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Il discorso astrologico sulla “cometa” del 1572 del carmelitano Francesco Giuntini: aspettative e inquietudini dal cielo alla terra nell’epoca della Controriforma
No full textThe nova star that appeared in 1572 (known today as T ycho’ s supernova) was considered to be a comet, rather than a star, by many astronomers and observers of that time. Francesco Giuntini (1522-1590), a Florentine man of letters, Carmelite theologian, and skilled astrologer, was among those who regarded the unexpected nocturnal light as a sublunary comet, albeit with some inconsistencies. The identification of the nova with a cometary phenomenon was in accordance with the “standard physics” of the late Renaissance, namely Aristotelian natural philosophy, which was still being taught and learned as the common basis of knowledge in universities and colleges all across Europe. From this point of view, Giuntini conformed his understanding of the nova to the general scientific framework of his age, even though in the end he mixed up his own interpretation with a different view, which had been advanced in the meantime by the Flemish astronomer Cornelius Gemma (1535-1578). Nevertheless, the short astrological dis- course, or giudicio, that Giuntini composed on the topic and published in Venice in the immediate aftermath of the stunning astronomical sighting does present a few original elements, which are briefly examined and discussed in the present contribution. Giuntini’s Discorso sopra la cometa apparsa nel mese di novembre 1572 fully belongs to the genre literature of vernacular prognostications on comets with prophetic overtones. As late as the end of the sixteenth century, this kind of literature was still in high demand among a wide range of readers and patrons, whose anxieties in this case were as deep as their fear of an impending threat from the sky. For us today the astrological plaquette by Giuntini works like a prism of those fears, disquietudes and old beliefs, which were widespread among both laymen and the learned society of the Italian peninsula and France in the age of the Counter-reformation
Of agents and patients: mapping human agency via philosophical ontology
Full text linkHuman agency has proven to be a contested issue. This article seeks to delineate the boundaries of the discussion and map out what are arguably the main alternatives within it for development research and practice. Since such discussion deals with the question of what human agency is, the argument is elaborated from the philosophy of science. Contra convention, the discussion uses a philosophical ontology, which is concerned with out connection to the world. Jackson’s heuristic is adopted to generate four philosophies of science and four notions of agency, regarded as ideal typical. Neopositivism advances a rational agent, reflexivity suggests a patient, critical realism furthers an interagent, and analyticism proposes a transagent. This article invites scholars interested in this increasingly interdisciplinary area to raise their awareness regarding the foundations on which their ideas about human agency build and note the implications they have for research and practice.
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Escobar A. Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of his Work to the Third World. Alternatives 1985;10(3):377–400.
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Garcés P. Form follows function in evidence-based public policy: the pragmatic alternative to the positivist orthodoxy. Iberoamerican Journal of Development Studies 2019;8(2):44-68
Garcés P. From action to transaction: some implications of pragmatism and its concept of agency for development research and practice. Iberoamerican Journal of Development Studies (forthcoming); 2020a
Garcés P. The reasoning agent: agency in the capability approach and some implications for development research and practice. Iberoamerican Journal of Development Studies 2020b;9(2):268-292
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Barzaghi, G., 2020. La Somma Teologica di san Tommaso d’Aquino in un soffio.
Full text linkBook Review Abstract:This article presents a brief review of the book, La Somma Teologica di san Tommaso d’Aquino in un soffio, 2nd ed. by Giuseppe Barzaghi (2020). It provides a chapter-by-chapter résumé of the book‘s content and evaluates the author’s approach, bringing forth the effectiveness of his summary
Considerazioni sulla negazione logica e l\u27opposizione reale di F. A. Trendelenburg
Full text linkIn the third chapter of the Logische Untersuchungen, trough the distinction between logische Verneinung and reale Opposition, Trendelenburg articulates his own criticism of the Hegelian dialectic: the logic negation of the pure Thought would no longer find the way to proceed in his movement, if not by being continuously mistaken for a real opposition; that is, by illicitly drawing from the realm of empirical intuitions. Although this has been – and still is – one of the most resumed reprovals against Hegel\u27s method, it has to be noticed that the aforementioned distinction, especially in the way Trendelenburg characterizes it, shows some serious weaknesses. The following inquiry concerns the problem of his interpretation of Aristotle\u27s Metaphysics and Kant\u27s pre-critical writings, from which the distinction originally depends
Through Irony to Realism: An Essay Review
No full textThis article aims to reconstruct the discourse of Ernesto Castro on speculative realism connecting it to the role of irony in the philosophical matter. Irony is shown to play an ambiguous role in the history of thought parting from the figure of Socrate and arriving to contemporary speculative philosophers. The differences between post- modern thought and realistic one in the way to treat irony are explicated. The author also makes an attempt to state the key points of the debates within speculative thought and to outline Castro’s position in relation to them
Giorgio Agamben, L’irrealizzabile. Per una politica dell’ontologia
Full text linkGiorgio Agamben, L’irrealizzabile. Per una politica dell’ontologia, (Torino, Giulio Einaudi Editore, 2022)
References
Giorgio Agamben, L’irrealizzabile. Per una politica dell’ontologia, (Torino, Giulio Einaudi Editore, 2022
First Person Authority and the Problem of Other Minds
Full text linkAbstract: In recent times Donald Davidson has extensively discussed the concept of ‘special authority’ regarding one\u27s mental states. He takes up different topics of the philosophy of mind and interprets them from a new standpoint. This paper is the outcome how the understanding of first person authority enables us to understand the problem related to other minds. In this regard I have explained how first person authority is guaranteed by explaining how a belief statement expressed by two individual will have the same truth value. If this is proven to be true then the first individual expressing his belief statement will be said to have authority. Though proving the belief statement of the first individual by taking up of the same statement by another individual and proving it to be true is not as simple as that. However, the paper gives a detail account as to how it is possible and then explains the problem related to other minds. The paper sums up by taking up the Principle of Charity where the speaker’s belief is considered to be true and the interpreter believes that the speaker is a rational being who knows what he speaks and if he knows what he speaks, he knows what belief he holds to be true.
