Kyoritsu Womens University & Junior College: KWU Repository / 共立女子大学リポジトリ
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The Main Authorship of the Preface in Wackenroder/Tieck’s “Fantasies on Art”
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International Exchange Activities after the COVID-19 Pandemic : A Case Study of Online Exchanges with a U.S. University
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Simplifying Changes in Content and Practices Required in Sewing Lessons in Home Economics
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『優先主義の実践』の中の1 つの章の紹介 : 第9章「優先主義と教育」エルウィン・オーヘ(Erwin Ooghe)Mattew D. Adler and Ole F. Norheim (2022) Prioritarianism in Practice. Cambridge University Press, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge UK. ISBN: 978-1-108-48093-2.
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The Legacy of Wu Wenrong : Zeng Guofan and Hu Linyi
In January 1854 , during the battle against the Taiping Army, Wu Wenrong, the Governor General of Huguang(two provinces of Hubei and Hunan), fell victim to the wiles of the Manchu colleagues. Wu had planned a joint military operation with his two protégés, Zeng Guofan and Hu Linyi. Zeng had built a new fleet; however, it was not ready in time to rescue Wu, leading to his death. After enduring painful defeats in the naval battles of Yuezhou and Jinggang, Zeng finally recaptured the city of Wuchang from the Taiping army. Hu’s father and Wu passed the bureaucratic final examination in the same year. Hu’s father-in-law, Tao Shu, the Governor of Liangjiang(Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Anhui provinces), was renowned for his reforms in the salt administration and was deeply trusted by the emperor.Hu became a member of the Hanlin Academy but was later accused of mismanagement and subsequently demoted. After his father’s death, he served as a local official. The seven years of hardship he endured in this role in Guizhou Province strengthened his abilities to work as a governor and commander. Hu led the militia and rushed to Hubei Province in response to Wu’s summons. Upon hearing the news of Wu’s death, Hu joined in the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion under Zeng’s command.departmental bulletin pape
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) : Development Trend and Determinants
In 1971, the United Nations established the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) category to support the world’s most vulnerable and impoverished nations in achieving greater integration into global development and prosperity. While international efforts have been made to assist LDCs in this endeavor, the development gap between these countries and the rest of the world continues to widen. The factors driving LDCs toward sustained development remain unclear. This paper analyzes aggregate data from 1971 to the present, sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), to assess LDCs’ progress in income, health, and education relative to other income groups and the global average. The findings show minimal improvements in GNI per capita for LDCs, leading to an increasing gap with wealthier countries. However, LDCs have achieved significant progress in health outcomes and demonstrate similar trends in education indicators. Additionally, using a system GMM model on cross-country panel data from 45 current and 7 former LDCs from 1971 to 2020, this study identifies manufacturing valueadded, gross domestic savings, population growth, international trade, and foreign aid as key determinants of development in LDCs.departmental bulletin pape
The Beginning of the First Indochina War in Vietnam
This paper looks into the origins of the outbreak of the First Indochina War in Vietnam in 1946. It particularly reexamines the events from the conclusion of the preliminary agreement between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on March 6, 1946, through the outbreak of the war on December 19, 1946. This study relies on some of the most recent studies on the topic which make use of newly-available primary sources in Vietnam as well as in France.
In the preliminary agreement, France recognized the DRV as “a free state,” having its own government, parliament, army and treasury in the projected Federation of Indochina and French Union, while the DRV agreed to accept the stationing of 15,000 French forces in territories north of the 16th parallel. The French forces were supposed to withdraw after five years. The decision on the unification of Tonkin, Annan and Cochinchina was left to a referendum by the population.
Unfortunately, the agreement did not have much meaningful substance from the start. The DRV interpreted “a free state” as meaning an independent sovereign state. But the French government did not interpret it as giving full independence to Vietnam. Most French leaders and politicians believed that the DRV was to be given a certain amount of autonomy along with Annan, Cochinchina, Laos and Cambodia as a member state within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union where France should keep its diplomatic and defense powers. As a result, the French and the DRV delegates could not reach any agreement during the negotiations held in Dalat and later in Fontainebleau during the summer.
During the Fontainebleau negotiations, the French government allowed its high commissioner in Saigon to declare the establishment of the “Autonomous Republic of Cochinchina” without holding a referendum. The DRV government harshly criticized this as a violation of the March agreement.
The stationing of the French forces in Tonkin also contributed to the worsening of the situation. They soon moved into major cities and routes and the French policy of unilaterally reestablishing its control in the north caused military clashes between the French and the Vietnamese. In November, France opened a customs house and tried to control export and import in Haiphong, infringing on Vietnamese sovereign rights. This invited a major military clash. The French used naval and aerial bombardment against the city and thousands of Vietnamese and Chinese residents died. Tensions heightened and military clashes increased in northern Vietnam. In Hanoi, the Vietnamese strengthened their defense and began preparing for clashes with the French. On December 18, the French issued an ultimatum -- disarm the militias in the city or the French will enforce order. On the night of December 19, the DRV forces began attacking the French. The French quickly retaliated and bombarded the city. They controlled most of Hanoi by early January. But the war in Indochina was to continue for another eight years.
The DRV has long claimed that the French attacked first on the 19th. But we now know from some Vietnamese sources that the Vietnamese prepared defensive and attack plans in late 1946 and Ho Chi Minh and other DRV leaders discussed when to start their attack on the 19th. But one thing still seems to hold true as contemporary authors and recent scholars agree -- the Vietnamese may have attacked first, but the French policy and military actions during 1946 could not have failed to draw a full-scale attack from the Vietnamese.departmental bulletin pape
Chinese Language Education and National Symbols : The Prototype of “Chinese” Cultural Diplomacy and Transformations in Cross-Strait Relations
This study examines Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy under the one-party rule of the Kuomintang (KMT) from the 1950s, following the Republic of China’s relocation to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War, to the first political transition in 2000 after democratization in 1987. Mainly focusing on Chinese language education and national symbols, it analyzes the origins and characteristics of “Chinese” cultural diplomacy. Cross-strait relations are often framed by their historical antagonism; however, examining “Chinese” cultural diplomacy from a perspective of continuity and inheritance reveals significant commonalities. This paper explores the prototype of “Chinese” cultural diplomacy by focusing on Chinese language education and the image of Confucius, highlighting shared foundations between the two sides, and uncovers historical connections that offer new insights into the relations between Taiwan and mainland China. In addition, by exploring figures like Marvin Ho, a key founder of the Taipei Language Institute (TLI), this study offers new insights into the development of cross-strait relations and the shared foundations of “Chinese” cultural diplomacy.departmental bulletin pape