, Ryan T. “Chilean Commission Uncovers Nearly 
10,000 More Victims of Augusto Pinochet’s 
Rule,” Impunity Watch, September 3, 2011.
Hersh, Seymour. “The Price of Power: Kissinger, Nixon, 
and Chile,” The Atlantic, December 1982.
Hersh, Seymour. Kissinger: The Price of Power. London: 
Simon & Schuster, 1983.
Hove, Mark. “The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-
Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention 
in Guatemala.” Diplomatic History 31, no. 4 
(2007): 623-63.
Howe, Marvine. “2 Americans Slain in Chile: The 
Unanswered Questions.” The New York Times. 
November 19, 1973.
Onis, Juan. “Allende, Chilean Marxist, Wins Vote for 
Presidency.” The New York Times. September 
6, 1970. United States Senate. Covert Action in 
Chile: 1963-1973. Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975. “172. Memorandum 
From the President’s Assistant for National 
Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon.” 
Department of State: Office of the Historian. 
November 5, 1970.


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