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Parajes inhóspitos: Inquietud, familiaridad, mundaneidad
No full textResumen:
Con nuestras reflexiones pretendemos mostrar la ruptura de lo familiar-cotidiano y la existencia auténtica siguiendo las premisas que Martin Heidegger expone en sus trabajos redactados alrededor de 1935. En dichos textos cobra especial importancia la poética, ya que el modo en que ésta emplea el lenguaje presupone una realidad originaria del ser humano en el que no se encuentra un hogar familiar al que debiera volver, sino que revela la situación inhóspita a la que está arrojado el ser humano, no por haber emprendido una marcha desde el calor hogareño hacia lo desconocido, sino porque esa condición inhóspita es intrínseca a él mismo.
Abstract:
With our reflections, we intend to show the rupture of the familiar-daily and the authentic existence following the premises that Martin Heidegger exposes in his works written around 1935. In these texts, poetics takes on special importance, since the way in which it uses language presupposes a reality originating in the human being in which there is no family home to which he should return, but rather reveals the inhospitable situation to which the human being is thrown, not because he has embarked on a march from the warmth of the home towards the unknown, but because this inhospitable condition is intrinsic to him.
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Heidegger, M. Introducción a la Metafísica. Tr. A. Ackerman. Barcelona, Gedisa, 2003.
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Xolocotzi, A. Heidegger y el nacionalsocialismo. Una crónica. México D. F. Plaza y Valdés, 2013
Politeísmo, magia y teúrgia. La crítica de Prudencio al neoplatonismo de Juliano el Apóstata según Apoth. 449-502
No full textThis paper aims to analyze Prudentius´ critique to Julian the Apostate´s neoplatonic system mainly through an allegorical scene contained within verses 449-502 of the Apotheosis, where a failed pagan ritual is described. Towards concluding that in the fourth century A.D. the conflict between pagans and christians motivated the breakup of the neoplatonic system into two parallel currents, the augustinian and the misterical one, we will focus on three points: (1) Some aspects of the general state of neoplatonic imperial thought with regards to certain historical, philosophical and social transformations within Paganism and Christianity, attending specially to the internal fractures of the former; (2) Prudentius´ argument for the metaphysical and moral insufficiency of Julian´s use of polytheistic symbolism, with the latter´s consequent counter-arguments and some examples of conflict and syncretism with regards to this question and (3) Prudentius´ argument for the impious and heretical condition of the components of theurgic activity, with the successive defense of an internal and not external mystical paradigm
Donato Verardi, La scienza e i segreti della natura a Napoli nel Rinascimento. La magia naturale di Giovan Battista Della Porta, (Firenze: Firenze University Press, Collana «Premio Tesi Dottorato – Università di Firenze», 2018).
Get PDFReview of Donato Verardi, La scienza e i segreti della natura a Napoli nei Rinascimento, Firenze, 2018
Is Personal Identity, Moral Identity?
Get PDFThe problem of personal identity is a classical problem in philosophy. This question has been variedly tackled by different philosophers and philosophical schools. To address the problem of personal identity, it is essential to explicate the notion of ‘person.\u27 Many philosophers conceive persons as inherently conscious beings, who are capable of intentional mental activities which are explicable from the ability to have the first-person perspective and imagine the same of the other. On the other hand, physicalistic personhood is something that has mechanical/bodily properties but, either lacking consciousness or reducing it to a physical basis. For many others, persons have both the properties of mind and body, not reducing to each other. We would agree partially with the latter position and maintain that persons have not only physical properties but also various forms of consciousness, i.e., self-consciousness, moral consciousness, etc. The ability to take perspectives, we claim, lays the foundation of moral consciousness. In this paper, we aim to show that the idea of personal identity is very much related to moral consciousness. This is because persons are rational beings, and being rational is natural to the person. If a person does any irrational act, it becomes self-denial to him or her as rationality is natural to her or him. Therefore, rationality is one of the inborn qualities of human being, and thus her or his identity becomes a moral identity. If we accept persons as physical beings ultimately, the question of morality, freedom, and responsibility do not arise. The whole idea of self-determination is occurred only in the case of moral identity, but not in the case of persons as only physical beings. Therefore, personal identity and moral identity are conceptually connected to the extent that we propose that personal identity is moral identity.
Keywords: Personal identity, Moral identity, Material identity, Self-conscious identity, Moral identity
La noción de “reconocimiento” en el Hegel de Jena entre naturaleza, derecho e historicidad.
No full textThe purpose of this contribution is to offer a vision of the Hegelian conception of intersubjectivity during Jena\u27s period. This issue has anthropological, political and even logical consequences. It will be tackled starting from the possibility of a reconciliation between logical individuality and universality through the recognition process in the chapter of self-consciousness. A possible solution to this problem implies a historical and legal interpretation, within the framework of the current debate on the possibility of a naturalistic understanding of Chapter IV of the Phenomenology of the Spirit
Critique of Reason in Gaston Bachelard’s Philosophy of the Imagination
No full textA tension runs through the whole of Gaston Bachelard’s philosophy: between science and poetry, and between reason and imagination. One facet of the tension is the critique of reason Bachelard’s works on imagination engage in. This paper examines the critique in comparison with the ideas and arguments presented by Theodor Adorno, one of the foremost critics of reason in the 20th century. Bachelard’s study of the imagination is not a romantic, unreflective flight from the rigor and objectivity of sciences into the realm of the subjective. Imagination to Bachelard is a distinctly human activity with which reason’s limitations and excesses can be counterbalanced. All eight books by Bachelard on imagination, from The Psychoanalysis of Fire through The Poetics of Reverie, are considered together with Adorno’s works such as Dialectic of Enlightenment and Negative Dialectics. The affinity between Frankfurt School and French history and philosophy of science has been underscored by Michel Foucault but remains a topic that hasn’t attracted much attention from students of modern European intellectual history. Hoping to make a contribution on this topic, this paper explores the intersections between Adorno and Bachelard surrounding the question of reason.