References
Alston, William. “Verities of Privileged Access,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol-8 No-3, 1971, p. 235.
Burge, Taylor. “Individualism and Self-Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 11, 1988.
Csorsas, J. Thomas, “Intersubjectivity and Intercorporeality,” Subjectivity, Vol. 22, 2008.
Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984.
Davidson, Donald. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Clarendon Press Oxford, New York, 2002.
Hacker, P.M.S. “Davidson on First Person Authority,” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 47, No-188.1997.
Jacobsen, Rockney, “Davidson & First-Person Authority: Parataxis & Self-Expression,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol-90, 2009.
Nguyen. A. Minh, “Davidson on First Person Authority,” Inquiry, Vol-38, 2004.
Woodfield, Andrew, Thought and Object; Essays on Intentionality, Clarendon Press, New York, 198
A Study of Philosophical Foundations of 2013 Islamic Education Curriculum in Indonesia
No full textThis article provides a thorough analysis of philosophical foundations for the 2013 Islamic Education (Pendidikan Agama Islam-P AI) curriculum in Indonesia. The analysis is carried out to examine and observe some philosophical foundations in the 2013 curriculum, discuss the significance of the philosophical foundations in the 2013 curriculum, and examine the philosophical founda- tions associated with PAI Curriculum. Comprehensive analysis is applied to various documents related to the 2013 Curriculum, the 2013 PAI Curriculum, and several relevant references. Furthermore, the results show that the philosophical foundations of the 2013 Curriculum are perennialism, essentialism, experimentalism, and social reconstructivism. They provide philosophical answers about educational goals, educators and students, educa- tional content, and interaction processes. The philosophi- cal foundation for the 2013 PAI curriculum automatically is the same as the 2013 curriculum, and it just needs to be adapted to the characteristics of PAI
Searle\u27s Collective Intentionality: A Defence
Full text linkThis paper concerns social ontology. At the heart of the discussion of social ontology are institutional facts. These are indispensable to sustain harmoniously in a society. The focal point of this paper is collective intentionality or we-intentionality that is used to create institutional facts. It is one of the building blocks in the creation of institutional facts. There is a debate within the social ontological arena whether the collective intentionality can or cannot be reduced to individual intentionality. Primarily, I will deal with this debate. John Searle has opposed such a reduction but thinkers like Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller have painted an opposed picture. This paper is restricted to these thinkers the core discussion being collective intentionality. I have put forward arguments defending John R. Searle’s irreducibility account. Searle has put forward his account of collective intentionality as biologically primitive which is not merely a culmination of individual intentionality.
References
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Tuomela, R., Miller, K. (1988). We-intentions, Philosophical Studies, 53, 367–389. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/BF0035351
Elements of Life: Campanella’s Living World Between Discord and Harmony
No full textIn Campanella’s magic universe, starting from the space that the first material substrate occupies, every- thing is alive with sense perception and a will of its own. The pre-condition of universal life is every creature’s structural similitude to its trinitarian creator, whose Pow- er, Wisdom, and Love are reflected in each individual as its power, knowledge, and will of existence. Since the ac- tive principle of life and sensation is fire – one of the two opposed physical elements Campanella assumes – the sensitive soul is material (animal spirits). In order to avoid both pantheism and dualism Campanella employs the inner dynamic of the trinitarian God for his cosmogony and cosmology