CICERO Research Archive (CICERO Senter for klimaforskning)
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A Kantian approach to a sustainable development indicator for climate
How can the informed citizen know if the government is implementing a good-enough climate change policy? Most developed democracies have their own set of indicators for sustainable development, including indicators for climate change. These include yearly national emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHGs), global concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere and time series for global temperatures. However, without some kind of benchmark neither national emissions of GHGs nor global concentration of GHGs or temperatures, make it possible for the general public to evaluate the current climate policy of a nation state. In this paper we propose a benchmark for national climate policy based on a remaining CO2 budget allocated by egalitarian principles. Moreover, based on Kantian ethics we argue that this benchmark should be used as a sustainable development indicator for climate change. One way of interpreting Kantian ethics is to demand that each nation state should act as if a just global treaty on climate change were in place. We discuss possible important elements in a global treaty, and show how the different elements can be integrated in a forward-looking indicator of national climate policy
Wealth-dependent and interdependent strategies in the Saami reindeer husbandry, Norway
It has been argued that decisions in relation to choosing strategies to a large degree depend on an organism's state. For nomadic pastoralists, wealth is an important state variable since it has been argued that differences in observed behaviours reflect alternative strategies dependent on varying socioeconomic circumstances. From a game theoretical point of view, however, strategies are also interdependent, i.e., the choice of a strategy cannot be made wisely without considering what other actors are doing since the outcome of a given strategy is dependent not only on individual state but also on the strategies of others. This study investigated to what degree slaughter strategies in the Saami reindeer husbandry are both state dependent and interdependent. The main findings in this study were that (a) the probability, (b) the amount, and (c) the type of animal slaughtered to a large degree were influenced by both individual herders’ herd size and the number of animals slaughtered by neighbouring herders. Moreover, this study also found that kinship represents a coordinating principle since the degree of genealogical relatedness had a positive effect on the slaughtering strategies adopted by herders.submittedVersio
The acceptability of efficiency-enhancing environmental taxes, subsidies and regulation: An experimental investigation
Public opposition to efficiency-enhancing policies is a significant barrier to addressing many environmental challenges. We use a market experiment to explore the acceptability of three types of instruments: Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, and quantity regulation. We find that overall more than half of voters oppose efficiency-enhancing policies. The results replicate previous findings of tax aversion, and, by providing evidence of subsidy and regulation aversion, the estimates also suggest the existence of a broader aversion to market intervention. Voters supported subsidies significantly more than taxes while supporting quantity regulation significantly less than taxes. This is consistent with norms against coercive policy instruments. Concerning a possible trade-off between acceptability and efficiency, estimates indicate differences across instruments. Support for regulation relative to not having any policy in place increases considerably if inefficient half measures are proposed instead of efficient full measures. This is less true for taxes and subsidies. The language used to describe the policy also influences acceptability, which is particularly apparent in the case of the tax instrument.submittedVersio
Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US perspectives
According to two-level game theory, negotiators tailor agreements at the international level to be ratifiable at the domestic level. This did not happen in the Kyoto negotiations, however, in the US case. We interviewed 26 German, Norwegian, and US participants in and observers of the climate negotiations concerning their views on three explanations for why the United States did not become a party to Kyoto. Explanation 1 argues that Kyoto delegations mistakenly thought the Senate was bluffing when adopting Byrd–Hagel. Explanation 2 contends that Europeans preferred a more ambitious agreement without US participation to a less ambitious agreement with US participation. Finally, explanation 3 suggests that in Kyoto the Clinton–Gore administration gave up on Senate ratification, and essentially pushed for an agreement that would provide them a climate-friendly face. While all explanations received some support from interviewees, explanation 1 and (particularly) explanation 3 received considerably more support than explanation 2
Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US perspectives
According to two-level game theory, negotiators tailor agreements at the international level to be ratifiable at the domestic level. This did not happen in the Kyoto negotiations, however, in the US case. We interviewed 26 German, Norwegian, and US participants in and observers of the climate negotiations concerning their views on three explanations for why the United States did not become a party to Kyoto. Explanation 1 argues that Kyoto delegations mistakenly thought the Senate was bluffing when adopting Byrd–Hagel. Explanation 2 contends that Europeans preferred a more ambitious agreement without US participation to a less ambitious agreement with US participation. Finally, explanation 3 suggests that in Kyoto the Clinton–Gore administration gave up on Senate ratification, and essentially pushed for an agreement that would provide them a climate-friendly face. While all explanations received some support from interviewees, explanation 1 and (particularly) explanation 3 received considerably more support than explanation 2.submittedVersio
A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Climate Policy on 12 Jun 2012, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2012.692206The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to implement them. Thus, a Party can simply refuse to comply without consequence. The alternative compliance enforcement systems that have been proposed in the literature also face substantial problems. A simple, flexible, potent, and credible compliance enforcement system for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, based on deposits, is proposed here: at ratification, each country deposits a significant amount of money, and continues to do so in the preparation stage each year until the start of the commitment period. At the end of this period, those countries that meet their emissions limitation targets receive a full refund of their deposit, while those that fail to do so forfeit part or all of it. A simplified two-country model of the deposit system and a numerical example of an agreement involving the US, Japan, Russia, and Europe is also provided. If each country’s deposit is no less than its abatement costs, there is a strong incentive for participating countries to avoid noncompliance.submittedVersio
Capital Gains and Income Arising from Nonrenewable Resources
The final publication is available at SpringerShould capital gains be included in income arising from nonrenewable resources? In the present paper, I show that capital gains from a nonrenewable resource can be divided into two terms: real price change effects and real interest rate change effects. By application of sectoral income theory developed by Asheim and Wei (Environ Res Econ 42:65–87, 2009), only the former term is part of real income of the resource and the latter term should not be included. This result is significant in the sense that all change in real resource wealth can be included as part of real income only if future real interest rates are assumed to be constant. Hotelling rule always implies that capital gains from nonrenewable resources coincide with real interests on resource wealth; net investment generated from the resource cancels out current cash flow from the resource; and real income comes from price change effects.submittedVersio
People's opinion of climate policy - Popular support for climate policy alternatives in Norway
How can we evaluate whether national climate policies are sufficient? Which moral principles should be the basis of our policy efforts? The answers to these questions are central to the development of any climate policy framework, but not always made explicit in daily political discourse. In this article we seek to redress this imbalance through a survey of popular opinion in Norway