References
References
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G. Bachelard (1971[1960]), The Poetics of Reverie, Boston: Beacon Press.
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Plato’s philosophical method: a unified interpretation of dialectic in the Phaedrus
No full textWhat is Plato’s view concerning philosophical method? Plato thought that we should philosophize by using dialectic. The “progressive” interpretation of Plato’s dialectic holds that the word ‘Dialectic’ is an umbrella term to cover three distinct philosophical methods, namely, the method of elenchus, the method of hypothesis and the method of collection and division. Yet this interpretation leads to an unfruitful disagreement over Plato’s view of dialectic that clouds our understanding of Plato’s metaphilosophy. The goal of this paper is to outline a “unified” interpretation of Plato’s dialectic by arguing that Plato was committed in the Phaedrus to the view that dialectic is the method of finding correct definitions of “controversial words”, which articulates elenchus, hypothesis, and collection & division as dialectical procedures.
References
Burnet, J. (1901), Platonis Opera, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hackforth, R. (1952), Plato’s Phaedrus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yunis, H. (2011), Plato, Phaedrus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ackrill, J. L. (1997), “In Defence of Platonic Division” in Essays on Plato and Aristotle, edited by J. L. Ackrill, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 93–109.
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________. (2015), Clitophon\u27s Challenge: Dialectic in Plato\u27s Meno, Phaedo, and Republic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Castelnérac, B. & Marion, M. (2009), “Arguing for Inconsistency: Dialectical Games in the Academy.” In Acts of Knowledge: History, Philosophy and Logic, edited by G. Primiero & S. Rahman. London: College Publications, 37-76.
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Griswold, C. L. (1986), Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, New Heaven: Yale University Press.
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Irwin, T. H. (1988), Aristotle´s First Principles, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Plato. (1966), Plato in Twelve Volumes, translated by H. N. Fowler, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Politis, V. (2015), The Structure of Enquiry in Plato\u27s Early Dialogues, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Robinson, R. (1953), Plato\u27s Earlier Dialectic, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Scolnicov, S. (1992), “Love and the Method of Hypothesis” In Understanding the Phaedrus: Proceedings of the II Symposium Platonicum, edited by L. Rossetti. Sank, Augustin: Academia Verlag.
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Wordsworth’s Radical Aesthetics
Get PDFThis article focuses on the aesthetics of William Wordsworth, particularly his early poetry. The implications of this investigation are far-reaching. To learn about Wordsworth’s aesthetics is to learn about Romanticism, specifically radical Romanticism and the intricate relation it forges between aesthetics and democracy. I begin the article with a general account of radical aesthetics, addressing its nature, scope, and its relation to the normative, the political, and the everyday. Next, I turn to the radical aesthetics of Wordsworth. I then compare radical aesthetics to more traditional accounts of aesthetics, concluding by connecting radical Romantic aesthetics to practical power
“Creer” y “saber”: un debate entre Kant, Jacobi y Hegel
Get PDFThe aim of this article is to analyse the "debate" between the positions of Kant, Jacobi and Hegel in relation to the notions of "belief" and “knowledge". In this way, through detailed study of the critical exposition of the "attitude" (Stellung) of thought before the so-called "immediate knowledge" —within The three attitudes of thought with respect to objectivity— that Hegel offers us in the “Preliminary Concept” in the "Science of Logic" of his Encyclopedia (Enz.-Vorbegriff zur Logik, §§ 19-78) we will be able to, not only analyse the distance that separates him from Kant with regard to the possible modes of relationship between the subjective "to take as true" (Fürwahrhalten) a judgment and the conviction regarding it (Meinen, Glauben, Wissen), but also to appreciate Hegel\u27s critique of Jacobi\u27s confession of faith (confession made from Kant —antinomies— and against Kant —Spinoza—, with a view to surpassing, in short, the Kantian "rational faith"), thus clearing up, in the last instance, the importance that the role of mediation has as an essential element in Hegelian philosophy
« La vie contre la vie ». Le jeune Hegel, lecteur du Wallenstein
No full textTo what extent is possible be reconciled with a tragic past ? Could historical narration or dramatic performance help to get over the traumatic event indeed ? Or just do they ascertain its constitutive contradictions, the split and the rift from a pain impossible to sublimate ? Is the mourning experience based on the recovery of a feeble balance between the opposite drives, emotions and feelings from the will ? Or does it on the synthetic assimilation of that opposition into another way of life ? This essay travels hand in hand with Schiller and Hegel across the space opened by those questions. It starts from the dissatisfaction generated in the young Hegel by his reading of Schiller’s Wallenstein and it analyzes his different conceptions of the ethic pathos, as well as his uneven perspective about the Attic tragedy